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Summary 
 
This study explores contexts of disorder and crisis, in which criminal actors gain legitimacy. 
By affirming that criminal groups are already social agents, this research argues that they 
gain political legitimacy to the extent that criminal groups engage in an authority-building 
process. Thus, it focuses on two instances in which criminal groups launched campaigns—
or at least engaged in planned activities—	in order to gain political and social legitimacy. La 
Familia Michoacana (LFM) and Los Caballeros Templarios (LCT) de Michoacán in Mexico, 
on the one hand, and Cosa Nostra (CN) in Italy, on the other, offer rich and instructive cases 
to examine. Precisely, the research asks for how these groups seek to forge legitimacy, as 
well as for what are their strategies for that purpose. The research opens two avenues of 
conceptual discussion.  
 
Firstly, it recovers and organizes what has been written about political legitimacy in order to 
propose a working definition. Thus, to tackle this issue, we need an operative idea of how 
legitimacy could be, rather than how it should be. The second conceptual discussion uses the 
two cases to explore how the ideas of legitimacy and authority relate to each other. The 
contexts of the respective cases offer fruitful opportunities to re-think accepted notions, 
including the disciplinary perspectives from which they come. The story of Michoacán, the 
primary case in this research, emerged over the last several decades, and thus is less 
investigated than the centennial Sicilian story, the secondary research case. Comparing them 
brings into focus both similarities and differences, which sheds new light on them, and offers 
new perspectives for the conceptual debate.  
 
This study is structured into six chapters designed to tackle the stated puzzle. The first chapter 
is entitled “Illegal but Legitimate? Review on Legitimacy Concept towards a Social 
(Dis)Order Debate.”	It collects, systematizes and dialogues with the key research concepts. 
Political legitimacy comes first, focusing on what has been studied and argued about this 
theme across disciplines. This exercise helps distinguish a strictly literature review approach 
from a more engaged theoretical perspective which can grapple with how the hypothetical 
legitimate should be compared to the debate on how this same subject could be. Also, key 
concepts in political legitimacy and authority are explored, such as social order, the state, and 
sovereignty.	With this established, the second chapter’s agenda is twofold.  
 
First, to deepen discussion of the concepts as they relate to the specific cases of criminal 
groups interested and performing political legitimacy actions. Second, to describe and 
explain this study’s methodology, including data collection, techniques, strategies, and so on, 
not only as they pertain to this study, but how they might apply to similar investigations 
addressing other cases worldwide. Chapter 2, “The Ghost of Robin Hood,”	 lays out the 
epistemology behind the data collection carried out in fieldwork as well as the usage of 
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secondary sources.	Chapters 3 and 4 focus on Michoacán, the central case of this research, 
based on primary data and fieldwork. Chapter 3, “Tracking Local Robin Hoods,”	
contextualizes contemporary Michoacán, including the role of other agents involved in the 
war on drugs strategy carried out by the Mexican federal government.  
 
Chapter 4, The Art of Dying Twice, focuses on the analysis of LFM and LCT legitimacy 
efforts and performances, using what is called the sources and resources of legitimacy, which 
inspired the data collection in the field, and guided the presentation of the information. This 
chapter ends by elaborating cases in which these sources and resources somehow play 
together when the criminal groups performed their legitimacy campaigns.	After that, chapter 
5 carries out in an abbreviated form the same kind of analysis, but this time for CN. The first 
part provides a critical overview of what the mafia is and CN´s role in local political 
legitimacy efforts across this criminal group’s long history. The second and most important 
part addresses the sources and resources of legitimacy following the same model. Finally, 
and again paralleling the Michoacán analysis, it examines an emblematic case in which all 
the sources and resources of legitimacy overlap. 		
With both the Michoacán and Sicilian cases presented and discussed, chapter 6 conducts a 
comparative analysis. Initially, the data from both cases in the previous chapters inform the 
conceptual debates identified at the outset of this dissertation. Each source of legitimacy 
guides an analytical comparison in which similar and dissimilar practices are evaluated. 
Curiously, what at first seem like significant similarities actually conceal vast differences; 
combined, they deepen and clarify our understanding of the conceptual underpinnings of 
each case, while highlighting their unique characteristics. Finally, inspired by these ideas, the 
dissertation closes with some reflective concluding remarks.	
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Samenvatting 
 
Deze dissertatie bestudeert hoe criminele actoren zich legitimeren in een context van crisis 
en wanorde. Er wordt beargumenteerd dat deze criminele actoren, zijnde sociale agenten, 
hun politieke activiteiten legitimeren door te participeren in processen van 
autoriteitsverwerving. Het onderzoek richt zich op twee casussen van criminele groeperingen 
die publieke campagnes hebben gestart, of hebben deelgenomen aan bepaalde activiteiten 
met het doel om die als doel hebben het verwerven van politieke en sociale legitimiteit te 
verwerven, namelijk La Familia Michoacana (LFM) en Los Caballeros Templarios (LCT) in 
Michoacán, Mexico, en Cosa Nostra (CN) in Sicilië, Italië. De dissertatie bestudeert hoe deze 
groeperingen legitimiteit verwerven en welke strategieën ze daarvoor gebruiken. Voor dit 
onderzoek worden twee conceptuele discussies geopend.  
 
De eerste conceptuele discussie behandelt eerder geschreven werk over politieke legitimiteit 
om vervolgens een werkdefinitie van dit concept op te stellen. Om dit onderzoek uit te 
voeren, is er een definitie nodig die ingaat op wat legitimiteit kan zijn, in plaats van wat het 
zou moeten zijn. De tweede conceptuele discussie gebruikt de twee casussen om te 
onderzoeken hoe de ideeën van legitimiteit en autoriteit met elkaar verband houden. Deze 
casussen blijken geschikt om eerder geaccepteerde noties van legitimiteit en autoriteit te 
herzien, alsmede de disciplinaire perspectieven waaruit deze voortkomen. De casus van 
Michoacán is recenter en daarom minder onderzocht dan de casus van Sicilië. Door deze 
twee casussen te combineren worden de overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen beiden in 
kaart gebracht, komen de casussen in een nieuw licht te staan, en worden er nieuwe 
perspectieven op het conceptuele debat geboden.  
 
De studie is onderverdeeld in zes hoofdstukken. Het eerste hoofdstuk “Illegal but Legitimate? 
Review on Legitimacy Concept towards a Social (Dis)Order Debate” verzamelt, 
systematiseert en bediscussieert de centrale onderzoekconcepten. Allereerst wordt in kaart 
gebracht wat er in verschillende disciplines is geschreven over het concept van politieke 
legitimiteit. Er wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen een strikte literatuurrecensie en een 
meer geëngageerd theoretisch onderdeel dat ingaat op het debat over hoe legitimiteit zou 
kunnen functioneren in tegenstelling tot het debat over hoe legitimiteit zou moeten 
functioneren. Ook worden centrale concepten binnen deze debatten, zoals sociale orde, de 
staat, en soevereiniteit onderzocht. Het doel van het daaropvolgende hoofdstuk is 
tweevoudig.  
 
Ten eerste wordt de discussie van de centrale concepten verdiept aan de hand van de casussen 
van de criminele groeperingen. Ten tweede wordt de methodologie van het onderzoek – 
dataverzameling, onderzoekstechnieken- en strategieën – uiteengezet. Hierbij wordt niet 
alleen de relevantie van deze methodologie voor het onderzoek benadrukt, maar wordt er ook 
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gekeken naar hoe deze toegepast zou kunnen worden in studies van andere casussen 
wereldwijd. Hoofdstuk 2, “The Ghost of Robin Hood” gaat in op de epistemologie achter de 
dataverzameling tijdens het veldwerk en het gebruik van secundaire bronnen. Hoofdstuk 3 
en 4 analyseren de centrale casus van dit onderzoek, Michoacán, aan de hand van primaire 
data en veldwerk. Hoofdstuk 3, “Tracking Local Robin Hoods”, brengt het hedendaags 
Michoacán in context, en gaat in op de rol van andere actoren die betrokken zijn bij de 
drugsoorlog die de Mexicaanse federale overheid uitvoert. 
  
Hoofdstuk 4, “The Art of Dying Twice”, analyseert de legitimeringspogingen van LFM en 
LCT. Hierbij wordt gebruik gemaakt van zogenaamde legitimeringsbronnen en -middelen 
die van invloed zijn geweest op zowel de manier van dataverameling alsmede op hoe deze 
data gepresenteerd worden. Hoofdstuk 4 eindigt met een bespreking van een specifieke casus, 
waarindeze bronnen en middelen samenvallen met de legitimiteitscampagnes van de 
criminele groeperingen. Hoofdstuk 5 voert een verkorte versie van een soortgelijke analyse 
uit voor de casus van CN. Het eerste deel biedt een kritisch overzicht van wat de maffia is en 
van de legitimiteitspogingen van CN gedurende diens langdurige bestaan. Het tweede en 
belangrijkste deel bespreekt de legitimiteitsbronnen en -middelen aan de hand van hetzelfde 
model dat is gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 4. Tot slot en wederom parallel aan de analyse van 
Michoacán, wordt er een emblematische casus bestudeerd waarbinnen alle bronnen en 
middelen samenvallen.   
 
Na de presentatie en bespreking van de individuele casussen toont hoofdstuk 6 een 
comparatieve analyse. In de eerste plaats tonen de data van de casussen de conceptuele 
debatten die al eerder aan het begin van de dissertatie zijn benoemd. Elke legitimeringsbron 
leidt een analytische vergelijking in, waarbinnen zowel gelijksoortige als ongelijksoortige 
praktijken worden geëvalueerd. Opvallend genoeg, de op het eerste gezicht veelzeggende 
overeenkomsten tussen de casussen lijken bij nader inzien grote verschillen te verschuilen.  
Gezamenlijk verdiepen ze ons begrip van de conceptuele onderbouwing van elke casus en 
benadrukken ze hun unieke eigenschappen. Tot slot en gebaseerd op de voorafgaande ideeën, 
sluit de dissertatie af met een aantal conclusies.  
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Introduction 
 
According to Eric Hobsbawm, the social bandit career is “[…] the best way to enter the 
complicated subject of ‘social banditry’”	(2000, 1). His argument is that a bandits’	story is 
not exclusively about an individuals’	life, but sheds light on the social interactions in which 
illegality and its social acceptance, or rejection, take place. Highlighting the key elements of 
that relationship requires an understanding of political legitimacy. A case in point is Sicilian-
born Tommaso Buscetta, a former mafia figure who died of cancer in April of 2000 in New 
York. He had been living in the United States under the witness protection program after 
becoming the first pentito (repentant) and confessing multiple mafia secrets. His confession 
revealed relevant information about Cosa Nostra´s functioning and served to launch the 
biggest trial against the mafia in Italy. Buscetta revealed a number of secrets that shocked the 
public because of the extent of the mafia’s influence, exposing in detail the inner workings 
of a political economy linking criminal elements to ostensibly independent government 
institutions, and democratically elected leaders. Not long before he died, he explained to 
journalists: “It is not the Cosa Nostra that contacts the politician; instead a member of the 
Cosa Nostra says: that president is mine (è	cosa mia), and if you need a favor, you must go 
through me. In other words, the Cosa Nostra figure maintains a sort of monopoly on that 
politician […] one goes to that candidate and says, 'Onorevole, I can do this and that for you 
now, and we hope that when you are elected you will remember us’. The candidate wins and 
he has to pay something back" (Buscetta quoted in della Porta and Vannucci, 1999, 21).	
 
A decade after Buscetta´s death, the appearance of a "new Saint" in the southwestern state of 
Michoacán, in Mexico, surprised the local press. The installation of shrines with San Nazario 
statuettes honored the memory of Nazario Moreno González, former leader of the local 
criminal group, La Familia Michoacana, who was declared killed by Mexican federal police 
in December of 2010. Nazario's cult was developed after that date, even when almost four 
years later, in March of 2014, the government confirmed that (this time for sure) Nazario had 
been killed by federal forces. However, now it was not only shrines, but “bibles” as well, as 
a Mexican newspaper called them (Staff Reforma, 2012), that spread across the region. A 
memoire-like narrative of Nazario's entitled "Me dicen: 'el más loco'" (They Call Me: ‘the 
Maddest One’) was freely distributed containing the experiences of the local group leader 
together with a collection of justifications and explanations on the decisions he made as an 
individual and as a group leader. "Some will think that I do this book to justify my actions 
and present myself as a little angel,” he said in the opening. But his real motivation, he said, 
was the "Need to explain to the Mexican people the truth about my behavior, since this has 
been altered maliciously by the government.”	
 
Southwestern México may seem a long way from the corridors of power, and Michoacán is, 
in fact, a great distance from New York and Italy. But cases like Buscetta and Nazario, point 
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to a political legitimacy discussion, and reveal similar things about both contexts’	political 
economies, and the bare mechanics of power. Both cases share the overlap of legal and illegal 
actors and institutions, and expose the intricacies of how money, power, and cultural 
iconography have been used to establish legitimacy. In expressing their ‘truths’	in their own 
voices, Buscetta and Nazario’s first-person narratives reveal the values and logics informing 
the quest for political legitimacy of two criminal groups. Hobsbawm’s introduction to 
Bandits opens with a local student´s narration of Weldegabriel, a sort of Eritrean Robin Hood 
who led rebellious activities in banditry to give the Eritrean people advantages against the 
Italian colonists. According to Hobsbawm, Weldegabriel's reputation as a heroic figure and 
local savior led people across Eritrean society to attend his funeral and sing songs in his 
honor. Often in society, crime is viewed negatively, and those who engage in crime tend to 
eschew their activity and maintain a low public profile. But sometimes, certain kinds of 
crimes, combined with the persuasiveness or eloquence of certain figures, can expose 
ruptures in the social fabric, and lead people to question the legitimacy of institutions, and to 
find valiance in criminals looking for making crime legitimate. 	
 
Research Context	
 
This research falls within the research group and project "From Disorder to Order: Conflict 
and the Resources of Legitimacy,” financed by the Political Legitimacy profile area of Leiden 
University.1 Led and supervised by Prof. Dr. Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Dr. José	Carlos G. 
Aguiar, the project researches contexts of disorder or crisis, in which counter-state actors 
gain legitimacy. The project conceptualizes	“rebels,” such as extremist groups, terrorists, 
militias, and guerrillas in terms of their popular legitimacy, seeking to understand how and 
when these types of groups, figures, and institutions come to be seen as valuable and are 
accepted. In this case, the core-researched actor is a criminal group. So are these criminal 
groups “rebels,” and if so, in what sense? This research affirms that criminal groups are 
already social agents, and they gain political legitimacy to the extent that they engage in an 
authority-building process. Thus, this research focuses on two instances in which criminal 
groups launched campaigns—or at least engaged in planned activities—	 in order to gain 
political and social legitimacy. La Familia Michoacana and Los Caballeros Templarios de 
Michoacán, on the one hand, and Cosa Nostra, on the other, offer rich and instructive cases 
to examine. Precisely how do these groups seek to forge legitimacy? What are their 
strategies? When and to what extent do they find it necessary to seek such legitimacy (and 
ultimately, who bestows this legitimacy —	the state, popular consent, some combination of 
the two?) Ostensibly, criminal groups´	 primary motivation is exclusively or primarily 
economic profit, and to preserve or expand their access to such profit. But strictly economic 
 1 In addition, the author received and acknowledge a grant to conduct this research from the National Council 
for Science and Technology of Mexico (CONACyT).	
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concerns do not explain all of their activities, certainly not, in the case of Michoacán, for 
example, the sudden proliferation of saints.	
 
This research opens two avenues of conceptual discussion. First, as part of a general literature 
review it recovers and organizes what has been written about political legitimacy in order to 
propose an operative idea of political legitimacy. Given that crime is by definition illegal, if 
legality is the source of legitimacy, then the quick answer would be that no criminal group 
could ever be legitimate. However, the reality is more complicated. Thus, to tackle this issue, 
we need an operative idea of how legitimacy could be, rather than how it should be. The 
second conceptual discussion uses the two cases to explore how the ideas of legitimacy and 
authority relate to each other. The contexts of the respective cases offer fruitful opportunities 
to re-think accepted notions, including the disciplinary perspectives from which they come. 
The story of Michoacán, the primary case in this research, emerged over the last several 
decades, and thus is less investigated than the centennial Sicilian story, the secondary 
research case. Comparing them brings into focus both similarities and differences, which 
sheds new light on them, and offers new perspectives for the conceptual debate. This is 
explored in depth in the thesis, but here what follows is a brief explanation regarding the 
cases’	selection.		
The Cases	
 
The first and primary case is actually composed of two atypical criminal groups located at 
the Southwestern state of Michoacán, Mexico: La Familia Michoacana (The Family of 
Michoacán; identified henceforth with the acronym LFM), and Los Caballeros Templarios 
de Michoacán (The Knights Templars of Michoacán; identified henceforth with the acronym 
LCT). Together they form a sort of single criminal continuum, and this research shows their 
shared concern for forging and preserving legitimacy, although there were some crucial 
distinctions between the criminal families regarding social group transformation. Both 
criminal groups are treated as one case due to their shared context and similar practices in 
their campaigns for political legitimacy. The first registers of LFM date from 2005; LCT 
declared their ‘birth date’	in a document published in 2011 (this code is carefully analyzed 
in the fourth chapter). 	
 
Javier Sicilia, a Mexican poet and the leader of the most prominent victims of violence 
movement in Mexico, referred to LFM and LCT as the New Age criminal groups. This astute 
observation is based on how these criminal groups mixed self-help teaching rituals, religious 
systems and principles, counterinsurgency, paramilitary, guerrilla spirit, and fanaticism 
(Sicilia, 2015, 13). Not so far from this view, the British journalist Ioan Grillo, called these 
criminal groups "the puzzling postmodern" mafia network (2017, 11). Together with other 
organizations like the Red Commando in Brazil, the Shower Posse in Jamaica, and the Mara 
Salvatrucha gangs in Central America, Grillo describes LCT as a complex mix of gangs, 
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mafias, death squads, religious cults, and urban guerrillas. The story of how they gained 
legitimacy cannot be separated from their capitalist success in becoming an economic empire 
in both legal and illegal markets in Mexico, China, the United States, and Europe. But 
categorizing such atypical criminal groups in anything but the broadest brushstrokes is 
difficult, due to the complexity and variety of political intentions, streams of profit, practices, 
and symbols that go into shaping their interest in, perception of, and quest for legitimacy.	
 
After feigning his death in December of 2011, in which the Mexican government claimed to 
have killed him, LFM head Nazario Moreno, in fact, continued to lead LCT until March of 
2014, when he was finally, actually killed. But already in 2011, LFM had launched discourses 
that reflected a complex political legitimacy strategy. And when LCT appeared, the criminal 
group began to set up religious symbols and rituals, reflecting a different, perhaps even more 
culturally deft turn. However, between the two groups, continuance could be trace by interest 
in achieving legitimacy Differences such as these notwithstanding, both groups continued 
similar strategies to achieve legitimacy such as publishing and distributing books, explaining 
their actions in terms that would appeal to ordinary people, increasing their public visibility, 
and assuming a nominally governmental role (of ruler and ruled) with local populations. At 
the same time as these groups were growing in legitimacy and gaining authority in soft 
power-style campaigns in local communities, waves of violence continued to exact a bloody 
toll on local populations. Journalistic reports attribute a high degree of violence and drug 
trafficking to LFM and LCT "members". But how could this be; how could both ‘faces’	of 
these groups coexist? To methodologically solve this puzzle, this research focuses on 
analyzing the period of 2005 (first register of LFM apparition), to 2014, when the Mexican 
government assured the public that police had finally killed Nazario, the villainous LCT 
leader.	
 
The Sicilian Cosa Nostra (identified henceforth with the acronym CN) offers an auxiliary 
research case. It made methodological sense to compare Michoacán with Sicily for three 
reasons: as criminals and bandits (in Hobsbawm’s sense) both launched successful 
campaigns for political legitimacy; both have been highly visible as well as deeply impactful 
in their respective societies; and they provide revealing differences because of Michoacán’s 
relative youth and the CN’s relative age.	The CN, also known as the Sicilian mafia or simply 
"the mafia", is the notorious criminal group based in Sicily (and which has inspired countless 
books, Hollywood films, and television series). Together with the Camorra in Naples, and 
the ´Ndrangheta in the Southern-continental region of Calabria, CN shapes the Italian 
criminal organizations' landscape, deeply impacting the social, economic, political, and 
cultural milieu in Italy. Furthermore, in the case of the CN, as a social phenomenon, this 
centennial criminal organization has for many decades been a fixture in Italian society, 
particularly in Sicily. Beyond the obvious connections with other criminal organizations in 
Mexico and elsewhere, another methodological relevance here pertains to the CN’s place 
within the other criminal organizations in southern Italy. But given that the CN is nearly as 
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old as the modern Italian state, it can also provide a usefully contrasting political case to 
examine, considering the relative "youth" of LFM and LCT. In the long history that 
interweaves the CN with Sicilian society, different stages and phases can be distinguished. 
Those distinctions are of particular relevance for this research because, in terms of analyzing 
political legitimacy, CN has had different historical periods. Its performance and place in 
society during the late nineteenth century differed greatly from the post-war era, for instance. 
This research takes into account its long trajectory, using both primary and secondary 
sources, but focuses on the political legitimacy discussion and recovers specific empirical 
references where relevant.	
 
Research Structure	
 
This study is structured into six chapters designed to tackle the stated puzzle. Initially, the 
discussion focuses on conceptual and theoretical issues, and goes on to address 
methodological concerns related to the data collection. Then the discussion moves to consider 
empirical aspects of the cases which, after being presented and analyzed, get compared. This 
comparison is what brings the analysis back to the initial conceptual level, but now with 
lessons and new questions connected to theoretical debates. 		
The first chapter is called “Illegal but Legitimate? Review on Legitimacy Concept towards a 
Social (Dis)Order Debate.”	It collects, systematizes and, more importantly, dialogues with 
the key research concepts. Political legitimacy comes first, focusing on what has been studied 
and argued about this theme across disciplines. This exercise helps distinguish a strictly 
literature review approach from a more engaged theoretical perspective which can grapple 
with how the hypothetical legitimate should be compared to the debate on how this same 
subject could be. This discussion seems essential given the actors involved. Also, key 
concepts in political legitimacy and authority are explored, such as social order, the state, and 
sovereignty. Other terms and concepts are also considered, namely the social agent, and the 
idea of non-state actors in general, followed by violent non-state actors in particular, and 
finally addressing the criminal groups as particular kinds of non-state actors within these 
categories. 		
With this established, the second chapter’s agenda is twofold. First, to deepen discussion of 
the concepts as they relate to the specific cases of criminal groups interested and performing 
political legitimacy actions. Second, to describe and explain this study’s methodology, 
including data collection, techniques, strategies, and so on, not only as they pertain to this 
study, but how they might apply to similar investigations addressing other cases worldwide. 
Chapter 2, “The Ghost of Robin Hood,”	lays out the epistemology behind the data collection 
carried out in fieldwork as well as the usage of secondary sources.			
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Chapters 3 and 4 focus on Michoacán, the central case of this research, based on primary data 
and fieldwork. Chapter 3, “Tracking Local Robin Hoods,”	 contextualizes contemporary 
Michoacán, including the role of other agents involved in the war on drugs strategy carried 
out by the Mexican federal government. As it will be seen, the context shapes and is also 
shaped by the many social agents pursuing and assuming legitimacy there. Chapter 4, The 
Art of Dying Twice, focuses specifically on the analysis of LFM and LCT legitimacy efforts 
and performances, using what is called the sources and resources of legitimacy, which 
inspired the data collection in the field, and guided the presentation of the information. 
Indeed, as one method for organizing the data, the chapter ends by elaborating cases in which 
these sources and resources somehow play together when the criminal groups performed their 
legitimacy campaigns.	
 
After that, chapter 5 carries out in an abbreviated form the same kind of analysis done for 
Michoacán in the previous chapters, but this time for Sicily. The first part provides a critical 
overview of what the mafia is and CN´s role in local political legitimacy efforts across this 
criminal group’s long history. The second and most important part of the chapter addresses 
the sources and resources of legitimacy following the same model. Finally, and again 
paralleling the Michoacán analysis, the chapter examines an emblematic case in which all 
the sources and resources of legitimacy overlap. 		
With both the Michoacán and Sicilian cases presented and discussed, chapter 6 conducts a 
comparative analysis. Initially, the data from both cases in the previous chapters inform the 
conceptual debates identified at the outset of this dissertation. Each source of legitimacy 
guides an analytical comparison in which similar and dissimilar practices are evaluated. 
Curiously, what at first seem like significant similarities actually conceal vast differences; 
combined, they deepen and clarify our understanding of the conceptual underpinnings of 
each case, while highlighting their unique characteristics. Finally, inspired by these ideas, the 
dissertation closes with some reflective concluding remarks.	
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Chapter 1.  
Illegal but Legitimate? The Concept of Legitimacy and the Debate on 
Social (Dis)Order 
 
Authority is not synonym for legitimacy, and history helps to prove it. Correspondingly, each 
study of legitimacy follows social and political crises linked to lack of power, questioned 
political authority, and people's mistrust in governance processes. In 2000, almost a decade 
after the massive violence of Slobodan Milosevic´s administration in the former Yugoslavia, 
the Kosovo Report was presented to the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The 
Commission’s Report concluded, among other points, that the NATO military intervention 
designed to contain violence in the Balkans “(…) was illegal but legitimate. It was illegal 
because it did not receive prior approval from the United Nations Security Council. However, 
the Commission considers that the intervention was justified because all diplomatic avenues 
had been exhausted and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority 
population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule”	 (2000, 4, 
emphasis added).	
 
Two years later, in 2002, the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, proved Milosevic's administration crimes against 
humanity. The former head of state (acting as his own lawyer) defended himself by denying 
the court's legitimacy (Rotella, 2002). Despite the particularities of the case, many questions 
regarding legitimacy arise. Is an "illegal but legitimate" scenario really possible? If so, how 
and under what circumstances? Is there legitimacy beyond or without legality? What is the 
source of legitimacy in such situations? Who decides? Why did Milosevic use the questioning 
of the court's legitimacy as a legal weapon? This case is helpful to draw a landscape of how 
relevant legitimacy becomes in certain political situations. Contexts like these and 
legitimacy's crises are undoubtedly proper instances for carrying out research on a 
fundamental social science concept, namely, legitimacy. This research makes use of one of 
these crises to study legitimacy in contexts of violent crime to examine why and when 
criminal groups, illegal agents per se, dispute legitimacy. Can these groups become illegal 
but legitimate?	
 
The first and mandatory step consists of reviewing the central concepts, starting with the 
political legitimacy idea itself.2 It has been a matter of interest for many disciplines, such as 
political science, sociology, philosophy, social psychology, but also in criminology and legal 
studies (Johnson, Maguire, and Kuhns, 2014; Schlichte and Schneckener, 2015). Each of 
 2  In this research, legitimacy is recognized as a phenomenon that potentially involves numerous social 
dimensions. However, here it is centered on political legitimacy, broadly speaking, addressing the definition of 
who rules over whom. Of course, political legitimacy involves more than questions of power, but it’s highly 
relevant in understanding how and why criminal groups would be interested in it. 	
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these approaches has its ideas, concepts, and methodologies through which disciplines shape 
their involvement in the debates around social and political legitimacy	– some of them will 
be summarized in the first section of this chapter. Meanwhile, this research starts focusing 
on an in-depth exploration of, first of all, the concept of political legitimacy. This is done 
through a disciplinary review but also through specific scholarly reviews (especially of Max 
Weber). In that review, it will become essential to observe that legitimacy is not only a matter 
of interest for many disciplines but also an interdisciplinary problem itself. This discussion 
will become more evident when getting deep into specific social contexts, where many actors 
look for and possibly achieve legitimacy for themselves and their activities within their 
context.	
 
This chapter begins with the literature on legitimacy which leads, later in the chapter, to a 
formulation of an operational concept of legitimacy that applies to this research. This 
operational concept is based on the literature review along with data collection and empirical 
references, and serves to highlight certain theoretical aspects that inform this investigation. 
My interdisciplinary approach to this topic offers some new perspectives on political 
legitimacy in criminal and violent contexts. In particular, this chapter explores how 
legitimacy relates to the idea of social order. Does legitimacy somehow exist outside of or 
without social order, or is it rather a source of (alternative) order? What kind of relationship 
does legitimacy have to social order? To flesh out this issue and explore answers, this chapter 
discusses the role of the state, and how the concepts of the social contract and sovereignty 
help to establish the state’s authority. This is important because it allows us to understand 
how and why the state becomes the key reference point when talking about who, how, why 
and with whom, specific political actors become legitimate	—	or illegitimate. 		
The chapter’s third section defines and analyzes non-state actors, particularly violent ones,  
and discusses legitimacy among state and non-state actors alike. Reflecting on criminal 
groups’	experiences with legitimacy (they represent a specific kind of non-state actor in the 
contemporary world) sets the stage for a more in-depth discussion in chapter 2. 	
 
1.1. What is Political Legitimacy? Understanding a Social and Political Concept 
 
Even though legitimacy involves several dimensions, this research focuses explicitly on 
political legitimacy. This idea involves problems related to power, government, and how 
different kinds of authority are established. According to The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, “Political legitimacy is a virtue of political institutions and of the decisions […] 
made within them”	(Peter, 2016), a sentiment which works as a starting point to discuss such 
legitimacy from two angles: fist, from the perspective of that supposed virtue, and second, 
from the perspective of where that legitimacy comes from and how it is established. These 
issues involve both institutions and decisions. As a restrictive definition that constrains its 
meaning to the power of decision making, it is helpful to question the idea. For instance, what 
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happens when the decider is not legitimate? Or legal? Alternatively, how and why is the 
power of decision making challenged? Because of situations like these, political legitimacy 
involves intense and complex dialogues between those who pursue the "right to do and 
decide" and those who concede it. Moreover, what happens when more than one political 
actor is pursuing that right to decide? To answer those questions, this first section reviews 
what the existing literature has said about this concept.	
 
When studying legitimacy, a significant problem is detecting if it involves a normative or a 
descriptive conception (Peter, 2016). In other words, is legitimacy a fixed idea, in which 
political actors should reach specific characteristics or virtues to become legitimate? Or is it 
a flexible or even volatile notion with characteristics that vary from case to case? The 
problem between both general, theoretical insights and particular perspectives crops up again 
and again when discussing "political" legitimacy, which raises the issue of whether we are 
debating a problem of political philosophy, or engaged in a more extensive social science 
discussion (Fossen, 2013, 426). To address this conceptual and epistemological problem, we 
follow a binary categorization originally proposed by Duyvesteyn (2017). His work helps to 
summarize, organize, and understand how legitimacy has been studied across disciplines. 
Duyvestyn’s division consists, firstly, of literature in which legitimacy is defined by how it 
should be, or is supposed to be, what we’ll call the normative perspective. The second 
category relates to how political legitimacy really is or could be in the field, that is, the actual 
practices of legitimization (Duyvesteyn, 2017, 671), which is the descriptive perspective.3 
The former is common to legal and philosophical approaches, while social sciences mostly 
use the latter. 	
 
However, philosophy, political philosophy, social psychology, legal approaches and many 
political theorists also rely on the normative perspective. But maybe what’s most interesting 
about these works resides in what they say about what legitimacy is not, by naming 
characteristics that legitimacy should have and how its building process should be. The fields 
of sociology and anthropology, on the other hand, tend to use the descriptive perspective of 
legitimacy study. Their concepts, methodological instruments, and approaches let these 
disciplines distinguish differences and particularities from specific cases. As a result, they 
seem open to recognizing variations in definitions of legitimacy, including the social 
contingency influence. Nevertheless, it is true that other disciplines and their conceptual 
elements (such as the law, power, and shared beliefs) are also present in this kind of analysis. 
Finally, political science has scholars on both sides. Thus, it is not surprising to find scholars 
interested in both kinds of legitimacy, as will be shown for all disciplines in detail below.	
 
 3 This division is close and actually compatible with the one proposed by Fossen between de jure legitimacy, 
in which “[…] an authority´s being legitimate with respect to valid norms”, and de facto legitimacy, means “an 
authority´s being taken to be legitimate”. Fossen suggests that this division between de jure and de facto 
legitimacy, is a sort of disciplinary “division of labor between philosophy and social sciences” (2011, 20).	
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1.1.1. Normative Perspective of Legitimacy 
 
The normative perspective works with ideal-type conceptions of legitimacy. It is profoundly 
attached to a normative analysis interested in general aspects of legitimacy, more than the 
factual aspects of its formation (Thornhill, 2006, 165). Hence, it is less sensitive to 
contingency and new perspectives on the idea. For instance, the legal approach of legitimacy 
mainly focuses on established norms, rules, and law in general,4 emphasizing the accordance 
between practices and current legal frameworks existing in each case. That depends on the 
law, and sometimes on its interpretations. However, this may become a very restrictive 
perspective. From this point of view, people´s attitudes do not make the law (Soper, 1984). 
Therefore, if a population merely stops respecting normative commitment, this will not 
change the existing legitimacy setting, but only represent a non-observance of the law, which 
tends to be approached as though it were an inherently legitimate independent variable. For 
instance, the legal positivist school founded by the British legal philosopher, John Austin, 
tends to eschew moral evaluation of the law, and generally doesn’t see the law’s legitimacy 
as conditional or provisional.	
 
Even when this approach recognizes historical changes and transformations of the law, it 
offers a limited frame for understanding legitimacy from a holistic social phenomena 
perspective because it does not take into account what happens outside the legal framework. 
Therefore, any possible struggle for legitimacy like, for instance, the emergence of a 
legitimate actor who does not achieve it through legal ways, or social behaviors attempting 
to disrupt and change the prevailing legitimacy´s configuration, become automatically illegal 
and, therefore, illegitimate (Hurd, 1999; Soper, 1984). However, considerations for this 
approach matters because of the socio-political influence of law. Its discourse and usage play 
a significant role when defining what, who, and when an institution is or is not legitimate. 
Enforced or not, the law can also work as an incentive for legitimation and then becomes 
source and resource to modify power relations (i.e., discourses, the use of public institutions 
and resources, etc.), as shown in chapter 2.	
 
The philosophical approach to legitimacy comes from a moral perspective of governance, 
and studies the way power is justified (Buchanan, 2002). This approach seeks to understand 
1) what kind of claim for authority occurs in general situations and 2) what is the ethical basis 
from which it is developed. Therefore, an important attention of this viewpoint is situated in 
the authority´s accomplishment of normative requirements with which an authority becomes 
legitimate, such as the reasons that people have to follow its directives and build together 
obedience (Raz, 1985, 8). The philosophical perspective is usually complemented by a 
political theory view, in particular within the modern political frame through Jean Jacques 
 4 As a matter of fact, from a philological angle legitimus meant specifically “lawful, according to law”	 in 
Classical Latin (Merquior, 2006, 2).	
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Rousseau. Although he did not focus much on legitimacy per se, he did develop some other 
concepts concerning it. The main one is the social contract.	
 
The social contract is not a minor pact but a valuable repertory of principles for the sovereign. 
These principles provide legitimacy to govern: the social contract is	“[…] a specific mandate 
given by those governed to those in government" (Ruggiero, 2006, 13). Hence, for the first 
time in political theory, power resided in people, who were able to transfer it to a superior 
entity through their own will, their own consent, and by doing so, people decide the legitimate 
authority. This represents the political materialization of the social contract. Bernard Manin´s 
ideas on Rousseau help to clarify this; he stated that legitimacy requires the highest level of 
public debate between everyone concerned or affected by each decision. Moreover, he argued 
that this should occur through public deliberations, justified on the ontological idea of the 
Rousseaunian social contract. By popular will, each political decision is a matter of public 
interest and thus everyone should deliberate on it before putting it into practice (Manin, 1987, 
352).	
 
Manin considered this deliberation process essential to achieve legitimacy; thus, everyone 
should take part in it: “[…] the source of legitimacy is not the predetermined will of 
individuals, but rather the process of its formation, that is, deliberation itself". And he even 
goes further than Rousseau and others: "We must, therefore, challenge the fundamental 
conclusion of Rousseau, Sieyes, and Rawls: a legitimate decision does not represent the will 
of all, but is one that results from the deliberation of all" (1987, 351-352). That requires an 
adequate political sphere through which deliberation is available and possible, but also to 
increase the levels of public interest as problems arise (Habermas, 2000, 77). The core 
question from this perspective is not what happens with legitimacy in specific contexts, but 
how it should be built, maintained, and possibly increased. All of that is based on irrevocable 
principles like civic participation, legal validity, and representation. Thus, political actors 
should march through the one valid path in order to be recognized as truly legitimate.	
 
Social psychology is the other discipline in which a normative perspective on legitimacy 
arises. This angle focuses on people's beliefs, values, and social attitudes, exploring why 
people trust an authority. Social psychology understands trust not as something simply in an 
“on”	or “off”	position, but as a dynamic that is built between the ruler (or ruling institution) 
and the ruled. Social psychology is particularly interested in the cognitive elements behind 
how an authority is legitimized, how legitimacy is forged. These actions and strategies to 
construct legitimacy operate in a wide range that goes from trust to fear. These actions might 
influence decision procedures, political arrangements, and legal tools: general mechanisms 
through which the belief in the rightness of the decision and the process of policymaking are 
constructed (Tyler, 1997; Dahl, 1956). An absence of that belief also interests social 
psychologists, who examine as well how and when trust in authority is lost.	
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Therefore, relationships of trust between people and governments (and other institutions of 
authority) is a priority issue. Personal attitudes towards the ruler like confidence, expectations 
of the use of power, and general beliefs in the correctness of the authority are core elements, 
as well. As Tyler stated, "[...] legitimacy is a psychological property of an authority or social 
arrangement that leads to that which is appropriate, proper, and just" (2006, 375). However, 
this perspective does not usually consider cultural or sociological aspects of how legitimacy 
is generated, which is a limitation of this approach. In addition, power relations are not at the 
core of social psychology analysis since they are seen as resulting from of the legitimation 
processes. This discipline puts more attention on the acceptance or rejection of the rule, rather 
than on the source from where it emerges. In this case (as in the whole normative perspective 
of legitimacy), a requirement is acting as guidance to make legitimacy happen in society. 
Furthermore, only one kind of legitimacy is possible to aspire to, rather than variations of it 
or contesting/sharing scenarios – even more, sources and resources of legitimacy seem pure 
and static, regardless of whether the focus is on people's mindset, government, law, or codes. 
That contrasts with the ideas and disciplines of the descriptive perspective, as explained 
below.	
 
1.1.2. Descriptive Perspective of Legitimacy 
 
The descriptive perspective of political legitimacy involves the understanding of how 
legitimacy, as a collective accreditation of the political authority, is built in every case. To 
be more precise, this is an exploration of legitimacy as a process of building, rather than a 
fixed conceptual unit. This approach recognizes that a concept can be formulated and 
understood in linear relation to local conditions. That implies that political legitimacy will 
always be attached to the socio-political settings of each place (locality), reasonably linked 
to the historical circumstances analyzed (historicity), and not necessarily connected to 
standardized formulations. It is a perspective less of how legitimacy should be, and more of 
how it actually operates. This perspective fits and has been developed in anthropology, 
sociology5, and some elements of political science with minor disciplinary variations. A 
detailed analysis is presented below.	
 
Anthropology is quite helpful to understand the conceptual elements of how legitimacy 
works within societies – particularly those that generate the consent for the rulers to decide 
or govern. Among other features, this discipline recognizes the existence and relevance of 
both material and non-material resources of authority. Moreover, it also pays attention to 
practices and symbols that enable legitimate mandates independent of their legal condition. 
Those elements work together with a strong recognition of how locality influences the 
 5 Max Weber, of course, heads sociological approaches to legitimacy. Given his importance to the topic, the 
next section will specifically analyze his ideas and a general sociological perspective. Other scholars such as 
Tilly and Beetham whose work is of great importance on the topic are also explored in that section.	
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understanding of specific social scenarios. Approaching legitimacy from this point of view 
is accompanied by a profound knowledge of the empirical context and a sensibility of how 
locality has been configured through historical, cultural, political, and social terms. 6 
However, an interdisciplinary dialogue is needed to share insights and build a comprehensive 
basis in which a legitimacy discussion becomes fruitful. In this regard, the anthropological 
work helps in the detection of how empirical realities are powerful enough to reconfigure 
conceptualizations. As a result, even when shared beliefs, valid moral conducts, and 
appropriate behaviors may act as strong elements to configure the law, other sources could 
exist on the ground to build legitimacy. Anthropological work examines those other sources 
on the ground.	
 
Legitimacy in anthropology (and actually in the whole descriptive perspective with more or 
less emphasis) has an extra feature: it enables the legitimacy understanding as a process. In 
this regard, according to the Dutch anthropologist Henri Claessen, there is a qualitative 
difference between legitimacy as the condition or quality of being legitimate, and 
legitimation as the process itself or the act of making legitimate (1988, 25). That is especially 
important for understanding changes in legitimacy features through time and space. For 
instance, in postcolonial contexts, where the nation-state building process took place at 
different rates, the state had to make efforts to achieve legitimacy, sometimes competing 
against other (local and foreign) political actors (Claessen, 1988). Some of them succeeded, 
some of them did not, and some of them seem to share legitimacy (these are, of course, 
essential matters for this research and will be recovered further in the following chapters). 
Anyway, it is essential to underline the academic benefits of this approach to measure and 
understand legitimacy. The main reason, as Claessen pointed out, is that this perspective 
allows us to distinguish between different degrees and dimensions of both possibilities: being 
legitimate and legitimation (1988, 24).	
 
Political science participates in this descriptive perspective debate by including a core 
concept for the discipline, which is the right to rule. Its importance addresses the 
understanding of political relations and the power configurations associated with legitimacy. 
Whether it is understood from a rational choice perspective or a normative one, power 
relations and the elements of interactions on which they occur are sources of analysis. Thus, 
distinguishing this approach from the others is fundamental. As a result, the role of the ruled 
(and not only of the ruler) becomes the priority. For political science, the understanding of 
why and when specific governance is accepted or denied and what are the consequences for 
society is core. As Beetham explained, understand legitimacy helps to solve "[…] why people 
 6 However, both sociologists and anthropologists have started to recognize that their analyses increasingly 
require a meso and macro level scope to get a comprehensive view of the locality (Beck, 2004; Robertson, 
2005; Bouchard, 2011). This because global and national dynamics are more and more relevant in the local 
social configuration given the increasing and intense global connections in economic and commercial terms as 
well as sociopolitical consequences.	
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have the expectations they do about a power relations, why institutions of power 
systematically differ from one type of society to another, why power is exercised more 
coercively in some contexts than in others" (1991, 6). Moreover, understanding power 
relations becomes the first step in a holistic awareness of a commonly shared belief in this 
discipline, i.e., that the formal authority can govern over the governed.	
 
Authority is the concept that enables the latter statement possible, a sort of grease to lubricate 
mandates. Political scientist Robert Dahl defined authority as "[...] a special kind of [...] 
legitimate influence" (1991, 54). That influence is relevant in political systems because 
leaders try to convert it into authority, explained Dahl. Since there are many ways to use and 
perform power, and some of them involving coercion and even violence, legitimacy acts as 
a sort of shock absorber by transforming obedience by coercive power into legitimate 
authority (Wrong, 1979). Thus, legitimacy fits in this approach as an instrument or as a 
governing path. Regarding the first case, a mandate seeks legitimacy in order to avoid the 
non-desirable scenario of the use of force to achieve obedience and consolidate authority. 
Addressing the second case, legitimacy seems to be understood as one way among many to 
practice authority, and it is a goal itself, rather than a tool to achieve another political goal. 
Nevertheless, the political science debate does not ignore legitimacy; moreover, its 
discussion goes beyond the social consequences in society's power relations.	
 
Political science also tends to study legitimacy from its operative virtues. That involves a 
refreshing exercise by in understanding legitimacy holders´	benefits. Ruling a society as the 
legitimate authority differs considerably from lacking that authority. This operative function 
(Rothstein, 2009) involves (at least) two parts: the ruler, who seeks legitimacy, and the ruled, 
who legitimate the ruler. It is a socio-political relation involving two levels: 1) who enjoys 
the benefits and advantages of being legitimate and 2) who gives or refuses, removes or 
maintains, that political legitimacy – and also by which conditions and under what 
circumstances this happens. These two levels successively refer to sovereignty (first level) 
and social contract (second level). Both are core political science concepts and will be 
analyzed in detail later. Meanwhile, another perspective of political science is revisited, 
namely, the measurable approach.	
 
With certain proximity to sociological analyses, the measuring legitimacy angle also uses 
this perspective. However, this work involves an epistemological dilemma. If measuring 
legitimacy is possible, then it has universal measurable standards, which only differs in the 
potential variation from case to case. Thus, this phenomenon becomes a gradation problem 
rather than a political process. Hence, legitimacy should be understood in the same manner 
everywhere and anytime in order to be able to measure it. It becomes a universal concept. 
Bruce Gilley is the author of one of these works. In "The Meaning and Measure of State 
Legitimacy", he measured and compared degrees of state legitimacy among 72 countries 
around the world (2006). This work faced two problems: in the first place, the state works as 
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the only possible analytical and, thus, measurable unit. That fact avoids the possibility of 
studying legitimacy among non-state actors. Secondly, his research encountered the problem 
of variations in legitimacy´s dimensions; to be more precise, it measured the degree of 
legitimacy by identifying an increase or decrease of specific variables, but ignored other 
possible additions, such as adaptations to particular contexts as a consequence of local 
processes of legitimacy-building. Thus, to offer a broader analysis, these studies require a 
continual redefinition of their criteria. Only then, will they be able to include other political 
actors within the exercise, and from a broader range as well.	
 
Summarizing the descriptive perspective, rather than striving for a general or universal 
definition of political legitimacy, it focuses on social possibilities and conditions. The debate 
between both angles, the normative and the descriptive, could be summarized through the 
struggle between what legitimacy should be on the one hand, and how it could be on the 
other. However, even when both normative and descriptive perspectives work to summarize 
as well as organize the debate, in the literature they are not always clearly separated. This is 
the case with Max Weber´s ideas, a central scholar when it comes to this discussion. To some 
extent, Weber’s sociological work sets the terms of the debate both in the past and the present. 
Weber´s relevance can be seen across disciplines, as well, and no definition of political 
legitimacy, either in the normative or descriptive arenas, can avoid referencing his thoughts. 
He is such a fundamental part of the social science landscape, that sometimes his immense 
contributions are taken for granted. Given that, the following section reviews his work.	
 
1.1.3. Max Weber´s Legitimacy: Review of a Fundamental Scholar 
 
German sociologist Max Weber was one of the first (if not the first) scholars who explicitly 
worked on political legitimacy´s conceptualization. Even more, his work helped create the 
social sciences, the main arena to develop the study and conceptualization of legitimacy in 
general, and its political aspects in particular (in the sense of authority, domination, and 
control). His work is a mandatory reference on the topic. His ideas work as the starting point 
and the archetypical conception of legitimacy. This section explains some of Weber's 
thoughts on it, as well as other scholars’	 ideas addressing him. Before continuing, a brief 
methodological warning is needed. Weber's work on this subject is hard to categorize in the 
binary scheme proposed here (normative and descriptive perspectives) for logical reasons. 
First, the most crucial Weberian thought regarding legitimacy is possibly a normative 
categorization, which could be understood as a normative feature. However, Weber himself 
considered that his legitimacy categories were no more (but also no less) than ideal-types. 
Thus, they work as operative simplifications of complex realities – this Weberian recognition 
on the limits of ideal-types is quite usual in the rest of his work; hence it is not exclusive to 
the conceptual considerations of political legitimacy. Therefore, this is a recognition of social 
contingency which also indicates a feature of the descriptive perspective.	
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Regardless, Weber's thought is present in most of the disciplinary approaches to this idea. 
This justifies a particular review of the author. According to him, legitimacy depends on what 
motivates social action. For instance, and following his social action conceptualization, in 
the action-motivated by self-interest it is not always enough to expect people's support for 
authority because individuals may not consider it convenient to follow authority to achieve 
or obtain personal gains. Therefore, the possibilities for legitimacy are lower, and the 
authority could expect an adverse scenario for putting in practice its mandate, which possibly 
increases the chances for relying on coercion. That latter scenario contrasts with the action 
guided-by-belief, in which people often have or perceive a sense of duty to act according to 
what authority requires of them and, consequently, a ruler is more likely to expect obedience 
from people (Weber, 1964, 124). Thus, it is mandatory for the ruler to generate an "[…] 
internal sense of moral obligation" (Johnson et al., 2014; Weber, 1964) to expect action 
guided-by-belief as a platform to build legitimacy. That sense could operate on the grounds 
of what social psychology explains, but it also has a deep relation with current or past moral 
values, beliefs, and the social construction of law and power.	
 
According to Weber, the types of legitimacy (or as he called them, “types of legitimate 
domination”) are threefold: the traditional, the charismatic, and the legal-rational (1964). All 
of them are stated in teleological terms and recognize the necessity of the ruler to generate 
conditions for obedience among the ruled. However, even more important, they all ground 
the possibilities of legitimation in people's belief in the authority, and not vice versa. The 
first type is the legal-rational. Weber explained that this one rests “[…] on a belief in the 
legality of enacted rules and the rights of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue 
command”	(1964, 215). In this case, the established rules are the only possible path through 
which legitimacy can be created. That is because it is the sole way to become the authority 
and rule. Its rational characteristic assumes that the source of obedience from the ruled comes 
from the law because the power of the ruler was acquired through legal procedures. 
Therefore, the law is strong enough to give and to remove power from the government. That 
is why people assume the government's power to be legitimate.	
 
In the second type of Weberian legitimate domination, the traditional, legitimacy comes from 
traditions and heritage, but also from the idea of ancient regimes and established ways of 
governing with its long-established patterns. In this regard, legitimacy rests “[…] on an 
established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those 
exercising authority under them”	(Weber, 1964, 215). Therefore, it could be found in any 
place where authority claims obedience by traditional habits, customs, conventions, 
behaviors, etc. (Bendix, 1966, 306). Some examples of this type are monarchical and 
religious regimes. The third type is charismatic domination, where the legitimate mandate is 
attached to a charismatic head of state. However, the person itself is not the only one who 
produces this type of legitimacy; his or her extraordinary qualities can also do it. Therefore, 
this type of legitimate domination appears only with the presence of that person, and it does 
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not need the rest of conditions (for instance, historical or ancestral, as in traditional rule, or 
the established rule and legal basis as in the rational type). Following Weber, charismatic 
legitimacy rests "[...] on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character 
of an individual person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him" 
(Weber, 1964, 215).	
 
As stated earlier, Weber´s categories are archetypical. However, they have been contested. 
For instance, according to British scholar David Beetham, Weber´s categorization has the 
problem of hugely focusing in people´s beliefs and not in how authority reacts or interacts 
with those beliefs. As a way to explain his diagnosis, it is possible to say that Beetham 
observed an excess of normative perspective in the original categorization, this is, too many 
normative characteristics that allow for reconsiderations, and thus signifying an absence of 
descriptive perspective because categories do not always explain specific empirical cases. 
That is why Beetham himself proposed his trinity of legitimacy by invoking its 
multidisciplinary character. Beetham´s categorization includes three levels of legitimacy: a) 
conformity to established rules, b) justifiability of the rules because of, or based on, shared 
beliefs, and c) legitimation to the ruler through expressed consent of the ruled (Beetham, 
1991). Even when this scholar received critiques about the limitations of his proposal 
(Wrong, 1993; O´Kane, 2013; Fossen, 2011), he developed one of the first epistemological 
efforts pointing the symbolic dimension of legitimacy. In addition, he recognized a co-
constitutive relationship between the ruler and the ruled. That suggested that both parts are 
continuously shaping each other, especially in terms of legitimacy. In other words:	
 
Beetham understood legitimacy not in terms of the different sources from which authority arises, but 
in terms of three dimensions upon which all legitimacy relies [...] This allows for a level of symbiosis; 
that people’s perceptions of legitimacy are influenced by the justifications provided by an authority 
and that an authority’s justification for its legitimacy, in turn, is influenced by the shifting beliefs of 
the people. Furthermore, the acts of consent displayed by the subordinate contribute to the construction 
of justification for an authority (McCullough, 2015, 4).	
 
David Beetham is not the only one who has tried to increase or unfold the original Weberian 
classification. Matheson proposed an expanded five-category classification “[…] according 
to the particular explanation or reason why command and obedience are said to be legitimate”	
(1987, 200). He took Weber´s three types of domination to develop five legitimacy basics: 
1) command-obedience on the basis of convention, grounded in norms; 2) contracts that 
specify that power-holder and power-subject assume mutual rights and obligations; 3) 
conformity with universal principles which are discoverable by all human beings; 4) 
sacredness of authority or of the norms which prescribe command and obedience and 5) 
expertise, where command and obedience are considered legitimate because the power-
holder possesses some types of expertise which make him the right or even the best person 
to hold mandate at that moment (1987, 200-203). Despite the existence of other discussions, 
it is clear that Weber´s influence is located not only in the strength of his ideas to understand 
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legitimacy but also in proposing platforms through which legitimacy discussion emerged. 
While keeping those ideas in mind, the next section is centered explicitly on an operative 
concept of legitimacy that becomes useful for this research, as well as other investigations 
with similar empirical or methodological interests.	
 
1.1.4. Towards an Operative Concept of Legitimacy 
 
Conceptual frameworks are tasked with explaining what is observed in reality. However, 
empirical references are always required in order to dialogue with those concepts. After 
reviewing the discussion on political legitimacy, in order to design and propose an operative 
concept, this section aims to sort out five interrelated considerations designed to addressing 
the empirical cases reviewed in this research in the following chapters. Before presenting 
them, they require certain qualifications. First, the proposal is more a guideline of what is 
essential to observe regarding the interest of this research, which is how and why criminal 
groups look for legitimacy. Therefore, this analysis does not try to fix the weaknesses in the 
definitions already explored, and that could limit further analysis. Instead, it concentrates and 
structures thoughts from what is useful (and what is not) from conceptions to enable the 
operative concept of political legitimacy.	
 
Any conceptualization of legitimacy must address the ruler as well as the ruled. Here we are 
not only talking about how power or authority shapes them, but people come to accept, 
validate, or even become resigned to it. Moreover, this is not a given or static relation but a 
dynamic and contingent one. However, there could be a third perspective in understanding 
how legitimacy works when there is more than one figure or institution seeking to become a 
power-holder. That involves the problem of multiples legitimacies on the one hand, and the 
problem of the nature of the legitimate actor on the other (Stinchcombe referenced by Tilly, 
1985). How to build a definition that also recognizes the attempts of legitimate parallel 
authorities?7 Any attempt should consider this scenario.	
 
The second is the necessity of recognizing contingency in how legitimacy is built. That 
involves three analytical elements: locality, temporality, and rationality (Duyvesteyn, 2017, 
677-678). Since the experiences of authority could differ at the local level (either because 
central power is not so present, because it coexists with another reference to the authority, or 
just because of the history of the place), then it is essential to recognize that political 
legitimacy is not fixed and, thus, changes. If so, then authority needs to reaffirm itself and its 
mandate. There will not be perpetual legitimate authority without any effort to preserve it. 
These efforts are necessary to identify and analyze. Sources and resources of legitimacy also 
 7 It remains as a matter of interest for the further discussion if two or more legitimate power-holders can coexist 
as authorities in the same time and space. Furthermore, what happens when those two or more authorities not 
only share legitimacy, but also become a source of legitimacy among them by validating each other´s power? 
This, of course, is a separate consideration from what happens with the ruled.	
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make sense in local dimensions – even when there could be universal values, this test should 
be made in the field to demonstrate it.	
 
The third relevant consideration from the literature review directly concerns the hypothesis 
of coexistence of two or more parallel legitimate authorities. Charles Tilly stated; 
“Legitimacy is the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a 
given authority”	(1985, 171), that is, legitimacy as a relational concept (Duyvesteyn, 2017, 
674). His idea remembers how the nation-state, as a political project, was not only successful 
by itself but as a whole system (the Westphalian). Mutual recognition between the members 
undoubtedly was one of its main sources of validation. That explains why some postcolonial 
countries, particularly in Latin America, spent so much time and effort in achieving 
recognition from the other nation-states during the first years of independence (Held, 1989). 
Following this notion, if today an actor pursues legitimacy, to what extent may other current 
authorities influence that pursuit? Is that always a conflict? Is it a negotiation? Alternatively, 
is it that there is no clear distinction between both potential "legitimates"? Nevertheless, this 
should be investigated in every case to comprehend empirical cases.	
 
The fourth consideration arises from the presumption of contingency: political legitimacy 
understanding requires studying not only the current moment of the legitimate authority but 
also, how it became legitimate and how it was lost from another. In other words, this means 
giving history the relevance it deserves and locating how legitimacy has evolved in a specific 
place. One option to do so is by historicizing the completely political legitimacy process. For 
instance, that can be rationalized through a timeline method around the act of decision from 
a legitimate authority. In this regard, the first step (before the decision) concerns how the 
transfer of power occurred from the ruled to those who decide on politics, and also what gives 
them the right to make decisions on behalf of all in the first place. It is also important to 
understand how the decision is granted, and what are the characteristics of that legitimate 
authority (Mazepus, 2016). The second step (current moment of decision) is about the act of 
deciding, including the moral, legal, ethical and power bases on which that decision is 
possible and its consequences.	
 
Finally, the fifth (after the decision) regards the perpetual need of the legitimate political 
actor or institution to reconfirm its legitimacy. This implies a recognition of the current 
setting of legitimacy in an ongoing social process. To do so, it is not enough for the authority 
to keep deciding but also to keep performing to maintain its decision-making power. This 
last point lets the research recognize the appearance of new political actors defying (or 
possibly sharing) previous political actor legitimacy and even more significant, the 
peculiarities of the social process in which legitimacy is disputed, rebuilt, regenerated, and 
recreated. Again, political legitimacy shows itself to be contingent on a number of factors. 
This issue will be revisited in following sections and chapters, and particularly within the 
cases analysis. However, and before leaving the theoretical discussion, the following section 
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explains legitimacy concerning another concept, social order. Indeed, it is a needed revision 
of this idea to establish its relation with some other related concepts.	
 
1.2. The Right to Rule: Social (Dis)order, the State and the Grounds for Legitimacy 	
Ties connecting the social order, the state, and political legitimacy are close but not 
instantaneous. On the one hand, each society may be exposed to the resulting struggles of 
confronted views and expectations around how the social order should be. On the other, the 
same society will have its own formal and informal configuration of methods, structures, and 
institutions through which a legitimate mandate becomes valid, respected, and updated. In 
the modern world, the state is supposed to mitigate those social processes – depending on a 
number of factors. Legitimation processes play a primary role when shaping the social order 
by enabling condescending but productive relations between the ruler and the ruled. 
Moreover, legitimacy is an effective measure of the state´s strength: “[…] legitimacy 
includes the acceptance of the state´s symbolic configuration within which the rewards and 
sanctions are packaged. It indicates people´s approval of the state´s desired social order 
through their acceptance of the state´s myths”	 (Migdal, 1988, 33). A legitimate mandate 
enables government capabilities by defining the rules of the game (social order) and 
expecting approval and recognition for that social order as trustworthy and correct.	
 
However, empirically, those statements highlight an important subject: does political 
legitimacy depend on the existence of a given social order? Moreover, should it be a specific 
model? If so, then it is impossible to be legitimate outside the established social order and 
outside the state as well. This might be close to a normative perspective of legitimacy, where 
the hypothesis of sharing or challenging legitimacy between two or more of those groups 
turns into a potential destabilizing factor triggered by misuse of normative legitimating tools. 
In other words, this premise will not take into consideration any legitimacy attempt made by 
illegal means; its goals and ends will never be more than outcomes of illegality. Nevertheless, 
political legitimacy can be possible in social disorder if sanctioned by certain social groups 
within the society. Furthermore, social disorder may eventually become a source and 
resource for building new social orders, but we will return to this topic later in this research. 
Here the focus is on how the social order, the state, and legitimacy become linked. 	
 
Apart from political legitimacy, three concepts inform this research: the social order, the 
state, and the sovereignty. In order to develop these ideas, the following section explores and 
analyzes the literature on: 1) sovereignty (specifically regarding the use of violence and the 
definition of the decision-maker), and 2) the social contract (in particular, the deliberation 
process and the acceptance of the ruler´s mandate). This discussion will serve as a guide to 
discuss, later, if political legitimacy is possible beyond the state and within a supposed social 
disorder. In other words, to what extent can legitimacy create social order and vice versa? As 
with the conceptual review, the focus is not on definitive or final answers, but theoretical and 
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epistemological insights, thoughts, and suggestions that later help analyze the cases that are 
the subjects of this research. Nevertheless, the discussion now delves into what social order 
is and its political and sociological relevance. That is intended to show that legitimacy is 
closely related to the development of social order and the state.	
 
1.2.1. What Social Order Is and What It Is For 
 
Social order is a trans-disciplinary problem for almost all social sciences. It starts from the 
presumption that individuals live in society. Therefore, this happens in a certain way in which 
coexistence needs to be possible, and it unfolds in terms of social order. Societies organize 
their social life through specific conditions, in which legitimacy becomes relevant for 
political reasons. However, there are also practical issues related to how those societies 
generate a particular order and predictability, which are essential for carrying out their 
chances for developing. In other words, to make society reasonably predictable, and develop 
expectations about other’s behaviors, a proper social order is desirable (Banfield, 2003, 29). 
Some origins of social behavior predictability and conditioning can be found in the law, the 
respect for formal authority, or even the idea of a common good and shared destiny, just to 
pose some examples. However, what if illegality or informal authorities participate in the 
definition of social order? Moreover, what if social behavior conditioners go against the 
presupposed idea of a common good? Is that a social disorder scenario or just another sort of 
order? This research keeps those questions in mind to study two notional features of social 
order: 1) the role of legitimacy in the maintenance or changes in the social order (discussed 
here), and 2) the scenarios in which a supposed social disorder could become a source of 
order (discussed in cases´	chapters).	
 
Belonging, cohesiveness, and people’s trust in the establishment are all closely related, but 
they also connect social order with legitimacy (Gellner, 2003). Each case needs to define if 
those features are a result of obtaining legitimacy, or on the contrary, are means through 
which legitimacy is attained. What is known is that, when an authority is legitimate, a sense 
of belonging is more likely and, hence, the claim of authority is simplified. Additionally, how 
competent authority is at integrating popular social values and reproducing itself through 
social relations tracks closely to its sustainability and, of course, its legitimacy. With this 
background in mind, two questions become relevant: 1) is the social disorder always 
anomalous? To be more precise, what happens when atypical behavior, not aligned to the 
supposed dominant social structure, is more the rule than the exception? and, 2) is the social 
order capable enough to create society? In other words, is there a society where the disorder 
is dominant? Any possible answer to these questions involves recognizing the existing co-
constitutive relationship between social order and social disorder.	
 
Scholarly work examining the basis of social order comes from a variety of places. Balandier, 
for instance, argued that myths have the sociological function of explaining and shaping the 
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historical sense of social order (1970). However, the debate seems to have a consensus among 
traditional, modern, and contemporary scholars alike when recognizing, in the state, the 
central social order provider and manager par excellence. Thomas Hobbes considered the 
social order as a foundational part in which the Leviathan is possible and available, not as a 
consensus but as a needed coercion. The homo homini lupus owes its origins to this. 
According to this principle of political organization, and inspired by the idea of a superior 
general interest and a shared destiny, individuals resign their power to kill each other by 
conceding that power to a superior entity, that is, the state (Hobbes, 1998, 111-122). A more 
in-depth discussion on this will come later but here it’s valuable to quote Ian Hurd on 
Hobbes’s suggestions regarding social order preservation and maintenance:	
 
Although Hobbes’	citizens join society by consent and retain a residual right to self-defense, the system 
is best seen as an example of a society based on coercion rather than consent, or even religious 
conviction, since (1) the motivation for joining is the fear of certain depredation in the state of nature, 
(2) the motivation for obeying the sovereign is the threatened sanction, and (3) the obligation to obey 
exists only while the sovereign maintains almost absolute power. The argument is sometimes made 
that Hobbes also relied on legitimacy or religion to help explain the maintenance of social order; 
however, the Leviathan is necessary precisely because these other mechanisms cannot be counted on 
to do the job. For Hobbes, it is the sword that ultimately maintains compliance, since neither self-
interest nor legitimacy is sufficiently compelling (Hurd, 1999, 384).	
 
Modern State societies around the world have made efforts to codify their social order. Laws, 
norms, constitutions, and punishment codifications are part of that effort. However, when a 
non-permitted action goes unpunished, the supposed predictability of social order seems to 
collapse, and social disorder can arise. Nevertheless, here it is argued that the absence of 
social order is not equal to chaos. Hence, the social disorder does not necessarily entail an 
absence of order but indicates a different kind of social setting. Of course, rebellion, violence, 
dissent, crime, deviance, and conflict in general do not necessarily means that there is no 
order, nor any society. And a different social order may rise from the ashes of the old order. 
Hence, disturbing behaviors with legitimacy pretensions may become a source of social 
order. For instance, crime (anti-social activities from a rigid legal perspective) and its 
perpetrators (likewise anti-social players from a rigid legal perspective) may become a source 
of social order by getting into legitimacy dilemmas — creating or renewing institutions, 
codes, values, and so on in their attempts to achieve, or maintain, political legitimacy.	
 
Social order is needed to make antisocial behavior recognizable and punishable. This idea 
addresses how social structure is defined and how it operates in specific contexts, i.e. to 
recognize the mechanisms through which social order is achieved (Hetcher, 2003, 4). Those 
mechanisms condense social behavior based on norms, beliefs, ethics, values and how they 
become crystallized in institutions, laws, hierarchies and power relations. That is why the 
social order also works as a platform or channel through which social behaviors like 
consensus, negotiation, and conflict happen. Therefore, it functions as a sort of guide, to 
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outline the standards of social behavior. According to Michael Hechter, the maintenance of 
a particular social order depends on “[…] the existence of a set of overarching rules of the 
game, rules that are to some degree internalized, or considered to be legitimate, by most 
actors. Not only do these rules set goals, or preferences, for each member of society, but they 
also specify the appropriate means by which these goals can be pursued”	(1987, 3 quoted by 
Hurd, 1999). That is why criminality,	— a compendium of activities and values that go 
against the rules of the game	— is such a valuable source for legitimacy for the sovereign.	
 
The gangster, the underworld, or the informal sovereign who has become “a law onto himself”	are, in 
other words, central to the endeavors of governments and police forces to produce legitimacy, and to 
perform the sovereignty of the State. Likewise, both the underworld and the imputed amorality or 
corruption of State functionaries are central to the production of its opposite, “the community”, as a 
sovereign repository of moral values and authentic sociality. Criminality as a “zone of darkness”	is, in 
brief, the perennial outside, an unruly and originary source of sovereign life, and thus a necessary 
condition for any claim to establish and defend a social order (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005, 32).	
 
We still have not addressed if, and how, this	“perennial outside”	can be successful in its 
attempt to become “a law onto itself”, or even become the law itself. Social order is persistent 
but never static. It is dynamic and contingent, which means it must affirm and reaffirm itself 
through time and space (Frank, 1944). Contingency is similarly anchored to social dynamics. 
As a result, academic work has made efforts to explore and explain social order from big 
picture concepts to very local and specific scopes. Each big social theory has its own view 
on how social order is conceived, how it works, and even how it could be modified. Marxism, 
for instance, recognized dynamism in any social order by looking at the logic of dialectical 
materialism (Seidman, 2016, 24-30), while American sociologist Talcott Parsons took a clear 
static position by arguing that only institutions and how they regulate social action are 
relevant when determining social structures, in particular but not exclusively within 
democracy (Burger, 1977).	
 
Given the long shadow cast by Parsons and the dominant assumptions of that point of view, 
it is important to stress that social disorder does not mean pure chaos or absence of authority, 
particularly when illegality and crime are the main causes of social disorder. In fact, social 
disorder contexts are powerful social inputs and/or frameworks for the creation of renewed 
complex social realities. From the ashes of a destroyed social order, a new one can be built. 
Hence, rather than long-stable social environments, social disorder should be studied for its 
relevant transition stages. The alleged social disorder scenarios facilitate 1) the establishment 
of a new social order and, 2) the enabling of zero-sum dilemma scenarios. Crime and 
criminals are usually associated with destabilizing governance because of their association 
with insecurity, violence, and corruption. Hence, hypothetically crime can overthrow a 
government´s legitimacy. If formal authorities do not recover that hypothetically “lost 
legitimacy”, are empty spaces (scenarios without politically legitimate actors) possible? In 
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other words, does this open the door for politics without legitimacy? Here exactly the 
opposite is argued.	
 
But before we get there, we review the state’s role in the construction, permanence, and 
sustainability of a specific social order by honing in on two central features of the state: 
sovereignty and the social contract. Both are unavoidable topics when talking about 
legitimacy because the first addresses the foundations of the right to govern (and decide), and 
the second addresses the basics of people for whom an authority becomes legitimate. 
Moreover, they are essential concepts regarding social order because they support the idea 
that the state is the legitimate apparatus through which power and authority is supposed to be 
channeled.	
 
1.2.2. Legitimate Power and Decisions: State and Sovereignty  
 
Among monarchical governments in Europe, royal houses´	legitimacy was mainly based on 
the notion of the divine right of kings, the right to rule by divine mandate. Several centuries 
later, the foundations of governmental legitimacy had shifted to a broader social contract. 
Established ruling procedures also become more complex and included the idea of citizens 
(through elections or the use of formal or legal mechanisms and institutions to achieve 
power). Sovereign power moved away from royal houses and started residing in complex 
social configurations involving deciders, laws, codes, and even the people themselves 
(Wallerstein, 2006; Schmitt, 2001; 2004; Krasner, 2001; Crossman, 1986). That change is 
the focus of this section. What is the basis of that renewed social agreement and what are the 
implications for legitimacy? The answer addresses the understanding of a couple of core 
concepts within the social sciences: namely, the state, and the source of its right to rule and 
decide, i.e., sovereignty.	
 
Logical statements on this topic suggest that only the state is sovereign enough to decide 
(where sovereign power resides varies depending on who explains it), and the legitimate 
mandate could only be reached through state channels. Within a modern framework, political 
legitimacy forms a central part (or even a complete definition) of the “who”, “how”, and 
“when”	 of sovereignty. Only the state can govern in a specific territory under certain 
principles while coexisting with other’s sovereignties. They became the solitary holders of 
the renewed divine mandate (Held, 1989). Therefore, the state is supposed to win and 
preserve legitimacy as a positive but natural consequence of good government. If not, society 
will hypothetically have mechanisms to change political conditions, whether this only means 
to change the government or the whole basis of the social order. That change will reestablish 
legitimacy when it has been lost or is in crisis. However, in any scenario, the state is supposed 
to be the sole channel through which this can occur.	
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However, what happens if both state and sovereignty are empirically far away from ideal-
types? What are the consequences of how the legitimate mandate is set? American 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz posed an interesting problem in Current Anthropology	“What 
Is a State If It Is Not Sovereign?”	(2004). This issue concerns him, particularly “[…] after 
the decolonization revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s have resulted in a renewed concern 
with the problems of government in multiethnic, multi-religious, and multi-linguistic 
countries”	(2004, 577). Is the lack of sovereignty the end of the state? And if so, what is the 
role of legitimacy in that social and political equation? In the case of democratic regimes, as 
a theoretical principle, elections are the main source of fixing the lack of representation, bad 
government, and more. But what triggers that change is precisely the lack of legitimacy of 
the current government. All those are helpful suppositions to come back to Geertz’s question. 
What happens when the state exists with its government but does not benefit from those 
qualities and advantages that legitimacy brings? If a state without sovereignty is possible 
(Geertz called these	“complicated places”), is a state without legitimacy possible?8	
 
Let me inject a word here on how this research understands the state. As a central concept in 
social sciences, of course, there is a vast literature on the subject. In this case, the "State in 
society" approach developed by Joel Migdal serves as a guide (together with conceptual tools 
from the anthropology of the state). Migdal´s work has considered how both the state and 
society interact with each other, particularly if one is embedded inside the other, or if it is a 
mutual constitution. He recognized that real states vary considerably in how much they 
resemble ideal-types, and he observed many institutions participating in the state-building 
process. He resolved the apparent conundrum by answering not only "what" and “who”	the 
state is but also "how" it works (1988, 19). That serves as a platform to deal with the 
sovereignty dilemma in this section, and helps to maintain the discussion of legitimacy in a 
broad perspective.	
 
Migdal offered the following definition: "The state is a field of power marked by the use and 
threat of violence and shaped by 1) the image of coherent, controlling organization in a 
territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and 2) the actual 
practices of its multiple parts" (2011, 15-16; emphasis in the original). The former point 
refers to what is named as "the state" within the socio-political imaginary and gets close to 
the government members and public officials (but not exclusively). The second point 
recognizes the social and political participation of other institutions and individuals. This 
definition will be both useful and stimulating for this research. First, it helps us distinguish 
between different state realities by their empirical singularities. Second, it works to 
understand how state and non-state actors coexist and relate by recognizing multiple 
 8 These questions bring the analysis to another coming topic in this chapter, specifically in section 1.4.c; where 
does the lost legitimacy go? Can other political actors without sovereignty or non-state actors claim it? Is the 
same legitimacy lost by the state the one that the non-state actors claim? Or is it another type of political 
legitimacy? And finally, is it possible to share it?	
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institutions´	 images and practices. This mélange has its own specific social and political 
features,9 but allows for scenarios in which all those parts are politically competing and 
potentially looking for legitimacy mandates, and where the state is possible with, without, or 
with a variety of legitimacies coexisting. It remains to be determined if the "multiple parts" 
take part in the legitimacy process, to what extent, and how. The answers, again, will depend 
on each case. It is fundamentally an empirical issue.	
 
In every society there are different groups competing between each other to impose order. This is, to 
impose each one its own version of order. It means that the state is never the only actor capable of 
generating norms. On the contrary, it is always one among others, many actors, more or less 
institutionalized, more or less formal, with a more or less wide radium: churches, families, patronages, 
webs, corporates, communities…and the state is not obviously, naturally and immediately superior to 
the rest of actors even when it wants to be. Sometimes, State’s lawfulness can impose above the others, 
in some spaces law can be reinforced with perfect regularity, but it is not possible to assure that it will 
be always like that. When that happens, when the state is successful in undermining the other powers, 
it is a consequence of a long struggle, and it is never a definitive victory (Escalante, 2011, 11).10	
 
What does sovereignty mean for legitimacy? Anthropologists Veena Das and Deborah Poole 
suggest that the place to look is what they call the “margins of the state”. They were 
specifically thinking of places that have been labeled as weak, failed, or partial states by 
political comparative studies (or “complicated places”, as Geertz put it). They argue that this 
study of the offers	“[…] a unique perspective to the understanding of the state, not because 
it captures exotic practices, but because it suggests that such margins are a necessary 
entailment of the state, much as the exception is the component of the rule”. That perspective 
presents an opportunity to detach social order from the language of the state as a ghostly, 
rational, homogenous, lonely, and persistent authority (2004, 4-5). Her work is fully helpful 
in mapping the state from the locality and, with this, recognizing the margins of where 
authorities exist and are conceived. Their ideas opened the door for the study and recognition 
of non-rational, non-uniform, non-static sovereignties. In brief, “Whether labelled State or 
not, it seems that a wide variety of institutions constitute themselves as de facto public 
authorities, with greater or lesser success”	(Lund, 2006, 676). Implications feed hypotheses 
of challenging, multiple, and successful legitimate authorities, and point the way toward 
conceptions of sovereignty and the state within descriptive perspective grounds.	
 
Departing from that understanding, sovereignty 1) is no longer the state´s exclusive 
prerogative, but 2) it does not disappear just for that reason. Thus, some social groups may 
 9 The “Mélange society”	idea suggests hyper-concentrations of authorities in the same space and time: “[…] 
groups exercising social control in a society may be heterogeneous both in their form […] and in the rules they 
apply […] [but] the distribution of social control in society may be among numerous, fairly autonomous groups 
rather than concentrated largely in the State. In other words, the over-all sum of authority may be high in the 
society, but the exercising of all that authority may be fragmented. In this mélange, the State has been one 
organization among many”	(Migdal, 1988, 28-29).	10 This and all the translations from non-English texts and documents are from my own.	
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be especially interested in taking advantage of these possibilities and operate in a sovereign 
mood, either by claiming authority, using violence, performing statehood practices, or 
pretending to become legitimate (and maybe simply becoming legitimate). Concerned with 
these problems, Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat proposed the “de facto sovereign 
power”	concept (2005). Ultimately, the monopoly of violence breakdown and sovereignty 
becomes a practice, which could be exercised by the state –or more precisely, by those who 
are supposed to be the sovereign through legal, political, or any other manner. Non-state 
actors, especially violent ones, may fit into the scenario of a fragmented sovereignty and 
exercise it. In this case, legitimacy will also be at stake. Sovereignty and legitimacy will 
always be related concepts. Following the scheme analyzed here, they would permanently 
need to involve at least two sides: the one interested in becoming sovereign/legitimate (which 
could be more than one), and the audience(s) with which sovereignty is exercised and 
legitimacy is sought, and possibly attained. The next section delves into the latter.	
 
1.2.3. The Audience for Legitimacy: Social Order, Legitimacy, and the Social Contract   
 
This chapter has questioned if political legitimacy is possible beyond traditional notions of 
the state and social order. However, there is another element to address, namely, with whom 
political actors attempt to become legitimate. In other words, who has the faculty (or power?) 
to grant (or deny) the condition of legitimacy? The answer points to the audience(s) of 
legitimacy. Matheson states that "Power-holders have an interest in securing obedience 
motivated by a belief in legitimacy, for legitimate authority is a less 'costly' form of authority 
than either coercive or reward-based authority" (1987, 200). Political legitimacy, as it has 
been explored earlier, is part of a relation between ruler and ruled. With that in mind, this 
section explores and debates the origins of the idea of the ruled legitimating the ruler. It is 
revisited to trace the logic behind this social process. In order to do so, the concept of the 
social contract guides the discussion.  	
 
State and sovereignty have deep linkages with the social contract idea. During the European 
Enlightenment Jean Jacques Rousseau proposed that sovereign power is no more than the 
expression of the general will, which can never be alienated. Therefore, the sovereign is 
nothing but a collective being and the power holder (1999, 51). Furthermore, while power 
can be transferred (for instance, as part of a government or regime change), general will 
cannot. Thus, the social contract is precisely the arrangement through which (either people, 
citizens, population, inhabitants, etcetera) power is transferred and, by doing so, sovereign 
gets legitimized. Moreover, this process can be developed in the opposite direction. The 
general will should be able to delegitimize and withdraw power to the sovereign and transfer 
it to a new one. That is why democracy is seen as the imperative legitimating mechanism, 
even despite the widely diverging interpretations of the concept (Duyvesteyn, 2017, 670). 
Any political actor or institution with legitimacy pretensions needs to regularly reaffirm itself 
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towards the population, and even towards other authorities. Otherwise, it will always run the 
risk of being delegitimized and, consequently, disempowered.	
 
Empirically, the social contract plays a dual role. First, as an ideal-type it defines parts of the 
imaginary constitution of how authority should be in its legitimate condition. On the other 
hand, it helps to shape the audience of legitimacy. In other words, it helps to shape and justify 
the existence of a more or less inchoate audience onto which legitimacy efforts are intended 
to have resonance. Therefore, the social contract acts as a sort of glue between the transfer 
of power from people to authority as an act towards legitimating its right to rule. Naturally, 
this is far from being mere fiction. Real people (individuals or collectivities) live in society 
perceiving or suffering political actors’ attempts to achieve legitimacy. However, this takes 
us to a new problem, i.e., how it happens. In the field, the state may share or compete 
legitimacy versus other actors. Thus, audiences of legitimacy, both in social order and 
disorder contexts, often distribute their credits to several authorities simultaneously (Hansen 
and Stepputat, 2005, 4). That may happen, for instance by respecting several coexisting rules, 
by trusting or fearing in one, another, or both mandates, or a complex mix of these.	
 
On social order and legitimacy grounds, the social contract is more than merely the state´s 
business. No government can create a social contract by itself. It requires at least an effort 
from the authority to (at least symbolically) sign and attend that social contract celebration. 
Moreover, it seeks social relations of a desirable predictability (i.e., celebrating and 
respecting contracts, recognizing and respecting the law, such as the formal authority) 
(Duyvesteyn, 2017, 679). Any political order’s claim, to be acknowledged as legitimate and 
fair, deserves recognition: "Legitimacy means a political order’s worthiness to be 
recognized" (Habermas, 1976, 6). That is why is quite usual to find political claims in the 
name of the general will. That happens either through discursive, practical, or symbolic 
means. Thus, authority's agendas and visions of reality may compose those claims. On the 
other side of the coin, audiences of legitimacy receive and (ideally) evaluate them and 
participate in the process by giving, withdrawing, or transforming legitimacy. That scenario 
is an undoubtedly deliberative approach. However, when violence and fear join or mark those 
messages and claims, this process may vary in its stages. It is helpful to look at why political 
actors may be interested in these issues and observe the line connecting three concepts: 
legitimacy, the social contract, and the general will.	
 
In Western Europe, where the social contract idea was initially developed, the credibility of 
the political project offered by the one who plans to rule played a primary role. Legitimacy 
came later as a consequence (Duyvesteyn, 2017, 679). Encouraging security had been the 
entry point for those pretending to establish the basis of a new social contract. Once 
warranted (or at least once the rules to do so are sanctioned), then it is possible to follow 
steps towards a legitimation process in which social order becomes firmly established. 
Following this idea shows the extent to which both legitimacy and social order become the 
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channels through which the social contract is supported. Audiences of legitimacy may vary. 
(Chapter 2 proposes how to categorize and recognize them – mainly when speaking about 
criminal groups’	efforts at legitimacy. That process enables also involves a discussion of the 
methodology through which fieldwork and data from these actors becomes accessible.) Here 
the important point is to understand “who”	is included in this legitimating process from the 
spectators’	perspective.	
 
Theoretically speaking, the social contract is a singular noun: it implies that there is only one 
within the same time and space. Its hypothetical expiration, malfunction, or decline is reason 
enough to renew it. However, again, empirical cases show contexts in which it is possible to 
talk about this in the plural. For instance, rebels may be able to propose their vision of social 
order, maybe establish it, and therefore set the basis for a parallel social contract. That might 
challenge the current status quo, but scenarios of cooperation, mutual understanding, or some 
other symbiotic relationship are of course possible. And as this analysis has repeatedly 
emphasized, this is a contingent process, and definitive victories are not guaranteed. That 
“never definitive victory”	of political actors in their legitimating process (including the state), 
needs to continually reinforce and recreate their legitimacy. This opens possibilities for all 
those other institutions that, following Migdal, also constitute the state. Some of them, 
specifically the violent non-state actors, might also offer a social contract for their audience. 
Hence, they will need to “[…] explain and justify their agendas and actions; they need 
material and moral support from communities both inside and outside the conflict region. 
Without minimal legitimacy, an armed group is bound to fail in its attempts to stay in power”	
(Schlichte and Schnekener, 2016, 410). These collectivities will find themselves in a dilemma 
between coercion and legality to achieve or enforce legitimacy, and to reaffirm their claim to 
authority. The question of who these social groups are and how to study them is explored in 
detail in the next section.	
 
1.3. Alternative People´s Legitimacy: Non-state Actors  
 
Nowadays, cases around the world proliferate in which other actors seek and potentially 
achieve legitimacy. These "other actors" have been called "non-state actors" within the 
academic literature as a pragmatic manner to refer them. However, that pragmatism is a 
conceptual problem itself and highlights fundamental questions for this research: what and 
who are those non-state actors? What is their claim to legitimacy? And if indeed they are 
legitimate, how and why? Even when this happens in places around the world, the process 
and the specificities are neither uniform nor homogeneous. Each case is unique precisely 
because this search for legitimacy depends on material and immaterial elements, symbolic 
features, practices, power configurations, and local and historical conditions (i.e. the 
descriptive perspective of the political legitimacy), which are also particular and therefore 
need specific considerations. (These considerations will be explored in detail in the last 
section of this chapter.) In other words, to be understood, each non-state actor looking for 
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legitimacy has its socio-historical context that needs to be incorporated into the analysis, 
together with a consideration of what non-state actors are and to what extent they are equal 
or different.	
 
Any group with minimum cohesiveness and whose members are not in government are 
supposed to be called non-state actors. However, social borders are not rigid. Thus, within a 
given social context, an individual can be the authority, criminal, citizen or more all at the 
same time and without even renouncing any of these roles. Also, as happens with the state, 
non-state actors are not monoliths, and therefore are not fixed entities or agents (or, at least, 
not always). These groups are part and parcel of complex socio-political processes, which 
often happen in the frame of conflict and dissension with authority. It is helpful now to 
identify some of the foundational thoughts about non-state actors to understand the limits and 
possibilities of the concept. When the social research and debate on globalization went 
beyond economic and financial issues and started addressing governmental and political 
processes, some scholars raised the question of a possible state-reduction or state-decrease. 
Consequently, non-state actors´	capacities appeared to be escalating, both politically and 
economically (Strange, 2002; Ianni, 1995; Hardt and Negri, 2001). 	
 
The hypothesis was that the international state scheme (the so-called Westphalian system) 
was becoming weak and useless in the face of new contestations, both local and global. With 
some distance, it seems fair to recognize that this premise was not complete or entirely 
accurate. In one hand, the state keeps having great analytical importance and, even more, not 
all the states face the same problems or in the same dimension. Thus, examining all the states, 
or the Westphalian system, in the same way is not useful. Furthermore, those new actors exist 
and grow as social groups with singularities and on-going activities. Thus, they have shown 
to be even more complicated and diverse (Josselin and Wallace, 2001). Some of them might 
be interested in dealing with legitimacy issues, either by claiming, questing, questioning, or 
giving it. This is why is it valuable to understand the concept of the "non-state actor”.	
 
Moreover, to analyze non-state actors involves questioning their problematic configurations. 
That includes studying their interior-group features but also how they are related with other 
political actors, including the formal or official authorities. For instance, are non-state actors 
comparable? If not, how to differentiate them? Is a taxonomy possible or desirable? Can a 
hybridity among them occur? Are they always entirely or unconditionally	“non-state”? These 
questions demonstrate the challenges of the concept but must be addressed. Otherwise, 
complexity and ambiguity generated in societies by non-state actors may go unnoticed or 
misunderstood, including their political contribution, particularly when talking about claims 
to legitimacy. This research is centered on and interested in one specific sort of non-state 
actor, the criminal groups. However, before delving into them, it’s helpful to locate this 
particular type in the spectrum of non-state actors. 	
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This section addresses conceptual perspectives. Later, this will help to analyze and 
conceptualize specific cases. First, we explore problems with definitions of non-state actors, 
which will be pertinent to the socio-political contexts in which they seek legitimacy. This 
discussion will help us to classify them	—	specifically, how academic literature has proposed 
to categorize those non-state actors involved in violent actions or who performed themselves 
violently. Finally, a conceptual exploration of criminal groups is made in order to locate them 
into the range of violent non-state actors. That represents a first approach to these specific 
groups. The central interest is to propose a functional conceptual apparatus and guidelines to 
understand criminal groups’	phenomena concerning their search for legitimacy.	
 
1.3.1. What Is a Non-state Actor? 
 
International relations and some studies in political science initially developed ideas on non-
state actors. This concept can be situated as a disciplinary necessity to name and explain the 
involvement of some other actors in local, national, and international politics and economy 
(Higgott, et al., 2000). That mainly happened during the last decades of the twentieth century, 
when the nation-state, its sovereignty, and the Westphalia system, offered insufficient 
frameworks to explain new social, economic, and political dynamics. Their participation in 
the so-called international society was expanded beyond the international arena, including 
global, national, and local stages, particularly during the second half of that century. In 
particular, complexity around world politics increased at the end of the cold war, when 
Berlin´s wall fell, and the Soviet Union broke up. The Balkan wars in the nineties and then 
September 11 (particularly involving so-called ‘violent new actors’) also influenced the 
discussion.	
 
These new actors were not states nor were they supposed to become sovereign, but began to 
seem of great importance in different areas of the political landscape. Moreover, most of 
them had their own agendas (local, national, regional, and even global), a pivotal element to 
locate non-state actors in legitimacy discussions. Hence, the notion of non-state actors 
appeared as a practical and convenient solution to include this phenomenon in the spectrum 
of many disciplinary analyses within the social sciences. It was now possible to name those 
new groups. However, the debate was mainly focused on how they were contesting and 
threatening state power. Nevertheless, the understanding of how politics happened in these 
new contexts was incomplete because this approach left aside two discussions. Namely, it 
did not address how these new actors might perform as if they were the state (emulating or 
simulating it, or negotiating and collaborating with other non-state actors). Also, the 
discussion was not interested in understanding hybrid situations, i.e., when social 
mechanisms allow individuals to simultaneously be a part of the state and a non-state actor, 
or to go between these categories (Krause and Milliken, 2009, 202). Both aspects are 
profoundly relevant to study criminal groups, where corruption and the border between legal 
and illegal tend to be blurred.	
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That latter point addresses the interesting problem: how to empirically draw the line between 
where the state ends and society begins? According to some scholars, this is a question that 
could be exclusively answered through a local perspective, and far away from 
generalizations. Also, it might highlight the indicators to differentiate a state from a non-state 
actor (Escobar, 2001). This involves an inquiry into the relation between political actors with 
formal authorities within a given social context, and how and why legitimacy is pursued and 
disputed there. Thus, any definition of a non-state actor needs to be based on an empirical 
discussion of the state. 	
 
The literature tends to frame the state as a counterpoint to non-state actors, but fixed ideas of 
the state obscure the complex power, influence, and sometimes even the existence of non-
state actors. For instance, some non-state actors can enjoy grades of autonomy with formal 
authorities, while others can also have, seek, or claim state affiliation (Josselin and Wallace, 
2001). To resolve this problem, ideas of state and non-state cannot be static or non-empirical, 
even when we recognize them as ideal types. This dilemma becomes even more important in 
disorderly contexts (i.e. “complicated”	 and “marginal”), where crime, corruption, and 
violence render hard distinctions shadowy. The complexity behind this can be summarized 
when recovering Akhil Gupta´s concept, “blurred boundaries”	(1995), which comes from an 
of ethnography of the state carried out in a northern Indian village, where he confronted the 
traditional and supposedly definitive distinctions between the state and the civil society. 
Gupta explains well how he came to realize that while these categories are real and useful, 
they are discursively constructed. 	
 
Rather than begin with the notions of State and civil society that were forged on the anvil of European 
history, I focus on the modalities that enable the State (and, simultaneously, that which is not the State) 
to be discursively constructed. Looking at everyday practices, including practices of representation, 
and the representations of (State) practice in public culture helps us arrive at a historically specific and 
ideologically constructed understanding of "the State." Such an analysis simultaneously considers 
those other groupings and institutions that are imagined in the processes of contestation, negotiation, 
and collaboration with "the State." There is no reason to assume that there is, or should be, a unitary 
entity that stands apart from, and in opposition to, "the State," one that is mutually exclusive and jointly 
exhaustive of the social space. What I have tried to emphasize in this article is that the very same 
processes that enable one to construct the State also help one to imagine these other social groupings 
(Gupta, 1995, 393).	
 
Postcolonial situations can pose intellectual challenges in using categories derived from 
Western European contexts. That is why Migdal´s definition of the state is quite useful. Both 
images and localized practices configure it and, beneath them, there are elements for the 
understanding of both state and non-state actors. The challenge is in how to operationalize 
non-state actors as social groups among others (of the multiple parts composing the state) 
with real practices developed in a power field marked by the threat and use of violence. 
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Following Migdal´s borrowing of a Bourdieunian concept, there is a dominant organization 
image within the field, coherent in a specific territory, which does not deny the interaction of 
other groups. Instead, these other groups help to build and shape social reality. Again, these 
thoughts are useful for particular social and disciplinary spaces where institutional 
constructions have historical and sociological peculiarities, and therefore, require different 
approaches. There are other disciplines and contexts, however, where ideal-types will be 
more accurate and helpful disciplinary tools. Empirical references are, again, needed in each 
case.11	
 
Despite the common ambiguities around the definition of the non-state actor, the concept can 
be used in a practical form. In this research, a non-state actor will be understood as an 
analytical category to recognize (even when it’s not possible to precisely define) those social 
groups and political actors through their own actions, practices, agendas, and interests that 
fit into narratives of being separate or distinguishable from the state. The category of non-
state actors becomes helpful to explain social phenomena of those who participate in politics 
or social violence in a specific social space. Moreover, it helps to study how formal or legal 
authority is involved. This discussion is, of course, in deep relation with the search of 
legitimacy and the construction and use of power among these non-state actors. How and 
why they do so is explored in the next section.	
 
1.3.2. Why and When? Non-state Actors In Search of Legitimacy 
 
Non-state actors are political actors. As a result, claims to successful legitimation processes 
can emerge informally and through illegal or non-legal means. Legitimacy is not an exclusive 
attribute of the state or the legal or formal authorities. This is a key point, and inclines this 
research towards a descriptive perspective of legitimacy. Non-state actors can become 
legitimate or at least seek legitimacy. However, is that claim to legitimacy a quotidian 
practice of non-state actors, or is it a particular behavior for some of them? Are non-state 
actors searching for legitimacy as a pragmatic way to achieve their goals? Alternatively, are 
they ideologically or politically or financially motivated? Why and when does that claim 
happen? Political legitimacy might bring benefits for non-state actors. Depending on the case 
and context, it will invite support from a variable audience but also offer the advantage of 
performing action without being questioned. However, the question remains: is political 
legitimacy an end itself for a non-state actor, or is it the means through which other goals can 
be reached? And can these social agents dispense with legitimacy?	
 
 11 In this regard, and following Schneckener (2017), the distinction between violent actors and the state might 
become impossible as a result of the potential existence of collusion, collaboration, and overlap between the 
categories.	
	49 
This applies quite broadly: to multinational and global firms; international, regional, and 
local NGO's; militias, terrorists, vigilantes, criminal organizations and bandits in general. 
Therefore, the agendas and actions mentioned above will be part of the answer to why and 
when claims of legitimacy claims apply. The possibility of a non-state actor becoming 
legitimate is related to the expectations of these actors from the imaginary construction of 
political authority. That opens a wide range of possibilities. Some of them will be interested 
in co-operating or influencing in specific topics of society, others will pursue drastic changes 
such as eliminating the formal and legal system of government, or merely to toppling the 
current administration, just to suggest a few possibilities. Non-state actors can be moderate 
or radical, depending on their agendas and practices. According to some authors, non-state 
actors are interested in participating in norm-formation or regulation (Peters, Koechlin and 
Fenner, 2009). That becomes a necessity for them, and can include their involvement in 
policy processes through legislative mechanisms, lobbying, or other formal routes. Their 
motivations can be political, ideological, economic, or a mix. These can be categorized as 
legal. 	
 
By contrast, the non-legal might be interested in disturb or at least ignore established rules 
through disruptive conducts (which does not mean that only rebels act violently, as will be 
explored in the next section). Justifications and motivations tend to be less economic and 
more political and ideological (but this is not always rigid), and are often illegal or conflict 
with established law. However, grey zones are possible: non-state actors can expand or 
redefine their interest through time, so an evolution of a "peaceful" non-state actor into a 
violent one is possible, and vice versa. In other words, they can shift between both categories 
as part of their historical process. Nevertheless, a common attribute of non-state actors 
seeking legitimacy is their participation in defining social order, either through the 
constitution of authority, the establishment of a mandate, or the definition of the ruler and 
the ruled.  	
 
Non-state actors involved in legitimacy issues need to be analyzed as well from their posture 
towards the ruler and the ruled. Since they participate politically, they have to establish 
relations with formal authorities. However, given that the support they seek comes from the 
ruled, this relationship becomes crucial to achieve legitimacy. Some of these actors use state 
resources (for instance, its legal system) as a claim to legitimacy (Schlichte and Schneakener, 
2016, 417), while others defy the state to accomplish the same goal. Non-state actors establish 
their position in relation to the status quo, which indicates the flexibility and contingency 
they employ when choosing to compete with, borrow from, cooperate with, or flatly reject 
the legal authorities’	legitimacy. Another possibility is shared legitimacy. 	
 
Non-state actors, and rebels/bandits in particular, as organized parts of these societies, can 
reproduce the experience of the state, building on former experiences (Förster, 2015, 204). 
That configures a path for non-state actors to achieve political legitimacy. But some non-
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state actors are violent; they use violence along with threats and intimidation to achieve their 
ends. To what extent can they achieve legitimacy? This question cannot be answered in the 
abstract, but requires empirical references. Nevertheless, some conceptual points are both 
necessary and helpful.	
 
1.3.3. Violence as Catalyst: Towards a Taxonomy of Non-State Actors 
 
In the decade or so after the Second World War, the social sciences showed little interest in 
investigating the role of a particular sort of non-state actors, largely due to economic, 
financial, and geopolitical reasons. But especially at the end of the Cold War, and as 
neoliberal policies and free trade agreements took off in capitalist countries, some new actors 
started appearing in the analytical landscape. Examples include international organizations 
and international cooperation agencies (both constituted by state memberships), corporations 
and banks, and special international entities (most of them defined by Public International 
Law). And little by little scholars began looking at some other non-state actors whose 
principal characteristic was the use or threat of violence to achieve goals (including to 
legitimate themselves or their activities). These other non-state actors were rebels like 
militias, guerrillas, terrorists, and vigilantes, but also, criminal groups and so-called 
"organized crime". 	
 
All of these groups were defined within international humanitarian law as social formations 
and conglomerates with a minimum degree of cohesiveness, and certain duration in their 
violence campaign (Krause and Milliken, 2009, 203). However, in the post-cold war era, 
violent non-state groups with relevance in politics became common (Halliday, 2001, 37). 
Some showed clear international (or global) agendas and actions, but most focused on 
national, subnational, and sometimes very local agendas. However, combined with the 
existence of previous groups that already had violent actions (some of them with a long 
history), the study of what has been called "violent non-state actors”	commenced. As Stathis 
Kalyvas stated, "Studying war now (after the cold war) calls for taking internal conflict 
seriously — a hard lesson for hard-wired scholars to take on state unity and dismisses non-
state actors as secondary" (2010, xi). The use or threat of violence became a catalyst to 
distinguish specific kinds of non-state actors. Grouping them into a more limited, neat 
category became epistemologically convenient, even though some of the original problems 
of conceiving of non-state actors remained.	
 
Nevertheless, is a violent non-state actor always or only violent? Asking this is crucial 
because it takes the analysis to the matter of legitimacy. Violent non-state actors can select 
from a diverse gamut of choices to obtain their goals. For instance, using the concept of rebel 
diplomacy, Bridget Coggins argues that rebels “[…] often dedicate significant time and 
attention to non-violent, diplomatic engagement and that the scope, direction, and timing of 
their efforts can help us to better understand the dynamics of contemporary civil war”	(2015, 
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99). According to her, rebels are capable of (and sometimes encouraged) to develop rebel 
diplomacy in their relations with other formal and informal authorities. This idea offers 
insight into the interplay between violent and non-violent tactics, and shows that without 
such and understanding a big part of the story can be missed. But if rebels can negotiate and 
use non-violent resources, why continue to call them violent non-state actors? To answer, we 
must address how violence is understood in this research.	
 
The concept of violence involves a whole conceptual dilemma and has been understood from 
many perspectives (symbolic, structural, implicit, etcetera). Above all, this research seeks an 
operational understanding. Rather than selecting a static definition, three authors works serve 
to sketch a conceptual outline of violence in the context of this study.12 This outline uses 
three phases to identify violent practices in the context of those actors seeking legitimacy: to 
recognize different sorts of violence and how they might connect; to understand how violent 
social contexts are built through violent connections; and to analyze the function of 
legitimacy in those cases and contexts. For the first phase, regarding recognizing violence 
practices, Johan Galtung´s (1990) ideas are useful. As he states, violence can be 
subcategorized into three different clusters. The first one, direct violence, is the most evident 
and easy to recognize; an individual beating or killing someone else is a banal but simple 
illustration. The second is structural violence, defined by marginalization, humiliation, and 
denigration of the subjects (this has a profound link with social order notions analyzed 
above). However, Galtung includes cultural violence, which involves “[…] the symbolic 
sphere of our existence –	exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical 
science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize 
direct or structural violence”	(1990, 291).	
 
For the second phase, regarding the understanding of how violent social contexts are built, 
Philippe Bourgois (2005) proposed the idea of a continuum of violent actions. He 
characterizes violent expressions as interconnected or associated actions, rather than isolated 
events. That opens possibilities to understand how violent people can also become victims 
of violence, but also to understand violence as social action attached to social context, rather 
than ephemeral acts. Finally, Hannah Arendt's definition from On Violence (2006) will be 
helpful for the third and final phase. Her thesis went against Freudian perspectives of what 
violence is. She did not think of it as irrational conduct by an ungoverned side of the human 
mind. She argued that violence always needs to be justified and, sociologically speaking, it 
is not an end itself but a means to an end. Hence, those “ends”	or “goals”	may be rationalized 
and so it should be with the use or threat of violence – which will have a direct relation to 
expected ends. Since those ends can be rationalized and attributed to a group or an individual, 
 12 For instance, the World Health Organization has a common definition of violence, which at least ignores 
social problems around the phenomenon: “Violence is the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened 
or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high 
likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation”	(WHO, 2014, 2).	
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the means to achieve it will by definition be rational, as Arendt argued: “Violence, being 
instrumental by nature, is rational to the extent that is effective in reaching the end that must 
justify it”	(1970, 79). Hence, the use or threat of violence actually works as a catalyst to 
conceptualize violent non-state actors within the rest of social groups competing for 
legitimacy. In other words, violence helps us to distinguish some non-state actors from the 
rest.	
 
Sometimes, the use or threat of violence is not enough to categorize the so-called violent non-
state actors. What difference or similarities exist between them? That is relevant because, 
while they may be categorized into this group, that does not mean that they are always equal 
or even of the same category, especially given their complexity and variety. Researchers must 
distinguish and classify them to identify and understand their particularities (Schultz, Farah, 
and Lochard, 2004; Vinci, 2006). However, this work always runs the risk of oversimplifying 
phenomena. While some scholars have focused on creating a list of the many and different 
actors that could fit in because of their activities, some others like Vinci have focused on 
categorizing them with a political interest rather than academic. Considering the problems of 
mobilization faced by rebels, this type of work faces the problem of categorization as a tool 
to improve effectiveness in confronting insurgents and terrorists (2006, 61). 	
 
In order to present a progressively multi-dimensional understanding, Miklaucic proposes a 
typology to examine what he calls illicit power structures through four successive analytic 
‘prisms': their ideologies, motivations, actions, and structures (2009). For this research, it 
will be a practical but ontological decision to distinguish them from two angles, namely: if 
the violent non-state actor shows interest or attempts to become legitimate; and by the use or 
threat of violence as a way to claim authority in three stages: current activities related to their 
agenda, social performativity with the formal ruler and ruled, and the pursuit of goals. 
However, the research focuses on Miklaucic prisms (and those three elements will be limited 
to criminal groups). The next section characterizes these groups.	
 
1.3.4. Criminal Groups: Characteristics of a Violent Non-state Actor Regarding Legitimacy 
 
In a rigid legal sense, crime and criminals refer to behaviors prohibited by law in a given 
time and space, which leads to a discussion of a non-legitimate people or activity from a 
normative perspective of legitimacy. But regardless of how it’s categorized, this activity and 
its perpetrators have powerful consequences for how society is shaped. Social reality 
(including criminals and criminal activity) is contingent, and what is criminal can become 
legitimate or even legal (and vice-versa). In other words, crime may achieve legitimacy 
(descriptive legitimacy). How this happens can be translated into specific questions: Why 
may some of these criminal groups call for legitimacy? What are the sources and resources 
of that legitimacy? And what does that mean for power configuration in those places? 
Chapter 2 addresses these issues at length with regard to empirical cases, but here follow 
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some brief notes. The aim is to locate and identify criminal groups as a specific sort of violent 
non-state actors and address conceptual problems over them.	
 
Of all the possible violent non-state actors, criminal groups are only one of them, but they 
represent the academic interest of this study. Following Krause and Milliken, we are 
specifically looking for those social formations which, when dealing with legitimacy 
aspirations, attempt to generate artificial distance, either from the government or from people, 
by showing a degree of cohesiveness (with or without leadership), and certain duration in 
their violence campaign. That distance, built through discursive elements, violence, symbolic 
elements, etcetera, lets them produce the image of a differentiated social group within a 
society. Even when this works as a representation, it highlights two relations: one with formal 
authorities (most of the time, the idea of the state itself), and another with the idea of 
“common people”. The idea of a separate group, criminal and violent, but striving to become 
legitimate, has empirical consequences which this research is aware of. Arjona, Kasfir, and 
Mampilly offered some thoughts on this when talking about rebels.	
 
When rebels secure territory, they must decide how they will interact with local residents. They can 
rob and rape them, they can recruit them, they can ignore them, or they can try to govern them – for 
better or worse. The choice a rebel group makes is always momentous for civilians. A surprisingly 
large number of rebel groups engage in some sort of governance, ranging from creating minimal 
regulation and informal taxation to forming popular assemblies, elaborate bureaucracies, schools, 
courts, and health clinics. Some also focus on organizing non-combatants for commercial pursuits”	
(2015, 1).	
 
This idea relates to how literature and legal codes have attempted to define organized crime. 
Given its complexity, that task has become interesting but problematic. According to Grégory 
Auda, it was in the New York Society for the Prevention of Crime issue of 1869, where 
“organized crime" was used for the first time (2009). Its original use was to describe migrant 
Italian communities in New Orleans and New York, which were supposedly related to 
Sicilian mafia. However, phenomena of mafia and crime became complex during the 
twentieth century, and broader, profitable and global during post-cold war era and the 
beginning of twenty-first century. German scholar Klaus von Lampe has collected more than 
200 academic, legal, and institutional definitions of organized crime (and keeps counting...) 
(2019), which illustrates the need for more accurate terms to describe and understand the 
phenomena of criminal groups, especially from a legal perspective (Serrano and Berdal, 
2002, 8). 	
 
Conceptual complications on this topic have increased over time. Unlike what happens with 
other academic concepts, the debate appears divided between exhaustive characterizations of 
criminal behaviors that allow authorities to find parties guilty, and complex elaborations to 
explain complicated criminal phenomena. Difficulties to define the topic clash with formal 
and intellectual efforts to delimit it. Paradoxically, the main problem to do so seems to be the 
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ambiguity, that is, the flexible and multi-interpretable ways in which this definition has been 
discussed. For instance, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, define it in the following manner: “‘Organized criminal group’	shall mean a structured 
group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the 
aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offenses established in accordance with this 
Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”	
(2000). Ambiguity is the essential component of this definition. 	
 
A large variety of actors fit this definition, all guilty of the same illegality and the same 
behavioral ontology. Lumped together in this definition are not only drug traffickers and 
kidnappers, but fraudulent financial institutions like Lehman Brothers during 2008 financial 
crisis and non-regulated street vendors bribing corrupted police officers to sell legal 
commodities in Mexico City. Each of these clearly involves some financial trickery, reflects 
planning and coordination, and causes some unspecified harm to society. But classifying 
them in the same category obfuscates rather than clarifies. In addition to formal definitions, 
there are also imaginary constructions of what organized crime is; it happens in every society 
with criminal concerns and is shaped by media (from journalist constructions to cultural 
productions), legal and political discourse and, in a less direct way, also by the academic 
discourse. Hence, organized crime also becomes politically defined – as happens with most 
social concepts. But the conceptual problem is real: it results from the necessity to 
simultaneously address legal, social, academic, and political problems.	
 
Von Lampe pointed out that there is a risk and an opportunity when dealing with definitions:	
“[…] ‘organized crime’	 may evaporate in the hands of diligent researchers but [the 
opportunity is that] a lot will have been learned along the way about patterns of criminal 
cooperation and about illegitimate power in the hands of those who systematically and 
collusively violate or circumvent the law to the detriment of the common good”	(2002, 197). 
In this research, we understand criminal groups as the organization of crime as a social 
phenomenon, rather than a completely separate social group. Moreover, when dealing with 
legitimacy, this organization of crime will involve 1) illegal activities, but also the effort of 
2) creating the image of a cohesive, unitary organization with its own identity, 3) acting and 
performing in accordance with this identity, and 4) efforts at achieving or preserving 
legitimacy. Criminality is also understood as non-lawful conduct, which may fit into the first 
point referenced before. Both questions, how and why, will be answered in this research, and 
particularly with the cases analysis in the following chapters. 	
 
Meanwhile, this explains why we adopt "criminal group" rather than "organized crime" as a 
noun to refer to them. Kasper Hoffman stated that: “Part of the allure of a rebel group is its 
promise of a new and better society. Yet it is simplistic to think that rebels always stand in 
opposition to the existing socio-political order”	(2015, 159). This is especially relevant when 
talking about criminal groups. Given that these groups are primarily motivated by economic 
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gain, could they also be interested in social and/or political change? Answers, of course, 
depend on specific cases, but none of these groups can avoid taking a position towards the 
socio-political order. Mainly because the current socio-political order is, in fact, the order in 
which those profits were possible and available in the first place, the analysis focuses largely 
on how this process happens. The next chapter describes how to tackle this problem 
methodologically.	
 
1.4. Closing Remarks and Summary of Chapter 1 
 
Given the vast academic work on political legitimacy, this research proposed the division 
between normative and descriptive political legitimacy. This twofold perspective helps this 
research to make operative a definition of political legitimacy. Between how political 
legitimacy should be (normative) and how it could be (descriptive), this research opts for the 
latter, while recognizing the relevance of the law and moral norms. Thus, state and non-state 
actors (especially illegal and violent ones) can perform practices of legitimation. Hence, even 
when the legality is a powerful source of legitimacy, it neither guarantees or denies political 
legitimacy. As a collective accreditation of political fiction, legitimacy is understood here as 
a social process building, rather than as a fixed conceptual unit. Consequently, political 
legitimacy will be perpetually attached to the socio-political setting of each analyzed case as 
well as to the local historical circumstances.  Growing from those ideas, this chapter 
elaborated five considerations to design an operative definition of political legitimacy to 
empirically trace it under a descriptive perspective. 	
 
The first consideration addresses both ruler and ruled when defining legitimacy. The second 
consideration concerns recognizing the contingency in which legitimacy is built, i.e. its 
locality, temporality, and rationality. Thirdly, given that legitimacy is a relational concept, 
the hypothesis of legitimate parallel authorities’ coexistence needs to be considered. The 
fourth consideration concerns the historical legitimacy-building process. Finally, as an 
ongoing process, the fifth consideration addresses the continuous necessity of the legitimate 
political actor to reconfirm itself and its legitimacy. In this regard, contingency becomes the 
rule and, as an ongoing process, leads legitimate political actors to a “never definitive 
victory”. Deeply connected with this, this chapter also elaborated concepts closely related to 
political legitimacy such as the social order, sovereignty, and the state. By adopting the 
anthropology of the state as a conceptual framework, this chapter highlighted specific ideas 
emerging from these three concepts. 	
 
The social order is understood here as a set of social organization patterns that give societies 
predictability. In this regard, social order connects with legitimacy because it is through the 
latter that political actors change the former. It starts by altering the relationship between the 
ruler and the ruled, and follows by modifying collective ideas of belonging, cohesiveness, 
legality, trust, and sharing a common destiny or general will. Sovereignty was understood 
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here as a practice that could be more or less exercised by either state or non-state actors. 
When performing sovereignty, the same actions might also be read as practices of legitimacy. 
The state is understood not as a merely static body made up of officially recognized figures 
and institutions, but is dynamic, flexible and composed of multiple parts, legal and illegal, 
legitimate and illegitimate, official and unofficial. Thus, specific communities can mirror 
many functions and practices of the state. Moreover, as a more organized part of these 
societies, rebels will be capable of and interested in doing so. This is what sets the path for 
non-state actors to achieve political legitimacy. Finally, rather than organized crime, this 
chapter proposed the category of criminal group, a type of violent non-state actor involved 
in legitimacy struggles by performing an artificial separation from the rest of society.	
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Chapter 2.  
The Ghost of Robin Hood: Tracking Legitimate Crime 
 
Among many violent non-state actors (including rebels/social bandits such as militias, 
guerrillas, and those labelled as terrorists), it is common to find interest in and concern about 
achieving legitimacy. For them, the primary motivation is often characterized as political, 
based on their discourses and narratives. Others, such as those we’re calling criminal groups, 
who’s interests are ostensibly economic, may in fact also pursue courses toward legitimacy. 
Behind many violent non-state actors' activities, pragmatic economic explanations often 
overlap with political goals, as when illicit profiting is made easier by obtaining social 
recognition or corrupting official authorities. But when criminal groups take part in complex 
legitimation processes, they begin to influence formal political processes as well as the local 
social order, and their effects on society are as much social and political as they are economic. 
By seeking legitimacy, these groups contest who, what, and how authorities previously 
portrayed them as illegal and, consequently, illegitimate. Hence, this becomes a social order 
contestation.	
 
But are all criminal groups, in fact, rebels or social bandits? Are all illegal agents rebels? To 
answer, this chapter guides the analysis through four questions involving crime and 
legitimacy: what, who, why and how. What refers to the concepts of crime and illegality in 
terms of political legitimacy. Limits and analytical possibilities for both normative and 
descriptive perspectives of legitimacy are reviewed in this section, together with the relation 
of crime with social (dis)order. The second part critically answers who are the criminals by 
understanding crime as social phenomena rather than the activities of anti-social individuals 
and groups. The third part addresses why criminal groups and illegality may become 
interested in legitimacy. Finally, by incorporating analyses from the chapter 1, the fourth and 
final section deals with how criminals attempt to become legitimate.  
 
With this general analysis established, we proceed to the specific research cases in the 
following chapters. This last section is used as well to synthesize the methods and 
epistemology behind the data collection for this research. It recovers past discussions to 
explore how legitimate attempts empirically take place. In other words, the methodological 
design prepared for this research is briefly explained –which intends to be useful to conduct 
research that specifically studies criminal groups seeking legitimacy. First, we examine the 
sources and resources of legitimacy and how they are used in order to achieve goals. This 
section ends with a relevant discussion for this research: What happens with legitimacy in 
contesting contexts? That is a specific interest in understanding if it is possible or not for two 
or more political actors to simultaneously share political legitimacy, this is, within same time 
and space. Answers and particularities around these questions synthesize both richness and 
relevance of the research.	
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2.1. Crime and Illegality as Social Phenomena 
 
This first section digs into what criminality is, and shows how the so-called underworld often 
seamlessly meshes with the world. By understanding the social basis of crime, the extent to 
which it is part of the social order becomes clear. In that respect, we will keep an eye on the 
transformation of the criminal, the informal sovereign, into	“a law unto himself”	(Hansen and 
Stepputat, 2005, 32). This is an exploration of a specific kind of criminal behavior that 
endeavors to produce legitimacy through performing the sovereignty that is supposedly 
exclusively a state capability. That could mean producing or reproducing the experience of 
government, but not only that.  Many sources or resources of legitimacy could be used. In 
this regard, the idea of criminality will be understood as that “zone of darkness”	and "[...] the 
perennial outside, an unruly and originary source of sovereign life, and thus a necessary 
condition for any claim to establish and defend a social order" (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005, 
32).	
 
This analysis focuses on the legitimacy endeavors, and not necessarily on determining if they 
were successful or not. After a political actor becomes legitimate, the literature tends to 
separate the governance process into three aspects: output (about governing for the people), 
input (about governing by the people), and throughput (about ruling with the people) 
(Mazepus, 2017, 4-5; see also Schmidt, 2013). However, here our focus is on the legitimacy 
attempts made by criminal groups in contemporary times. That discussion needs to take into 
account how illegality shifts its interest into becoming legitimate, including the specific 
efforts, and not in what happened in a hypothetical case in which those attempts were 
successful.	
 
The discussion is guided by the concept of political legitimacy to do so. Following the same 
literature categorization made in the first chapter, the first section locates how criminality is 
understood from a normative perspective of legitimacy. The second part turns to the 
descriptive perspective and makes the same analysis to argue how this latter perspective 
offers a better analytical opportunity for studying criminality linked to political legitimacy 
processes. Finally, this section ends making considerations around illegality becoming the 
heart of the social order, rather than a source of disorder. What happens when violence, 
insecurity, and lawlessness are not part of a contextual crisis but the context itself? Is crime 
always a sign of disruptive social behavior? How does political legitimacy help to explain 
scenarios without legality but with a determined social order? Answers to these questions are 
elaborated in this section as well.	
 
2.1.1. Illegal Is Illegitimate: Limits of the Normative Perspective 
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From a normative perspective of political legitimacy, illegality is illegitimate by definition. 
Not only the legal approaches but also the philosophical perspectives around political 
legitimacy do not leave space for considering crime or its perpetrators as legitimate.  
Moreover, these two perspectives (philosophy and legal approaches) usually go together 
when analyzing illegality. The power of this link comes from the fact that the spirit of the 
legitimacy consensus resides in the current law. Following Duff: "[...] the criminal law 
purports to declare and enforce authoritative standards of value, in particular of moral value: 
it claims the authority to tell us how we should live, and to enforce its demands on us if we 
disagree or disobey" (2013). The normative perspective links legality with legitimacy by 
assuming that law is created with the people's general set of moral beliefs. Thus, people know 
they should act following the rule of law and that officials are legitimate who promote that 
behavior above all (Tyler, 1990, 19-20).	
 
Following this understanding, when the law stops being a legitimate reflection of that 
consensus (often materialized toward a social contract), democracy offers mechanisms 
through which changes or updates are made. Therefore, what is outside of the law is illegal, 
thus illegitimate, and it always will be. The only possible change happens within the law. 
Moreover, this angle does not focus on the political dimension of lawmaking and law-
enforcement, that is, when the law is the consensus of those with political power, rather than 
a broader population, which is closer to what the social contract pretends. The role of 
authority within this perspective is sharply associated to the one who followed the legal paths 
to achieve power. Consequently, no criminal can become a legitimate ruler, simply because 
the sole condition of being illegal disables any legit condition. Classic legal, ethical, and 
moral definitions of crime and illegality fit in this perspective. Together with punishment, 
here illicit behaviors are attached to measure and identify actions that damaged the public 
together with options to restore damages (Lamond, 2007). Therefore, no criminal can give 
benefits to the people except when he or she is already punished or as part of that punishment. 	
 
Additionally, because of the rigid role that ideal-type notions play in these perspectives, 
crime and criminals tend to look like fixed entities. However, while the former opens a bit of 
space for change, the latter reinforces the illusion of being perpetually illegal. In the case of 
crime, the illicit behavior, possible social changes affecting how an illegal practice 
transforms into a socially accepted one, is reconsidered through legal paths that legitimize it 
and, consequently, it becomes legalized. However, in the case of criminals, the story is 
different. It is not possible to "legalize" a criminal, only to make them recognized as a 
liability, and pay the punishment. Hence, criminal actors are merely a source of social 
disorder (by reaffirming and validating current law), but they could never create social order 
while illegal, since they are perpetually illegitimate (more ideas about crime and order come 
later in this chapter).	
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Finally, it is necessary to consider that law is not enough for this analysis but takes part in it. 
Cases of political legitimacy concerning illegality, even when they cannot be explained 
exclusively from a normative perspective, need to take into account how legality works in 
the big picture. In the end, criminals attempting legitimacy are constantly dealing with a 
narrative that helps to justify their illegality. Given that the law is not a big enough blanket 
to cover illegal actions, fairness and justice beyond the law will help to do this job. In other 
words, given that criminal actors cannot claim or look for legality as a source of legitimacy, 
they need to look for new or renewed sources and resources of legitimacy (Duyvesteyn, 2017, 
673). Resorting to legal paths does not mean forgetting the interest in legitimacy. However, 
even then, it is necessary to insist that the law remains relevant as an analytical element. 
These elements continue being considered on the descriptive grounds of legitimacy, which 
is the basis on which this research is developed.	
 
2.1.2. Illegal But Legitimate: Towards Descriptive Grounds 
 
The descriptive grounds of political legitimacy open possibilities for making illegality 
legitimate. A fundamental reason for this is that every disciplinary angle included in this 
perspective works with change. Even when some disciplines may work as well with ideal-
types, an ongoing empirical debate suggests certain conditions in which a crime or criminal 
could be considered legitimate. Moreover, exploring actual cases gives an opportunity to 
include particularities that could go against the idea of the law as the main source of 
legitimacy. This is especially relevant for unlawful contexts, where corruption and mistrust 
in official authorities could undermine obedience to the law. In the short and medium term, 
interdisciplinary approaches combining anthropology, sociology, and political science allow 
for a conceptualization of criminals becoming legitimate without taking into account changes 
in the law or dominant morality. In the long term, social flux between legal and illegal can 
be studied through historical analysis. 	
 
This perspective identifies variations in people´s decisions towards legitimacy. As a relevant 
audience for legitimacy, it is not possible to argue that people always consider legitimate 
what (or who) is legal. Many reasons can be working around each decision; however, a 
descriptive perspective of legitimacy opens the door for these phenomena. In the words of 
Arjona: "Insofar as people make choices considering the alternatives available to them, 
identifying the range of those options is an essential step toward theory building. Yet for the 
most part, the literature on civil war and organized crime are mute about this" (2017, 756). 
That could also be said for legitimacy literature outside the descriptive viewpoint. Regarding 
legitimacy as well as criminality, to look at regular citizens’	behavior in contexts where 
criminal groups have a presence, may suggest that there is space for being legitimate without 
being legal.	
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Following the idea, the descriptive angle of legitimacy opens space to recognize different 
ways in which legitimacy is materialized. This idea is especially relevant when talking about 
crime, because violence, coercion, and fear can also shape how legitimacy becomes useful 
for the criminal groups. People cooperating (or not) with criminal groups are the two 
possibilities; however, following the debate on legitimacy, here we focus on the cooperating 
options as expressions of this descriptive viewpoint. These actions range from support, 
collaboration, and assistance, to participation, or even omissions, when discussing crimes 
with official authorities. All of them might be happening, and possibly more than one at the 
same time. For instance, Arjona said that obedience is a central form of collaboration (2017, 
757), but in the meantime, people might be collaborating with the group as well. Again, fear 
and violence could be the trigger this. In any case, these possible behaviors enable the 
creation and maintenance of local orders that criminal groups tend to create and from which 
they gain benefits. Related to this outcome, “the order” is explained in the following section.	
 
2.1.3. From Illegal to Legal: Changes in Social Order  
 
After explaining how crime is understood from both perspectives, in this section links 
between crime and social order are explained. Is criminality a component that increases social 
disorder and vice-versa? Moreover, is social order possible in contexts of high criminality? 
From a normative perspective, the answer is clear: crime always goes against the social order 
– the only one, inserted into the current legal frame. Moreover, criminals are seen as 
destabilizing agents that put at risk any possibility of order. On the other hand, the descriptive 
perspective can explain possible social order scenarios in which legality is even wholly 
absent. The idea of social disorder (i.e., the hypothesis of social order’s absence) brings other 
relevant questions. How should we understand contexts where violence, conflict, and chaos 
are not temporary periods of crisis, but are normal? This task points to the study of places 
where crisis are not context, but crisis acts as context (Vigh, 2008).	
 
The starting point is to consider the changing power of criminals and their activities in their 
contexts. Often in these circumstances, crime stops being the exception and becomes part of 
daily life, followed by rules, living standards, and social exchanges. They are all ingredients 
in the complex social order in which a paradox happens, namely, crime becomes the rule. 
These hypothetical scenarios again are not fixed and require constant legitimacy in an attempt 
to maintain the status quo. Social order is both an input and an outcome of these struggles. 
Following Arjona:	
 
NSAGs [non-state armed groups] often transform the daily lives of those living in areas where they 
operate. Their coercion, violence, and disruption of formal and informal institutions can give rise to 
disorder, where locals experience high levels of uncertainty. However, these groups also bring about 
new forms of social order, where civilians and combatants tend to follow clear rules of conduct 
allowing for stable patterns of behavior and interaction to emerge (2017, 756).	
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Among these rules, criminal groups might tend to create regulations in political, economic, 
and social functioning. By doing so, these groups could set the basis for 1) establishing the 
dominant order, and 2) expecting obedience from people in the local area. In the long run, 
establishing this sort of local order becomes more convenient than coercive measures, even 
when there is no definitive formula on how to balance carrots and sticks. In the end, criminal 
groups will always be dealing with the task of justifying illegality. Furthermore, through this 
order, the groups will be able to obtain "[...] resources, accessing political and social 
networks, putting into practice their ideology, and gaining the recognition and reciprocity of 
local residents" (Arjona, 2017, 760). This idea explains why the social order is possible in 
contexts of criminality – even when it is not the desirable one concerning peaceful 
coexistence and democracy. 	
 
It is not possible to say that every criminal group, in every case, will make attempts to build 
and maintain its order; however, those who do not do so run the risk of resistance coming 
either from locals or official authority. In the end, the decision to establish a particular social 
order (or at least participate in its definition), is what enables us to distinguish criminal groups 
involved in political legitimacy struggles. Thus, the link between crime and social order is 
defined by political legitimacy. Criminal activities, as an illicit behavior defined by a specific 
legal code (approved, spread, and validated through official mechanisms following its 
legitimacy settings), may become a source of social order through the interest of a group in 
doing so. Those groups organize and concentrate the criminal activities within a defined time 
and space, and their boundaries tend to be blurred. Hence, when a criminal group participates 
in the definition of social order, it gets involved in a discussion of legitimacy, and these 
phenomena can only be explained from that perspective.	
 
2.2. The Fiction of Counter-Society Actors 
 
A possible heritage from the descriptive perspective is the fallacy of thinking of criminals as 
agents against society (unable to live in society or to create social order). After almost fifty 
years, Hobsbawm’s “social banditry”	 concept was revisited. Dutch anthropologist Anton 
Blok pointed a lacuna in this sociological category: “What seems wrong with Hobsbawm’s 
perception of brigandage is that it pays too much attention to the peasants and the bandits 
themselves. Before looking at them, it is necessary to look at the larger society within which 
peasant communities are contained […] Given the specific conditions of outlawry, bandits 
have to rely very strongly on other people”	 (2001, 18). Blok’s critique reconsiders the 
criminal’s role in society while upgrading society’s influence on criminals. This statement 
needs attention given that, as stated earlier, illegality is a sociological output. In the end, 
societies define legal and illegal through their established rules, institutions, and mechanisms. 
Moreover, if bands or criminals are not isolated characters but social agents, then this needs 
to be taken into account when analyzing criminal phenomena. 	
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Following this perspective, as counter-society agents or counter-state actors, criminals 
destroy society rather than create it, and break the rules without creating others. Therefore, 
illegality seeds chaos and needs crisis to exist. That is part of the reasoning of why criminals 
should be separate from the rest in jails and prisons (Foucault, 1995, 257). How true is this 
statement? This section answers that question using two analytical angles. First, by 
translating the blurred boundaries idea fully into a crime and illegality perspective. And 
second, by understanding the social circuits in which illegality works, involving many actors 
that do not enable to always strictly separate legal from illegal. However, despite the 
difficulties of grasping criminals as counter-society actors, some criminal groups make 
explicit and rational efforts in order to distinguish themselves from the rest. This feature helps 
maintain the discussion on political legitimacy.	
 
2.2.1. Blurred Boundaries: Crime and Illegality 
 
As discussed in the last chapter, boundaries between state and non-state actors tend to be 
blurry. However, when talking about criminal actors, this may become even more confusing. 
Law and illegality may become an obsession within “disordered societies”, even a fetish 
(Commaroff and Commaroff, 2006, viii). For instance, several governments around the 
world have declared wars against crime (including drug-traffickers, piracy, smugglers, etc.). 
Within those wars, the discourse tends to portray the idea of people acting against society, 
considering them enemies that should be eliminated (the specific case of Mexico will be 
explored in the following chapter as part of the first research case). By considering the 
criminals as “them” (as opposed to “us”) the idea of the social contract is destroyed, and with 
it, any notion of a social collectivity (Matravers, 2011, 81). People can play different roles in 
society: a citizen can simultaneously be a taxpayer, public officer, and a criminal. 
Acknowledging this simple fact exposes the myth of criminals as hypothetical outsiders to 
society.	
 
The original context of Gupta´s blurred boundaries concept was developed to identify 
difficulties in recognizing the border between state and society in specific contexts. How is 
this idea helpful for a crime and legitimacy discussion? In the first place, it suggests where 
crime begins and ends, that is, the extent to which criminals are apart from society, expelled 
from the current social order, and capable or not of creating a new one. In the end, this debate 
recognizes, in the last section of this chapter, that some criminal groups will be interested in 
portraying the myth of separate social agents from the rest as a legitimacy strategy. Maybe, 
in this case, counter-society is not the precise description, but "outside agent" could work. 
Thus, it is necessary to consider that, despite the narrative efforts and other symbolic 
representations of criminal groups, there is no such criminal agent as a counter-state actor. 
That is precisely because society and its codes (legal, moral, ethical) are what give crime its 
condition (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012, 125). Moreover, criminals’ efforts to justify or 
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change the current codes, and attempts to become legitimate, should be understood as a social 
change, but not as an activity against society.	
 
2.2.2. The Myth of the Counter-Society: Circuits of Illegality 
 
The second element to argue against understanding criminals as agents against society is to 
examine how crime works – especially the crime that requires organization. The expansion 
of crime during the post-cold-war era coincides with market liberalization, 
telecommunications improvements, and the sophistication of financial services. These 
processes are linked. Following Andreas, the promotion of free-market reforms and the 
prohibitions of the illicit drug market are based on an opposite philosophy (2013). While the 
ultimate goal of the free market is to maximize trade and avoid state intervention, the 
prohibitionist frame developed by several governments around the world aims precisely to 
the contrary, that is, to suppress the market through state intervention. Both projects 
theoretically cannot work together, but in practice they do. The state supposedly avoids direct 
market interventions, it takes an active part in controlling and stopping illicit trafficking. A 
similar apparent paradox happens with mafias and criminal organizations around the world: 
on the one hand, these groups operate flexibly, often copying the operations of legal 
corporations, and looking for the benefits of trade liberalization and new types of financial 
instruments. 	
 
However, on the other hand, these same groups tend to play the role of the state by carrying 
out services that the government no longer performs (Commaroff and Commaroff, 2006, 16), 
and at the same time function in some ways as traditional enterprises. From a criminological 
viewpoint, the economic perspective needs to be discussed. Based on a homo-economicus 
and rational choice perspective, it suggests that crime is just an option or kind of decision 
made within a wider economic context. For instance, inspired by utilitarian sociological 
elements, Becker worked on an economic approach to crime and punishment to develop his 
ideas. According to Becker, crime operates in a context in which everyone counts with 
enough information to decide. Thus, to commit crime becomes a rational choice based on the 
analysis of all available information (Becker, 1968). His findings seem closer to an economic 
model than a criminal behavioral approach; moreover, political and social implications 
remain relegated to a second level of importance. Legitimacy, of course, does not play a 
significant role from this point of view.	
 
It is certainly common to study both illegal activities and criminal groups (i.e., organized 
crime) as an exclusively economic activity. Following ideas close to Becker´s work, 
prioritizing rational choice perspectives, this understanding assumes that profits (as the 
variable) and economy (as the discipline) are the analytical tools par excellence to 
comprehend it fully. Following this logic suggests that current illegal drug production may 
become lawful without changes except for the chief controlling the business (Wainwright, 
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2016, 266-267). Of course, economics matter. The financial stakes involved are enormous, 
and certainly motivate the business and what happens in between (Wainwright, 2016). 
Illegality makes the business increase across borders, for instance. However, economics are 
neither the last nor the only variable involved. Political interests are involved and are also 
analytical variables, as the legitimacy perspective suggests. An answer to apparent conflict 
lies in the circuits of illegality. It helps to recall the notion of blurred boundaries while 
explaining how criminal organizations function. 	
 
Empirically, despite the efforts to separate criminal members or groups from “the rest”	of 
society, both criminals and non-criminals are embedded in social circuits in which certain 
legal actors also enable illegality. Within these circuits, social interactions take place, 
including legal and illegal behavior. Goods and benefits circulate through these channels but 
a wide variety of social expressions, as well. Thus, a non-criminal individual can be in touch 
with a criminal one, and form a circuit, as when an illicit drug consumer buys substances 
with the local dealer in a context in which consumption is not punished but sale is. Another 
example that draws this complexity is corruption. Often, corruption works as the tool that 
keeps illegality flowing (Ackerman, 1999). Is that corrupt public officer acting somehow 
outside of the state? The answer is no, and even more, that officer still forms part of the 
circuit of illegality, creating society rather than going against it. In any case, neither criminals 
nor non-criminals stop being part of the social circuit and, as a result, neither stops being part 
of society. That is why crime and illegality are more usefully understood as social circuits of 
illegality, despite certain political actors’	efforts to draw a contrasting group or counter-
society actor toward its own agenda, identity, and features (Escalante, 2012, 80-86). More 
on this perspective on crime will be elaborated in the following section as part of a discussion 
on the importance of criminal agendas.	
 
2.3. Criminal Agendas and the Performance of Legitimacy 
 
Why do criminal groups become interested in political legitimacy? Despite the complexity 
of drawing a sharp line between legal and illegal, specific criminal groups and individuals 
might portray themselves as either or both, depending on the circumstances and their specific 
goals. That is the first step towards legitimizing criminality, namely, to promote the idea that 
despite illegality, there is a higher cause that deserves attention and social respect. Not all 
illegal actors take this approach: legitimate-crime-circumstance seems to be more an 
exception than a rule. Even those criminal groups that indeed are dealing with political 
legitimacy dilemmas are unlikely to do so perpetually. Therefore, both criminals and 
illegality need to be understood as social phenomena, and the question of why a criminal 
group becomes interested in achieving political legitimacy deserves an answer centered on 
the specific social conditions (i.e., spatial, historical, and political) that enable this possibility 
in the first place, and then to consider the criminal actor’s particular features.	
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This section explores why criminals seek political legitimacy while referring to previous 
arguments. Next, the analysis focuses on the role of criminal groups’ justifications. Is crime 
always objectionable or punishable? When actors seek to cover crime and violence with the 
blanket of legitimacy, how is this defense constructed? This section elaborates on this 
perspective to understand why these groups may or may not become interested in legitimacy. 
Finally, the discussion explains the relevance of the agenda to understand why criminal 
groups seek legitimacy.  That explanation helps to guide the next section (which discusses 
how to do research and look for criminal groups’	attempts at legitimacy in the field) and to 
promote a general reflection useful when going deep into the following research cases.	
 
2.3.1. Lessons from Diverse Scenarios 
 
As part of an in-depth comparative study, Wolff asked himself why two different drug gangs 
in two different Brazilian cities developed such different authority functions towards local 
people (2015). Both gangs, one in Recife and the other one in Rio de Janeiro, were developing 
similar activities for a long time inherently related to drug trafficking and extortion. However, 
the Rio gang did develop sophisticated techniques, structures, and practices with the local 
population. This gang also developed a “[…] territorial monopolization […] that these groups 
could credibly offer protection to residents who […] sought them out to perform the most 
basic functions associated with the Weberian state”	 (Wolff, 2015, 22). On the contrary, 
Recife´s criminal gangs remained underdeveloped from the organizational perspective due 
to the lack of necessity to do so. That was because, in Recife, police presence has been much 
less violent than in Rio, in addition to a lack of people´s confidence in putting local gangs in 
charge of local security. Wolff´s research becomes useful from several perspectives. 
However, to answer why criminal groups may look for political legitimacy, context matters 
in terms of the relation between criminal groups and locals, legal authorities, and especially 
territory (i.e. geographical and spatial issues). The territorial monopolization of crime 
generates the needed conditions for these groups in order to expand and deepen their social 
and political functions with locals (Wolff, 2015, 23).	
 
This perspective certainly offers a rational perspective in which both criminal groups and 
locals make deals and exchanges with expectations on both sides, although a certain level of 
uncertainty regarding these expectations should be acknowledged. Nevertheless, this angle 
underlines the radical differences in how criminal groups interact with both locals and official 
authorities, either in terms of developing authoritative structures or effectively providing 
public goods. In Recife real threats to criminal gangs’ activities and business seemed not to 
exist, while in Rio local gangs have extensive experience of doing so in order to preserve 
profits. In this regard, the role of the official authority becomes relevant. Given the previously 
explained conceptual complication on defining who the illegal party is when analyzing 
criminal and legal authority struggles, rather than just look for the presence or absence of the 
idea of the state, it becomes important to focus on what kind of state is making or not presence 
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together with how these criminal groups react to this while relating to the space and to locals. 
As Wolff explains:	
 
[…] Populations have a preference for both social order and material welfare over disorder and 
destitution, and they will tolerate or attempt to seek out some form of political authority to provide 
such benefits where they are lacking […] Criminal enterprises will seek to establish political and social 
control of territory in the absence of an effective authority that can mitigate the costs of illicit market 
competition […] Specifically, where the state is incapable or unwilling to effectively investigate and 
punish homicide, criminal groups will attempt to protect themselves by securing territorial sovereignty, 
which serves as a safe zone for market activity as well as physical survival. To the extent they achieve 
this, they may resemble primitive forms of predatory states […] Criminal groups will invest in 
improving their relationships with their host communities in order to reduce the cost of that control 
[…] which by coercion alone may be exorbitant (Wolff, 2015, 22-23).	
 
Every society develops mechanisms and mediations to resolve conflicts, enforce contracts, 
and administer scarce resources. Seeing how they work helps to understand the criminal’s 
interest in legitimation. Wolff showed that criminal groups would not always develop an 
interest in legitimacy, including creating strong authoritative functions, providing public 
goods, etc. Context matters when developing an effective control of those mechanisms and 
mediations in the long-term run. Because boundaries between legal and illegal often blur, 
this process will not be completely “criminal”	or completely “legal”, and may be legitimate 
or not – as we would expect from the descriptive perspective.	
 
Another example comes in the case of Jamaica, where an authority´s functions and personnel 
overlapping process produces what Jaffe called the hybrid State, i.e., “[…] an emergent form 
of statehood in which different governmental actors [including criminal organizations] are 
entangled in a relationship of collusion and divestment as they share control over urban 
spaces and populations”	(2013, 735). She explains how several political formations emerged 
on the island and shared authoritative and administrative functions together with the official 
and legal authorities. Jaffe described how, from time to time, collaborations between local 
gang leaders and the police became the practical way to negotiate peace and order at the local 
level in Jamaica. Especially in marginalized urban areas, in order to shape and develop the 
authority, bureaucrats and illegal actors used both state functions and symbols. By doing so, 
these actors often worked together with the legitimacy of the so-called dons, local gang 
leaders that operate as brokers between legal authorities (i.e., the police) and local citizens. 
As a result, this hybrid state also produces and normalizes a hybrid citizenship (Jaffe, 2013, 
740). This case confirms not only that certain concepts become reconfigured as a 
consequence, but also that the blurred boundaries can also outline the current political 
legitimacy structure.	
 
2.3.2. Legitimate Justification: Does Crime Always Need to Be Justified?  
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Usually, the question of why lawbreakers attempt to become legitimate is closely related to 
a justification discourse. However, especially criminal groups with an interest in political 
legitimacy often deal as well with difficulties in managing and justifying violence. But 
violence can also be deeply productive in legitimizing a figure or organization by defining 
the limits of order and supplanting representation (Commaroff and Comaroff, 2006). Usually, 
the use of violence is not indiscriminate and instead has real objectives: “More violence then 
leads to less legitimacy; less legitimacy leads to even more violence and so on”	(Schneckener, 
2017, 805). And as Gambetta stated, “Being violent does not make one generally credible 
[…] [and] The smart criminals must seek alternatives to violence”	(2009, 123 and 125). 		
Peaceful means toward legitimacy such as criminal diplomacy, corruption, and alternative 
non-violent methods offer possible alternatives in this regard. When there is an interest in 
legitimation, any violence must be rationalized, as Arendt has argued, and the narratives 
justifying and rationalizing that violence will relate to how the criminal group understands 
its goals as well as the (legal and social) context (Schneckener, 2017, 803). Typically, these 
strategies involve both incentives and punishments, threats and promises, or ‘carrots and 
sticks’	 in colloquial terms. The success or failure of adequately explaining rewards and 
punishments among the different publics may make or break a campaign for legitimacy. 	
 
When analyzing criminal justifications, social conditions are fundamental. The criminals’	
justifications may come together with certain forms of social order restorations and material 
benefits for locals such as alternative policing and regulation instauration (Commaroff, 2010, 
134). Behind the possibility for a criminal to justify himself, herself, or their actions, there is 
a pluralist democratic specter that gives space for alternative visions of truth and justice. 
Following Nivette´s idea on how democracy and crime come together, “[…] democracies 
face the constant challenge of balancing principles of individualism and inclusion with 
tensions brought by weak ties and self-expression”	 (2014, 99). In the end, even atrocity 
discourses need room for developing alternative visions of life and politics –and citizens need 
to respond with critical understanding. In this regard, these processes also reshape ideas about 
citizenship by redesigning how locals experience their rights in relationship to criminal 
groups. These groups may not only control (or seek to control) public life, but also develop 
a speech of belonging and generate new responsibilities, sometimes including citizen support 
(Arjona, 2017; Nivette, 2014, 94; Jaffe, 2013, 745).	
 
If violence is always rational, then it needs to be justified even when it is not explicitly 
explained. This is equally true for crime and legitimacy. Common to all are binary 
explanations of social contexts codified into "friend" and "enemy", "us" and “them", and 
indeed this is common to governments around the world when facing criminal threats. Armed 
groups talk about "[...] 'defense' or [acting as a] 'guardian' of an established political and 
social order and claim to protect it from internal to external threats and enemies" 
(Schneckener, 2017, 799). However, justification does not automatically lead to legitimation: 
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it is only a step. The discourse needs to be coherent, convenient, and convincing, as well as 
consistently developed. Dagher has argued that non-state actors in post-conflict contexts 
seize state legitimacy. This scholar uses the concept of performance legitimacy, and says it 
is as a by-product of delivered governance outputs (2018, 91). His proposal is attractive on 
descriptive grounds of legitimacy, in which no legitimacy is perpetually granted. However, 
it is necessary to recognize that this phenomenon could be dialogical (Bottoms and Tankebe, 
2012): the official authorities can lose performance legitimacy in favor of criminal groups; 
illegal agents may also lose it to any other state or non-state agent.13	
 
Criminality often works as the “[…] imaginative prism around which people [try to] figure 
out the problem of social dis/order”	(Comaroff, 2010, 135). Behind that discourse, especially 
at the local level, there is a crisis in how authority is exercised that affects how security and 
law enforcement is understood and expected. Ironically, some criminal groups (among 
others) take advantage of this crisis in order to develop their own criminal rule in order to 
reduce this uncertainty. The key concept to understand is sovereignty, since it can justify 
crime. Stepputat proposed “formations of sovereignty” to conceptualize those political 
landscapes in which several sovereign claims coexist and overlap (2015). This concept 
developed with Hansen pushes beyond the idea of sovereignty as a practice, challenging the 
notion that legality is the only valid way to define social order. Extralegal practices can also 
promote alternatives of social order, and provide fertile grounds for criminal groups 
interested in political legitimacy to find room to justify their actions and themselves. The 
relevance of this concept resides in its flexibility to recognize different claims continually 
struggling against each other. Legitimacy is what finally locates one of them above the rest. 
In the end, any justification of crime is tacitly accepted and conforms to criminal agendas, 
and every claim is articulated and empirically materialized.		 	
2.3.3. On the Importance of Criminal Agendas 
 
Criminal agendas are usually positioned in relation to the current social order. This could be 
explicit or implicit, physically located or developed through symbols, speeches, songs, codes, 
or done in other ways. Through their agenda, criminal groups strive to justify their actions, 
point to a social renovation, or target specific or general issues or groups or regions. Criminal 
agendas are not exclusively attached to violence or coercion; violence will be involved in a 
justification when legitimacy is sought. In these cases, selective violence becomes a 
convenient method for administrating power and, consequently, this defines the limits and 
possibilities for other forms of obedience. If violence is indiscriminately used or becomes the 
only or exclusive source of order, obstacles quickly appear for the criminal group. Their 
 13 Together with Bottoms and Tankebe (2012), Nivette (2014, 96) also underlined Weber´s usage of the word 
“cultivate”	 when talking about establishing a dominant legitimacy (1964). Weber used it as part of the 
establishing process of legitimacy, and suggests the non-perpetual condition of the concept, together with its 
necessity to constantly reinforce political legitimacy.	
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criminal activities not only become harder to realize or just impossible, but also people and 
other authorities (including the official one) can easily create resistance by decrying the lethal 
force used (Arjona, 2017, 764). The risk, in that case, is non-cooperation from local people 
and, consequently, the criminal group´s social order project disruption. In this case, 
legitimacy aspirations will be dropped.	
 
The relevance of the agenda also explains why groups may look for legitimacy. As a political 
instrument, the agenda draws lines towards a political justification where crime and violence 
may be discursively situated as a secondary consequence. Within the agenda, economic 
profits, violence, and harm are subordinated to a political project in which the general will 
commands the cause, rather than a private interest or individual´s benefit. The agenda is 
always discourse. Thus, the expectations of completion are not as relevant as the means, 
symbols, and practices through which it is spread. The detection of the agenda will depend 
specifically on each case. It will not always be written. Speeches, symbols, anthems and 
songs, rituals, and other means are essential resources to detect, rationalize, and study it (as 
it will be explored in the next and last section of this chapter). Indeed, not all the criminal 
groups' legitimacy interests will be into the agenda –even when this one is explicit or implicit. 
Possible interests may be outside the agenda itself. Each case will define each of these 
possibilities, but within all of them, the agenda may become functional in order to carry out 
this kind of research.	
 
Some criminal agendas not only present groups as trustworthy but also inspire trust among 
locals, as well.14 This practice tends to improve success in illegal business by developing 
local civilian control. Some criminal groups have adopted that practice and started relying 
on local people, whose obedience could be due to fear, real loyalty, rational convenience, or 
a complex mixture of these reactions. On the other hand, criminal groups in this scenario 
may recognize that, by having confidence in locals and establishing trustful relations with 
them, the former can achieve supplies, intelligence, shelter, and recruits (Valentino, 2014, 
94). In these cases, criminal groups act similarly to some insurgencies and rebels. However, 
unlike them, criminal groups do not often face limited resources troubles. Thus, it becomes 
interesting to see that material resources or violence may not be enough legitimacy sources. 
Some scholars have conducted research focused in Mexico and Colombia on how trust is not 
always or automatically a positive feature to promote peaceful societies. By comparing 
Italy´s North and South, Putnam initially said that social capital is always a positive societies´	
feature towards a democratic consolidation (1993). He explained the mafia´s presence as a 
result of a lack of social capital in Southern Italy. Conversely, these scholars argue, the 
 14 Trust Exchange between criminal groups and legal authorities offers a criminal agenda possibility as well. 
However, in this case, this relation is more precisely defined by concepts such as corruption or the blurred 
boundaries mentioned before. 	
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question of whom the people trust and why is more relevant than the presence or absence of 
trust and social capital.	
 
By borrowing the concept of social capital (also developed by Pierre Bourdieu and James 
Coleman), Aguayo stated that social capital might vary into a positive or negative shape. In 
the first one, people support democratic values including the rule of law, and in the second 
one, the support goes for crime and criminals (Aguayo, 2014). On the other hand, Rubio 
observed how social capital might turn "perverse" by rewarding criminality practices that 
promote, protect, and preserve both crime and criminals (Rubio, 1997). From another 
perspective but on the same topic, Zizumbo-Columba proposed that high levels of trust 
within given communities do not always signal positive legitimacy for the dominant ruler 
(2010). By studying the case of vigilante groups in Mexico, he observed that high levels of 
cohesion might imply obstacles to cooperating with the ruler. Conversely, in this case, locals 
will find more incentive to trust and cooperate with vigilantes because these vigilantes are 
often more in touch with local welfare than the legal authority.	
 
After reviewing specific experiences, the role of justifying, and criminal agendas relevance, 
this section closes by briefly summarizing a full explanation of why criminal groups become 
interested in political legitimacy. That answer is threefold. In the first place, because of a 
historical and political context that enables and allows it. Part of the answer of why criminal 
groups look for legitimacy is simply because they can do so. Hence, it becomes relevant to 
explain what enables that by looking into local politics and history. Criminal groups may also 
become interested in political legitimacy because achieving it is essential to guarantee 
domination or social control by granting access to resources. Finally, crime (even more than 
criminals themselves) will always need a justification when the perpetrator explains it. 
Criminals, in general, always have the option of preserving them as regular criminals by not 
challenging the status quo; this is, by respecting the established social order in which 
criminals are mostly explained as a consequence of deviant behaviors that deserve 
punishment. On the other hand, by justifying their actions, these actors indeed challenge the 
established order. This fact locates them under political specter and, when conveying 
aspirations to legitimacy, criminal groups contest who, what, and how previously pointed 
and pictured them as illegal. Hence, this becomes a social order contestation. That last point 
is remarkably relevant and takes to the ideas previously elaborated within this research, 
namely, the idea of violence as an instrument to achieve specific goals.	
 
2.4. Sources and Resources of Legitimacy 
 
The study of criminal groups attempting to become legitimate needs multi-disciplinary and 
trans-disciplinary investigation. However, how to track the footsteps of these Robin Hood-
like figures? How does one collect this kind of data within contexts of criminality? 
Depending on the case, sociological, political, and anthropological elements might be 
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involved. Researchers might face two problems. The first one concerns the data collection 
process (what and where is the source); secondly, how to analyze them (which involves two 
tasks: how to understand it as a single piece and, later on, as a part of the big picture). The 
methodology proposed here is threefold. First, a theoretical and conceptual approach is 
presented. How can we combine social and political concepts regarding criminal actors and 
its legitimacy interest, with anthropological tools for the detection of practical and symbolic 
elements? The second component focuses on the audiences of the legitimacy claims. Who 
are the spectators for these claims to legitimacy? The third and last element refers to the 
sources and resources of legitimacy detection.	
 
This dissertation has argued that there is not a single way to become politically legitimate. 
However, this argument brings a new question: Which sources and resources grant 
legitimacy? How a violent non-state actor becomes legitimate needs to be understood as a 
social process. But it will be always expressed and attached to specific symbols (Schlichte 
and Schneckener, 2015, 417), and practices (Förster, 2015, 204) embedded in social contexts. 
In order to make this phenomenon academically legible, these expressions will need to be 
systematically categorized and empirically recognized. This final section keeps those 
thoughts in mind. This analysis addresses the problem of the origins of legitimacy, 
particularly its sources and resources. In other words, here we are interested in categorizing 
what produces legitimacy. What sources and resources matter for violent non-state actors (in 
general) and criminal groups (in particular) to become legitimate? 	
 
2.4.1. Anthropology of the State and Legitimacy for Research on Crime 
 
Before exploring the sources and resources of legitimacy, I discuss the methods. What is 
argued here is that state-idea and its outcomes are 1) profitable sources and resources to 
achieve legitimacy and 2) a useful analytical method to follow up this phenomenon. By state-
idea we will understand the reification of the state´s institutionalized practices that take on 
“[...] an overt symbolic identity progressively divorced from practice as an illusory account 
of practice”	(Abrams, 1988; quoted by Mitchell, 2006). This method can be employed for all 
those who pursue political legitimacy (including violent non-state actors), and even for the 
state itself. Hence, state outcomes may be profitable for those actors, even when they do not 
want to become official governmental entities or legal authorities (sometimes more 
legitimacy can be collected outside the rules than within them). This method proposes to look 
at the reproduction, emulation, or simulation of the state in legitimacy´s quests among 
political actors (including the state itself, which needs to reaffirm itself, even when this is not 
the interest of this research). 	
 
To do so, two key concepts will be used: the “state effect” (Mitchell, 2006), and “statehood 
practices” (Aretxaga, 2005; Maldonado, 2014). The former recognizes that the state is 
defined by a set of practices, processes, and their effects (Trouillot, 2001; Krohn-Hansen and 
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Nustad, 2005).15 On the other hand, the latter refers to too many players competing to 
perform as small states within same time and space. Both fit into the scope of practices of 
sovereigns discussed earlier, by enabling the understanding of this behavior within non-state 
actors. States, as social processes, are constantly being remade, even in its absence. In this 
constant flux, the state does not necessarily disappear or weaken. A hypothetical state 
collapse does not necessarily means the end of all state outcomes. Here is useful a brief 
example. Criminal groups defy the state´s legality, but while doing so, they make use of state 
resource (for instance, local currency) in order to achieve profits from their activities. Thus, 
that criminal group is reinforcing the state’s authority by making valid its currency. 
Simultaneously, the criminal group is challenging and reinforcing the state. This becomes 
even more complex when violence is involved – further chapters will come back to this 
theme. 	
 
As stated earlier, investigations on legitimacy have been discussed with an eye on the state. 
Either by being the legally valid guarantor or acting as the formal procedure endorser (just to 
mention two of many reasonable arguments), the state shapes the usual path through which 
the legitimacy process happens. That might indeed be a heritage of European political 
modernity, but nowadays this can be found within political configurations all around the 
world. How to deal with that concept in an investigation where the core is neither the state 
nor its components? The proposed solution addresses the state image as an analytical 
component when looking for legitimacy attempts. In other words, this proposal does not 
throw away the state element when talking about criminals attempting to become legitimate. 
On the contrary, the idea is included and considered, but from a "practices and images" 
perspective.	
 
In the first place, we follow state in society idea explained earlier (Migdal, 2005). This 
concept leads us to observe that a) the state is a field marked by the use or threat of violence 
and b) that there are potentially many agencies participating in each state-building process. 
In this case, the “who”	and “what”	of the state means several actors operating simultaneously 
as the “real”	authority. The methods to do so (i.e., the “how”) involve legitimacy attempts in 
which practices, symbols, images, and performance matter as sources to analyze the process. 
In this case, criminal groups pretending to become a sort of local Robin Hood is one of those 
 15 It is valuable to recover and keep in mind Mitchell´s own words on state effect: “We should address the state 
as an effect of mundane processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, 
supervision and surveillance, and representation […] These processes create the effect of the state not only as 
an entity set apart from economy or society, but as a distinct dimension of structure, framework, codification, 
expertise, information, planning, and intentionality. The state appears as an abstraction in relation to the 
concreteness of the social, a sphere of representation in relation to the reality of the economic, and a subjective 
ideality in relation to the objectness of the material world. The distinctions between abstract and concrete, ideal 
and material, representation and reality, and subjective and objective, on which most political theorizing is built, 
are themselves partly constructed in those mundane social processes we recognize and name as the State”	(2006, 
185).	
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agencies acting in the field marked by the use or threat of violence, i.e., the state. Once the 
criminal group gets defined as one of those agencies, the second step consists of looking in 
the field for de facto sovereign practices (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005). That is the second 
conceptual tool. When many actors are playing and performing state functions, the monopoly 
of violence may collapse. 	
 
In that case, sovereignty becomes a practice that could be exercised or withheld by the legal 
authority (Krasner, 2001). Thus, it might be employed simultaneously by many actors. This 
might happen with high possibilities of violence. Non-state actors, especially violent ones 
such as the rebels mentioned earlier, may fit into the possible scenario of a fragmented 
sovereignty and try to exercise it. This does not necessarily mean that criminals will entirely 
sidestep legal authority. While some of them could look for legitimacy through the state (like 
Pablo Escobar in Colombia), some others might do so outside of it. With rebels in general, 
this is particularly important because their distance from legal and formal authorities often 
marks their course to legitimacy. The final possibility is the already mentioned set of concepts 
(state effect and statehood practices) and helps to illustrate those de facto sovereign practices. 
Even in the absence of the state, populations can reproduce the experience of it based on 
previous experiences (Förster, 2015, 204). Criminal groups in particular, as an organized part 
of these societies, can do so as well. By doing so, these actors start thinking in legitimacy 
terms, and their activities, goals, and relations become shaped by this interest. 	
 
The use of this methodology does not mean to automatically study criminal groups (or any 
other rebel group nor non-state actor) as if they were the state. On the contrary, this takes 
into consideration that, through a legitimacy review, 1) there might be scenarios in which 
non-legal and non-official agents could perform as the state. Moreover, 2) in those situations, 
criminals will not always act as purely economic and rational agents. That challenges the 
economic oriented explanations of criminal behavior (Becker, 1968) by taking them to 
political and sociological analytical stages. Finally, this 3) enables the possibility of scenarios 
with legitimacy without legality. For research purposes, it does not matter as a first concern 
if criminality is illegitimate, but if the illegality may attempt or succeed to become legitimate. 
To do this analysis, we take three conceptual tools from the anthropology of the state, all of 
them relevant to conduct this kind of legitimacy research.	
 
Therefore, the state is directly and indirectly a valuable source and resource of legitimacy 
either by a) statehood practices and b) state effects. But, why is the state´s image still 
powerful when pointing to sources and resources within current legitimacy disputes? This 
leads us to disaggregate the state´s success in its historical process of consolidation, its role 
in symbolic and legal disputes, and in successful concentration of the use of violence. Charles 
Tilly´s thoughts are helpful for keep thinking on this. According to him, war making, 
extraction, and capital accumulation, were elements that shaped European modern state 
formation. However, none of those elements would have been possible without successfully 
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monopolizing the use of violence within their territory. In the beginning, this violence was 
one source among many, recognized Tilly. He distinguishes between the state's use of force 
and anyone else’s (use or threat of) violence. However, the taming of the latter was essential 
for the former´s success. 	
 
That was the first step in making the state´s claim to violence credible (1985, 172-173). In 
this regard, at least two signs of the success of European states are: 1) massive pacification 
and 2) the monopolization of coercion means. Tilly draws a political entity, challenging with 
other political forms and authority claims, and looking for it makes its own violence credible 
for others. What is the difference between those first European states and current violent non-
state actors looking for legitimacy? The answer recognizes that nowadays, the state´s image 
often acts as the hypothetical legitimate, a sort of phantom with implicit legitimacy. Violent 
groups, when looking for legitimacy, may borrow, steal, withdraw, emulate or simulate that 
image by producing state effects. In brief, the understanding of sovereignty as a practice will 
enable this method. This research takes the ethnographic understanding of the state, including 
both its practical and symbolic settings, towards building upon how criminal groups, in 
particular, might make use of the state image when pursuing political legitimacy. 
 
By making power exercise objective, this anthropological perspective of the state helps to 
research and understand how authority becomes established in the local context. Moreover, 
it highlights a complex vision of the ruler and the ruled by recognizing it as a non-definitive 
process. In other words, just as the state-building process varies from case to case, so do the 
type and features of the actors involved in it. This includes, indeed, those non-formal and 
non-legal actors. This is the niche in which this research builds upon previous works, i.e., by 
taking this methodological instrument to the field of criminal groups particularly interested 
in becoming legitimate. Violent phenomena within societies are especially helpful for 
clarifying this, but there are other areas in which it may happen, including taxation, justice, 
and identity, among others. But this will be the main topic of next section, which categorizes 
proposals of the audiences of legitimacy, and the sources and resources of legitimacy. Both 
are presented in the following sections in order to make them recognizable in specific 
empirical circumstances. 
 
2.4.2. The Audiences of Legitimacy: Four Types 
 
Given that legitimacy is a relational concept (especially from a descriptive perspective) –
someone has to give or withdraw it; thus, someone may win or lose it –	there will always be 
audiences. This section aims to address the question of who they are and how to classify 
them. This task becomes essential especially for fieldwork as these audiences could work as 
robust sources of information. By categorizing them, the researcher cannot only recognize 
them but also collect valuable data by conducting interviews. Audiences of legitimacy (legal 
or not) often distribute their credits to several authorities simultaneously (Hansen and 
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Stepputat, 2005, 4). Moreover, they evaluate them and participate in local political processes 
by giving, withdrawing, or transforming legitimacy.	
 
However, it is not necessarily the case when violence, threats, and fear define the outputs of 
legitimacy attempts (as is usual when talking about criminal groups). After all, these 
audiences have not only witnessed the legitimacy struggle (as a captive audience) but also 
participated in it (by giving or withdrawing it). In this regard, we follow the Schlichte and 
Schneckener proposal. Initially, they proposed it thinking of rebels. However, this 
classification fits into criminal studies because it responds to the legitimacy problem. They 
identified four types of audiences (2016, 419 and 2009, 248). Below they are listed and 
explained in the context of researching criminal groups:	
 
a) Inner legitimacy audience inside the group. This is the hardest audience to reach 
for a researcher. Commonly, journalists, or NGO works and recently social media 
outputs on them are the easiest way to approach them. In this case, any self-expression 
from the group becomes of the first importance for the data collection. In the case of 
Michoacán, for instance, there is an editorial legitimacy attempt. By the publication 
and spread of many books, the local mafias pretended to present themselves as the 
actual legitimate power, a sort of local savior from the other powers and authorities. 
In this case, the criminal group members are the core example of this audience.	
 
b) Supporters and followers within the local population, some of whom might 
eventually join the fighting ranks. In this case, the difficulty for a researcher to 
establish direct contact increases. Especially when the criminal groups are still active 
or influential in the local context, risks become higher, but their role is still crucial in 
order to explain the case. Another complication with this audience is to legitimately 
recognize if they are honestly supporting the criminal group or just responding to fear 
or threats. In any case, with this audience, it is possible to indirectly detect legitimacy 
features through secondary sources such as media or virtual expressions in social 
media. Other secondary sources include codes, moral beliefs, behavior, practices, 
rituals and other elements from which this audience may be part of (the last section 
of this paper take a broad look into this). Local supporters and adherents, too, are 
examples of this audience.	
 
c) Specific local communities or a broader national audience. Particularly the locals 
become a robust source of information. However, contextual elements can inhibit or 
promote their willingness to talk. As said earlier, fear, insecurity or local codes linked 
to these emotions could impede the flow of information. However, these passions can 
originate into the exact contrary scenario; this is, promoting people to talk about this. 
Trusting the researcher is fundamental. Local religious members, local merchants, 
and peasants are representative members of this kind of audience.	
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d) The international arena, comprising of states, international organizations, 
transnational NGOs, foreign media, and spontaneous supporters either groups or 
individuals (but necessarily outside the conflict zone). Except for media and the 
supporters, this audience becomes the most institutional audiences, often expressing 
their positions through official statements. The relative distance from local 
phenomena usually makes this audience the easiest to approach for a researcher. 
Media, on the other hand, could oscillate between direct and indirect sources. Often, 
locality is what defines this. Any representative of those national or international 
institutions, such as the journalists themselves, are examples of this audience type of 
audience.	
 
The four audiences may help to obtain empirical data on how criminal actors developed 
themselves in a legitimacy code. However, those audiences are not fixed. The reason is that 
legitimacy status invariably changes as part of numerous contingent social processes. This 
“never definitive victory”	in their legitimating process (including the state), take actors to 
reinforce and recreate their legitimacy over time. To conduct this research, we got access to 
at least one informant from every audience type for each case. In total, this research obtained 
access to eighteen interviews (see Interviews Appendix). All of them should be considered 
audiences, in their local contexts, of the criminal groups' political legitimacy attempts. They 
are audiences since they were directly exposed to one or several sources and resources of 
legitimacy (see Table 1 explained below). In some cases (such as journalists, magistrates, 
churchmen, and activists), they also had experience working with victims of criminal groups 
in their localities, and even working to fight the criminal groups.  
 
That makes them valuable information sources, not only as the previously mentioned 
legitimacy audiences, but also as knowledgeable citizens in their context. A semi-structured 
interview was conducted with each participant. These interviews were codified later through 
the Atlas.ti software guided by the referred Table 1, which provided the analytical tags that 
also made operational the sources and resources of political legitimacy. The priority in every 
testimony and interview was detecting, understanding, and analyzing the local narrative 
habits around the matter of interest for this research, and locating them in the analytical frame 
explained earlier to offer an original and in-depth explanation of the phenomenon. Finally, 
in order to implement the comparative perspective analysis, the same methodological criteria, 
conceptual apparatus, and theoretical frame were applied to both research cases to maintain 
the comparability of the research. 
 
2.4.3.  Sources and Resources of Legitimacy: Where to Watch 
 
The sources and resources of legitimacy usually make sense in very local dimensions. For 
the effects of this research, one might understand a source of legitimacy as the point of supply 
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from which emerge the actual legitimacy resources. In other words, a source of legitimacy 
acts as a semantic field from which specific legitimacy resources can emerge. Thus, each 
resource links to a source category. For the definition of sources, here we follow Schlichte 
and Schneckener again. For them, resources might subcategorize into three types: a) 
symbolic (what they say), b) performance-centered (what they do), and c) portrayal of the 
enemy (outside threats and established enemy images) (2015, 417-418). Those types work 
as semantic fields from where precise legitimacy elements may emerge, i.e., the resources. 
Therefore, each resource operates as a singular piece of material or non-material display 
through which sources of legitimacy and general attempts to become legitimate become 
visible and analytically operative.16 
 
Each of the three sources of legitimacy, conceptually created by Schlichte and Schneckener, 
work as semantic fields. However, this research builds on their work by developing the idea 
of resources of legitimacy, i.e., material and immaterial legitimacy efforts that concretely 
objectify every source of legitimacy. The result of this work is Table 1, presented below. 
This table is an original contribution of this research specifically designed to research 
criminal groups interested in political legitimacy. For instance, both material as well as non-
material resources of legitimacy in Table 1, result from an original research design taking the 
discussion of the anthropology of the state, towards the criminal groups' legitimacy 
phenomena. Seen from that perspective, all of these resources result from condensing the 
understanding of sovereignty and statehood as practices, but explicitly applied to the 
characteristics of a particular violent non-state actor, i.e., the criminal groups. Finally, the 
intention of expanding the sources of legitimacy idea into a broader spectrum of resources 
helps to make concrete, operationalized, researchable indicators for every resource. 
 
Usually, given their scarcity, both sources and resources need correct management. This 
statement works for almost any political actor interested in becoming legitimate, but even 
more for violent non-state actors. Especially for them, those resources are not assured through 
time. Thus, they might have to pursue them continually. Table 1 below, presents a 
systematized proposal for studying criminal groups seeking legitimacy. All of them match 
with perspectives of statehood practices, state-effect, and sovereign practices. For rebels in 
general and criminal groups in particular, former state experiences build and shape direction 
of legitimacy sources and resources (Förster, 2015, 204). This may happen either by imitating 
or changing how violence was used or misused, how population was or was not listened to 
in their claims, providing or denying public services in opposition to what happened with 
legal authority or how cultural identities were or were not taken into account within formal 
governmental exercise. Moreover, these groups can be conscious of previous ignored 
 16 According to Schneckener, “During the formation period of a group symbolic sources seem to be essential; 
in the long run, however, performance-based sources gain more importance for an armed group´s legitimacy”	
(2017, 807).	
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opportunities for cooperating with population or other informal authorities, and work 
together in order to achieve legitimacy. All of these possibilities, of course, are consistent 
with state-effect and statehood practices, ideas explored in the earlier section. This section is 
an operative exercise to identify, categorize, and describe sources and resources of 
legitimacy. In order to comply with the operative exercise mentioned earlier, Table 1 
presented below shows a systematized proposal to study criminal groups’ legitimacy cases.	
 
Table 1. Operative Distribution of Legitimacy Sources and Resources for Criminal Groups	
Main Source	 Subtype Source	 Material Resources	 Non-Material Resources	
 
 
Symbolic	 Social Contract Offer	 Granting Public services	 Promote belonging and cohesiveness / Trustworthy mandate	
Agenda´s Spread 
and/or Justification	 Publications / Written Codes	 Founding narratives / Songs / Anthems / Public messages 	
Symbol’s Spread	 Identity Symbols in 
Ornaments and 
Documents	 Rituals / Values, Moral Beliefs / Religiosity	
 
 
Performance
-centered	
Provision of 
Governing 
Institutions	 Taxation and Economy	 Security and Justice Managing (courts, sanctions, and judges) / Labor 
Regulations	
Philanthropy	
(Carrots)	 Gifting	 Promises and Hope Generation	
Coercion	
(Sticks)	 Weapons and Ammo Control	 Fear / Use or Threat of Violence 	
 
 
Portray of 
the Enemy	
Expressions against 
Formal Authorities	   
 
Documents	
 
 
 
Negotiations / 
Confrontations	Expressions against Other (non-formal) 
authorities	
Stance towards 
current law	
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Together with the conceptual approach and the audience category, this table intends to offer 
the possibility of identify, treat, and systematize their data, but to compare between cases as 
well. For instance, by recognizing which of the sources or resources have greater or fewer 
legitimacy efforts, it is possible to draw a criminal group profile, which has to be inserted 
later into a broad historical explanation. Finally, this research needs to address violence from 
an academic perspective, since the legitimation process for criminal groups often involves 
violence. Violence act as a means rather than an end, an instrument to achieve goals (Arendt, 
1970). Its employment might be regularly understood concerning those actors´	goals and 
codified into a legitimacy language. Many variations and mixes between how this table may 
work are possible because these groups are neither completely part of nor foreign to the social 
environment in which they are inserted: 	
 
No matter how radical the political vision of a rebel group, its practices are always embedded in 
historically contingent values, norms, beliefs, and forms of governance. Thus, a rebel organization, 
which is endogenous to the political order within which it rebels, cannot avoid drawing on common 
cultural and political values (…) Indeed, rebels who fail to cultivate legitimacy among the civilian 
population act at their own peril, since they must rely on civilians for recruitment, intelligence, taxes, 
supplies, and labor (Hoffmann, 2015, 159). 	
 
Thus, in a way, attempts to deny legitimacy claims to these groups may be like trying to 
detach them from their own social contexts, an impossible mission. Relations between the 
ruler and the ruled consistently redefine their settings. Thus, social sciences studies can raise 
interesting questions. Is it possible to share legitimacy within same time and space? If so, 
does this sharing happen by peaceful or violent means? What does it depend on? 
Furthermore, these enable another subject, the hypothetical "without-legitimate actors 
scenario". In other words, is a social context without legitimate political actors possible? 
Specifically when referring to criminal contexts looking for legitimacy, it does not seem to 
be empty spaces. This is because formal and legal authority will always literally exist on the 
ground by symbolic, practical, and/or legal paths. Its presence/absence will always 
distinguish legal from illegal and, hypothetically, punish the illegal. 	
 
That is why certain criminal groups become deeply profitable – the following chapters will 
go deep into this discussion through empirical references. A criminal group or individual will 
a) contest this potentially lost legitimacy; b) share the same legitimacy, or c) create new 
spaces to claim and win legitimacy. In any case, this deactivates situations in which formal-
legal authorities´	legitimacy is lost and no other actors can claim it. Violent non-state actors 
in general and criminal groups in particular, often or even never count on with legality; 
however, on the other hand, there are specific efforts of these groups looking and/or 
achieving legitimacy for themselves of their activities. Addressing this problem requires a 
combination of epistemological efforts and descriptive paths, i.e., specific cases with 
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empirical references. That is the philosophy behind the following case chapters analysis. 
They are briefly presented below.	
 
2.4.4. The Michoacán-Sicily Connection: Towards Two Criminal Legitimation Processes 
 
After reviewing the theoretical and conceptual dilemmas around legitimacy, crime, and 
social order, now comes the case analyses. The next two chapters analyze Michoacán social 
and political context, followed by the criminal legitimacy´s local context. In this regard, the 
criminal groups that appeared in the last two decades in Michoacán, a Southwestern state in 
Mexico, are the central research case within this comparative study. The following chapter 
exposes both context and criminal legitimacy´s local context in Sicily, a southern island in 
Italy in which a long-term mafia group has existed for centuries. Thus, Sicilian mafia works 
here as the second case that enables the comparison. That is why the sixth and last chapter of 
this research thoroughly discusses a comparison between both cases in order to expand the 
horizon of these phenomena, both conceptually and empirically.  	
 
Antonio Mazzitelli, a former representative of the Mexican branch of the United Nations 
Office on Drug and Crime, published an academic text entitled “Mafias in Mexico?”	(2016). 
Mazitelli argued that, despite the proliferation and expansion of Mexican criminal groups 
within the war on drugs, most of these groups are still far from the success and maturity of 
Italian mafia groups. According to him, the international fight against organized crime 
“speaks Italian”, thanks to and as a consequence of these criminal organizations’ success 
(2016, 29). Moreover, the author suggested that Mexican authorities need to understand that 
criminal threats are not as developed and organized, neither has the long-run history as for 
how the Italian mafia is and has. After this statement, Mazzitelli analyzed, described, and 
compared each of the biggest criminal groups in Mexico against the Italian mafias. After 
doing so, he recognized that only the Michoacán criminal group developed proto-mafia 
behaviors. Moreover, these groups received “high”	 and “mid-high”	 qualifications when 
analyzing the “mafia features”	of each Mexican criminal group (2016, 52).	
 
Even when Mazzitelli recognized a huge gap between both criminal groups’ national 
scenarios (i.e., Mexico and Italy), he also stated that the Italian experience might be helpful 
for Mexican authorities and scholars in order to prevent the formation of similar structures 
as it happened in Italy (Interview in field no. 2, 2017). This idea is academically borrowed 
here; thus, the Sicilian case as a long run case study is recovered to compare with the closest 
case, i.e., Michoacán criminal groups. By doing so, the following pages delve into both cases 
offering original data recovered from primary sources (and secondary in some instances), 
and are analyzed in terms of political legitimacy. This pushes the discussion towards 
improving the understanding of how political legitimacy is reshaped by criminal groups 
around the world in specific social and political situations. Naturally, the previous concept 
and theory discussion guides the following chapters and shape the analysis.	
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2.5. Closing Remarks: Chapter II Summary 
 
After elaborating how crime, criminal groups, and illegality come together with political 
legitimacy, the following are closing remarks thoughts derived from this second chapter. This 
chapter argued how, despite the criminal groups' efforts to portray themselves as separate 
social groups, they are embedded in a social context. As politically active social 
constructions, they influence the local social order. Not all criminals or criminal behaviors 
achieve, gain, or produce legitimacy. However, when this is the case, the descriptive 
perspective of political legitimacy is what enables us to carry out research. As political actors, 
when a criminal group deals with legitimacy, it will consequently deal with the sum of 1) 
illegal activities, but also the effort of 2) creating the image of a cohesive, unitary identity 
organization, 3) acting or performing like it, and looking for 4) achieving or preserving 
legitimacy. Under this conception, participation in the local definition of political legitimacy, 
criminal groups´	illegal behavior does not mean abandoning efforts at legitimacy.	
 
This chapter argued why criminal groups are not counter-society or counter-state actors. 
Empirically, criminals and non-criminals are embedded and interacting in social circuits in 
which certain legal actors also enable illegality and vice-versa. Within those circuits, certain 
crimes and specific perpetrators will seek to justify it. Indeed, behind the intention of 
justifying crimes and lawlessness, there will be a pluralist democratic specter that gives space 
for alternative visions of truth and justice. In the case of criminal groups, the agenda plays a 
fundamental role. As a political instrument, it draws lines towards a political justification 
where crime and violence may be discursively situated as a secondary consequence of crime 
and illegality. Regarding the question of how criminal groups become interested in political 
legitimacy, this chapter offered a threefold answer. First, it develops from a historical and 
political context that enables and allows it. Second, achieving legitimacy is essential for the 
specific criminal group to guarantee domination or social control by granting access to 
resources. Finally, to become justified, crime needs to be explained.	
 
Finally, this chapter made two methodological contributions for collecting data in contexts 
like those analyzed in this research – but which could also be used to research other cases. 
The first is the audiences of legitimacy. This idea was developed thinking about how to 
collect data in the field from criminal groups interested in political legitimacy. Given that 
legitimacy is a relational concept between the ruler (real or potential) and the ruled, therefore 
there will always be audiences, which become potent sources to approach to collect data in 
the field. On the other hand, this research proposed the operative distribution of sources and 
resources of political legitimacy for studying criminal groups. This table works across this 
research as a point of supply from which emerge the actual legitimacy resources. Each source 
makes sense in the local context as a semantic field from which specific legitimacy resources 
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can emerge. Insisting, both methodological propositions rest on understanding legitimacy as 
a relational concept from a descriptive perspective. 	
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Chapter 3.  
Tracking Local Robin Hoods: Criminal Groups and Legitimacy Attempts 
in Michoacán, Mexico 
 
After four years of being started the Independence war in the former New Spain (Mexico 
today), the insurgency proclaimed their independence from the Spanish crown. The 
Constitutional Decree for the Freedom of the Mexican America was promulgated in 
Apatzingán, a city now located in the Southwestern state of Michoacán,17 on October 22, 
1814. The document was symbolically relevant for insurgents’	contestation as an attempt to 
promote their own rule of law in the middle of a battle that lasted eleven years (from 1810 to 
1821). On the same day 196 years later, former Mexican president, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, 
delivered a speech in Apatzingán commemorating the anniversary of the constitution and the 
beginning of two emblematic wars in the modern Mexican history: the bicentenary of the 
Independence (1810) and the centenary of Mexican Revolution (1910). The president used 
the occasion to talk about the achievements of José	María Morelos y Pavón, the insurgent 
and independence hero who shaped the constitution and	“[…] never agreed with the enemies 
of the Mexicans”	(Calderón, 2010). Instead, he used the time to redefine the “new enemies 
of the nation”: “Today, the enemies of the nation are others, but our duty to seek equality, 
security and protect the property of citizens and their freedom is the same”, he said. Minutes 
later, the president gave a name to those enemies who, he said, are currently threatening both 
Mexico and Michoacán: “criminality”	and “illegality”	(Calderón, 2010).	
 
The symbolic element was no longer the constitution, but the place itself. Apatzingán is a 
relatively small town18 located in the middle of an interior region of Michoacán called Tierra 
Caliente (Hot Land). This region shares space with two other Mexican states (Guerrero and 
the State of Mexico), but it is principally located in Michoacán. However, Tierra Caliente 
was also the place in which local criminal groups were based and from where they have been 
operating since the middle of the 2000s (or even before depending on the version), and was 
the first battlefield of the Mexican war on drugs. Declared by Calderón himself, the war was 
announced a few days after he arrived at the presidency, in December of 2006. That happened 
in the middle of legitimacy struggles because of a close election result in which Calderón, 
from the right-wing party, won against the left-wing candidate by only 0.62% (INE, 2017). 
Some scholars have argued that war's declaration was a political reaction to electoral-crisis 
to regain political legitimacy (Meyer, 2015). However, he did not act alone, and he had the 
support of several actors when taking the decision (Astorga, 2015, 27-28). 	
 17 Actually, the current formal name of the municipality is Apatzingán de la Constitución (Apatzingán of the 
Constitution), as a reminder of the place in which the first independent constitution of Mexico and Latin 
America was signed.	18 According to the last national governmental count (measure made between each decade national census), its 
population raised 128,250 inhabitants in 2015 (INEGI).	
	85 
 
This war, however, unfolded very differently in different regions. Michoacán is Calderón’s 
home state, which was symbolically relevant towards an acceptance of his security strategy 
and, possibly, his central governance. Twelve days before becoming president, Calderón 
discussed with the Federal Congress, in Mexico City, the necessity of increasing the security 
budgets in order run military operations in the country to fight criminal groups. The first one 
announced was the so-called Operativo Conjunto Michoacán (Joint Operative Michoacán). 
In this, several security institutions, mainly the Army, the Marines, and the Federal Police 
will operate in that state with the objective of “[…] fully restore the command of government 
authority over the territory and population of that entity”	(Nuñez, 2006). Briefly stated, the 
former president presented it as the strategy “[…] to recover the normal life and tranquility 
of Mexicans who live in that state [of Michoacán]”	(Calderón quoted by Nuñez, 2006). On 
the other hand, Michoacán is also the place of atypical criminal groups. First La Familia 
Michoacana (LFM) and later Los Caballeros Templarios (LCT) were quite peculiar groups 
in their campaigns to become legitimate, especially towards local society. 	
 
The case of Nazario Moreno, the LFM and LCT leader, is a good example. In December of 
2010, he was shot to death by Mexican federal security forces. Months later, in March of 
2011, the group´s name changed to LCT and developed a strange religious cult around 
Nazario, who according to local people appeared in the towns as a saint (Nájar, 2014). 
According to versions collected through interviews carried out in fieldwork, LCT started 
making initiation rituals, while creating and spreading their code of conduct. In the meantime, 
the criminal group kept committing crimes. Nazario was killed “again”	in March of 2014, 
again by federal forces, and again in Michoacán, but during Enrique Peña Nieto's 
administration. That was how Nazario performed the art of dying twice. This chapter 
analyzes this process from a political legitimacy perspective, and focuses mainly (together 
with the next chapter) on the local criminal groups' performance. In fact, this legitimacy story 
is inserted inside a bigger one marked by the struggles of legitimacy among a broad diversity 
of political actors, both local and national, but with an interest in becoming the local ruler 
(the sovereign). 	
 
The data for this analysis comes from fieldwork conducted in Michoacán. That work is 
present in this and the following chapter through the methods described in the last section of 
the second chapter, and consists of semi-structured interviews in the field, digital 
ethnography, media and press analysis, and a literature review. First "the big picture", i.e., 
the Mexican war on drugs. This chapter describes and critically investigates how this war has 
unfolded	– and continues in relatively different circumstances. Second, this chapter presents 
an overview of Michoacán from three angles: a description of the variety of actors, a 
summary of the evolution through these years of war, and an analysis of local geography. 
Across these sections the political legitimacy perspective is highlighted. The subsequent 
chapter analyzes where local criminal groups (both LFM and LCT) are located in the 
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constellation of local political actors. The criminal group’s legitimacy analysis covers a range 
of almost a decade, from 2006 to 2014, in which these attempts can be attributed to the same 
criminal identity and agenda.	
 
3.1. The Big Picture: The Mexican War on Drugs 
 
After one month of assuming the presidency, Felipe Calderón made one of his first public 
appearances outside Mexico City. The war was already declared, and he appeared wearing 
an army suit and hat in Apatzingán, Michoacán. How to analyze and understand this war 
from a political legitimacy angle? What were their roots and consequences for Mexico and 
the region? What was the role that Michoacán played? Given that the criminal groups’ 
legitimacy attempts were embedded in this context, before analyzing them the war and these 
questions need to be addressed to contextualize the big picture. After all, those legitimacy 
claims made by criminals were coexisting and struggling with other legitimacy claims 
coming from actors involved in this war – including especially the federal government’s 
claims around the declaration of war. Following Tilly, this was a scenario of making violence 
and authority credible to others as a step towards becoming legitimate (1985, 172-173). 
Calderón, who did not have any kind of military background, had breakfast with troop 
members and commanders. He showed appreciation for the troops’ efforts in the security 
tasks carried out in Michoacán (Herrera and Martínez, 2007). The war message was not only 
sent for the army members but also for the rest of the people. 	
 
It was not that seventy years later Mexico has again an army member governing, but that the 
messages and public displays had become codified in the terms of war. General Manuel Ávila 
Camacho was, in the 1940´s, the last Mexican president with a military background. After 
his administration, only civilians held the presidency, but all sustained cordial relations with 
the troops and their commanders, occasionally cooperating in campaigns against regime 
dissidents, as in the student mobilization of 1968 and the so-called Guerra Sucia (Dirty War) 
during the seventies (Lozoya, 1984; Matute, 1977). That cooperative relationship between 
civilian president and the army made of Mexico a sort of exception in Latin America 
regarding the non-threat of a military dictatorship. Unlike from many countries in Central 
and South America, in Mexico, the army has been historically seen as "the people themselves 
in uniform" (Mexican Army High Commander quoted by Moloeznik, 2008, 163). The army 
"survived" its institutional test when the PRI, the hegemonic party during the twentieth 
century, lost the 2000 election. The army showed loyalty to the state and not to the regime. 
However, the armed forces were about to face a higher test six years later, when the war on 
drugs was declared, and the army became one of the central characters fighting it. 	
 
3.1.1. War as Metaphor: From the Symbolic Dimension to Real Consequences 
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The September 11, 2002 edition of The New York Times included an editorial by Susan 
Sontag, "Real Battles, Empty Metaphors". In her text, Sontag made a critique review of the 
so-called war on terror undertaken by the former American president, George W. Bush. That 
war, she stated, has a "[...] peculiar nature. It seems to be, given the nature of the enemy, a 
war with no foreseeable end" (2002). She used as well other references of these sort of endless 
wars such as those declared against illness, poverty, or drugs. Sontag pointed out that, given 
the nature of those assumed "enemies", which cannot be terminated, thus the war on them 
cannot strictly end as well. That is why this is a metaphorical war, but with both real and 
powerful consequences. In other words, even when the idea of war may be metaphorical (in 
which discourses and representations play key roles), death, victims, bullets, and guns are all 
too real. The "war as metaphor" idea becomes helpful to understand the Mexican war on 
drugs declared four years later, in December of 2006. This one is not the first of its kind and 
nor the last one (for instance, in 1971 President Richard Nixon declared the first war on drugs 
in the United States, which President Ronald Reagan then redeclared in 1986. 	
 
Other countries around the world have followed suit with their own wars on drugs, in places 
such as Indonesia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Iran, and more recently the Philippines. 
In very practical terms, those wars on drugs (or against organized crime) usually are no more 
than a repressive drug policy models in which security forces employ lethal force to eliminate 
drug supply and demand (Rolles, et al., 2013, 26-27). By doing so, both drug producers and 
consumers get criminalized and shape the background of this policy, which generates 
additional problems around violence, justice administration, human rights violations and an 
extensive list of atrocities codified into a war code and language (i.e., “friend”	and “enemy”, 
“good”	and “bad”, “us”	and “them”). Sontag is not necessarily dialoguing with the new wars´	
literature, whose debate attempts to improve the understanding of the changes in how armed 
conflicts happened, usually by expanding the comprehensive range of war concept (Berdal, 
2003 and 2011; Kaldor, 2013). However, her idea works together with this debate in the 
attempt to demystify the political usage of the war in crisis contexts, and explain the contexts 
of those hostile claims in which citizens (alleged criminals in this case) become enemies of 
war.19	
 
One of the legacies of the Mexican Revolution was the creation of a government regime that 
orbited around one political party. That one was, first, the National Revolutionary Party 
(PNR, founded in 1929) and later renamed as the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, and 
which remains to date as one of the leading political forces in the country). Through that 
party, the Mexican State created institutions, bureaucracies, and power structures that 
allowed it to govern with carte blanche, and with more or less legitimacy for almost eighty 
 19 Moreover, in the case of Mexico, during the first years of the XXI century, the federal government also 
launched a “war against piracy”. As a punitive strategy punishing the intellectual property rights violation, to 
some extent it could be understood as the predecessor of the war on drugs (Aguiar, 2010).	
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years depending on the time and location within the country. However, that period was not 
homogeneous. There is a stage that begins approximately at the end of the nineteen-sixties. 
Then, the Mexican political system gets transformed from an imperfect democracy (or under 
construction) and began to be called authoritarianism (Linz, 1964 and Meyer, 1977). The 
discourse of the Revolution decayed as a regime legitimacy resource (particularly after the 
student movement of 1968). Instead, the Mexican State showed a dependence on institutions 
and practices created around authoritarianism. That became the basis for the government 
exercise during those decades. 	
 
However, the eighties and nineties decades came with a gradual dismantling of the 
authoritarian regime in favor of neoliberal policies. As a result, Mexico joined the North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which officially started in 1994 in the middle of 
internal economic and political crises (specifically the so-called efecto tequila) which 
included the assassination of the presidential PRI candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, plus 
PRI´s president, José	Francisco Ruiz Massieu, and the armed rising of the Ejército Zapatista 
de Liberación Nacional (EZLN). In addition, the government started several privatizations 
of former central industries for the national economy. Six years later, the PRI lost the 
presidential election for the first time, and the right-wing party, National Action Party (PAN) 
won the presidential election. That moment in known in the literature as the failed transition 
to democracy because of the administration failures in transforming practices and structures 
from the authoritarian period. When Felipe Calderón, candidate for the same right-wing 
party, won the next presidential election with a low margin, Mexico was in the middle of the 
historical authoritarianism and young democratic attempts. 	
 
According to Astorga the cracking of the authoritarian structures, especially in the remote 
regions, produced local power structures reconfigurations, which explains the increase of 
violence and helped the government to justify the war (Astorga, 2007). In his first day, a 
couple of hours after becoming president, Calderón pronounced a discourse in which he said: 
"I know that restoring security will not be easy or quick, it will take time, it will cost money 
and even, unfortunately, human lives. However, take this for granted: this is a battle in which 
I will be at the front, it is a battle that we have to fight and that together we Mexicans will 
win crime" (Calderón stated in Núñez, 2006). Since then, many efforts were developed by 
his government to make war allusions. The discourse repeatedly turned into a binary "us" 
(the good ones) and "them" (the bad guys) who were also called "cockroaches", “termites", 
and "rats" (Calderón, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). Metaphorical messages such as Calderón wearing 
a military suit mixed with the real side of the war, such as an increased homicide rate. Indeed, 
since the beginning of Felipe Calderón´s term, the national increase in the total homicide rate 
in Mexico was directly connected to the increase of the drug-related homicide rate (LSE, 
2014, 30). That trend continued between 2007 and 2010.	
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In February of 2007, Calderón again justified the war. "The alternative is very clear", he said, 
"either we rescue Mexico or we cancel the future of prosperity that the children of every 
Mexican deserve [...] and we will use the full force of the State to respond to those who defy 
authority and society [and] those who challenge institutions and put our country's future at 
risk”	(Calderón quoted by BBC Staff, 2007). Michoacán was the state in which the war was 
about to start. It was a non-exclusive list of 8 states out of 32 that constitutes the country 
(some other may be added if necessary). In this sense, the Mexican war on drugs is another 
side of the same legitimacy story in which Michoacán criminal groups participated. 
Following Claessen's idea of legitimation as a process (1988), for the Mexican federal 
government, this war had the function of promoting its mandate. This effort was codified 
through symbols and practices rather than through legality and justice management, i.e., 
descriptive political legitimacy language. Even a successfully legitimate actor or institution 
will need to continually reaffirm this condition, and the Mexican state is no exception. 
However, in the case of this war, the war implied a sort of rehabilitation of the state’s image 
after decades or even centuries of distance if not absence. In Michoacán, this absence and 
rehabilitation is what enabled the co-existence of simultaneous authorities and, potentially, 
legitimacy struggles. The following section analyzes the extent to which this was the case of 
Michoacán, as well as its symbolic war relevance.	
 
3.1.2. Michoacán: The First Battlefield  
 
Michoacán is practical and symbolically relevant for the Mexican war on drugs for two 
reasons. This was the first battlefield of the war, and Michoacán is Calderon’s hometown 
state. For a government who was looking for support for this war, this first battle becomes 
relevant. Next section of this chapter will be dedicated entirely to the understanding of 
Michoacán, especially those elements which deserve to be highlighted to conduct a political 
legitimacy research. By now, here we are only locating the relevance of this first battlefield 
and its role in the stated big war on drugs picture. The federal government used that violence 
as a critical juncture to launch the war, starting precisely in Michoacán (Meyer, 2007). 
Moreover, the federal government counted on with local Michoacán politicians who 
supported the strategy, even when they were not necessarily from the same political party. 
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, Michoacán experienced criminal groups’	
struggles guided by the ambition of these groups to control local illicit businesses. One 
especially relevant moment of these fights happened in the municipality of Uruapan, close to 
the capital city of Morelia. 	
 
In the early morning of September 6, 2006, five human heads were dropped in the middle of 
a nightclub dance floor in Uruapan. Journal chronicles talked about 15 to 20 men with rifles 
arriving in three pick-up vans; they released the heads without saying a word (Martínez et 
al., 2006). However, a narcomanta (a practice associated with drug trafficking dynamics 
consisting in leaving banners with written messages; more about this communication 
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strategy, spread as a popular practice among different criminal groups, could be found in 
Maihold, 2012) was left there with the following message: "La familia no mata por paga, no 
mata mujeres, no mata inocentes. Sólo muere quien debe morir. sépanlo toda la gente, esto 
es justicia divina" (“The family [of Michoacán] does not kill for pay, it does not kill women, 
it does not kill innocent people. Only those who deserve to die, should perish. Let it be known 
to all: this is divine justice”) (quoted in Relea, 2006). That was a sort of presentation message 
towards society from the criminal group La Familia Michoacana. As Arjona and Hollister 
pointed out:	
 
The effect of violence on freezing may help explain why armed groups rely on symbolic violence, such 
as exhibiting the dead bodies of their victims in public places or gathering communities to witness the 
killing of locals: it might help to make civilians obey not only because they learn that disobedience 
carries serious consequences, but also because fear makes the psychologically incapable of reacting in 
any way but complying. As Hollister points out, “[t]hrough dramatizing punishments, an aura of 
imagined pain may be built around the painful experiences which can actually be inflicted”	(Arjona 
and Hollister quoted by Arjona, 2017, 765).	
 
Members of LFM recognized the authorship of committing that atrocity, but they tried to 
cover it with a justification. As explained later, not every crime or illegality needs to be 
explained. However, when this is the case, the criminal agenda acquires relevance as a 
political instrument through which the practices of legitimation make sense and become 
rationalized. The heads dropped were supposed to belong to former members of the local 
rival organization, the Zetas, a criminal group dedicated to drug trafficking and integrated by 
former army members in Mexico and Guatemala known for their bloody techniques to 
perform their illegal activities (Astorga and Shrink, 2010, 15-16: Logan, 2012, 6). Thus, in 
another way, that was also a violent political statement from LFM against their main rivalry. 
This action exemplifies the understanding of sovereignty as practice in the very last sense of 
deciding over who lives and who dies (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005). The event happened 
three months before Calderon’s presidency began, and thus before the war declaration. 
Strictly, it justified government’s argument in the sense of the necessity of taking extreme 
measures given the circumstances. 	
 
However, as explained in the previous chapter, criminal agendas are not usually or 
exclusively based on violence. Even when they are, that narcomanta was possibly the first 
legitimacy attempt made by LFM, it was followed by another certainly friendlier claim. 
Almost three months later (but again before the war’s declaration), LFM paid to publish a 
disclaimer in the local newspaper. Together with a collection of justifications, the text also 
presented “who we are”, its “mission”, its “objective”	and its reasons to be seen as a group. 
It goes from an enterprise discourse to a rebellious one, but never acknowledges them as 
criminals or drug traffickers. The entire disclaimer was published in La Voz de Michoacán 
and El Sol de Morelia, both local newspapers without circulation outside Michoacán 
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(2006).20 In both cases, the publication date was November 22, 2006, days before the war on 
drugs declaration:	
 
LA FAMILIA MICHOACANA	
 
ABOUT US?	
 
We are native workers of the Tierra Caliente region in the state of Michoacán, organized by the 
necessity to get out of the oppression, of the humiliation to which we were always subjected by people who 
have been holding power, which allowed them to perform all kinds of mischiefs and abuses in the state [of 
Michoacán], such as those of the MILLENNIUM Cartel, some others with the surname Valencia and other 
organizations, such as the band of the 30, which has been terrorized a large part of the state [of Michoacán] 
since the eighties to nowadays, especially in the areas of Puruarán, Turicato, Tacámbaro and Ario de Rosales, 
and who have carried out kidnappings, robberies, extortions and other crimes that harm the peace of 
Michoacán´s people.	
 
MISSION	
 
To eradicate kidnapping activities from the State of Michoacán, direct and telephone extortion, paid 
assassinations, express kidnapping, theft of trailers and cars, house robberies, by people like the mentioned 
above, and that have made of the state of Michoacán an insecure place. Our only reason is that we love our state 
[of Michoacán] and that we are no longer willing to let people´s dignity become run over.	
Maybe at this moment people will not understand us, but we know that in the most affected regions, they 
understand our actions, because it is possible to fight these criminals, who settled down from other states and 
we will not let them enter into Michoacán to keep committing crimes.	
We are totally eradicating in the entire state the sale of the LETHAL drug known as "ICE" or "ICE" 
[referring to methamphetamines], as it is one of the worst drugs that are causing irreversible damage to the 
society, thus it is going to be prohibited the sale of adulterated wine that, people say, comes from 'Tepito' [a 
well-known dangerous neighborhood in Mexico City], and we know that whatever comes from there has bad 
quality.	
 
OBJECTIVE	
 
To maintain the universal values of the people, to which they have full right.	
By eradicating what we have proposed, although for this, unfortunately, we have appealed to very 
strong strategies on the part of us, since in this way we have seen that it is the only way to bring order to the 
state [of Michoacán], and we will not allow this [situation] to get out of control again.	
[We will] Support people with food, literature, as well as classrooms to improve education in society: 
this is mainly directed to the rural area, which is the most marginalized, humiliated and especially in the Tierra 
Caliente region.	
 
WHY DO WE FORM OUR GROUP?	
 
 20  The original one was published in Spanish. Besides the analytical elements for this research, it was 
characterized by several grammatical mistakes as well. This translation did not attempt to correct them, but to 
reflect the original spirit of the message. The original newspaper page is included Appendix. See Picture 8.	
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When this LA FAMILIA Michoacana organization began, it was not expected to be possible eradicate 
kidnapping, paid-murders, scams, and the sale of the drug known as 'ice', however, thanks to the large number 
of people who have had faith, this great problem in the state [of Michoacán] is now being controlled.	
LA FAMILIA is a group of people, which has been growing in such a way that; now, we cover the 
entire state of Michoacán. This organization emerged with the straight intention of combating the unrestrained 
crime that existed in our state [of Michoacán].	
LA FAMILIA has made great progress, as we are fighting these evils little by little, but we still cannot 
claim victory, but if we can say that the state [of Michoacán] has improved in these problems by 80%. Also, 
we have eradicated the kidnapping in the same percentage.	
People who work decently in any activity should not worry, we respect them, but we will not allow 
people from here or from other states to commit crimes or [the same will go for] those who control other types 
of activities.	
When we started to organizing and propose to remove the retail drug sale from the streets, such as it 
was with the 'Ice', many people told us that not even in the first world countries they could reach to control it, 
and we are already doing it.	
 
SOMETHING TO THINK ABOUT 	
 
 What would you do as a Michoacán origin? Would you join la familia if you see that we are fighting 
these crimes? Or would you let them keep growing? ... Give us your opinion.	
I ask you, father [as the family leader]: Would you like your son to walk the streets in danger of falling 
into drugs and crime?	
Would you support this organization in its fight against these evils that attack our state [of Michoacán]?	
The media have been very successful and objective in their comments on the events that occurred, 
which is appreciated for their impartiality and we thank these media for their comments on our actions.	
Even in other countries, they have not already organized themselves to carry out this type of activity 
in favor of their people, and we have already started here. The expected success will depend on the support and 
understanding of the Michoacán Society.	
 
 
SINCERELY,	
LA FAMILIA MICHOACANA	
 
After the severed heads event, the text was the second materialization of the agenda as a 
political legitimacy guideline. Although there was no direct reference to the Uruapan events 
happened weeks earlier, indirect statements about people committing crimes in Michoacán 
needs be understood as a connection between both legitimacy claims, one violent and one 
peaceful: carrots and sticks towards the same objective. LFM took a position towards them, 
but did not talk to them. The language is directed at the Michoacán people as an audience, 
including expressly direct reference to the family fathers (men to men dialogue). Invitations 
to support them, as well as to join them are included. Moreover, the narration portrays the 
idea of an enemy. It also built the idea of shared moral beliefs: those ambiguously called 
"universal values of the people", to which, they said, everyone has full right. Their fight is 
against criminals such as kidnappers, murderers, and meth traffickers. More legitimacy calls 
came out from this group, LFM, as well as LCT. Both are the same criminal group; however, 
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even his name change had political legitimacy implications. All of this is presented later in 
this chapter.	
 
As said earlier, Michoacán became the first battlefield in this war. The Operativo Conjunto 
Michoacán (Joint Operative Michoacán) became the model for the war strategy in its very 
early stage. The model consisted of sending federal security institutions coordinated by the 
federal government and was later used in other Mexican states such as Chihuahua, Sinaloa, 
Guerrero, and Baja California. In the case of Michoacán, it is important to remember that the 
former governor, Lázaro Cárdenas Batel (grandson of the former President during the 
nineteen-thirties, Lázaro Cárdenas del Río), request the president to receive federal support 
to deal with local criminal groups (Astorga, 2015, 28). The strategy was mainly to dismantle 
the more prominent criminal organizations linked to the illicit drug trafficking in the country. 
However, scholars have proved a correlation between the operative implementation and the 
homicide increase (Zepeda, 2016; Merino, 2011). From a historical point of view, these 
operatives interestingly look like a state return. At least in the case of Michoacán, but not 
only, the federal government is anything but close to the local population. For instance, 
Maldonado argues that especially the Southern region of Michoacán became a sort of 
marginal region within the Mexican state (2010, 24). This real and symbolic remoteness 
produced the myth of entire lawless regions within Michoacán. 	
 
However, on the contrary, this supposed power absence generated local rulers, close to 
cacicazgos. After the implementation of the operative, the government carried out a sort of 
state return to the territory, but wearing the mask of security forces instead of other types of 
masks, such as healthcare, education, or employment. That is especially relevant because we 
are talking about one of the poorest and marginalized states in the country. Ironically, 2007 
became the most peaceful year in the recent Mexican history (see Figure 1). Even in 
Michoacán, where the war started, 2007 was the third most peaceful year in the last 25. 
However, from 2008 and onwards, almost all indicators of crime rose, generally led by 
specific states. Michoacán was one of them. September of 2008 became an especially 
relevant month in both local and national agendas. On the evening of the sixteenth, during 
the Independence Day celebration (possibly the highest national commemoration), a 
fragmentation grenade was thrown in the main square of Morelia´s downtown, that is, in the 
core of Michoacán’s capital city. Some civilians died and others were injured. 	
 
Hours later, the United States government, through its ambassador to Mexico, categorized 
the phenomenon as narcoterrorism (Gómez, 2008). In the end, that statement supported the 
war on drugs strategy together with the necessity of hard hand against the so-called cartels. 
However, neither LFM nor any other local group acknowledged the grenades, but it meant a 
war reinforcement in the region. When the grenade event happened, Michoacán was already 
one of the many battlefronts across the country. Each of those places had particular settings. 
In this case, the legitimacy perspective opens an analytical window through which it is 
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possible to analyze the local phenomenon. Each of these multiple actors will be reviewed 
later, especially concerning their legitimacy interest and the resultant conflict. Meanwhile, 
next section is dedicated to assessing the conflicts´	size and tendencies. This work is made 
through the recovery and systematization of violence variables available from public data. 	
 
3.1.3. The Real Battles: The Size of Violence in Michoacán 
 
As Sontag said: even when the war is metaphorical, it has real consequences: real bullets, 
casualties, violence, and battles. The war impact was different depending on the state or 
region of the country. For example, while certain cities such as the Northern Ciudad Juárez, 
Chihuahua, reached higher homicide rates levels than Bagdad, Iraq, or Afghanistan at the 
height of recent wars, others like Mérida in the Yucatán peninsula, had the same levels of 
homicide as Canada (data for 2010 and 2012: Staff El Universal, 2009; Nolasco and Ávila, 
2014). Some variables directly affecting this difference were the presence or absence of a) 
disputing local criminal groups, b) federal forces presence (like in the joint operatives), and 
c) geographical conditions (mainly related to transnational illegal routes). In Michoacán, the 
three conditions were present in addition to other particularities such as a historical absence 
of the state power and an excess of political actors performing state functions, especially 
those related to security and the monopoly of the use of force.	
 
Before continuing with the analysis, a methodological comment needs to be made regarding 
the figures presented in this section. Three illicit behaviors were selected as variables 
analysis; these are homicides, kidnappings, and extortions. With exceptions, these three 
crimes used to be associated with larger criminal groups activities rather than solitairy 
criminal actions. Thus, these variables are helpful to trace changes in violent dynamics, 
mirroring the background political struggles. However, analyze Mexican criminal registers 
is challenging because of the dark figure of crime, a criminological term to refer the 
unregistered and non-reported crimes (Biderman and Reiss, 1967, 2). Both in Mexico and 
Michoacán, this number is always above the 90 percent. In other words, specifically in 
Michoacán, more than 9 out of 10 crimes are not reported in the official statistics (see Table 
2). This pattern changes from crime to crime, and from state to state. Does this mean that 
there is no sense in studying this data? Indeed, official statistics present a problem. But one 
can make some sense of the data if the analysis carefully parses it by taking into account 
specific local considerations around these variations. 	
 
For instance, the homicide variable is analyzed here from two sources. In the first one, from 
INEGI, the dark figure does not indicate a problem. That is because of how the National 
Institute of Statistics and Geography (stands for INEGI, the Mexican federal agency for 
demography and economic analysis and one of the most prestigious institutions in its field 
within Latin America) collect the data. Since 1990, INEGI has registered the "deaths 
occurred by homicide" by concentrating the medical examiner archives from those who 
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received the corpses. Thus, they do not work with official reports from any justice institution. 
On the other hand, the second source is the Executive Secretariat of the National Public 
Security System (stands for SESNSP, a federal bureau that concentrates criminal data from 
denouncing reports). That is the source for the 1) intentional homicides (differentiated in this 
case from the non-intentional), 2) kidnappings, and 3) extortions registers. Its database is 
built with the victims reported cases to authorities. In this case, yes we are dealing with the 
dark figure problem. Is it convenient to work with this data anyway? The answer is yes but 
the analysis needs to be careful and aware of these. 	
 
Table 2. Dark figure (%), Michoacán (2010-2016)	
 	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	 2016	
Michoacán	 94.7	 92.0	 94.0	 94.0	 93.6	 92.9	 93.8	
	
Source: Encuesta Nacional sobre Victimización y Percepción de Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE), INEGI.	
 
For instance, it is helpful to trace significant changes in illicit trends, the increase or decrease 
in reported cases, and places in which people used to report these kinds of crimes. Moreover, 
even when it is not possible to accurately calculate precisely, homicides, kidnappings, and 
extortions used to have lower dark figures percentages (Ochoa, 2016). In addition, in the 
homicide variable, this database offers to distinguish those cases, in which the murders were 
intentional, which adds a violence charge to the action and shapes another sort of behavior 
from the perpetrator. Finally, regarding these methodological difficulties, it is necessary to 
affirm that not all these crimes are associated or responsible for the war on drugs dynamics, 
nor the army nor the criminal groups´	activities. However, here we are looking for data that 
might help to identify changes in the general trends that could contribute to portray how 
Michoacán, in particular, lived this context. Moreover, this information is also helpful to 
understand the scenario in which the legitimacy attempts, and struggles were made.	
 
After explaining those considerations, the first analytical statement in this sense is that 
Michoacán´s violence is everything but new. The early 1990´s decade showed higher 
homicide levels than in the last decade (see Figure 1). Following the homicide data registered 
by INEGI, demonstrates Michoacán with higher homicide levels than the national number. 
That happened from 1990 to 2009. In the next year, Michoacán experienced a decrease and 
kept with lower rates than the national one until 2013. Furthermore, as said earlier with 
Mexico in general, the state of Michoacán had the lower homicide levels in 2007, the same 
year in which the war was launched. In the coming years, the rate raised in both cases and 
until 2009 for Michoacán and 2011 for Mexico. Many lectures can be given to this, but in 
this case, it becomes relevant the observe at least three trends:	
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1) In the year of 2005, the homicide rate was bigger than ever later within the context 
of the war on drugs, this before LFM publicly appeared through the Uruapan heads 
event and the message in the local newspapers. This number could explain the local 
struggles (later justified by LFM and LCT) in which these criminal groups became 
predominant in the state.	
 
2) As will be explained later in detail, December of 2010 is especially relevant. In this 
month, the criminal leader group and responsible for many of the legitimacy attempts, 
Nazario Moreno, was supposed to be killed for the first time. That might have 
provoked a significant increase in homicides in 2011, the year in which civilian and 
local people rebellions against the criminal groups started as well. 	
 
3) While in the national rate it is possible to appreciate certain trends through the last 
25 years, in Michoacán the trends stopped in 2005. Since then, there are drastic but 
constant “ups and downs”, especially during 2005 to 2012, which coincide with the 
war on drugs period and the whole Calderón administration.	
 
Figure 1. Homicide Rate per 100 Thousand Inhabitants, Michoacán vs. Mexico, 1990-2015	
	
Source: Author´s calculations based on data from INEGI and CONAPO.  	
 
By taking a look on the total homicide cases (and not the rates), we can confirm the trend 
differences between the national and the local context. In this regard, is relevant to look at 
how both graphs “move”	 through the time for the same period of twenty-five years. 
Following Figure 2, we can look again to 1) the “violent past”	of Michoacán in the early 
nineties, 2) the national rising trend in Mexico after the war on drugs declaration, which 
although is not that accentuated in Michoacán, and 3) the ups and downs in Michoacán within 
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the same period. This latter point shows that this trend was clear enough to be appreciated 
both figures, i.e., the homicide rate as well as in the total homicide cases.	
 
Figure 2. Trends of Total Homicides in Michoacán vs. Mexico, 1990-2015	
	
Source: Author´s calculations based on data from INEGI.	
 
Regarding the SESNSP variables, this data was calculated for this research from 2011 to 
2016. This period is relevant for this research case because the local criminal group suffered 
a significant change. As said earlier, LFM's leader, Nazario Moreno, was killed for the first 
time in December of 2010,21 thus LFM turned into LCT, and the cult around Nazario was 
developed together with other rituals and legitimacy attempts. Nazario was killed for the 
second (and definitive) time in March 2014. This timeline, along with the criminal group's 
legitimacy analysis, will be explored in detail later. However, here it’s important to highlight 
the significance of this period. Following the intentional homicides graph, the reports 
registered in the denounced cases show a couple of matches with the total cases in the INEGI 
database even when, as it was expected, the numbers are not equal. The first one is that 
Michoacán kept a lower rate than the national figure both in 2011 and 2012, and this trend 
change since 2013 and onwards. The second coincidence is to show Michoacán 2013 and 
2014 as years with upward rates, and 2015 descending. However, in the SESNSP data, it is 
possible to appreciate a significant rise for 2016, reaching the highest level in the figure.	
 
Figure 3. Denounced Intentional Homicides in Michoacán vs. Mexico, 2011-2016	
 21 Allegedly, locals in Apatzingán, Michoacán made a demonstration supporting Nazario. The people held up 
signs with the legend “Nazario will always live in our hearts”, and “Rest in peace, Nazareo [sic]”. See Pictures 
3 and 4 in the Appendix.	
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Source: Author´s calculations based on data from SESNSP and CONAPO.	
 
The other two variables from SESNSP, kidnappings, and extortions denounced, presented 
different trends between them. In the former, Michoacán does not show drastic changes; 
however, the possible reading is not that kidnappings keep stable in Michoacán but that the 
victim´s reports towards official authorities were (see Figure 4). Regarding the extortion 
cases, 2012 and 2013 were the years with high rates. In any case, this crime followed the 
national trend closely until 2014 (see Figure 5). Besides, it is relevant to take into 
consideration that these both crimes use to be reported by urban victims. In this case, most 
of the reports happened in the capital city, Morelia, relatively far away from the countryside 
and rural areas in which both LFM and LCT were based.	
 
Figure 4. Denounced Kidnappings Rate per 100 Thousand Inhabitants, Michoacán vs. 
Mexico, 2011-2016	
Source: Author´s calculations based on data from SESNSP and CONAPO.	
 
Figure 5. Denounced Extortions Rate per 100 Thousand Inhabitants, Michoacán vs. Mexico, 
2011-2016	
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Source: Author´s calculations based on data from SESNSP and CONAPO.	
 
Finally, the last figure presented in this section shows the age profile of the homicide victims 
in Michoacán during the studied period. A general Mexican trend within these years is that 
youngsters were the principal victims and killers. Michoacán is not the exception to this rule. 
Several investigations have been conducted trying to understand the role of young people in 
the violence dynamics. Many of them locate young people in marginal zones and low 
education or job expectations as the principal criminal groups´	 cannon fodder (Ramírez, 
2014; González-Pérez, et al., 2012). Young people are used either for awareness of foreigners 
or officers in towns and highways (the so-called halcones, falcons), or as gunmen (sicarios). 
The crises in this regard is such big that the federal government made a national survey which 
was conducted by INEGI to understand how and why youngsters spend their free time, feel 
about their surroundings, and perceive the future, etcetera (INEGI and SEGOB, 2014). In the 
case of Michoacán, 4,361 of the homicide victims from 2005 to 2015 were between 15 and 
34 years old. That is the 48.8% of the total (see Figure 6).	
 
Figure 6. Total Homicides in Michoacán by Age Group, 2005-2015	
	
Source: Author´s calculations based on data from INEGI.	
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Since the first decade of the current century, Mexican demographers proved how a 
“demographic bonus”	 was coming for Mexico. This bonus means a change in the 
demographic structure due to population age, characterized by a swifter increase in the 
number of young people in productive age (Ordorica, 2010, 50). In other words, the bonus is 
a demographic opportunity to boost the economy based on a larger number of young people 
instead of older retired or not in working conditions. According to García, the bonus would 
take place between 2012 and 2033 (2010, 384). However, according to Giorguli, a prominent 
Mexican demographer, the bonus was not capitalized due to a lack of working conditions 
(Giorguli quoted by Sánchez, 2016). If that was not enough, the demographic bonus also 
coincided with a deadly trend era for youngsters in Mexico in general, as well as in particular 
states like Michoacán. This violence data will be returned to in the case analysis, since it is 
there where it begins to make sense. In the end, following Arendt once again, violence is not 
an end itself, but an instrument linked to ends. Even when particularly in Michoacán the 
political legitimacy struggles indeed were not the goal, they help to rationalize these data.	
 
3.1.4. An International Overview: Michoacán Between the Caribbean Basin and Asia Pacific 
 
Before delving into the Michoacán study, a broader (global and regional) overview of the 
Mexican violence crisis is needed in order to recognize how local consequences may modify 
the global trends and vice-versa. In this regard, transnational crime activities work into a sort 
of interconnected logic, sometimes even into a global scale (van de Ven, 2017, 25-28). For 
instance, a change in the pattern of cocaine consumption in Amsterdam could affect how 
local politics happen in a small settlement in the Colombian jungle, including the countless 
changes in social dynamics occurring in the middle. This shock might presumably result in 
a new scenario also susceptible to suffering potential changes as a result of a further 
modification of the dynamics (either, production, regulation, prohibition, enhancement, or 
deterioration of routes, changes in political configurations, and a large etcetera). The 
variables involved are neither fixed, and the local contexts have a relevant influence but 
always connected to the regional and global illicit trends.	
 
Although the history of Mexican narcotics did not start with the War on Drugs nor in the 
recent present, a convenient starting point for this analysis is located during the 1980´s and 
1990´s. In the first place, the Ronald Reagan´s war on drugs policy in the late 80´s, implied 
sealing Miami´s border, which was the main entrance of cocaine coming from Colombia. 
The strategy involved two faces: the "friendly", and the "bloody". The former was the "Just 
Say No" campaign led by Nancy Reagan. The latter consisted of a hard security repressive 
policy, especially abroad (Schroth, Helfer and Lanfair, 2011, 436-438). Later, this resulted 
in Plan Colombia, an integral security policy developed in this South American country in 
which the local forces were coordinated and commanded by the American military. As a 
result of the plan, the two most prominent criminal organizations in the Americas were 
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dismantled. Both Medellin and Cali cartels were taken down through the kingpin strategy -a 
security policy emerged from the American security agencies that consist in eliminating the 
"head" of each criminal group. Pablo Escobar, the leader of Medellin, was killed in December 
of 1993. Of course, within the dialectic logic explained earlier, that meant a significant 
change in the global configuration of drug trafficking. 	
 
For instance, from the nineties to the first decade of the twenty-first century, the drug 
trafficking through the Caribbean Sea fell 71 percent and was rerouted through Central 
America and Mexico (Aguayo, 2014). In other words, cocaine trafficking (whose only 
sowing point is Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia) keep flowing to the United States but using 
an alternative corridor – causing a sort of water effect phenomenon, in which a first “push 
down”, causes a second “pop up”	elsewhere. According to John Bailey, this change let the 
formerly inexperienced Mexican criminal groups take the lead and the profits of the business 
from the proficient Colombian groups, which were struggling to survive (Bagley, 2009). That 
meant a full transformation of the criminal corridor settings in the Americas and transformed 
Mexican politics. It is useful to remember here that this regional change coincides with the 
Mexican transition in which the historically dominant political party (PRI) lost the 
Presidency, including a reconfiguration of several local power settings across the country. 
Following Aguayo, Mexican violence cannot be understood outside the Caribbean Basin. 
This region is the most violent on the planet and lives through constant flows going both 
from South to North (drugs and migrants), and North to South (money and weapons) (2014, 
chapter 5). 	
 
These are permanent ingredients in the war on drugs. However, another global geographical 
element needs to be included when talking about Michoacán, namely, the Asian Pacific. Even 
when LFM and LCT participated in the fundamental Caribbean Basin scheme, the Mexican 
West coast plays an essential role in this case. As will be seen later in detail, the port of 
Lázaro Cárdenas located in the western part of the country enables a full entrance to the 
Pacific Ocean. Journal and official reports identified exchanges between LFM and LCT with 
China: the criminal group sent iron and other mining extracts from the mountains in 
Michoacán, and they received in exchange precursors to fabricate methamphetamines. From 
2008 to early 2013, 4.6 tons of iron were sent to China from Lázaro Cárdenas port, a 
quadrupling of export (Gil Olmos, 2015, 59). Finally, it is possible to argue that Michoacán 
plays a specific role, at least, into two global illegal market circuits, which are not 
disconnected. The first one is in the Caribbean Basin, including the illicit commerce 
occurring in the Americas, but especially from Michoacán to the United States. Both official 
and journal reports have detected meth production sent to Mexico's northern neighbor (Grillo, 
2017). The second one looks at Michoacán’s connections to Asia, especially China. We will 
come back to these dynamics in the third section of this chapter. Meanwhile, the second 
section offers an explanation of conceptual elements to understand Michoacán´s current 
sociology.	
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3.2. How to Understand Michoacán: Many Actors, Complex State 
 
In this section, the Michoacán context is explained through the conceptual approach proposed 
earlier in the first chapter together with a geographical analysis. They all configure analytical 
tools to achieve a broad understanding of the scenario that lets us proceed later with the 
review of criminal groups’	legitimacy campaigns. The argument followed can be stated in a 
straightforward formula, but has a profound background: it is not that in Michoacán there is 
no state, but that there are too many political actors whose agency is developed into a state 
language (including sovereignty practices). Within these actors, the criminal actors have a 
crucial role in several aspects of public life, and this will be observed in the last section 
through their political legitimacy interests and attempts. Here we follow the ideas of Aranda 
in terms of authority excess in Michoacán, as well as the historical state experienced by local 
social agents (2014, 155). In particular, this is related to how certain ranchero societies later 
become greater drug traffickers as well as how these populations experienced the state, its 
sovereignty, and the general formal authority expectations (Interview in field no. 17, 2017). 	
 
For several ranchero societies, the family is more important than society. Family is your network of 
kinship before than the citizenship of the state. The family is your domestic group, it is your core 
institution on which you are going to being cared, you will protect yourself, you will reproduce, and 
you will socialize. This idea of the family as the central nucleus also explains why after 30 or 40 years 
la familia of Michoacán concept emerged, [but also] the concept of caring for the Michoacán, the 
concept of Michoacán for the Michoacán people. All these in places where the State did not manage 
to build its sovereignty and it could not displace these other more informal sovereignties and over 
which control, sociability and the use of violence were more effective. All these values are being 
crystallized, but between the sixties and eighties, they become consolidated with the strong expansion 
of drug cultivation around Michoacán. The actual expansion of drug crops occurred in these territories 
where these family societies controlled inhospitable areas in which these families handled territorial 
control very well (Interview in field no. 17, 2017).	
 
In other words, geography and family culture come together and historically shape the 
context. Both are elements that explain the transformations of a specific society, in which 
drug trafficking evolved towards producing such particular criminal groups formations. 
Since legality and illegality blur due to historical reasons, then what remains in the middle 
are two versions of legitimacy. On the one hand, there are the ranchero societies that have 
been performing their own authority for decades, in which drug cultivation was not precisely 
seen as a bad activity due to its illegality. On the other, there is an aggressive return of the 
official authority by attempting to bring back a version of order based in legality and the state 
monopoly of sovereignty. This analysis is guided by geography plus the cartography of social 
actors performing sovereign practices. In other words, to build the constellation of social 
actors having legitimacy interest, Michoacán´s Geography parallel to those actors performing 
as the state are analyzed in the following section.	
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3.2.1. Michoacán: Geography Matters 
 
As one of the 32 states that compose Mexico, Michoacán is located in the Southwestern part 
of Mexico. His location and its natural resources are both strategic elements to understand 
the recent violent crises and the legitimacy struggles in which the state was (and possibly still 
is) inserted. Its population grew to 4,584,471 in the last count in 2015 (INEGI, 2015), of 
which 48.2% are men and 51.8% are women. Maldonado divides the state into five regions: 
1) the avocado zone, 2) the Michoacán coast, 3) the South Mother mountain range, 4) the 
Michoacán and Jalisco (northern neighboring state) mountain range, and 5) the Tierra 
Caliente (hot land). All those regions are essential to explain the local context. However, 
each of them has a different role in the local criminal groups that is explained below. 
Moreover, violence and criminality in Michoacán can be traced back to a booming regional 
mining and agro-industrial economy, which developed alongside expanding drug trafficking 
(see Picture 9 on Michoacán regions; Maldonado, 2010).	
 
The avocado zone is profoundly relevant for both licit and illicit activities. Mexico is the 
world’s top avocado producer, and Michoacán is the leading state in that production (del 
Moral and Murillo, 2016). In 2016, this meant the first source of income for the local 
economy, even above from the remittances sent by migrants from Michoacán in the United 
States and income from tourism (Nájar, 2016). Forty-six out of the 113 municipalities of 
Michoacán produce avocados (Notimex, 2017b). This lucrative business was taken over by 
the local criminal groups. They control production by regulating offer and demand, levy a 
sort of tax through extortion (the so-called "piso" or "cobro de piso", which is analyzed later 
in detail), stealing fields from the original farmers, and by regulating felling trees and forest 
burns to transform them into avocado farming zones. The avocado zone frequently coincides 
with indigenous municipalities and borders with the flat region in the northern part of the 
state (the Purépecha zone), many of these towns are characterized by poverty and 
marginalization. The avocado agro-industrial area has more than 120 thousand 
internationally certified hectares that export about a billion dollars’	worth of avocados per 
year, mostly to U.S. and European markets. 	
 
The second region, the Michoacán coast, is quite relevant as well. The central point is the 
Lázaro Cárdenas port, in the municipality of Lázaro Cárdenas. This port is one of the most 
developed on the Mexican Pacific coast. Its capacity enables commercial links with China, 
Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Australia, Colombia, Central America, and the West coasts of 
the United States and Canada (Gobierno del estado de Michoacán, 2015; Secretaría de 
Comunicaciones y Transportes, 2015). At the beginning of 2017, the National Economy 
minister inaugurated a new terminal in the port. It was the result of federal government 
investment. With this enlargement project, the port increased its moving capacity from 27 to 
47 million tons (Notimex, 2017a). The relation of the port is, as said in the last section, 
crucial. The detected exchanges of metals (especially iron) going from the port to China and 
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receiving elements to cook meth proved a profitable business for criminal groups. In the 
words of the journalist Ian Grillo: “For Americans, your guacamole on game day, the metal 
in your kid’s remote-controlled car, and the beef in your burger may have passed through the 
Knights Templars’	hands—alongside the meth smoked by your local fiend”	 (2017, 456). 
From this port, thousands of tons of iron and other ores are extracted legally and illegally 
from communal land by transnational companies that have interwoven complex networks 
with armed groups. These ore exports are going mostly to India and China (Gledhill, 2014). 
Even further, according to Maldonado (2014) tons of precursor chemicals come back from 
these countries, basically on the same cargo ships and containers in order to make synthetic 
drugs in clandestine laboratories located in the state’s highlands.	
 
The third and the fourth regions are the mountain zones in the state. The South Mother 
mountain range is especially relevant in this case because of the geopolitical role played in 
favor of the criminal groups´	 interests. The relevance of this region increased given the 
interest of the criminals in controlling both mining production and the port. Thus, its 
geopolitical relevance added value to this region. In this case, we are talking about a sort of 
forgotten area by the government; in other words, this is a place in which the "state 
experienced" has not been close. Moreover, the zone has important unspoiled mineral 
resources, and exploitation becomes deeply profitable, especially for mining companies even 
when the activity is illegal. Local people argue that the most recent violence wave has been 
a coordinated effort between mining companies with interest in the area, and local criminal 
groups in an effort to break or displace the community and its communal institutions 
(Gledhill, 2014). Thus, criminal groups become a sort of regulatory entity making profits by 
administrating, exchanging, and controlling resources. 	
 
Finally, the last region is probably the most important for this research. Tierra Caliente (the 
hot land) is the origin, hometown, control area, and operation center of LFM and later LCT. 
Thus, it is not a coincidence that most of the legitimacy attempts registered for this research 
happened there, even when this is not a rule. In addition, around Tierra Caliente area there 
are other emerging agro-industrial complexes producing raspberries, blackberries, mulberries 
and loganberries, this is an industry supported by transnational capital. The export of 
Mexican berries has been growing since 2010 at rates over 30%. The largest market for 
Mexican berries is the United States, where 97.1% of imported berries come from Mexico; 
followed by the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Italy (Stupkova, 2016).22 In the past 
people complained about the state’s difficulty to access this area together with Tierra 
Caliente. According to González y González, this is a “[…] region that ‘[d]ue to its isolation 
from well-trodden roads has earned the epithet Netherworld and been nicknamed ‘the abyss 
 22 Michoacán has been for decades a national and worldwide berries producer and exporter. However, as 
happened with the avocado, the increasing demand for these fruits in recent years pushed producers to focus on 
this market. Indeed, together with the United States, Canada, and European countries, China has become a 
major consumer to which Michoacán producers have looked for supplying their demand.	
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of the globe’	[moreover] more than remote […] it was virtually inaccessible because of the 
sierras, crags and ravines that surround it’; a place that caused such wonderment that it came 
to be catalogued ‘as a house of horrors’”	(González, 1991, 108 quoted by Aranda, 2013b, 47-
48).	
 
After that prompt recognition of the regions, this analysis continues tracing how violence 
phenomena happened in specific places within Michoacán. This work is conducted through 
the municipalities’	homicide rate calculations with INEGI data. The rate calculations were 
made by a thousand inhabitants to make all the registers comparable between them. In the 
following maps, this data is presented for the years of 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015, and show 
how this variable evolved during this research (2005 to 2014). In other words, this goes from 
the first LFM struggles against the other criminal groups based then in Michoacán, until the 
second and definitive death of Nazario, which resulted in a transformation of the local 
criminal groups´	 legitimacy setting. In the middle, several relevant events related to 
legitimacy struggles happened in Michoacán (see Table 3).	
 
Table 3. Michoacán’s Legitimacy Events Timeline	
 
2006	 September	 LFM dropped the severed heads in the Uruapan´s nightclub.	
November	 Publishing of the paid advertisement in local newspapers.	
December	 The former president, Felipe Calderón, declared war on drugs.	
2007	 January	 The Joint Operative Michoacán was launched.	
2008	 September	 The grenade event in Morelia´s downtown.	
 
2009	  May	 The federal government imprisoned 28 local public officers without judgment through the Michoacanazo strategy.	
December	 The first death of Nazario happened.	
 
2010	 March	 The change from LFM to LCT.	
And onwards	 Religious rituals around of San Nazario, together with the spread of a series of 
published books by the criminal groups (this is analyzed in the last section of this 
chapter).	
2011	 April	 Indigenous rebellion in the municipality of Cherán, located in the avocado region.	
2013	 February	 First groups of vigilantes (Autodefensas) appeared in Michoacán, specifically in 
the region of Tierra Caliente 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
January	 The federal government sent a special commissioner, Alfredo Castillo (trusted person to current president Enrique Peña Nieto) who became the Commissioner for the Security and Integral Development of Michoacán (more of this together 
with Cherán and vigilantes events is explained later).	
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2014	  January	 The Acuerdos de Tepalcatepec (agreement of Tepalcatepec) was signed between the federal government and vigilantes groups. Through this document, the 
vigilantes were legalized and became official local police.	
April	 Second and definitive Nazario´s death and the resultant change in the local 
criminal group´s legitimacy attempts setting.	
Source: Overview based on newspaper reports. 	
 
The 2000 map works as a background context – given that none of the events related to this 
research had appeared yet. However, certain trends were already happening since then, such 
as the high levels of homicide in the Pacific coast, in Tierra Caliente, and mountain ranges. 
In particular, three regions violence is especially linked: the coast, the Northern Mother 
mountain range and Tierra Caliente. Within those zones, both LFM and LCT were positioned 
(even when they performed activities in practically the whole state of Michoacán). Moreover, 
in two cases there is a correlation between the highways and the municipalities with high 
homicide rates. The first one is on the coast. Except for 2005, both Lázaro Cárdenas (port 
municipality) and Aquila (the northern coast neighbor municipality) always displayed high 
rates. 	
 
Map 2. Homicide Rate in Michoacán per Municipality, 2000 (INEGI)	
	
Source: Built with data from INEGI.	
 
The second case is precisely the set of roads connecting Tierra Caliente with the capital city, 
Morelia, especially those going from Apatzingán and La Huacana. The relevance of 
highways for criminal enterprises is not exclusive for Michoacán but for Mexico and the 
hemisphere as well. More about this and the role of the Mexican government will be explored 
in the following chapter, as part of the specific LFM and LCT political legitimacy sources 
and resources.	
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Map 3. Homicide Rate in Michoacán per Municipality, 2005 (INEGI)	
	
Source: Built with data from INEGI.	
 
Highways become relevant when considering that the region's primary transportation occurs 
through these paths (as in the country in general), given the absence of trains and the high 
costs of air travel. Hence, from a logistical point of view, illicit flows require the efficient 
use and control of transportation resources in order to keep the business moving on. During 
2005, two analytical angles stated earlier need to be considered.  The first one is the violent 
fight between the Zetas, the criminal group that had a significant presence in the state, and 
LFM, which was recently created. The second angle is the substantial increase in the state 
homicide rate, which was the higher during the analyzed period in this research (see Figure 
1). Some elements such as the displays of violence might suggest a connection between both 
cases.	
 
Map 4. Homicide Rate in Michoacán per Municipality, 2010 (INEGI)	
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Source: Built with data from INEGI.	
 
Finally, for 2010 there is a sharp connection between the southern and coast rates (mostly 
from Tierra Caliente), together with the northern rates. In other words, if a vertical line is 
drawn on the map, the right side shows higher homicide rates than the left side (see Map 4). 
In 2010, after the first death of Nazario, no civil resistance appeared in Michoacán. These 
cases came up in the coming years. Finally, in 2015, Michoacán still is a violent state even 
after the last death of Nazario. Meanwhile, Tierra Caliente, the coast, and the southern 
mountains continue with the same high levels. For this year, LCT has been affected because 
of the open fronts including struggles with the army, the Mexican marine, the federal police, 
vigilantes, and even the indigenous rebellion in Cherán. In the meantime, a new criminal 
group from the state of Jalisco, started operating in Michoacán without an interest in 
becoming legitimate but in controlling the territory to administrate illicit business (Flores, 
229). That resulted in a considerable increase in violence, especially in the northern part of 
Michoacán, in the Michoacán-Jalisco mountain range. During this time, local criminal groups 
still had operations and disputes but without becoming a single cohesive group.	
 
Map 5. Homicide Rate in Michoacán per Municipality, 2015 (INEGI)	
	
Source: Built with data from INEGI.	
 
The next section is the last one dedicated to offering analytical elements to understand the 
local context. Before beginning a legitimacy analysis, another kind of mapping is required: 
the one in which the principal key actors involved in the local legitimacy struggles are 
located, described, and identified.	
 
3.2.2. Cartography of a Pre-supposed Sovereign: State-effect, Statehood, and Sovereign 
Practices 
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This research is guided by the idea that, in Michoacán, it is not that there is no state, nor that 
it is weak. On the contrary, the primary characteristic is that there are too many actors with 
agency performing the role and function of the state. Michoacán could be seen as a case of 
“formations of sovereignty”, a political landscape in which several claims to sovereignty 
simultaneously struggle, coexist, and overlap (Stepputat 2015). This excess of statehood 
practices and discourses, as well as the rejection of the notion that violence is the result of a 
deficit of democracy, can help better understand what is happening in the region. This has 
several consequences concerning the local definition of political legitimacy. In a context like 
this, who is legitimate and who is not is under constant pressure and contest. These ideas help 
to realize that claims to legitimacy in Michoacán are a permanent negotiation between 
various audiences, including the non-legitimate, the newly legitimate, and the public. 	
 
The discussion can take many shapes: either when the criminal groups justify themselves 
because the government does not do its duty, vice-versa, or when vigilantes justify their 
weapons because criminals threaten them. Legitimacy is always explicitly or implicitly at 
stake. This work has been called ‘the cartography of a pre-supposed sovereign’, namely, local 
political actors. That name acknowledges that sovereignty is a practice, a negotiation, a 
performance that is contextual and in constant flux, as chapter 1 demonstrated. These actors 
are listed below together with an explanation of their local legitimacy struggle role between 
2005 and 2015. Below some ideas and examples of sovereign practices of state functions are 
given. Except for the criminal groups for which the specific considerations are below, this is 
not an exhaustive study of these actors. Several different disciplines have investigated each 
of them. The following section briefly describe the main participants in the constellation of 
legitimacy during this research.	
 
Criminal groups (particularly LFM and LCT). As said earlier, LFM appeared around 2005 
and was explicitly displayed in 2006, and turned into LCT in 2011. However, criminal history 
in Michoacán did not start with these groups. During the 1980s, Michoacán suffered a major 
agricultural crisis as a consequence of the exponential growth of marijuana and poppy seed 
cultivation. The Milenio and Los Valencia cartels emerged and centralized drug production 
and trafficking and started massive transfer of cocaine from Colombia to Mexico and the 
United States. They had the support of several politicians and police officers until early 2000 
when the Gulf Cartel, seeking control over the Michoacán region, sent its armed wing, the 
Zetas. In 2006, the local groups expelled Zetas from Michoacán, with the remaining forces 
from the Milenio cartel merging into LFM. After several years of negotiations and alliances 
with local power elites, the cartel managed to become a strong organization with 
transnational networks and State political connections, in addition to running multiple 
“social”	programs in order to maintain popularity amongst the population. There are even 
reports of the cartel running small supermarkets where items were sold under the market 
value in order to “help”	 the community (Falko, 2015). This is actually part of the larger 
political legitimacy story, which is analyzed in detail in the following chapter.	
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After becoming LCT, this group, under the leadership of Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, turned 
out to be one of the most peculiar criminal organizations in the country. Nazario was known 
to act as a benefactor to schools, churches, farmers, and more. He also wrote books, devised 
a code of conduct for every member of the criminal gang, and even created his own local 
religious cult. LCT also went to great lengths to develop mechanisms and practices that 
would further legitimize its activities and presence. A good example is the quasi-judicial 
system implemented by LCT. Under this system, if a member of society engaged in what 
was considered deviant behavior (rape, stealing, etcetera) then a three-phase punishment 
system unfolded. In this system, first members of LCT approached the perpetrator for a 
“chat”. Second, physical punishment (euphemism for torture) was given. And third, if the 
behavior persisted, or if the transgression was deemed too disruptive, then execution was 
carried out (Falko, 2015). This information will be explored as part of the legitimacy analysis, 
but here it is examined in terms of the sovereign practices and state-effects performances. 
Before continuing, however, a conceptual disclaimer must be highlighted again.	
 
In addition to what was explained in the first chapter, by adopting this idea, we try to 
demystify Calderon's government hypothesis of "us" and "them", as if criminals were 
completely distinct and disconnected from the rest of the population. However, in the case 
of Michoacán, both LFM and later LCT made explicit efforts to portray, shape, and display 
the image of a cohesive, unitary, and distinguishable group when attempting to legitimate 
themselves. These attempts included initiation rituals and their own code of conduct, 
representing a particularity of this case. Moreover, and recalling Migdal's definition of the 
state, Michoacán's criminal groups were part of the "multiple parts" with their own specific 
practices. Both LFM and LCT coexisted with the image of a coherent, controlling 
organization in a territory, i.e., the federal and local government. In Migdal's terms, they all 
shape the state as a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence. 	
 
Government (both local and federal). In Michoacán, some crimes were attempted to be 
transformed into social causes. The hypothesis of political decision-making vacuum as a 
condition that let criminal groups look for legitimacy regularly appears among the local 
perceptions. Some scholars have argued that the absence of the state in some regions of 
Michoacán is historical. This argument fits with the hypothesis that the state´s "heavy handed 
return" to Michoacán in the context of the war on drugs and a securitization strategy, later 
resulted in an increase in violence (Gledhill, 2003). This return has been reviewed through 
the previous section of this chapter. However, to highlight the role of the government (both 
local and federal) into specifically Michoacán´s legitimacy dynamic, three events are 
essential. They are: 1) the Joint Operative Michoacán, 2) the imprisonment of several 
municipal authorities by the federal government (Michoacanazo), and 3) the designation of 
a special commissioner from the federal government for being responsible for the local 
security. 	
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These three events are helpful to understand how the government emerged again in a 
supposedly non-state context and performed the State face into a very specific manner. As 
said earlier, the Joint Operative made of Michoacán the first battlefield after the declaration 
of the war on drugs, and become the first moment in which the government involved into the 
local legitimacy struggle. After the violence and drug trafficking conditions in the state of 
Michoacán, and in the context described earlier, the federal government decided on a punitive 
strategy to solve the problem. Seven thousand army members were sent to Michoacán to 
combat this new fluid "enemy", organized crime (Becerril, 2012). The strategy did not 
consider health problems, or solutions such as rehab centers, education and employment 
policies, crime prevention, or conflict resolution. The strategy was war. 	
 
In the second place comes what the Mexican media called Michoacanazo. At the end of May 
2009, the federal government decided to imprison 28 of Michoacán´s public officers without 
any judicial procedure. Ten municipal presidents, one judge, and sixteen others with high 
positions at the local level. Those public officers were accused of having links with organized 
crime structures, and the apprehensions order were carried out by the army and federal police 
officers (Zermeño, 2009). However, each of them was released because the authorities could 
not demonstrate any charges against not even one of them. Even more, the National 
Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) issued a recommendation to the federal institutions 
involved in the Michoacanazo (General Attorney of Mexico (PGR) and the Public Security 
Secretary (SSP)) for the human rights violations against these public officers (CNDH, 
72/2009 recommendation). Even though the procedures were completely wrong from a legal 
perspective, they represent a new era in the relation between the federal and local 
government, marked by mistrust (Zermeño, 2009). The local authorities were now seen either 
as corrupt or inefficient by the federal authorities in Mexico City. Moreover, the 
Michoacanzo could be read as a particular state-effect and sovereign practice, this is, through 
performing authority, justice, and combat against the corrupt local authorities, members of 
organized crime. 	
 
Whether this was real or not, the legal procedure could not produce evidence. The relevance 
of the case does not seem to be in the justice generation but in the effect of making it appear 
the state was carrying out justice. The third and last moment happened in the context of the 
Autodefensas crisis explained above. Parallel to the rise of popularity of these vigilantes 
groups, a political crisis occurred in Michoacán with the resignation of the governor of the 
state, Fausto Vallejo, because of health problems. In this context, the federal government 
designed a special plan to intervene in the state with the appointment of a special 
commissioner for security in Michoacán. It was the creation of a sui generis charge. Alfredo 
Castillo, who was very close person to President Enrique Peña Nieto, was appointed to the 
position. It was an ad hoc legal instrument that allowed the federal government a direct say 
over local politics, including the relationships and negotiations with the self-defense groups 
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and its leaders. The most important consequence of the negotiation was the signing of the 
agreements of Tepalcatepec. 	
 
After months of talks between both, the Mexican federal government and the armed groups, 
the signing occurred in January 2014 and meant a schism between the leaders of the 
movement, because at that time not everyone agreed with the particularities of the agreement, 
particularly in the idea of trust and/or collaborate with the government. It was an event full 
of performativity by the Mexican State (Lampérière, 2007, 57) with two consequences, one 
symbolic and one practical, on which Autodefensas were registered (including their weapons, 
guns, ammo, etcetera) and received uniforms. The symbolic consequence was their 
legalization. The practical consequence was to provoke confrontations between Autodefensas 
leaders. Thus, they became uncoordinated and finally were immobilized and unable to have 
a unitary speech. The agreements contained eight points among which the vigilante groups 
would become part of the municipal police. Of course, those members or groups who did not 
agree with the agreements and continued carrying weapons and defending themselves 
became, from that moment, illegal. They were no longer carrying out self-defense but 
criminal activity. In general, the federal government never stopped participating in the 
definition who is legitimate by defining itself as the legitimate one. Violence, justice 
simulation, negotiation, and creating an internal enemy represent examples of the state-effect.	
 
Cherán Rebellion Movement. Located almost two-hours away from Michoacán’s capital, 
Cherán is a small town with a little over 18 thousand inhabitants (INEGI). Cherán is one of 
eleven municipalities that are inhabited by the Purépecha indigenous people. They speak the 
Purépecha language, as well as Spanish. In the early hours of April 11, 2011, the local women 
lead an upraising against criminals, public officers, and political party members (Interview 
in fieldwork no. 20, June 2016). The rest of the local population followed them and rose up 
to confront illegal loggers and organized crime members who have been working together to 
exploit the community’s forest first for its wood and forest resources in general (Gasparello, 
2018), and second, once the forest is depleted, to claim the land for farming — mostly 
avocado, lemon, berries, and marihuana. The local authorities were complicit and by the time 
of the uprising, more than 80% of the 27 thousand hectares had been stripped of its trees 
(Ventura Patiño, 2012, 160). The community came out victorious from that first 
confrontation and began a political battle, which consisted of the capture and detention of the 
illegal loggers, who were taken into custody for almost a week. The head of the government 
at the municipal level was also expelled from the town, as well as the municipal police and 
all the representatives from every political party. After this political battle, a legal battle 
followed. 	
 
The people of Cherán sought to secure a governing system closer to their own customs and 
ways of life. This is how they laid out the work for instating the “usos y costumbres”	
(traditions and customs) model. “Usos y costumbres”	 is a legal term denoting indigenous 
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customary law in Latin America. Since colonial times, authorities have approved of 
communal self-governments, the use of indigenous customary law and juridical practice, and 
basically local forms of rulership with varying degrees of acceptance and formality. In its 
contemporary form, this system is usually based on the selection of community 
representatives through consensus in community gatherings. This was how Cherán overthrew 
the municipal government, and began a legal battle, which took them to the Electoral 
Tribunal for Federal Judicial Power (Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la 
Federación). The town’s people were asking for future municipal elections to take place in 
a model based on their idea of an autonomous government, and without political parties. 
Given their violent context, their claims were heard, and The Supreme Court of Justice of the 
Nation (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación) which is the supreme court of Mexico and 
the head of the judicial branch of the Mexican federal government, consisting of eleven 
judges, voted in favor (10 in favor and 1 against) of Cherán's petition. 	
 
The state gave the Concejo Mayor or Elders Council legal authority to govern as the 
municipal government. This included its local community security forces, and granted access 
to state resources, including the Federal budget that every Mexican municipality receives. 
For the purposes of this paper, and as previously mentioned, we are analyzing two points for 
each case 1) how legitimization was built based on the audience sought to legitimize the 
movement; and 2) the ways in which each movement negotiated with authorities. For the first 
point, we find that Cherán sought legitimacy within the town’s people only, never outside. It 
was a battle for and by Cherán. Its people didn’t look for allies or sympathizers — at least 
not overtly, outside of its own limits. And support by the town’s people was overwhelming. 
At the end of 2011, a few months after local people led by women rose up and took over, the 
Electoral Institute of Michoacán carried out informative meetings with the population of 
Cherán, to inform about the self-governing practice based on ‘Usos y Costumbres’. Then in 
December a referendum took place so that people could choose whether they wanted to 
remain in the party system in place for decades or change to the communal self-governing 
system. The result was very clear, with 4,846 community members in favor of the self-
governing system, and only eight against it (Ventura Patiño, 2012, 169).  	
 
According to a member of the Elder’s Council, at some point, one of the most charismatic 
leaders in the self-defense movement, Manuel Mireles, came to Cherán seeking possibilities 
for an alliance. However, the town’s people opted for keeping its distance and remained 
focused on its own process, which they considered to be “just”, “legal”, and “able to grant 
them many more rights, more than before”	(Interview in fieldwork no. 20, June 2016). The 
second important point is the type of negotiation maintained with authorities. The people of 
Cherán's position was firm and never open to negotiating the terms. Since the beginning, 
there was no intention to negotiate or to align with any other actor or group. The people 
always maintained the intention to form an autonomous government system. There was never 
the intention to spread the movement to even neighboring towns or vicinities, even though 
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some of those towns are also indigenous Purépecha, and thus share the same language and 
culture. Up to this day, based on fieldwork recently conducted, the idea still remains, 
throughout the council, to abstain from forming alliances or cooperation outside of the town’s 
border. There’s an additional factor, which has worked as a cohesive force, and that is the 
threat of political parties wanting to return. This has brought the town together again now to 
defend their recently gained and legalized autonomy. In this case, the legitimacy struggle was 
both through legality and extra legal means. We are talking about a special legitimacy case, 
which happened through both descriptive and normative grounds. 	
 
Vigilantes. This group appeared in Michoacán in the beginning of 2013. They were mostly 
men from the Tierra Caliente region who wanted to fight directly against LCT because of 
their abuses. Regarding the so-called Autodefensas, Schneckener proposed a three-pronged 
militia profile depending on their formation type, objectives, and stakeholders. Initially, each 
of them plays with “borrowed legitimacy”	from those actors who pursue the same objectives 
and foundational interest. However, the next steps depend on how they manage that borrowed 
legitimacy. The threefold profile explained by Schneckener is as follows: counter-
insurgency, counter-rival, and counter-crime. This latter definition explains the Michoacán 
Autodefensas profile. According to him, in this latter: […] militia violence is part of the fight 
against organized crime and (alleged) ‘criminals’. Militias see themselves as safeguards for 
‘law and order’	which includes the physical protection of marketplaces, villages or urban 
neighborhoods, the deterrence, arrest and prosecution of (presumed) offenders, the fight 
against corruption, the support of the police and the judiciary, but also extra-legal measures 
and forms of vigilante justice. Thereby, militias claim they provide security and protect the 
property of citizens, but especially of certain interest groups […] who often act as sponsors 
and stakeholders (Schneckener, 2017, 809-810).	
 
In early March 2013, two years after the start of the movement in Cherán, one of the most 
prominent Mexican newspapers reported the existence of 68 paramilitary groups in the same 
number of Mexican municipalities. Guerrero (27), Chiapas (11) and Michoacán (10) topped 
the list (Staff Reform, 2013). Their emergence had historical and contextual explanations. 
On the one hand, the historical distance with the official authority, mainly their idea of the 
state, opened the window for local people to carry out the task of creating or recovering 
public security. On the other hand, the recent events in the region were enough motivation 
for them to take the big decision of deciding between keeping living under the yoke of crime 
and risking their lives trying to beat the local criminal groups.  Hipólito Mora, a lemon farmer 
from Michoacán, founded the first self-defense group in that state in February 2013, in La 
Ruana (Buenavista Tomatlán municipality). The group aimed to end extortion and violence 
generated by the LCT, even if that meant to negotiate, cooperate, or collaborate with the 
government, or to kill them directly. As Mora said, self-defense groups were willing to let 
the government rule once they finished with the criminals.	
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During an interview, Mora was asked, “Do you have the antidote for scorpion?”	referring to 
LCT as an insect metaphor, "The antidote is the government, together with its citizens”. "Will 
you lay down arms, if the government asks?”	Mora was questioned by the interviewer and 
he answered: "Only when they, the leaders of LCT, die or when they are in prison”	
(Zamarripa, 2013). Self-defense groups were able not only to expand territorially through 
Tierra Caliente area in Michoacán. In just a couple of years, they had a presence in a big part 
of the state, were recognized and visible in the rest of the country, and even overseas. For 
instance, during August 2013, the Center of Social Studies and Public Opinion of the 
Mexican Congress raised a survey on self-defense groups. There, 72% of respondents said 
they are aware that in some communities across the country have emerged armed civilian 
groups or the so-called self-defense groups, and 42% said they were agree or strongly agree 
with the struggle of those groups against organized crime (CESOP, 2013). The liberating and 
anti-crime speech of the self-defense groups leaders, their presence in national media and the 
sympathy and/or public recognition of their fight and some of its leaders (particularly to José	
Manuel Mireles and Mora himself) caused this rebel movement to become a matter of 
national public interest. 	
 
Gradually, people of other Michoacán towns, former criminals (specifically former members 
of LCT, the so called perdonados or "the forgiven"), among others, joined them. 
Nevertheless, the self-defense groups in Michoacán achieved sympathy among various 
sectors of Mexican society. Almost a year after being formed, in May 2014, a video entitled 
#TodosSomosAutodefensas (we all are Autodefensas) circulated on the Internet. 
Businesspeople, politicians, religious leaders, and members of social organizations joined 
the message, not only from Michoacán but also from all of Mexico. José	Manuel Mireles 
Valverde became the most representative and charismatic leader, and received solidarity and 
sympathy from these groups. The “First Meeting of Autodefensas”	followed that video. The 
reunion held in Mexico City, where Mireles and Mora met with movement´s supporters. 
Mireles said at that time: "Here we are in the center of Mexico, from here we speak out...let 
all over the world hear us, the self-defense of Michoacán are willing to defend Mexico" 
(quoted by Baranda; 2014). The search for local legitimacy had reached a national scope. 	
 
However, the crisis in the coming months started with the public-officer Alfredo Castillo´s 
appointment, whose capacity to negotiate with Autodefensas leaders became an effective tool 
for the federal government to participate in local Michoacán disputes. Castillo achieved the 
signature of the agreements of Tepalcatepec, and a consequent division between the 
Autodefensas leaders. Years later, in February of 2016, Michoacán´s governor declared (for 
the second time in less than one year) the end of the self-defense groups in the state: "From 
now on the work of so-called self-defense groups is completed. There are no more armed 
civilian groups doing that work, which only concerns to the government. Anyone who may 
want to do this task must do it illegally" (Aureoles quoted by García; 2016). Afterward, other 
actors such as farmers, peasants, religious leaders played a role in the criminal group’s 
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attempts at legitimation. In the following pages, these attempts are described and analyzed. 
Hence, the next chapter is specifically dedicated to analyze LFM and LCT legitimacy 
endeavors.	
 
3.3. Closing Remarks: Chapter III Summary 
 
After elaborating on Michoacán’s political legitimacy context, the following are closing 
remarks derived from this third chapter. In the first place, the LFM/LCT phenomenon is 
connected to the war on drugs launched in Mexico in 2006. In the case of Michoacán, this 
iron-fisted punitive strategy set the basis for a political legitimacy struggle that implicated 
several actors – LFM and LCT among them. Increased violence around Michoacán becomes 
rationalized through the different versions of the local social order clash. The war on drugs 
had and still has real consequences in terms of multiple sovereign bodies performing 
simultaneous legitimacy practices. In other words, Michoacán became a particularly 
contested legitimacy scenario. On the side of the Mexican federal government, Michoacán 
became a relevant symbolic war arena not only because was it the home state of the president, 
but also because the first army deployment was launched there.	
 
On the side of the local criminal groups, but more particularly LFM, two particular actions 
were recovered in this chapter. Both matter deeply in terms of their political legitimacy 
interest at the beginning of Michoacán´s case analysis – during the following years, there 
were a collection of actions in this regard, but they are revisited in the next chapter. On the 
one hand, the event in which LFM dropped the heads of their alleged enemy, a rival and 
foreign criminal group. LFM left a narcomanta with a justification of illegality. It was not 
only the agenda´s spread but also crime justification and public explanation pointing to a 
legitimacy interest. On the other hand, the text published in the local newspaper and 
reproduced here was another action in which elements of locality and moral values were 
spread and addressed to the local people. Other political actors also emerged and had a 
presence in the field by clashing for the local social order definition. 	
 
Autodefensas, the people of Cherán, as well as the local and federal government are the 
prominent examples in this regard. LFM and later LCT were embedded in the same social 
context. Even when the analysis here centers on criminal groups, their legitimacy 
performance always takes place in relation to these other agencies. Michoacán became an 
intense arena to contest political legitimacy. The place experienced a saturation of authority 
practices (codified into sovereignty exercise, state-effect, statehood practices). This condition 
only increased through the next years when other social agents also took part. Within this 
context, from a general political legitimacy evaluation, Michoacán is appreciated by the 
simple equation of many actors, many of them state actors. As a result of the political 
legitimacy contestation, the context exhibited a multiplicity of authority and not an absence 
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of it. Each of the political actors in the social order constellation of Michoacán performed 
sovereign as well as political legitimacy practices.	
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Chapter 4.  
The Art of Dying Twice: Legitimacy Sources and Resources of La Familia 
and Los Caballeros Templarios  
 
Although the politics of legitimacy are usually relevant for political actors, in some instances 
armed actors might also seek to establish social order and acquire broad support. In particular, 
legitimacy becomes indispensable for criminal groups pretending to improve their “[…] self-
understanding (‘who we are’) and [self] placement into a wider historical and societal 
context”	(Schneckener, 2017, 804). This idea is useful to guide the analysis of Michoacán 
criminal groups´	legitimacy campaigns. By studying LFM and LCT's politics of legitimacy, 
this chapter discusses: 1) their influence and participation in the definition of  local social 
order; 2) the construction of a legitimacy audience; and 3) the sources and resources 
composing and building the group´s identity – inside the organization as well as how this 
identity was embedded in an extensive socio-historical context. In the case of Michoacán, 
local criminal groups made attempts, endeavors, displays, and practices that provide plenty 
of material for a study of the politics of legitimacy. In other words, LFM and LCT made use 
of the descriptive angle by attempting legitimacy without abandoning their illicit condition. 
Below, these efforts are systematized, explained, and analyzed across this chapter as 
empirical references related to the previous conceptual discussion.	
 
From 2006 to 2014, both LFM and LCT developed a language of legitimacy (including 
speeches, messages, symbols, and rituals) which in turn shaped practices of legitimacy. How 
so? The answer does not rest exclusively on the shoulders of these illegal agents but in their 
contexts as well, including the other social agents involved in contesting legitimacy (together 
with their audiences). Therefore, the investigation needs to go from the general to the 
particular. In other words, it is first required to detect and describe the extended legitimacy 
context. It then becomes possible to situate the criminal groups’ legitimacy performance 
itself. The review of the general legitimacy panorama was made in the previous chapter, 
including the aforementioned formations of sovereignty contestation (Stepputat, 2010). Thus, 
here we can review and analyze the legitimacy endeavors performed by these criminal groups 
within that time and space. Most of the data come from fieldwork, specifically through semi-
structured interviews carried out in the cities of Michoacán, Zamora, Uruapan, and Cherán	
— all in Michoacán and Mexico City. 23  In addition, material objects collected during 
fieldwork complete primary sources complemented with secondary sources such as local, 
national, and international newspapers, and specialized literature as well.	
 
The analysis has been guided through the sources and resources of legitimacy categorized in 
the second chapter (Table 1), together with the concepts’ instrumentation previously 
 23 Given the topics of this research and the questions during the interviews, anonymity was promised to every 
informant independently of their willingness or not for being quoted anonymously.	
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discussed. First the "Symbolic" sources are explored, followed by the "Performance-
centered" sources, and ending with the "Portrayal of the enemy" sources. Each type of source 
is later divided into subtypes, each of which consists of material and non-material resources 
depending on how each endeavor was empirically carried out. Afterward comes a special 
section, which consists of a detailed analysis of the LFM and LCT editorial production. 
During the period studied here, at least five books were written, edited, published, and spread 
on behalf of or supporting these criminal groups’	activities and their members, especially its 
leader. This phenomenon is, at least, original within the specter of criminality around the 
world and in the recent history. These books run across the three types and subtypes of 
legitimacy sources identified within this research. Hence, symbolic, performance-centered, 
and representational portrayals of the enemy are identified and explained in this section. Even 
when several elements coming from these books take part in the first section, a particular 
revision of them is realized in the second section as an example of a legitimation attempt that 
cuts across the sources and resources of legitimacy (summarized in the Table 4).24	
 
Table 4. Summarized Operative Distribution of Legitimacy Sources for Criminal Groups	
Main Source	 Subtype Source	
 
Symbolic	 Social Contract Offer	
Agenda´s Spread and/or Justification	
Symbols Spread	
 
 
Performance-centered	 Provision of Governing Institutions	Philanthropy	
(Carrots)	
Coercion	
(Sticks)	
 
Portrayals of the Enemy	 Expressions against Formal Authorities	
Expressions against Other (non-formal) authorities	
Stance towards current Law		
 
4.1. La Familia and Los Templarios: Sources and Resources of Legitimacy 
 
 24 These editions are named here the “criminal editorial production”. The analysis is conducted in the second 
section of this chapter and seeks to understand how the books worked for building the identity of the criminal 
group, constituting their narrative, and justifying their criminal agency and activities.	
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Before delving into the analysis of criminal groups and the war on drugs, three characteristics 
of the social context should be emphasized: religiosity, masculinity, and the Mexican social 
and economic crisis.25  These elements need to be treated separately because they shape the 
general Mexican scenario, and not exclusively Michoacán. Moreover, their relevance is due 
to how they shaped the socio-political background in which, in this specific case, LFM and 
LCT displayed their legitimacy interest. In the first places comes religiosity. Mexicans are 
not becoming less religious but less Catholic. Although Mexico is one of the most Catholic 
countries, Catholicism is currently suffering a historical crisis of believers. According to the 
2010 census, almost ninety-three million of Mexicans declared themselves Catholic plus 
eleven million more professing other religion (INEGI, 2010). At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, 99.5% of the total population in Mexico was Catholic; in 2010, the 
percentage decreased to 82.7% (DataR, 2018, with information from INEGI, 2010). In other 
words, it is not that Catholics stopped their faith altogether but that most of them converted 
to another religion or cult. In 2010, only 4.7% to 17.3% of non-Catholics declared themselves 
atheists; the rest were Protestants, Pentecostals, Evangels, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other 
sects (DataR, 2018, with information from INEGI, 2010). The national faith context is still 
Christian.26	
 
The second element is machismo. This needs to be understood as result and producer of a 
generalized gender violence context. In addition to the enormous but countless cases (due to 
the lack of data produced by the denounces absence) of domestic violence suffered by 
women, the war on drugs context dramatically expanded the cases of women victims. Indeed, 
although during these contexts homicide victims largely consist of men, "[...] it does not 
imply that homicides against women have not increased" (Zepeda, 2016b). As a 
consequence, increasing homicide among men corresponds with the rate among women, 
although perpetrators tend to be men or, at least, violence happens in a context of hyper-
masculinity (Interview in the field no. 6, 2017). As a reaction, together with NGOs´	
assistance, local congresses around the country had created and launched gender alerts, a 
public policy addressing to use human, legal, and financial resources in order to tackle the 
violence against women. So far, to the moment in which this research was worked, 56% of 
Mexican territory is under gender alert (Conavim, 2019).27 Collaterally, this public policy 
strategy has become an indicator of how bad the situation within a given region is.	
 25 As social features of Mexico and Michoacán in particular (religiosity, machismo, and the crisis) have a 
dialectic function in the LFM and LCT legitimation performance: they make sense of many of these legitimacy 
practices, which in turn also produce consequences in the local social order.	26 Indeed, this contextual factor is essential because LCT drew in their legitimacy claims of prior existing 
Christian symbolism and imagery (see Picture 1 in the Appendix).	27 The Gender Alert against Women Violence (Alerta de Violencia de Género contra las Mujeres) is the public 
policy mechanism used in Mexico to face and eradicate violence against women in a given territory. It includes 
designing and promoting actions, protocols, and budgets to prevent and eliminate this type of violence. In order 
to be decreed, it needs to be requested by local, national, or international organizations based in diagnosis and 
should be approved by local congresses.	
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In Michoacán, gender alerts started in June of 2016 and were promoted by Circe López, a 
local NGO leader who later was accused of defamation after denouncing sexual abuse 
accusations against a university teacher who participated in the group in charge of promoting 
the gender alert (Redacción Animal Político, 2018). Finally, the last relevant social element 
to describe the context concerns the political and economic crisis that took place in Mexico 
during the eighties and nineties. In Galtung's terms, structural violence took the form of 
neoliberal economic transformations increased exclusion (1990). Along with the dismantling 
of social and economic rights, privatizations, and accelerated electoral democratization, also 
increased generalized crime, suicides, undocumented migration to the United States, and 
gender violence, as was the case in Ciudad Juárez (Fuentes Díaz y Fini, 2018, 14). The 
consequences of this crisis in the mid and long term were marginalization, humiliation, and 
denigration of the subjects, which generated structural violence that eventually led to both 
cultural and direct violence (Galtung, 1990, 295). In the case of Michoacán, this machismo 
and gender roles featured prominently in the behavior of the local criminal groups.	
 
Now the analysis addresses the specific criminal groups´	legitimacy attempts in which their 
influence is a more or less evident. This section pays special attention to “[…] capturing 
‘state effects’	 in a range of sites. This involves studying how state-like institutions and 
practices produce […] ‘isolation’, ‘identification’, ‘legibility’, and ‘spacialization’	effects –
creating publics, interpellating subjects, classifying and regulating collectivities and 
producing jurisdictions with territorial boundaries”	(Jaffe, 2013, 736). As said before, this 
legitimation trajectory investigation starts in 2006, when LFM dropped their enemies’ heads 
in a local nightclub. This action should be understood as the first legitimacy attempt. As a 
violent exhibition of beating the enemy, it also exhibited a sort of self-presentation by naming 
the enemy, i.e., who they are not. That was a traditional differentiation ritual between "them" 
and "us" (Todorov, 2007), but also as a distinction between	“friend”	and “enemy”	(Schmitt, 
2001). The argument of an external threat to the local interests (i.e., the local rivalry criminal 
group Los Zetas) motivated this first attempt at drawing the line between two allegedly 
different criminal groups. On the one hand, one with local roots and social cause (LFM), and 
on the other, a foreigner and selfish group non-engaged with local development, i.e., the 
Zetas – criminal group initially constituted by Mexican army former members (see about this 
Correa-Cabrera, 2017 as well as Aguayo and Dayán, 2018).	
 
This argument was spread by LFM discourse, in which the Zetas played the role of the foreign 
threat that was exclusively taking advantage of the locals. A couple of months after the 
nightclub event, an insertion appeared in two local newspapers as a sort of peaceful 
introduction to locals (the entire text was transcribed in the last chapter). However, this 
message needs to be placed into the same legitimation track. In this case, the discourse inside 
this prose worked as LFM’s explanation and justification of criminal activities in order to 
apprise locals of their reasons and origins. The two events launched this criminal political 
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legitimacy process that seemed to start declining as of the first half of 2014, when, Nazario, 
the criminal group leader was beaten. However, those attempts became intensified when 
LFM turned into LCT, as will be seen later.28	
 
In the manifesto published in 2005 by LFM, the criminal group was self-described as "[...] 
native workers of the Tierra Caliente [...] organized by the necessity to get out of the 
oppression [and] humiliation" from other cartels. Moreover, following the same document, 
their mission was to "eradicate" crimes from Michoacán, and motivated by their "[...] love to 
our state [Michoacán]". Their objective, they stated, was to maintain "[...] the universal 
values of the people" (La Familia Michoacana, 2006). According to Wolff, “[…] the lack of 
regular and effective state presence in a given community is the primary condition under 
which some form of non-state entities will develop authoritative functions, whether in 
response to residents seeking order and material welfare or an imposition on them”	(2015, 
21). Criminals may or may not try to fill this gap. In this case, a complex overlapping and 
struggling between criminal groups and other local agents shaped the scenario. 	
 
Following Claessen, due to the short but intense period of disputes, LFM and LCT kept 
mostly in the track of legitimation rather than reaching the legitimate condition (1988). As a 
result, these criminal groups privileged the over-exposition as a visibility strategy towards 
building a legitimate authority. The following section explicitly attempts to describe and 
explain this process through the state-effects coming out from both LFM and LCT after that 
kick-off legitimation interest described before. During fieldwork, these practices were 
nuclear ideas to look for. Following the idea, those state-effects are also explained as 
practices of sovereignty and legitimacy that fill, compete, challenge, or withdraw authority 
presence in the local context. This methodological model structures the following sections. 
The first one centers the analysis in describing and analyzing Michoacán´s criminal groups' 
legitimacy attempts through the effective distribution of legitimacy sources and resources for 
criminal groups explained in the second chapter (Table 1). Each practice is examined and 
categorized as legitimacy resources belonging to a particular legitimacy source. Symbolic 
 28 LFM and LCT efforts toward becoming self-published, publicly advertised and plainly notorious is a feature 
that distinguishes them from other mafias and criminal groups. Possibly the most prominent efforts in this 
regard rotate around Nazario Moreno, both groups former leader. A material and immaterial collection give 
prove of this and shape a collection of legitimacy sources and resources. Both LFM and LCT constitute a sort 
of continuum. Despite Aranda called LCT “[…] a new [criminal] group”	(2013b, 62) this research encountered 
that both LFM and LCT took part of the same group given their legitimation continuity, but in different stages. 
Thus, in the most radical perspective, here we are not talking about two different groups, but two stages enclosed 
into one legitimation history. In the first place, the legitimation endeavors around the period from 2006 to 2010 
correspond to LFM. Later, after Nazario Moreno´s false assassination, the following legitimation events can be 
attributed to LCT and up to 2014, when government agents finally assassinated Nazario. Hence, this person 
together with his character robustly influenced the legitimating profile and process.	
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sources come first, followed by the Performance-centered sources, and finishing with the 
Portrayal of enemies sources.29	
 
4.1.1. Symbolic Sources 
 
LFM and LCT continually promoted themselves as criminal or political groups, which offers 
material for an analysis of symbolic legitimacy. Initially, LFM displayed efforts to gain 
locals´	sympathy. In this regard, secrecy and discretion did not seem to be an option; on the 
contrary, the most visible seemed the best option to announce the criminal group´s presence 
and declare legitimacy as the collective accreditation of political authority. Symbolic sources 
played a relevant role. This phenomenon becomes interesting from the criminal and political 
legitimacy point of view: although criminals, both groups preferred to be publicly observed 
as part of their legitimacy strategy. Between not being perceived by formal authorities, and 
being seen by locals to gain acceptance, Michoacán´s criminal groups seemed to choose the 
latter. Material and immaterial symbols were deeply relevant towards addressing this 
objective, either by promising or building social contract benefits for locals and spreading 
material and non-material discourses. Following Table 1, the symbolic sources are 
categorized into three subtypes: proposed social contract, agenda´s spread and/or 
justification, and symbol’s spread.	
 
4.1.1.1. Proposed Social Contract 
 
The "proposed social contract" subtype source of legitimacy is expressed through a) granting 
public services (material resource), b) promoting belonging and cohesiveness, and a 
trustworthy mandate (non-material resources). In this regard, no material resources were 
detected in this research (in the sense of public services granting), whereas there were 
massive efforts fitting in the non-material specter. Here, social contract offering bases its 
symbolism on the criminal groups' endeavors for establishing the basis for a shared destiny 
understanding under their lead. Following this idea, belonging is probably one of the most 
apparent elements behind this legitimacy subtype source, i.e., the criminal group’s offering 
of a social contract. This could even be understood as a negotiation with locals. Both LFM 
and LCT discourses are full of references to local elements – from introducing themselves as 
genuine michoacanos, to using local heroes and symbols as part of their discourse. Actually, 
is locality that built the political legitimacy continuum between LFM and LCT. Moreover, 
the discursive use of foreigners (blaming other cartels such as the Zetas or the local Valencia 
cartel for not taking care of Michoacán and its people) worked in order to consolidate this 
 29 With relative differences, and according to several interviews carried out, each of these attempts failed more 
sooner than later. Thus, locals realized that this criminal group was not different from “the rest”, referring to 
other criminal groups. Hence, locals started expecting the same violence and abuses, which finished with any 
possibility of a trustworthy mandate. In this regard, the political legitimacy analysis mostly rests on those first 
attempts rather than in their further consequences.	
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local identity (Lomnitz, 2016b, 23). LFM and LCT pushed a discourse towards creating an 
othering conflict.30 Within the manifesto published by LFM in November of 2006, the group 
introduced themselves as “[…] native workers of the Tierra Caliente region in the state of 
Michoacán”	(La Familia Michoacana, 2006). This was the beginning of LFM and LCT local 
philosophy:	
 
[LCT and LFM promoted] a very local philosophy, in which Michoacán has the right to protect 
ourselves, and we as Michoacán people have the right to decide on our future and that no external 
forces could come to harm us, or to control us. And it was a philosophy that consisted of loving our 
neighbor, and for looking after the poorest people [...] suddenly they seemed to have good intentions, 
and Nazario developed a whole doctrine with philanthropic aspects, he went into the communities [...] 
There were many communities mainly in Tierra Caliente that protested when Calderón said that he had 
killed El Chayo [...] then at the beginning it was very peaceful and everything seemed  done with good 
intentions. [For instance] There were aspects in this regard such as the absolute prohibition of crystal-
meth consuming (Interview in field no. 1, 2017).	
 
Again and again, references to locality, protection, and belonging shaped a discourse 
attempting to build trust and reliability on the criminal group – starting from the idea of the 
family as a cohesive trustworthy unit. The idea of family works as a secure shelter. On the 
other hand, LFM did try to create a trustworthy mandate by spreading several statements 
expressing that they will not damage children, women, or “innocent people”. Ironically, LFM 
and LCT attempted to ban (certain) substances consumption, which in the end was the same 
as any legal government stands in the world. The banning of crystal meth consumption for 
local people and (especially) their members, is an example in this regard –despite, as said 
before, that enormous profits resulted from selling this drug mainly to the United States 
(Interview in the field no. 1, 2017). Moreover, the LCT code also forbade its members from 
drinking alcohol. In the same sense, but concerning LFM, according to local versions, this 
criminal group was chasing and punishing common thieves in the region of Tierra Caliente 
(Interview in field no. 2, 2017). Indeed, this feature concerns the security provision analyzed 
in detail later, but from the perspective of a trustworthy mandate, it was an action that pointed 
to achieving political legitimacy – this security provision also works as a material resource. 
These were actions linked to governance pretentions explained in their agenda.	
 
4.1.1.2. Agenda´s Spread and/or Justification 
 
The "agenda´s spread and/or justification" subtype source of legitimacy becomes expressed 
through a) publications and written codes (material resources), and b) founding narratives, 
songs, anthems, and public messages (non-material resources). Spreading a criminal agenda 
does not necessarily mean justifying it. However, in this case, both actions seemed to go with 
 30 As it is explained later as part of the “portrayal of the enemy”	source, and in the criminal editorial production 
analysis, especially these criminal groups corresponded the Mexican federal government discourse during the 
war on drugs in terms of creating an artificial social division between “us”	against “them”.	
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each other. Flashing back to this legitimacy trajectory, when LFM dropped their enemies’ 
heads, the narcomanta accompanying them stated: “this is divine justice”. This statement is 
relevant regarding several legitimacy sources and resources; it concerns a wide range of 
them, from a trustworthy mandate, a public message, justice managing (including security 
provision and sanctioning), fear spreading, and a general violence administration attempting. 
Moreover, values diffusion and moral beliefs were spread within the discourse when the 
narcomanta stated that, LFM, “[…] does not kill for pay, it does not kill women, it does not 
kill innocent people. Only those who must die will die”. In the case of the published text in 
local newspapers, something similar can be appreciated. By publishing	“About us”, their 
“Mission”, the main “Objective”, and “Why”	the group was made up, LFM fully spread and 
explained their agenda. Around these statements, contradictions took place between the 
criminal group's sayings and actions, but from an anthropological perspective, it does not 
matter if this was true or not but how these messages were displayed. 	
 
The LCT´s superlative agenda´s dissemination happened four years after the LFM newspaper 
manifesto and that first narcomanta in Uruapan. By distributing their code (El Código de los 
Caballeros Templarios de Michoacán), a pseudo-religious booklet reviewed in detail later, 
LCT announced not only their creation but also their moral values and general objective. In 
this case, it is interesting to observe that the audience seems to point towards LCT´s members 
rather than locals or the general population. However, this contrasts with the fact that the 
booklet distribution precisely aimed to reach locals rather than only or exclusively criminal 
group members. The booklet appeared in bus stops, outside houses, in local markets and 
minimarkets, and in public spaces (Interview in field no. 7, 2017). Indeed, for many locals 
receiving or only noticing the code, this was a sign of fear or alert. That was a reasonable 
reaction considering that, at this point, the criminal group (former LFM) had had bad 
experiences when managing other social contracts. Besides, violence levels in the whole state 
of Michoacán substantially increased during this period, i.e., from 2006 to 2010 (SESNSP 
and INEGI, figures one to five in Chapter III).	
 
However, the agenda´s spread went further beyond the narcomanta, the newspaper 
presentation, and the code. Every one of the published texts had a relevant aspect in this 
regard and attempted to publicize and underline the group´s agenda. Each of these books is 
carefully analyzed below. Meanwhile, the criminal group leader’s memoir offered a full 
explanation of his actions and beliefs together with his influence on the criminal group 
actions and decisions. The criminal group also allegedly paid a local journalist to “tell their 
truth”	without being influenced by the federal government interests (Interview in field no. 1, 
2017). Several videos currently available on YouTube were uploaded to several Internet sites. 
In most of them, Servando Gómez, nicknamed “La Tuta”, the second leader in charge, 
showed himself escorted by several armed men while explaining, justifying, and making 
several statements around the so-called war on drugs launched by the Mexican federal 
government, including the criminal group’s public security diagnosis.	
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Finally, regarding the “agenda´s spread and/or justification”	as a source of legitimacy, LCT 
created and published an anthem, a non-material resource which takes part in the mentioned 
source. Even when folkloric songs dedicated especially to LCT were released, there is a 
singular video uploaded to YouTube, this is, the “Himno OFICIAL de los Caballeros 
Templarios de Michoacan”	(OFFICIAL Anthem of the Knights Templars of Michoacán),31 
whose lyrics states as following while martial music sounds:	
 
I am a Knight Templar, 	
a soldier to the order of the temple,	
I do represent the oppressed peoples´	feelings in this nation.	
I am a Templar fighter,	
everything for a better world,	
I was pointed, I was rejected,	
and several times humiliated,	
that is why I am Now I am a rebel,	
A rebel from the heart,	
[…]	
I do have an impeccable conduct,	
because I do have to respect everybody	
protecting every Christian,	
and always looking for the truth	
[…]	
helping the helpless will always be the objective	
[…]32	
 
Again, the “rebel”	role is underlined by claiming to defend a social cause. The lyrics combine 
an implicit defense of a criminal stance, together with a portrayal of LCT as the 
representatives of the nation´s oppressed people. The war language is present as well by using 
the idea of the soldier. Religious references appear in these lyrics such as the Christian 
defense, but also by presenting an individual who was previously humiliated and came back 
as a social protector. The purpose of this anthem is not clear, but it clearly appeals to political 
legitimacy with these constituents. Of course, these attempts were complemented by the 
performance-centered legitimacy sources, which are more practical than symbolic.	
 
4.1.1.3. Dissemination of Symbols 
 
The "symbols spread" subtype source of legitimacy becomes expressed through a) identity 
symbols in ornaments and documents (material resources), and b) rituals, values, moral 
beliefs, and religiosity (non-material resources). On the last floor of SEDENA´s (National 
 31  Available on YouTube, uploaded by the user “Guardia Michoacana CT”, on May 11, 2012, URL: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A6RbZjP_h_4, consulted on June 12, 2018	32 This is my translation from Spanish.	
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Defense Secretary) headquarters, in Mexico City, the Mexican Army created the Museum of 
Narcotics. Not open to the public, this place was designed to show the troops’ and army's 
efforts to eradicate drug trafficking in Mexico. The last section in this museum is called 
“Narcocultura”	(Narco-culture), and one of the main pieces is a shrine together with a saint 
image, a sword, and a golden book: pieces of the LCT material resources of symbols spread, 
i.e., the criminal identity symbols in ornaments and documents. The image is of Saint 
Nazario, and the book is the code. Gold and other expensive jewelry can be seen in the image, 
the shrine, beside a sword and the main edition of the code with its cover and sheets made of 
gold.33  The religious side of LCT deserves special attention, especially the role of San 
Nazario, i.e., LCT leader´s self-sanctification. 	
 
In this regard, together with the editorial production, LCT was original enough to develop 
their unique morality together with its religious symbols and rituals. The political 
legitimation relevance around these phenomena takes to the moral usage towards affiliating 
and convincing new and old members. After Nazario´s “first death”, in December of 2010, 
even when the person did not die, a saint was born, i.e., San Nazario. How do religion and 
criminal groups come together? When mixing Michoacán's case with the political legitimacy 
lens, interesting analytical advantages pop up. Across all these criminal group attempts to 
perpetuate their rule, one of them was produced from a religious perspective. Nazario 
consistently presented himself as a strong man and iconized leader, which also worked as a 
mechanism to legitimize him and the criminal group in general. By taking advantage of the 
confusion arising from that alleged death of its leader, this criminal group developed a 
religious narrative together with Christian-medieval imagery based on the personal-cult of 
this person, Nazario Moreno, now Saint Nazario.34	
 
Moreover, the "Templar" seal needs special attention. Also known as the Order of Solomon's 
Temple, the Knights Templar were a Catholic military order active in Europe between the 
twelfth to the fourteenth centuries. To some extent, the Templars were related to the crusades, 
historical battles in which the faith of Europe was decided between Christianity and Islam. 
Around the Templars had existed an imaginary of mystery, secret society and, furthermore, 
faith loyalty. There is no doubt about how this imaginary inspired, at least, the aesthetics of 
LCT and particularly Saint Nazario's creation. Michoacán criminals adopted the uniform and 
created discourses, symbols, and codes following this historical reference. The Saint Nazario 
phenomenon needs to be inserted into this context. Even when it is not possible to prove or 
 33 Additionally, gold made up medallions confected with the Templars´	cross, as well as guns and rifles with 
the same characteristics could be seen in this Museum. See the Pictures 1 and 2 in the Appendix.	34 The local context plays a fundamental role and, as explained earlier, Christianity continues to work as a 
powerful source of bonding. Beyond Nazario´s commitments, across all religious settings, Christianity makes 
sense in a scenario in which strict the Catholic faith might somehow decrease, but in which people might still 
stick to a moldable Christian imaginary despite variations – as with Santa Muerte or Jesús Malverde (Aguiar, 
2018).	
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not saint Nazario´s and its cult success, the Templar religion sought recruitment (Lomnitz, 
2016a), which reveals a substantive part of its political legitimacy perspective. Saint 
Nazario´s cult developed the image of a white bearded man looking alike Jesus Christ, but 
wearing the medieval Knight Templars uniform with a big red cross in a white tunic.35	
 
Together with the image of San Nazario, the Código de Los Caballeros Templarios de 
Michoacán took part in this religious display and legitimacy performance. The code worked 
in a similar way to the Taliban's code of conduct, the so-called Taliban La'iha, or the 
"criminal constitution" of the Brazilian criminal group Primeiro Comando da Capital. The 
former worked as the Taliban code of conduct. Even when in practice all kinds of abuses 
occurred, through the code the terrorist group controlled the rank while attempted to prevent 
or limit the emergence of rogue elements (Hamid, et al., 2018). Meanwhile, the criminal 
constitution from the Primeiro Comando set the limits on what members can do to one 
another or even to the local population (Hamid, et al., 2018), very similar to the LCT code 
in this regard. Journalistic reports also described ceremonies organized by LCT dedicated to 
showing faith to Saint Nazario (Castellanos, 2012b). During fieldwork, at least one prayer 
dedicated to San Nazario (and also to God) was found, which is transcribed here: 	
 
Oh Lord mighty powerful,	
Free me from every sin,	
Give me blessed protection,	
By Saint Nazario.	
 
Protector of the poorest,	
Knight of the peoples,	
Saint Nazario, give us life,	
Oh, blessed eternal Saint.	
 
Blessed light of the night,	
Defender of the sick,	
 35 Currently, the Knight Templar reference also plays a role in European and North American extreme right-
wing politics. An example of this is the “Knight Templar International”, a Christian militant group based in the 
United Kingdom. It began in 2015 with a commitment to “combat”	Muslim expansion and immigration coming 
from Islamic countries. The Templar symbolism serves as inspiration for this movement, whose reference to 
the medieval crusades help to shape the hate discourse. After Nazism and Fascism, far-right movements 
particularly in Western European countries find in the Templar’s historical sense and iconography the sources 
for justifying hate, intolerance, and violence against Muslims, but not exclusively. Following Koch, these new 
twenty-first century “crusaders”, “Crusader symbols and anti-Islamic rhetoric help to consolidate individuals, 
groups, organizations, parties and movements in Europe and in the United States (and elsewhere) under a 
transnational framework, by reviving the crusader heritage and presenting it as an appropriate response to Jihad, 
even though just for propaganda purposes. Thus, Christian symbols and rhetoric provide a religious justification 
and inspiration for a physical struggle against a religious enemy”	(2017, 20). LCT and this far-right movement 
coincidentally got inspiration from the same source. However, what is interesting to highlight is that in two 
different contexts, and by two different collectivities with also different objectives, found in the same source, 
the Templar imaginary, the inspiration to justify atrocities based on social distinctions for their alleged “holy”	
mission.	
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Saint Nazario our saint,	
I always entrust myself to you,	
 
Glory to Godfather,	
I dedicate you my rosary,	
Give us health and more work,	
Abundance in our hands,	
Let our people become blessed,	
I beg you, Saint Nazario.36	
 
According to Stepputat, social relations do not have to be spatial; “They can also be temporal, 
with claims to sovereignty shifting between night and day, or they can be related to specific 
domains, such as the spiritual.37 Religion, for example, can provide (sovereign) protection 
for members an representatives, but as it happened during the Guatemalan civil war, such 
protection may also break down”	(2015, 132). In this regard, as Grillo said, “The pseudo-
ideology, Nazario found, was a cement that could bind his criminal empire together”	(Grillo, 
2017, 250). At its time, political legitimacy interests motivated the creation of that cement. 
After all, as Tilly reviewed, the European modernity and the empire of the nation-state 
resulted only when the means of power became concentrated instead of religion (1985). 
Before, religiosity worked as a primary legitimacy source that enabled a sense of identity, 
essential to consolidate the State centuries later. With the sources for this research, it is not 
possible to talk or not about Nazario´s or LFM/LCT success in this regard. However, it seems 
that these illegal agents systematically spoke a sovereign language that had become 
criminally codified. 	
 
4.1.2. Performance-Centered Sources 
 
According to Grillo, led by Nazario, LFM “[…] installed an alternative justice system, in 
which local bossed judged and punished those who carried out ‘anti-social’	crimes such as 
robbing or raping […] But the Maddest One added his loco twist. He pronounced in the name 
of the lord and punishment was in the style of Old Testament justice. Alleged criminals were 
flogged, like in Roman times, or even crucified”	(2017, 261). This quote fairly illustrates 
how the performance-centered sources became materialized: by combining secular and 
 36 This is my own translation from Spanish. The original prayer is printed in the afterwards of the book Palabra 
de Caballero. Los Caballeros Templarios. Un movimiento insurgente, which is analyzed later in this chapter. 
See Picture 7 in the Appendix. The original text is presented here respecting the original drafting mistakes: “Oh 
Señor todo poderoso, Líbrame de todo Pecado, Dame protección Bendita, A través de San Nazario. Protector 
de los Más Pobres, Caballero de los Pueblos, San Nazario danos vida, Oh bandito Santo eterno. Luz Bendita de 
la Noche, Defensor de los enfermos, San Nazario Santo Nuestro, Siempre en ti yo me encomiendo. Gloria a 
Dios Padre, Te dedico mi Rosario, Danos salud y más trabajo, Abundancia en nuestras manos, Que nuestro 
Pueblo este Bendito, Yo Te pido San Nazario [sic]”	(Morales, no year).	37 Similar phenomena involving spirituality and authority building took place during the African civil wars. 
According to Duyvesteyn, “[…] in both Liberia and Somalia the form of rule was highly personalized during 
the wars. The leaders heading the factions were interested in getting to power. They used identities and religion 
or beliefs to strengthen their legitimacy”	(2000, 110).	
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religious claims. In the end, thee are sovereignty practices in all of them. In fact, the justice 
system was not the only alternative; every state-effect by LFM and LCT became an 
alternative. Later they became alternatives to other agents’	statehood practices as well – such 
as Autodefensas. Following the Table 1, the performance-centered sources are 
subcategorized into three subtypes: provision of governing institutions, philanthropy 
(carrots), and coercion (sticks). The two latter are grouped into one unique section in order 
to sharpen the analysis.	
 
4.1.2.1. Provision of Governing Institutions 
 
The "provision of governing institutions" subtype source of legitimacy is expressed through 
a) taxation and economy (material resource), and b) security and justice managing, as well 
as labor regulations (non-material resources). In Michoacán, the criminal provision of 
governing institutions claims did emulate the state institutions in four fields: 1) security 
provisioning, 2) justice system exercise, 3) imposing taxation (shaped by extortion practices), 
and 4) imposing economic and productive activities regulation. Each one of these was 
objectively materialized, and that happened in a two-fold manner. Either when 1) the criminal 
group did fulfill governance gaps that the legal authority left (presence vs. absence) or, 2) 
with the criminal group explicitly challenging legal authority (presence vs. presence) – and 
sometimes combining both scenarios, which interestingly, also fit into the symbolic sources. 
As security providers, LFM claimed the responsibility of taking care of minor criminals (such 
as street-robbers and small drug sellers), markedly during the first years. That shot pointed 
to control while monopolizing regular crime, drug selling, and drug consumption – as 
explained before in the case of crystal meth known as hielo (ice) foco (bulb) (Interview in 
field no. 2, 2017). Since 2006, some locals noticed that LFM members were managing to 
punish ordinary thieves (Interview in the field no. 7, 2017). 	
 
There were stories of several youngsters accused, beaten, and publicly exposed in local public 
spaces coincide – indeed, as a case of overlapping, this feature also fits into the symbolic 
source of legitimacy. This alleged security also worked as a demonstration of power and 
business control. From another angle of security provision, these criminal groups attempted 
(and sometimes succeed) to take control of highways, ports, and strategic communications 
around the state of Michoacán. By controlling paths and routes, LFM and LCT consolidated 
the presence of their mandate while controlling territory. Paradoxically, instead of making 
highways secure due to the criminal group's control, they became particularly insecure hot 
spots around the Michoacán, as well as in many other parts of the country. In this regard, it 
becomes relevant to underline the highways’ role in Mexico´s economy and its link to 
criminality. During Felipe Calderón’s administration, not only was the war on drugs 
launched, but also the so-called “biggest highway infrastructure project in the country´s 
history”, i.e., an extensive national highway development program. These projects built or 
renewed more than fourteen thousand kilometers of highway, three thousand less than what 
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was initially promised. More than 351 billion Mexican pesos were expended on this project, 
more than double in comparison to the former government, in a country that was already 
lacking trains and other transport infrastructure apart from highways (Martínez, 2012). 	
 
As a consequence, control of criminal highways became a trend in several Mexican states 
such as Guerrero and Morelos in the South (Peña, 2014 and 2017). Michoacán was not the 
exception in this regard. As explored in the cartographic analysis, many of Michoacán’s 
municipalities with the highest levels of criminal violence coincide with the main highways. 
The worst were municipalities with highways connecting 1) with central regions inside the 
state, 2) with neighboring Mexican entities, 3) the highway to the United States, 4) the roads 
in the coastal zone and 4) the highway to Lázaro Cárdenas port, consistently have high crime 
rate levels – the case of the port is profoundly relevant for the local and national economic 
productivity, as will be explained later.38 The modus operandi in order to ensure highways 
control was usually to install more or less developed random checkpoints. Even when it is 
not easy to determine criminal group´s success or not in this regard, those high levels of 
violence on the highways reveal them as disputed zones. 	
 
Indeed, this control works as a display of visibility and power, useful for creating legitimacy. 
When traveling around highways during fieldwork two elements are standardized. First, there 
is an advanced practice for locals related to developing expertise on which road is secure and 
which is not. Additionally, people know what time is the best for traveling in this regard. 
Secondly, several busy or abandoned checkpoints could be seen on the highways (especially 
in the smaller ones). Almost everyone  installed them	—	not only criminal groups, but also 
the municipal, local, and federal government, as well as locals around meseta purépecha, the 
Mexican army, vigilantes (in Tierra Caliente), and social movements such as students near 
the capital city.39 Controlling paths and highways needs to be understood as a contested 
sovereign practice in which several social agents participate, and which is not related to a 
security provision discourse (indeed, highways become more dangerous as a consequence), 
but as a power display by becoming visible. Furthermore, there was a small jump from 
managing security to also administrating justice. According to local NGOs members’	
testimonies interviewed, criminal groups' members in Michoacán used to wait outside rural 
Public Ministers (the official local justice branch in Mexico) to wait for specific victims. The 
objective was to offer them the justice that they could not find with the legal officers. That 
was the case with Tierra Caliente women who were suffering from domestic violence. In this 
context, machismo persists. Hence, several cases like this appeared every day (Interview in 
the field no. 6, 2017).	
 
 38 See Michoacán map in the Appendix.	39 During interviews, informants reported that criminal groups have developed several checkpoints in Lázaro 
Cárdenas port. However, given the security condition, it was not possible to attend this zone in order to conduct 
fieldwork there.	
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After asking for justice from the town judge, and not receiving it or being re-victimized, 
members from LCT waited outside for women in order to offer immediate “justice”	to their 
problem. Most of these women were suffering from physical, emotional, and economic 
violence. It was justice that official authorities denied or simply could not offer. A brutal 
example in this regard was the case of women whose were asked to keep weapons in their 
backyards (this point is analyzed below as part of the “coercion”	 subtype resource of 
legitimacy). In this case, the criminal group attempted to convince her that they were making 
a social revolution (Interview in the field no. 6, 2017). Whether to accept or deny criminal 
group´s justice administration became almost irrelevant; in the end, their approaching was 
intended to create a link that could immediately benefit their illegal interests. In this regard, 
these practices made use of the legal authority´s mediocre justice administration. However, 
despite the pragmatism behind these actions, criminal groups followed operating by a 
political legitimacy code, which possibly was poorly managed in the long run given the 
locals´	loss of trust.	
 
We knew about the case of a woman who suffered violence at home. So she went with the judge to 
denounce him [her husband]. In the presidency, public officers told her: "you are lying, you have no 
witness", all this shit that they say to women. This woman came out, and someone approaches her and 
asks to tell her concern. Of course, women are so sensitive, crying, and desperate [...] so they [criminal 
group members] start telling her: "I do understand you, and I do believe you [...] we do know about 
you, where you live, your husband´s name". The women said: "I went here to ask the authority to give 
a lesson to my husband. Not to kill him, only to scare him, but no one listens to me, because I am tired 
that he is always taking off my money, beating me, etcetera". This woman did trust in these guys who 
belong to narco, and they indeed scare the husband without killing him. That is why they are organized 
because they do know how to manage these problems. Then, the woman did trust on them and spread 
the voice. These women did not think that someone would ask for paybacks. However, the payback 
was to keep drugs, weapons, protect gang members (Interview in field no. 6, 2017).	
 
Finally, the practice of extortion deserves special attention connecting two subtype sources 
of legitimacy under the performance-centered category, i.e., governing institutions providing 
both carrots and sticks to local society (philanthropy and coercion, reviewed above). 
Concerning the former, rather than taxing administrators, both LFM and LCT were mostly 
violent extortionists. Extortion is a practice that embodies a singular state-effect. In the sense 
of providing governing institutions, in this case extortion means performing the sovereign 
practice of an alternative institution of taxation, administration, and security. Extortion is a 
frequent illegal practice in Mexico and Michoacán, which increased in the context of the war 
on drugs (see Figure 5). Moreover, in this context it acquired both practical and symbolic 
meaning. The rent extracted from extortion victims has a practical relevance (in the end this 
is real profit for criminal groups), but the symbolic act of portray as a non-elusive authority 
in the front of local people becomes even more relevant –this concerns the sticks and carrots 
subtype legitimacy sources. Regarding the institution-providing dimension, by extorting, 
LFM and LCT did attempt to substitute the formal and legal taxing and security providing 
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authorities especially with street vendors and farmers.40 LCT in particular attempted to make 
this “official”	by issuing papeletas, i.e., receipts in saying the payment occurred "in time and 
form" (Interviews in the field no. 1 and 7, 2017).41 	
 
4.1.2.2. Philanthropy and Coercion: Carrots and Sticks 
 
The "philanthropy" subtype source of legitimacy is expressed through a) gifting (material 
resource), and b) promises and hope generation (non-material resources). On the other hand, 
the "coercion" subtype becomes expressed through a) weapons and ammo control (material 
resource), and b) fear and use of threat or violence (non-material resource). Not only in 
Michoacán, but also in the whole country, extortion carried out by a criminal group is known 
as cobro or pago de piso (floor charge or floor payment). As said earlier, extortion has a 
practical function of giving earnings. It also helps to develop a political legitimacy interest 
of providing alternative institutions to those of the state. Nevertheless, the case of Michoacán 
(and especially LCT) is one of those in which this practice was taken further beyond as a 
legitimacy source because of their piso victim’s range, and how this crime went from a 
friendly introduction (carrots), to an extreme violent practice (sticks). 	
 
Following Tilly´s definition of legitimacy as the probability that other authorities confirm the 
decisions of a given authority (1985, 171), piso in Michoacán attempted to give LFM and 
LCT authority over other authorities. As a result, victims of extortion included 
businesspeople, smaller food vendors, farmers, and even public officers.42  Quantitatively, 
piso in Michoacán was not very different from in the rest of the country. However, 
qualitatively, it was bribery masquerading as a tax. LCT charged piso to rich businesspeople, 
taquerías, and food vendors selling in the street corners alike. Sometimes, piso charging did 
not start with violent threats but with the promise of benefits. This was the case with 
tortillerías business (tortilla selling stores), which received the offer of being helped to expel 
foreigners´	competition from Jalisco, the neighbor state, who were gaining clients against 
Michoacán´s tortilleros because of their house delivering system. LFM first created hope and 
later became violent:	
 40 Regarding the farmers, according to journalist reports, as a matter of interest of the “provision of governing 
institutions”	subtype resource of legitimacy, LCT in particular promoted aggressive labor regulation systems 
for peasants working in avocado and berries fields (Aranda, 2013b, 53; Padgett and Martínez, 2011).	41 That paper configured a state-effect by converting a regular paper with symbols and seals into an “official”	
document with real effects regarding possible violence consequences for those who did not pay the piso. As 
can be seen, many of the empirical references as is the extortion can be framed in more than one source of 
legitimacy. For instance, in this case, the papeletas entails with a relevant symbolic charge despite that here it 
has been tagged into the performance-centered sources.	42 Some of the local business that suffered piso charging that were mentioned when carrying out fieldwork, and 
that match with journalistic reports, are cafeterias, restaurants, night clubs, public transport operators, and 
tortillerías, among others. Moreover, the violence increasing reached levels that caused autodefensas reaction: 
“If you did not want to [pay] piso they would say, well, we will get your business [...] and in the case of 
Tepalcatepec [...] they started to take things away from you, and later women, and then not only women but 
also their daughters [...] and that is why they rebelled”	(Interview in field no. 7, 2017).	
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When these guys [LFM] began to expand, they went with local tortilleros. [LFM] built structures in 
each city, where there was a "head guy" of the "plaza", who reported to the dome in Tierra Caliente 
[...] They called the tortilleros and told them: "We are here, we are La Familia Michoacana, we belong 
to the people, we do not kill children nor women, we come to eradicate the other groups, and we want 
the best for Michoacán. That is why we are asking people for what problems you have". At that 
moment, the problem of tortilleros was the unfair competition of tortilla sellers from Jalisco [...] 
Michoacán tortilleros said: "Well, these [Jalisco] bastards are our problem, because we do not know 
how do these fucking jalisquillos do to sell tortilla kilos for only eight pesos, while we can barely sell 
it at ten pesos" [...] Of course, the authority did nothing [...]. Thus, [LFM] told them: "give us a week 
and that problem will be over, we will take care of it". Later, [LFM] went to jalisquillos, and told them: 
"from now on, you will stop selling tortillas here, if not, we are going to kill you off". After doing so, 
LFM came back with local merchants: "It is done. We are not going to charge you money, we come to 
help you". However, later there was a quota [piso charge], but later they did loose control and became 
violent" (Interview in field no. 1, 2017).	
 
Local farmers also suffered the transition from a “friendly”	cobro de piso to a violent way of 
doing so. This was the case with avocado and berry producers, which, as said earlier, are two 
of the main economic activities in Michoacán. Avocado producers were asked to pay a 
percentage of the profits but, initially, some received promises of advantages as a result of 
paying the piso such as security provision and better access to new markets. However, this 
quickly changed, and farmers received threats and robberies from the criminal group 
members themselves. For instance, LCT arbitrarily calculated the total farmer profits and the 
extortion percentage and killed those who did not pay. Another extortion practice was forcing 
to regulate avocado production in order to manipulate the final price through the offer and 
demand variables, i.e., speculate with the price (Interviews in field no. 3 and 5, 2017). 
Initially, some farmers were convinced to participate in this price manipulation by promising 
better profits resulting from the price increase. 	
 
Nevertheless, LCT's friendly request quickly transformed into a violent claim, as it was with 
tortilleros and street vendors (Interview in field no. 5, 2017). As a result, during certain 
periods, avocado and lime prices rose dramatically in the whole country (Staff Reforma, 
2014; Interview in field no. 20, 2016 and no. 5, 2017). Indeed, the avocado was not the only 
product involved in this criminal economic dynamic. At least lime, berries, grapefruits, meat, 
chicken, and pork did suffer the same consequences. In some instances, such as what 
happened in Cherán, local criminal groups managed to cut down trees and profit from the 
wood and seed more avocado plants that increase the so-called green gold profits explained 
in the last chapter. In this regard, both LFM and LCT developed marijuana and poppy seed 
fields that constitute the “regular”	drug trafficker’s primary source of income (together with 
crystal meth). As seen before, the cobro de piso practice was not only a taxing administration 
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activity but also worked as a protection system from other potential extortionists and 
robberies (Interview in field no. 3, 2017), as well as an economic and productive regulation.43 	
 
That is why, although fitting into the performance-centered sources, it came accompanied by 
symbolic sources. The piso influenced in the attempt for regulating significant economic 
activities for Michoacán such as the local agro-industrial activities, mining and the port 
control to more common activities as small food shops and even piracy commodities selling 
(Interview in field no. 3, 2017). The cases of mines and the port control deserve special 
attention. By 2012, Michoacán was the number one iron producer in Mexico. More than 27.2 
percent of total production was from Michoacán mines (Secretaría de Economía, 2013). As 
a result of iron´s price increase during the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
Michoacán’s iron extraction rose as well. By 2014, around fifteen percent of the mining 
territory in Michoacán was granted to non-Mexican companies such as Ternium, Arcelor 
Mittal, Endeavour Silver Corp, and AHMSA (Hernández, 2014). However, LCT took control 
of several extraction stages, concretely in the mines between Tierra Caliente and Lázaro 
Cárdenas port. From that moment, their criminal authority over taxing, regulation, and 
governance began.	
 
When it came to mining, carrots also quickly transformed into sticks. In the first place, LCT 
managed to charged piso to mining companies for safely transporting their shiploads. Sooner 
they also dealt with non-granted mining companies in order to allow them to exploit already 
working mines usually administered by transnational firms. This “criminal granting”	
mirrored the state by organizing and establishing minimum quotas for interested companies. 
Moreover, LCT pushed mining companies to pay more to ejidatarios (landlords) for 
continuing the concession; of course, the criminal group's profitted from this as well 
(Hernández, 2014). Finally, the role of the port begins here. LCT not only controlled the 
Mexican customs in Lázaro Cárdenas ports, but also used the port in order to establish 
commercial exchanges with China. LCT sent iron and received inputs to produce crystal meth 
in exchange, that is, chemicals to develop the same foco that the criminal group banned to be 
neither sold nor used by locals. Lázaro Cárdenas’ port location on the Pacific Ocean makes 
it a privileged spot in commerce between North America and Asian Pacific countries. In this 
case, the absence of official authority was relative, given that customs officers still worked 
there but were commanded by a criminal authority compelled through violence, corruption, 
or both.	
 
These methods also spread through how the local criminal groups administrated justice and 
courts for locals. Previously, it was explained the case in which LCT attempted to punish 
 43 Given these situations, the high extortion levels in Michoacán explored in the last chapter (see Figure 5) are 
not surprising, even considering that these figures correspond to the cases reported to the local official 
authorities.	
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accused perpetrators of domestic violence in one woman’s case. The case was not only 
relevant to the governing institutions' provision perspective. This action also has a sticks and 
carrots analysis angle. On the one hand, Michoacán´s Templars justice complying became 
translated for this woman (and any other individual in more or less similar conditions of 
impunity) into promises to generate hope. However, as happened in the other cases reviewed, 
this carrot quickly became a stick. Providing solutions and justice turned into an inevitable 
payback for LCT, in the form of hiding weapons and ammunition in the women’s backyards. 
Indeed, as seen in Table 1, guns and ammo control is a particularly relevant aspect of the 
"coercion" subtype source of legitimacy. Finally, before continuing with the last legitimacy 
source, below is a case that sheds light on another angle of the performance-centered source 
phenomena. As part of their political legitimacy interest, LCT developed a particular relation 
with legality and illegality. 	
 
Some criminals may politically deal with their "illegal" condition, and some others may not 
pay attention to this. Their decision has symbolic consequences concerning their standing 
towards the law. In the case of LCT, a bizarre combination of positioning and ignoring formal 
law could be seen. According to testimonies collected during fieldwork, the criminal group 
used to violently occupy ranches and haciendas. The owners were kidnapped and threatened 
with murder if he did not to sign papers to transfer the property to LCT members. However, 
after signing the documents, the owner was usually killed anyway (Interview in the field no. 
9, 2017). Despite the atrocity in these narrations, the knotty legal-illegal dealing becomes 
clear: there was a bizarre interest in legality, i.e., to correctly transfer the property to the 
criminal group according to the current law, while performing several illegal actions in order 
to achieve this objective.  Both LFM and LCT transformed philanthropy into coercion.	
 
4.1.3. Portrayals of Enemy Sources 
 
As part of an interview with Channel 4 News from the United Kingdom, Servando Gómez 
"La Tuta", LCT leader after Nazario´s "second" death, said: "[...] we are a needed harm, here 
we are unfortunately or fortunately, otherwise, here there would be another group" (Channel 
4 News, 2018). The interview happened in January of 2014, i.e., in the final stretch of the 
political legitimacy trajectory studied here. However, quoting “the enemy”	is useful to start 
talking about this last legitimacy source: portrayal of the enemy. The idea of a "needed harm" 
is more or less transversal to the general LCT portrayal of the enemy. Behind this sentence, 
there is a whole pessimistic discourse pointing out that worse threats could come to 
Michoacán. Given that, LCT criminal governance attempts became represented as a sort of 
least worse-case scenario. In this regard, and Following Claessen again, the constant 
necessity of pointing and blaming “enemies”, speaks to how these criminal groups spent 
more time in the process of becoming legitimate, rather than being legitimate. Following 
Table 1, portrayal of the enemy sources are subcategorized into three subtypes: expressions 
against formal authorities, expressions against other (non-formal) authorities, and stances 
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towards the current law. In this case, the three subtype sources of legitimacy are expressed 
through a) documents (material resource), and b) negotiations and confrontations (non-
material resources).	
 
4.1.3.1. Expressions Against Formal Authorities 
 
A couple of years after the Mexican federal government launched the war on drugs in 
Michoacán, the former president, who declared it, became himself a new enemy – initially, 
only the Zetas were the enemy, as will be analyzed below as part as the expressions against 
other non-official authorities.44 This statement was explicit in the book Palabra de Caballero 
(Morales, no year). Despite the fact that several references like this could be found in other 
books, in this alleged independent journalistic report, LCT is supposed to tell "their truth". 
As part of that truth, the author criticized several official Mexican institutions such as the 
armed forces and the Federal Police because of their actions in Michoacán. For instance, the 
federal government is accused of launching a "cowardly attack" against LFM, whose 
members were only complying "[...] with the exercise of their freedom to watch over and 
give security to local population given the alert of Zetas´	 comeback [to Michoacán]" 
(Morales, no year, 52). This quote is particularly interesting regarding the continuum between 
LFM and LCT as a sole political legitimacy trajectory. These are lines defending LFM in a 
book dedicated to defending LCT prestige.	
 
Five pages later appears a chapter titled “¿Cuál fue el delito?” (What Was the Crime?). By 
defending LCT members, the author also suggested that the official authority unnecessarily 
criminalized a social leader (i.e., Nazario), rather than a criminal (Morales, no year, 57-58). 
What is interesting is that neither the federal nor the local government were “enemies”	in the 
first place – or at least there were no references addressing them. On the contrary, in the first 
message displays made by LFM, the discourse across the manifesto, the narcomantas, and 
etcetera did not address but other non-state organizations. These other social groups were 
criminal groups, the Zetas (the foreigner criminal group), and Valencia (but, according to 
LFM discourse, not acting in favor of locals’ best interests). Both references are analyzed 
below, and shape cases of expressions against other non-formal authorities, the second 
subtype source of legitimacy under the “portrayal of the enemy”	source.	
 
4.1.3.2. Expressions Against Other (Informal) Authorities 
 
 44 According to Barnes, relations between criminals and official authorities oscillate between confrontation 
(high competition), enforcement-evasion (low competition), alliance (low collaboration), and integration (high 
collaboration) (2017, 971). This typology helps to look at how LFM and LCT oscillated between these stages 
depending on the agent involved. For instance, while confrontation shaped the relation with the federal 
authority, when dealing with local authorities the relation was closer to integration or, at least, alliance. This 
sort of interaction shaped relevant sides of this criminal group´s enemy portrayal.	
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The first statement regarding a stance against an enemy, in general, was Uruapan´s severed 
heads event. In that case, the Zetas were the perfect scapegoat to build the first statement 
against an "enemy". In other words, before confronting any official or legal authority, LFM 
first went against another criminal group. In 2006, LFM launched a campaign to "expel" the 
Zetas from Michoacán. Following what LFM argued in public messages including the 
manifesto published in the newspaper, the Zetas were working together with remaining forces 
from the Milenio cartel. This was also the case of the Valencia cartel, which also had a 
presence in Michoacán. Usually, the language of Mexican security institutions used to 
explain this through territoriality. Fighting for the "plaza", a euphemism for the "place" in 
this logic is the event in which two or more criminal groups or gangs dispute the control over 
a specific territory. In this logic, "control" essentially means the faculty of defining who can 
and who cannot do illegal business in that place. Fighting the "plaza" is almost automatically 
understood as violent confrontation. In this regard, the severed heads event in Uruapan indeed 
matched this formula.	
 
4.1.3.3. Stances Towards the Current Law 
 
LFM as well as LCT enemy portrayal was also developed indirectly, i.e., by not addressing 
“the enemy”	explicitly but implicitly. By doing so, both criminal groups displayed stances 
against the official law and attempted to define their own. However, this was neither 
automatic nor instantaneous. Initially, when LFM published their manifesto in the local 
newspaper, the group explicitly stated in their mission to “eradicate”	from Michoacán a set 
of crimes such as theft and kidnapping (2006). In other words, to some extent, the first LFM 
stance towards the current law implied compliance with it and urged others to enforce it. 
However, as part of this criminal group’s mutation into LCT, the stance changed towards 
creating (and implementing) their law. That happened by indoctrinating potential members. 
The aim of this indoctrination was to inspire local loyalty to LCT, and not to "the enemies". 
These enemies included the official state authority (and especially the federal government), 
as well as other criminal cartels such as Los Zetas (foreign) or Los Valencia (local). 	
 
Eventually, other social agencies that also disputed political legitimacy became potential 
enemies, especially for LCT – such as autodefensas or the case of the indigenous movement 
in Cherán. Indeed, these indoctrination methods were used to recruit new members, or to 
threaten local public-officers to collaborate with the criminal group. According to 
testimonies, a bus took attendants to Morelia, where they stayed for a week studying 
Pensamientos (the book with Nazario´s thoughts), eating only rice and beans, and waiting 
for Nazario, who attended on the last day, giving them a speech while dressed in white 
(Interview in field no. 7, 2017). That was how Nazario’s rules “[…] kept troops in line and 
gave the movement a semblance of purpose, a mission. His narco hit men were not just 
carrying out wanton murder. They were waging holy war”	(Grillo, 2017, 262-263). Countless 
violent confrontations occurred around Michoacán and beyond, motivated through by	
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“enemy”	 struggle, while negotiations with “enemies”	 were not registered during this 
investigation. 	
 
4.2. Across Legitimacy Sources and Resources: The Forbidden Books of Michoacán 
 
At least five books were printed and distributed under the “publishing seal”	and signature of 
LFM and LCT. Across this criminal editorial production, the three types and subtypes of 
legitimacy sources were identified. Publishing dates are not clear but all of them were done 
within the period analyzed here. Amazingly, LFM and LCT legitimacy interests were written 
down and constitute what here is called the criminal editorial production in Michoacán, 
which condenses the propaganda methods carried out by these groups.45 All of these texts 
were apparently written by criminal group members (especially their leader, Nazario 
Moreno), as well as supporters. None of the texts were sold but were freely distributed across 
the state of Michoacán, at bus stops and local stores (Interview in field no. 1 and 7, 2017). 
The intention was to advertise the criminal group´s ideas, agenda, and identity. 	
 
These books run across the three types and subtypes of legitimacy sources identified within 
this research. Therefore, symbolic, performance-centered, and portrayal of the enemy 
elements are identified. The books attempted to spread and justify the criminal agenda, while 
they promoted belonging and cohesiveness. It also contains elements of founding narratives 
and served as a vehicle to promote and spread images, values, religious and moral beliefs, 
and a whole identity setting. Moreover, the books work together performance-centered 
sources by proposing the provision of governing institutions. Finally, the books also made 
stances towards the enemy, including formal and non-authorities as well as stances towards 
the current law. In other words, the criminal editorial production should be analyzed as a 
transversal case in which legitimacy is pursued through a wide range.	
 
Before delving into the aggregate analysis here I present a quick overview of each of the 
books, together with a general description focused on the narrative style as well as the alleged 
author. These are: 1) Me dicen “El más loco”	(They Call me “The Maddest One”), Nazario´s 
autobiography allegedly written by him; 2) Nazario ¿Idealista? ¿Renovador? ¿Justiciero? 
Usted juzgue (Nazario Idealist? Renovator? Justice Man? Judge yourself), written by J.J. 
Colorado but with a similar drafting style to the former book; 3) Código de los Caballeros 
Templarios de Michoacán (Code of the Knights Templars of Michoacán), with no author; 4) 
Palabra de Caballero. Los Caballeros Templarios. Un movimiento insurgente (Knight´s 
Word. The Knights Templars. An Insurgent Movement), written by Edgardo Morales 
 45 Five is the number of editions that were encountered during this research. However, other texts may be added 
to this criminal editorial production, such as the newspaper insertion mentioned earlier in this chapter and other 
random texts supposedly written and spread by these criminal groups, for instance, the narcomantas. Hence, 
for the effects of this research, these five books make up the analysis corpus. All the quotations are my own 
translations from Spanish.	
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Shertier; and, 5) Pensamientos de La Familia Michoacana (Michoacán Family Thoughts), 
supposedly written by Nazario as well.46 All of these texts present different narrative voices 
(heterogeneity) but addressing towards the building of one truth, i.e., the legitimation of their 
their criminal agenda (homogeneity). From a political legitimacy lens, what could be 
analyzed is a set of written and dispersed legitimacy efforts developed by many discursive 
routes.	
 
Each of these five books is in a different literary genre. This means that they have completely 
different narratives, and the prose indeed varies from text to text. From a legitimacy 
perspective, these texts connect criminals' political discourse interest with moral 
justifications, ethical assessments, obedience guidelines, the portrayal of enemies, and the 
apologetic portrayal of a leader, i.e., Nazario. Moreover, when official authorities banned 
these books in order to stop LFM and LCT spreading (especially Me dicen "El más loco" and 
the code) it only increased a sort of mysticism around them.47 Independent of gaining or 
losing any kind of legitimacy, these were political attempts to gain traction in terms of  
legitimacy among their constituents. The literary genre within these books goes from the first 
person tale in Nazario's memoirs (reference 1) to the third person propaganda (reference 2), 
and the "external" journalist investigation (reference 4). Within this corpus, there is also a 
moral dictation and conduct rule (reference 3) and random thoughts on self-improvement 
(reference 5).	
 
4.2.1. “El más loco”: Nazario´s Memoirs 
 
Possibly the most politically relevant text from LFM and LCT is Nazario Moreno´s 
autobiography. This book, together with Usted Juzgue condenses the legitimacy endeavors 
based in charismatic authority attempts in the Weberian sense (1964). This book was 
published, printed, and distributed around Michoacán, particularly within the zone of Tierra 
Caliente. The Mexican Army prohibited both reading and carrying this book. Moreover, the 
army and the federal police banned it, and argued that it promoted apology for crime. A quick 
reading of Nazario´s memoirs shows messianic prose combined with a stereotypical heroic 
bandit. Nazario seems to be playing Jesus Christ role or a random Catholic saint because of 
the book’s moral ideas. Moreover, this holy role mixes with Robin Hood (Nazario presents 
himself as a social vindicate of the people, his people, which is a long-standing practice in 
Mexico during the post-revolutionary period). In this regard, he may be seen as an example 
 46 The author had complete access to four out of five of these books. In the case of Pensamientos de La Familia 
Michoacana, only random pages were consulted; thus, there is no clarity on the extension or physical 
characteristics of this one. However, these pages together with fieldwork data let discuss its implications in the 
criminal legitimation process and consequent editorial production in Michoacán.	47 Initially, the books were founded by the Mexican army in casas de seguridad (security houses), a euphemism 
for drug traffickers’	hideouts, together with illicit commodities such as drugs, guns, cash, and cell phones. 
Onwards, the army elements associated carrying these books with being part or support LFM or LCT, which 
caused an aura of illegality and for forbid mysticism (Interview in field no. 7, 2017).	
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of the traditional bandit displayed by Hobsbawm: an agrarian leader who is willing to make 
sacrifices for the good of his people. Pancho Villa is one of the examples Hobsbawm offers 
(2000).48 	
 
However, these are just the superficial aspects. There is much more behind the book in terms 
of legitimacy. Nazario´s memoirs show a figure that is more than Hobsbawm's bandit and a 
dangerous serial murderer self-styled Robin Hood, which is a close description to what he 
was (2000, 2-3). Nazario´s memoirs are narrated as an autobiography reported by a self-
declared hero, who quickly started his narration introducing himself and speaking about his 
birth: "My name is Nazario Moreno González, my friends and family call me Chayo. Now, 
suddenly, I decided to write the most important events of my life; both the good and the bad, 
because like every human being, I have made mistakes and successes" (Moreno, 2011, 4).49 
Some pages further, he continues giving details on his birth: "I was born on March 8, 1970, 
at 5 o'clock in the morning. I think that is why I like to get out of bed at that time, a habit I 
have had since I was a child" (Moreno, 2011, 10). Moreover, Moreno described the poverty 
in which he was born: "[...] there was simply no hope at all" (Moreno, 2011, 5). 	
 
Finally, Nazario also explained his nickname's origins, "El más loco". According to him, 
people portrayed himself as a brave child and man who was crazy enough to face challenges 
that required fearlessness —	either riding a bull in a local town festival or fighting against 
bigger and stronger guys. Early in the book, Nazario denies that his is writing in order to 
justify his actions and portray himself as “a little angel”. Those who think that, he continued, 
“[…] are wrong and will check it as they move forward in reading these, let´s say, 
confessions, experiences or reasons for my actions towards society" (Moreno, p. 4). 
However, his words contradict himself even more quickly as he starts justifying his actions 
and decisions: "First of all, I find myself in the imperative necessity of explaining the truth 
about my conduct to the Mexican people, since it has been altered maliciously by the PAN 
[National Action Party, Felipe Calderón´s political party] government and its journalists [...] 
who have attacked me viciously, misrepresenting my actions and my desire to bring a change 
in the conditions that prevail in our homeland, since so far the only thing that is offered to 
my compatriots is desolation, hunger and injustice" (Moreno, 2011, 5-6). 	
 
Nazario also described his life as a journey towards becoming a famous character at the 
moment of writing, but underlining his humble origins. The story starts with his childhood, 
followed by his travel to California as an illegal migrant together with his brother as a 
youngster, and his return to Michoacán as a successful and wise person who was ready to 
 48 In the case of Nazario, it was not Pancho Villa but Emiliano Zapata, the other revolutionary Mexican caudillo, 
who appeared like an influence for the criminal leader in particular and the group in general. As an example of 
this, is Zapata one of the characters who appeared in the cover of Usted Juzgue, another book of the criminal 
editorial production that is reviewed next. See Picture 5 in the Appendix.	49 I have translated all quotes from LFM and LCT books to English from Spanish. 	
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bring justice, progress, and benefits to his people. Nazario wrote in the middle of the war on 
drugs in Mexico. Thus, his background prose let him start telling his truth about his actions. 
Besides, in Nazario narrations, there is an individual claiming discourse in which poverty 
and scarcity work as the foundational beginning. Nazario, for instance, underlined his 
penurious situation explained through a poverty discourse, which eventually is heroically 
surpassed by turning weakness and setbacks into strength and braveness. In his words:	
 
We, those who were born with the saint upside down, that is, those of us who were poor, suffered and 
fought a lot and on countless occasions we exposed our lives to earn money, even illegally, and 
although I admit that we were outside the law, we did not have another way, because all the doors were 
closed to us due to our ignorance and lack of office because schools and culture were closed to us "; 
also, because (sic) we did not care a damn for the government or anyone (Moreno, 2011, 7).	
 
Furthermore, Me dicen "El más loco" has a particularity that deserves special attention: an 
epilogue included at the end of the book and entitled as Capítulo de lágrimas y luto (Chapter 
of tears and mourning). One hundred and one pages compose the whole book. However, this 
epilogue starts on page 84 and follows until the end. The prologue´s context off from the text 
itself is fascinating in this regard. At this point, the narrator stops being Nazario, and a third 
narrator, a high criminal group commander explains on behalf of the other commandants that 
Mexican federal forces have killed Nazario and that they have agreed to do not make changes 
on the original manuscript. The murder description takes eight out of eighteen pages in the 
epilogue and is composed of heroic exploits developed by Nazario on the day of the attack, 
together with the funeral honors made after he was murdered. Full respect is expressed to the 
former LFM leader: "It was so much our pain and regret that many of us let the tears go out 
and we militarily salute him [Nazario´s dead body] as a sign of obedience and respect towards 
his bloodied and mutilated body" (Moreno, 2011, 90). 	
 
In the remaining pages in the epilogue the narrator switches to several people who assumedly 
met Nazario when he was alive. This section is entitled "Opinions of People who met and 
dealt with Nazario Moreno in his Various Life Stages". Indeed, his mother, a "friend, and 
advisor", a "collaborator", and a "combatant" gave some of these testimonies. This book was 
published in 2011, and Nazario was supposedly killed in December of 2010. However, he 
was not truly assassinated until 2014. Thus, random timing occurred with this epilogue's 
content and intention. In any case, either talking about the text or the epilogue and even if it 
was Nazario himself who wrote it, the legitimation interest is still there. In the end, telling 
his own story is a self-empowering action, which reinforces the legitimacy interest by a) 
introducing the group/leader; b) justifying actions, intentions, beliefs, and plans; and c) 
spreading the agenda. Moreover, there is an enlightened spirit in being able of telling the own 
story: not everyone has deserved to do so, which stands for concede the intelligence of those 
who did it. Besides, especially Me dicen “El más loco”, exhibits an individualist perspective 
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by giving the impression that Nazario can and actually had improved his circumstances 
together with those of local people.	
 
4.2.2. “Usted juzgue”: The Third Person Perspective 
 
The second published book by LFM/LCT is Nazario. ¿Idealista? ¿Renovador? ¿Justiciero? 
Uzted juzgue.50 The invitation to judge the criminal leader is rapidly resolved in the text, 
prologue shows admiration for Nazario after reading his memoirs: “From the day I finished 
reading the book Me dicen el más loco by the authorship of Nazario Moreno González, I had 
a huge desire to know more details of this singular character who had intentions to improve 
the situation of his family, his acquaintances and of all humanity, inspired by fictional 
characters" (Colorado, 4). According to Grillo, Nazario did not attend school; however, he 
was moved to learn to read by Kalimán, a cult Mexican radio-comic from the seventies (2017, 
239-245). Kalimán was a wise superhero that wore a white dress and turban, with mental 
powers and was a martial arts expert. As expected for a character like this, he always fights 
and defeats evil, while stating wise phrases in each of his heroic adventures. Nazario´s 
admiration for Kalimán became explicit in the cover of Usted juzgue (see Picture 5 in the 
Appendix), where his disseminated face appears above Kalimán´s, but also shares space with 
Ernesto Che Guevara (revolutionary leader in the Cuban revolution), José	María Morelos y 
Pavón (Mexican insurgent hero during the Independence war), Emiliano Zapata (Mexican 
insurgent hero during the Revolution), and Porifirio Cadena, a Mexican radionovela hero 
less known than Kalimán. There, Nazario shared and actually led the constellation of national 
and super heroes (see Picture 5). Indeed, Nazario confirmed himself Grillo´s hypothesis:	
 
I never attended the school for the simple reason that the one I had on my ranch never had a teacher, 
as it happened in many of the rural areas. I grew up practically wild. I learned to read and write only 
when I was more than ten years old in order to be able to read Kaliman and other fashion magazines 
[...] Kaliman's words were famous about that the most powerful thing was "patience and the human 
mind", and because of that, I practiced [a sort of hypnosis] with animals [...] now that I am an adult I 
feel like if I have something strange in myself that make me understand some things in animals. In 
certain occasions, I know in advance what they are going to do [...] I cannot explain that phenomenon, 
but that is the way it is […] (Moreno, 2011, 16-19).	
 
This book’s prose is excessively baroque, including constant positive adjectives around 
Nazario´s virtues together with those of “his group”. Actually, these adjectives seek to justify 
violence and crime	—	again, working toward legitimacy. Nazario, said the author, was the 
“[…] boss of a well-organized group of men determined to carry their ideals, as they say, to 
the triumph [to the point that they defeated] other bands of dangerous drug traffickers”	
(Colorado, 9), referring to Los Zetas and the initial events in 2006 and before. Moreover, 
 50 In fact, Usted juzge drafting is quite similar to Me dicen “El más loco”: with excessively long and wordiness 
sentences and constant typos and deficient orthography. Moreover, the font and edition work look very similar 
as well when comparing both texts. 	
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Nazario and the group were described as people who, while trying to defend their territory, 
“fell into the scope of crime" (Colorado, 9), a euphemism to avoid calling them criminals 
and drug traffickers. In this regard, Nazario and LFM repeatedly relativize: our work "[...] 
has two faces: everything depends on the color of the lens with which they are seen [...] given 
that you cannot live with madmen that attack peaceful families with no mercy [hence] I 
applaud and approve, also with no mercy, the justice applied by Nazario. It is historical and 
biblical justice: 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth'" (Colorado, 13-14). Naturally, the third 
person voice, supposedly external agent in this context, is supposed to contribute to the 
argumentation legitimacy. 	
 
Nazario is or was [here, the author doubts on the truthiness or falseness of his death in 2010] an idealist 
who covers himself with the skin of a wolf in order to defend himself from traps and betrayals, but in 
his heart, he is cheerful, playful, charismatic and of noble heart. Energetic to impose fear, jovial to the 
laughter and extroverted to tell jokes or funny details that have happened. All this is clearly shown or 
between lines in the book of his authorship.	
[...]	
To Nazario Moreno there are things that torture his heart that is why we have to understand him more 
for his feelings than for his actions. He is made up of flesh, bones, blood, and feelings, apparently in 
the same proportion. What occurs is that he hides his inner and intimate feelings, perhaps believing 
that if he exposes them he will be considered as a man with weak personality.	
[...]	
Violence is justified morally when all other paths are closed and cover the path of ideals, progress and 
social justice. That is why the revolutions supported by the people may be illegal at the beginning, but 
historically they claim themselves, as they are strong because of their moral basis. (Colorado, 24-27).	
 
In Usted juzgue, Nazario is explicitly compared to Robin Hood.51  The author does not 
hesitate to associate him with those who "[...] fought against the established order, helped the 
poor, imposed their particular concept of justice on the territory dominated by them, who 
were defamed, [and] persecuted by the law representatives" (Colorado, 5). Even when the 
book is supposedly written to offer an impartial overview of Nazario and his group, and keep 
open the title question (Usted juzgue, judge for yourself), the author solved it in the page 24 
out of 103. Naturally, the judgment is positive, and more than a criminal, both Nazario and 
LFM are brave men fighting for ideals rather than criminals, kidnappers, murderers, etc. It is 
especially interesting the description made of Nazario: “[…] an idealist who covers himself 
with the skin of a wolf in order to defend himself from traps and betrayals”. To support this 
point, the author drafted a justification that works as a legitimacy discourse because he 
morally justifies violence and calls the criminal group actions “social justice”.	
 
 51 In fact, besides the Robin Hood comparison, the text makes some other associations whose characters deserve 
to be enlisted here. In this regard, within Usted juzgue, Nazario and the myth of his death are compared to Adolf 
Hitler: Pedro Infante (famous Mexican singer and actor during the middle XX Century); Jorge Negrete (a close 
profile to Infante); Carlos Gardel (Argentinian Tango singer and composer); Cantinflas (Mexican comedian 
and actor); Emiliano Zapata (Mexican revolutionary leader); Pancho Villa (Mexican revolutionary leader); 
Mahoma; and the pharaohs of ancient Egypt.	
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4.2.3. El código: Criminal Commandments 
 
Among all the books produced as part of the Michoacán criminal editorial production, the 
Código de los Caballeros Templarios de Michoacán is probably the most serious and 
ceremonious one. Across its twenty-four pages, fifty-three commandments and one final oath 
are addressed to group members. They are identified as the Knight Templars order, a simile 
of the medieval Templar crusaders (whose image appears in the code´s cover) and whose 
origin was explained earlier. In this regard, the explicit moral and commanding drafting 
recalls the Christian Ten Commandments. Since then, LFM stops being mentioned and LCT 
appears: "LCT of Michoacán was born on March 8, 2011, its main mission is to protect the 
inhabitants and the sacred territory of the free, sovereign and secular state of Michoacán" (1). 
Notions of “good”	 and “bad”	 are sharply distinguished across the prose by combining 
theological and secular references with behavioral directives. From a political legitimacy 
perspective, it is intriguing to whom the code was speaking to. Even when since the first 
commandment the code´s audience supposedly is the order members, local people in 
Michoacán were possibly the secondary audience given the distribution made either in public 
spaces and neighborhoods in Michoacán. 	
 
Moreover, perhaps local people were the first audience and the code worked as an agenda-
spreading tool. There were at least two editions of the code. The one which was spread was 
a small easy-reading booklet, but the Mexican army seized a book edition golden made-up 
(some ideas about this are coming later). Grillo and Sicilia´s description of LCT as New Age 
mafia are in the code. A wide range of values and ideologies are promoted across the 
commandments: God´s existence; fight against "materialism"; "injustice and tyranny across 
the world"; "moral values" defense; patriotism; freedom of expression, consciousness, and 
faith; as well as the "natural justice", i.e., the "right of peoples and nations to govern 
themselves". This set of positions is complemented by other attitudes expected from the 
members such as humility, courage, nobility, courtesy, honesty, dignity and honor (1-11). 
Moreover, the code forbids group members conduct such as brutal violence. "Offensively 
drunk" behavior (8) and drug consumption are prohibited as well – the code obligated the 
members to pass anti-doping tests. Kidnapping is forbidden and lethal force is regulated 
through Council member's authorization since pleasure murdering or murder for money are 
not allowed (16-17). LCT’s code is the document that proves how this criminal group became 
a modern criminal and political organization, which created a discourse combining religion 
thoughts and messianism with human and political rights.	
 
Punishments are stipulated as well: if a member commits a fault or loses his loyalty towards 
the group, he will be killed together with his relatives, and his belongings will be seized by 
LCT: "In the case that, unfortunately, I betray my oath, I beg to be executed by the order as 
a traitor [...] I consent, if I fail my word of honor, to be executed by the arms of good 
companions or be devoured by the wild beasts of the forest" (23-24) (this fragment was 
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written in capital letters in the original text). Of course, that empirical evidence exhibits all 
kinds of contradictions between these commandment expectations and actual violence and 
crime activities carried out by the criminal group. However, rather than looking for 
consistency between practices and what was professed in these books, the interest here is to 
understand the legitimacy angle in this story. In this regard, the fact of combining medieval 
rites with philanthropic activities together with violence, drug-trafficking, extortion and the 
creation of an alternative justice system and taxing managing may be, indeed, contradictory, 
but shapes the silhouette of an atypical criminal political legitimacy case. Hence, the code is 
a material synthesizer of these phenomena, together with an instrument of internal discipline 
and a public warning to locals of who rules.	
 
4.2.4. Palabra de Caballero: The (Independent?) Journalist’s Angle 
 
The fourth book analyzed here is Palabra de Caballero. Los Caballeros Templarios. Un 
movimiento insurgente. This baroque text has a different narrative style. Edgardo Morales, a 
local journalist, was marginalized by Michoacán's journalism guild after publication 
(Interview in field no. 1, 2017). Presented as the result of an independent journalistic research 
work, Morales and his book was an original work of propaganda, useful in a legitimacy 
strategy because of his independence. In 2012 he denounced threats and harassment from a 
Mexican army commander as a result of his book, and defended his work as a literary 
production, which should be protected under the freedom of expression that any journalist 
should be granted (Castellanos, 2012a). However, the propaganda tone is addressed by 
justifying the text as LCT replying right. Thus, Morales is attempting to provide “the third 
position”	reasons and arguments in the context of the war on drugs (no year, 4). According 
to him, the first position is the government’s, the second is society´s, and the third is the 
organized crime stance. Interestingly, this is the first (and possibly only) LFM or LCT 
reference as “organized crime”:	
 
"[...] in this process [of the war against organized crime] there is the third position], the so-called 
organized crime, the one that must have its reasons and fundamentals, the one that perhaps has 
something to manifest to the society and that, like everyone, I believe they must have the opportunity 
to defense themselves. That is why the idea of carry out a journalistic research work arises from the 
framework of our freedoms, [a work] which gives society the basis to deliberate its position and 
achieve a clear vision of this war announced by the [Mexican] government (Morales, no year, 4).	
 
After presenting that justification, Morales narrated how he received a letter from an LCT 
member with the criminal group positioning towards the current political context on Mexico 
and Michoacán. Days later, on March 6, 2012, Morales describes receiving a phone call from 
a person called Marcos. According to Morales, Marcos told him that the LCT member's 
interest in a face-to-face conversation to discuss LCT's general positioning (Morales, no year, 
14). Two hours later, they met up in an agreed point of Michoacán and traveled towards the 
region of Tierra Caliente. After minutes driving, at some point, Morales was asked to lie 
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down on the van's couch and to cover his face with a mask in order to keep the secrecy of the 
meeting place, i.e., LCT headquarters. Despite the possible tension, Morales does not hesitate 
in saying that he felt secure at all times: "In the end, I was sure that they had only invited me 
to know his position and [afterward] I would return safely to my home" (Morales, no year, 
16). Later, Morales said he received food and, then, the conversation started even when he 
never said the name or the names of the people with whom he met, but who spoke on behalf 
of Michoacán’s people: “‘Don, I express to you the true feeling of the majority of 
Michoacán's about the government's actions’”	(Morales, no year, 21).	
 
This book adds another layer to the LCT, which is the existence of a social organization, 
political aims, and social mobilization. Along the conversation that Morales had with these 
supposed LCT members, the criminal group was called “insurgency”, “people’s movement”, 
“civil resistance”, “fraternity”, and “Social Organized Movement”	 (capital letters in the 
original text). Moreover, several political legitimacy elements shape the prose. For instance, 
Morales quotes the interviewer when he explains that this “movement”	emerges as a “[…] 
reconnaissance of all men and women who, from the bowels of the lands of Michoacán, […] 
defend the ideological principles of those who truly sought order, justice and freedom for our 
people" (Morales, no year, 39-40). After his interview, the journalist wrote a set of brief 
chapters in which, motivated by his data, he posed questions around LCT. One of them is 
“What was the crime committed by Chayo [Nazario] to die that way?”	to which he responds: 	
 
[…] there are precedents which [point that], rather than the society, it has been the government who 
undertakes a campaign against those who, according to them, are criminals and do not fit into their 
form of government, [this statements, according to] peasants, professionals, students, leaders of 
opposition to the Mexican political system and other society sectors (Morales, no year, 57-58). 	
 
Journalistic discourse has legitimacy built in. Although in this case the text was more fictional 
than journalistic, it’s supposed objectivity and truth made it seem like actual reportage. But 
leaving aside the contradictions and lack of rigor, what is of the first relevance is the 
legitimacy function displayed in the text. After declaring the government guilty of pursuing 
LCT, Morales finished his book by stating that he had already gave “voice”	to each of the 
“positions”. Therefore, by doing so, he concludes that LCT is an insurgent movement 
defending a marginalized society by appealing to Nazario’s postulations (Moreno, 62).52	
 
4.2.5. “Pensamientos”: The Doctrine 
 
 52 Together with the statements describes, this book also includes in the four last chapters, a set of texts 
dedicated to make a critique of how the Mexican and Spaniard far right wing is affecting and may be dangerous 
to the country’s development. As a result, the prose emerged was a mixture of facts and fiction.	
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The last book analyzed as part of this corpus is Pensamientos. Although this research had 
restricted access the full text,53 still there is a political legitimacy interest in this manuscript, 
which is studied here. That is, how Nazario explicitly used this book as a teaching instrument 
during forced courses in which the attendants were local public officers, criminal group 
members, and local entrepreneurs, among others. These courses were designed as spaces for 
spread either LFM or LCT agenda -especially from a moral belief viewpoint. The courses 
used to last days or even a whole week. Pensamientos is a book of Nazario's thoughts 
expressed in short statements, using the language of self-improvement, allusions to God, and 
instructions on how to overcome life's difficulties.54 A typical sample sounds like this: "If 
you want you can become a good Christian [...] [to do so] you should not worry about 
building walls or barriers, but bridges to unite peoples" (Moreno, no page). Grillo, Nazario 
himself, and informants interviewed during fieldwork, all talk about the self-improvement 
learning that the criminal leader received at rehab centers in California (Grillo, 2017; 
Moreno, 2011; Interview in field no. 7, 2017). Nazario also uses Messianic language and 
biblical connotations that locate Nazario as a source of confidence and inspiration, as well as 
a leader who deserves a following.	
 
I asked God for strength and He gave me difficulties in order to make me strong [...] I asked for wisdom 
and gave me problems to solve [...] I asked for prosperity and [He] gave me muscle and brain to work 
[...] I asked for courage and [He] gave obstacles to overcome [...] I did not receive anything that I asked 
for, but I received everything I needed.	
[...]	
Everyone sees the suffering as an evil, I do not think so, because when the pain becomes peace 
liberation is when you can learn to live with it and, curiously, that pain disappears and becomes peace. 
Blessed are the sick because they will be healed; blessed are those who mourn in solitude because they 
will be comforted by the word of God.	
[...]	
If someday you feel like if you want to cry, talk to me, I do not promise to make you laugh, but I can 
cry with you [...] If someday you feel sad, look for me, I do not promise to make your day happy, but 
I can be with you. If someday, you want to have someone, come running to me because maybe I can 
listen to you, my friend (Moreno, no pages)	
 
This collection hints at elements outside the texts that also relate to legitimacy, a discourse 
beyond the texts themselves. For instance, in Me dicen “El más loco”, the red cover with 
Nazario’s face in black tones presents the leader’s face in propagandistic language, like the 
covers of Mao Tse Tung’s red book or Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf’	–indeed, a coincidental 
propaganda element across totalitarian regimes with charismatic leaders. Moreover, this face 
is recovered in Usted juzgue’s cover, where “El más loco’s”	face is surrounded (but clearly 
above) Kalimán’s, Che Guevara’s, et al. Additionally, Usted juzgue's background cover is 
 53 The only pages analyzed were included in a Power Point presentation, so the selection is not personal while 
also the entire composition and extension of the book is unknown for this research. Power Point slides were 
obtained during fieldwork from an informant.	54 Actually, each of these thoughts appeared signed by “El más loco”	(The maddest one).	
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made by the colors of the Mexican flag and shield as patriotic symbolism. A last but equally 
relevant example is the Code cover and general material composition. Even after several 
people gave testimony of the Code's paperback distribution in zones of Michoacán, the 
Mexican Army confiscated an edition with a golden cover. According to Gerard Genette, in 
a literary text, there was an accompanying production that "[...] surround it and extend it, 
precisely in order to present it" (2001, 1).  He called this the paratext, a set of heterogeneous 
practices and discourses residing in the external presentation of the book, but linked to its 
text. In his words:	
 
"[...] the paratext is what enables a text to become a book and to be offered as such to its readers and, 
more generally, to the public. More than a boundary of a sealed border, the paratext is, rather, a 
threshold, or [...] a 'vestibule' that offers the world at large the possibility of either stepping inside or 
turning back. It is an 'undefined zone' between the inside and the outside, a zone without any hard and 
fast boundary on either the inward side (turned toward the text) or the outward side (turned toward the 
world's discourse about the text) [...] Indeed, this fringe, always the conveyor of a commentary that is 
authorial or more or less legitimate by the author, constitutes a zone between text and off-text, a zone 
not only of transition but also of transaction: a privileged place of a pragmatics and a strategy, of an 
influence on the public, and influence that -whether well or poorly understood and achieves- is at the 
service of a better reception for the text and a more pertinent reading of it" (Genette, 2001, 1-2).	
 
In the case of Michoacán’s criminal editorial production, that “vestibule”	 or “undefined 
zone”	appears constantly. Propaganda could start either in the cover, in the quotes, or across 
every symbol printed; but also in the actions surrounding the production and distribution of 
these peculiar editions. Moreover, it is steadily dialoguing with the criminal agenda even 
without mentioning it or even avoiding to doing it. Elements of legitimation rest both 
inwardly and outwardly. For example, the code and its bloody conduct rules were masked 
under golden and pseudo-sacred pretentions. Certainly, official authorities participated in this 
phenomenon by creating an aura of controversy and mystery when they banned and burned 
those books, especially in the case of Nazario’s memoirs. Even though each book had an 
audience and a different narrative style, it is also relevant to analyze how every element works 
in the overall political legitimacy attempt. In other words, the strategy to which it responds 
deserves attention as well. In the end, neither the text nor the paratext works alone. 	
 
What matters most for this discussion is the legitimacy intention over, inside, and beneath 
these texts, observing these books as an entire cultural production. This criminal editorial 
production condensed a discourse launched by LFM and boosted by LCT combining 
religious thoughts, messianism, and modern political values, accompanied by an attempt for 
building a feudal regime based on nationalism and localism but with capitalist and global 
criminal business visions. Having this case in mind, the Sicilian mafia is reviewed in the 
following chapter. This review combines both context and criminal group analysis into one 
single chapter to portray the Sicilian mafia´s political legitimacy profile. As said earlier, 
Michoacán is the primary analysis case within this research; however, the Sicilian case 
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becomes deeply helpful to generate an interesting comparison regarding the conceptual 
research interests. Later, the sixth and last chapter focuses on both research cases comparison. 
In the end, together with their differences and similarities, both contexts lead to a 
fundamental question: why and when do criminal groups seek political legitimacy?		
4.3. Closing Remarks: Chapter IV Summary 
 
After elaborating on the particular LFM and LCT political legitimacy efforts, the following 
are closing remarks derived from this fourth chapter. In the first place, LFM and LCT took 
part in one sole legitimation history. In other words, independently of the debate about if 
LFM did or did not turn into LCT, both criminal groups did shape one single political 
legitimacy continuum. Moreover, this legitimacy sequence took place in the same context 
(the Mexican war on drugs with the particularities of Michoacán) and the corresponding local 
history. Furthermore, the case of these criminal groups of Michoacán is atypical due to their 
interest in becoming publicly and widely noticed. Although criminal, both groups preferred 
not to become unnoticed but publicly observed as part of their legitimacy strategy. Between 
not being perceived by formal authorities, and being seen by locals to gain acceptance, 
Michoacán´s criminal groups seemed to choose the latter. Preferring visibility LFM and LCT 
kept mostly on the track for legitimation never reached their goal.	
 
Material and immaterial symbols were deeply relevant towards addressing this objective, 
either by promising or building social contract benefits for locals and spreading material and 
non-material discourses. Regarding the symbolic sources of legitimacy, belonging was the 
angle in which both LFM and LCT spent the most effort. The element of locality was a 
discourse articulating the general legitimacy endeavor structure. To push it, both criminal 
groups also pointed enemies, first against other local and foreign local criminal groups, and 
later against the Mexican federal government and concretely the former president, Calderón. 
In this regard, these groups followed the artificial discursive distinction between “us”	and 
“them”	initially promoted during Calderón´s administration to justify the war. LFM and LCT 
were also particularly active when spreading their criminal agenda, including a varied set of 
material and non-material symbols. Particularly since the emergence of LCT, these symbols 
became explicitly religious. The image, general iconography, and social context of Saint 
Nazario give proof of this. 	
 
However, the political legitimacy profile launched was far from becoming purely religious. 
Finally, regarding the sources, LFM and LCT stood against non-state enemies, while later 
the official State authorities eventually became enemies. While reviewing the criminal 
editorial production, this chapter found how the general LFM and LCT legitimation discourse 
mixed elements of political modernity with pre-modern and modern values. As a result, 
eventually LCT became a post-modern political agent who created a discourse combining 
religious thoughts and messianism with human and political rights; initiation rituals and 
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prohibitions with progress promises for locals; as well as a feudal regime based on 
nationalism and localism but with a capitalist and global criminal business vision. This post-
modern combination contained one a constant: bloody criminal behavior with no respect for 
human dignity. In the end, despite the particularities, both violence and legitimacy endeavors 
were embedded in a context of disputed authority, as well as contested versions for defining 
the social order.	
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Chapter 5.  
Cosa Nostra: Tracking Sicilian Mafia’s Political Legitimacy 
 
At 2012, El Komander, popular Mexican "narco-singer", released his new single entitled "La 
mafia se sienta en la mesa" (Mafia Takes a Sit on the Table). El Komander, the artistic name 
of Alfredo Ríos, as well as other performers of the so-called narcocorridos (or, as it was later 
named, movimiento alterado) were forbidden to perform public concerts in Mexico. That was 
also the case in Michoacán, where a local public officer argued that Komander's ban was due 
to the lyric´s songs, which touch "very sensitive topics" (Velázquez, 2018). Certainly, most 
of his songs are dedicated to assert Mexican "narcos" as stylish and brave popular heroes. 
However, the lyrics of "La mafia se sienta a la mesa" were slightly different. Instead of 
glorifying exclusively Mexican “narcos”, this song did “[…]	a twentieth-century history seen 
from the mafia’s point of view”	(Ravveduto, 2014), in which “someone”	in Sicily did start 
“everything”: “En un pueblito en Sicilia, un hombre empezó	las cosas. Fue el padrino en la 
familia y fundó	la Cosa Nostra. Desde Italia a Nueva York, traficó	vino y tabaco. La mafia 
lo bautizó, fue el primer capo de capos”	(In a small town in Sicily, a man started everything. 
He was the godfather in the family, and founded the Cosa Nostra. From Italy to New York, 
he trafficked wine and tobacco. The mafia baptized him; he was the first chief of chiefs).55 	
 
In this research, it is not an overriding concern to decide if	“everything started”	or not in 
Sicily. However, it becomes relevant to underline this song as a narrative habit that connects 
the social imaginary about criminal groups from two allegedly distant cases such as Mexico 
and Italy. How remote are they? And even more, how different or similar? The Italian case 
in general and Sicilian in particular count with a significantly long history of the mafia’s 
existence. Indeed, this southern island´s past and current context cannot be understood or 
explained without analyzing how the mafia experience influenced the social life setting since 
the nineteenth century. According to Jane and Peter Schneider, the ghost of the “myth of 
Sicily”	has been constantly prowling Sicilian studies. This myth, they argued, suggests that 
Sicilian history can only be explained through mafia’s history, like if there were no other 
players in the historical construction of Sicilian culture. As a consequence, a set of non-
modern features such as familism, corruption, and patriarchy use to be understood as a mafia 
heritage to Sicilian society, rather than as a broader socio-cultural construction (Schneider 
and Schneider, 2005). 	
 
Thus, social investigation on Sicily has often been in need to fight back the preconceived 
idea of a pre-modern society in which mafia only makes stronger this condition. Indeed, the 
 55  At the moment of writing these lines, the video clip on YouTube has more than 15.5 millions of 
reproductions. Indeed, later in the song, El Komander continues honoring Colombian, Japanese, Russian and 
Mexican mafias while keeps looking to that "small town in Sicily" as the place where everything started. URL: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jgGOW6Aoks8	
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"myth of Sicily" tends to cancel or diminish other agencies. From a political legitimacy 
perspective, the myth is not only impossible but also unreasonable. As a relevant social agent, 
CN is a historic Sicilian player who participated in the social order setting while interacting 
with other local, national, and transnational agencies (Schneider and Schneider, 2005, 502-
503). In this regard, mafia is an agent between others that, in the case of Sicily, despite their 
heterogeneity joint around an anti-mafia movement that has been becoming powerful in the 
last decades by disputing CN´s influence in defining the local social order through political 
legitimacy practices. This research agrees with the idea of fighting back the "myth of Sicily" 
even when, also in terms of political legitimacy, local political agents had historically shaped 
their endeavors in relation to CN and vice versa. To do so, special attention is given to the 
interaction between CN and these other players that also configures local power and, even 
more, the state as Migdal discussed it (1988). 	
 
The Sicilian mafia is a significantly older criminal group case. As a result, this case helps for 
comparison because it offers a wide specter of sources and resources of legitimacy across 
different historical stages. The outcome is diverse data for new insights on what are 
commonalities between both cases, and what is specific. Sicilian mafia analysis dates back 
to the middle nineteenth century and even before – that means, even before the creation of 
the Italian State. In this regard, Sicily´s case requires making use of historical references with 
relatively more frequency. However, this research makes use of both primary and secondary 
sources. On the one hand, it comes back to previous works to document CN’s historical 
performance in terms of political legitimacy while, on the other, it also makes use of original 
data collected in fieldwork carried out during November of 2018 and February 2019 in the 
Sicilian towns of Palermo, Catania, and Partinico. In this research, CN works as a secondary 
analytical case. Nevertheless, it gives the analytical pattern to conduct the comparison. 
However, before getting into the last and comparative chapter, this chapter is exclusively 
dedicated to analyze, first, briefly around CN as a political legitimacy agent in Sicily. Later, 
the second and most relevant part in this chapter addresses explicitly CN legitimacy 
endeavors also guided by the Table 1 structure.	
 
In other words, this chapter structure is the same as in Michoacán´s except that here it is 
compelled in a single chapter instead of two. In the case of Michoacán, the context 
description (chapter three) and the criminal group political legitimacy performance (chapter 
four) were divided. However, here both were gathered into one single. Initially, CN´s context 
is explained by analyzing how to locate the criminal group and the concept of the mafia in 
the Sicilian and Italian recent history. It involves doing what, in the case of Michoacán, was 
called drawing the "big picture" of the political legitimacy context. It includes recognizing 
how the criminal group is one among other local political agents performing practices of 
legitimacy. Later, following Table 1, the second and most relevant section addresses CN´s 
sources and resources of legitimacy analysis. Finally, and also following Michoacán´s 
chapters’	structure, an emblematic in which CN´s political legitimacy interest runs across all 
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legitimacy sources is analyzed. That case is the 2019 procession of Saint Agatha in Catania. 
After this, the whole case comparison comes on the sixth and last chapter where, based on 
the cases’ references, the conceptual discussion is expanded, and the cases are compared, 
contrast, and jointly analyzed.	
 
5.1. The Big Picture: The Sicilian Mafia in Sicilian History 
 
Across the literature on the Italian mafia, there is a lively debate on what the mafia is, and 
denials of the mafia’s existence were common for decades (Santino, 2011, 5). Before the 
eighties, when the mafioso Tomasso Buscetta broke the omertá to reveal the CN’s structure, 
names, rituals, and organization, there were voices claiming that the mafia was no more than 
a myth. As for how Santoro called it, in order to get to the current debate, mafia studies has 
also passed through a “recognition problem”, based on identifying those elements and 
features characterizing mafia phenomenon (2015, 7). Currently, although the aforementioned 
difficulties in defining organized crime (Von Lampe, 2002 and 2017), the debate is still 
evolving. For instance, while conceptions of the mafia have tended to point towards 
underlining and understanding “how”	mafia shapes and is shaped by the society in which it 
happens (Santoro, 2015; Santino, 2015), organized crime conceptions primordially deal with 
answering “who”	is the criminal, as if they were not immerse into a broader social context. 
Before exploring the Sicilian mafia political legitimacy performance, it is needed an 
exploration on this case, context, and concept. Given the historical background of the case, 
this needs to start by analyzing how CN is intimately tied up with Italian State formation.	
 
5.1.1. Mafia and the Italian State: Parallel Histories? 
 
Across its history, the Sicilian mafia (as well as the Camorra and the ´Ndrangetha with their 
specificities) has had displayed authority practices in their very local context. Since these 
practices did contain political content around defining the ruler and the ruled, they deserve 
special attention from a state-building perspective. Similar to the case of Michoacán, these 
practices have been continuously linked to formal authority. In this case, the complexity is 
not minor but certainly much more ancient. In the case of Sicily, this phenomenon of 
authority overlapping is called intreccio or “interweaving”. As a result, during certain times, 
the institutions of the state cannot be distinguished from informal and criminal structures. 
Moreover, other local agents need to be included to decode the local political legitimacy 
equation. Thus, how the legal and illegal agent relate becomes relevant, which points the 
analysis towards a state-building investigation. What is the relationship between CN and the 
Italian state? Any answer will need to take in consideration that, differently from Michoacán, 
the Sicilian mafia parallels (or even predates) the modern Italian state, which first unified in 
1861.	
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Since Italian unification, mafias and the state have coexisted. However, despite the blurred 
line between where the mafia ends and the state begins, during certain episodes, the mafia 
acted close to what is expected from a modern state. For instance, as Dickie said, the Italian 
criminal organizations did have a broader territorial presence within "their" regions compared 
to the Italian state presence during the Risorgimento	 – the process headed by Giuseppe 
Garibaldi through which Italy was first unified as a single country (2015, 30). Another 
example in this regard is homogeneity, a modern conceptual expectation that almost no 
modern state complied with. Indeed, as will be seen in the second section when analyzing 
the criminal group’s political legitimacy performance, CN experienced periods of more 
unification than the Italian state. That was the case even after the Second World War. 
Between the sixties and the nineties, CN seemed unified through omertà (the code of silence 
which will be explained later as part of the legitimacy performance analysis), and other inner 
rules reviewed later (except for certain exceptions as pentiti), whereas the Italian public 
officers and some official institutions "[…] acted in different ways, with some parts 
preferring to collude with mafia organizations (by fear or interest), and other parts choosing 
to fight the mafia" (Catino, 2014, 206).	
 
Sicily's history before the Risorgimento, wanders between the forgetfulness and indifference 
of different metropolis. Neither the Naples kingdom nor the Spanish crown (even under 
different dynasties) worried about installing a strong authority on the island. On the contrary, 
as long as minimum control and order were guaranteed, these empires continually negotiated 
with local landlords operating under feudalist regimes. As a result, these landlords became 
private security guarantors that kept peasants submissive and established a sort of local 
economic and violence administration inside the island. To what extent these people became 
later mafiosi is hard to answer. However, when the modern Italian state was born, their first 
decades during the nineteenth century were not very different from the latter empires in this 
regard. This research does not argue that, during this period, CN was a state into the state, 
nor the state itself, but that the criminal group was developing legitimacy practices as well 
as statehood practices by providing governing institutions. Even when there was not yet a 
name to call it, mafia was already able and prepared to keep doing authority functions. 
Despite the creation of the new central authority:	
 
"[...] the State failed to monopolize the use of physical force in large areas of western Sicily and, 
therefore, could not hope to enforce legislation. It is only in this context that the origin and development 
of mafia can be understood. Mafia was born of the tensions between the central government and local 
landowners on the one hand, and between the latter and peasants on the other. At the same time, 
however, mafia helped manage these distinct but interrelated tensions and struggles since it provided 
a specific code through which members of the various social classes and groups arranged themselves" 
(Blok, 1974, 92). 	
 
As a tension and struggle manager, especially CN comply with a mediation and directive 
function that fills the space of a more or less absent State authority. By the time state-building 
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was promoted in Sicily (especially in the first decades of the twentieth century), the mafia 
was already functioning in Sicily. Gambetta stated that the mafia is primarily “[…] a specific 
economic enterprise, an industry which produces, promotes, and sells private protection”	
(1993, 1). Whereas on the other hand, from a political perspective, a recurrent analytical 
starting point is to consider mafias, and specifically CN, as an anti-state agent –or, to be more 
precise, the parallel or anti-state agent par excellence in Sicily (dalla Chiesa, 2014, 3; 
Gunnarson, 2008, 54). However, in the end, both perspectives recognize CN´s mediation and 
decision functioning in Sicily’s local public life. According to this perception, the mafia is a 
counter-state agent as reviewed before, whose ambition and political objective points against 
the current and legal state authorities. However, there is no evidence of CN attempting to 
somehow fully replace them. 	
 
Moreover, indeed the Italian state-building process has happened, through different historical 
moments, through a relation between the mafia and the legal authority of corruption, 
mediations, and negotiations; but also of confrontation – especially with Benito Mussolini, 
and during the eighties with the Maxiprocesso	–as will be explained later in this chapter 
together with its political legitimacy relevance for the case. Especially since the early 
twentieth century, the Italian state has sought to create a discourse of pre-modernity around 
the mafia. After the Second World War, Italy removed the monarchy and became a 
democratic republic. Under the new political system, this posture on mafia was reinforced by 
the central government, which looked especially at the mafia in Southern Italy as a symbol 
of backwardness in the region (Dickie, 2015, 335). It was believed that with progress the 
mafia would naturally disappear. That argument was close to Putnam´s, who explained the 
difference between North and South of Italy by the presence or absence of social capital 
(1993).	
 
Therefore, is CN a counter-state agent? For Santino, this perception is a “diffuse”	
understanding of the phenomenon, which has also contributed to create what he calls the 
“most diffused stereotypes”	on the Sicilian mafia (2011, 5-7). Capodici and Moccia think 
that mafia is “[…] almost a state into the state”	(2016, 10). They follow the words of Pietro 
Grasso, a former Sicilian judge in charge of prosecutions against CN members, who defined 
mafia as a “power parallel to the state”. According to Capodici and Moccia, that explains 
why mafia has been able to promote rules whose respect became imposed as if they were 
laws (2016, 11). Dickie´s definition of mafia closely follows this argument. He argued that 
mafiosi are much more than only brutal delinquents. Given that mafia infiltrates the State 
institutions such as the police, judiciary, local councils, and ministries, thus mafia conforms 
a "parallel governing class in Southern Italy" (2015, 30). This does not suggest two States 
struggling against each other, but one sole susceptible to become captured by criminal 
organizations by taking their attributions and tasks into criminals´	hands. However, behind 
this observation, Dickie did also observe the essential contradiction when it comes especially 
to mafia and the state in Sicily: despite CN’s illegal agency that conceptually opposes it to 
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the legal authority, quickly in its history mafia did spread throughout the formal institutions 
to the point when it becomes impossible to determine “[…] where does the sect end, and the 
State begins”	(2015, 93). Consequently, at least in the case of Sicily, the development of CN 
and the Italian state cannot be separated.	
 
5.1.2. The Mafia and the Social Order in Sicily 
 
At least in the case of mafia studies, scholars and legal frameworks had improved their 
conceptions to the point of recognizing that mafia understanding needs to consider how the 
criminal organization had influenced the Sicilian and Italian socio-cultural setting and vice 
versa (Santoro, 2015; Dickie, 2015; Santino, 2015; La Spina, 2015; Merlino, 2014; 
Gambetta, 1993). However, at the same time, especially the CN have historically developed 
practices and rituals that enhance the criminal group´s cohesion, identity and unity, i.e., 
influencing and potentially defining the local social order definition –more about this will be 
explained along this chapter. This means that those scholars dealing with mafia phenomena 
need to simultaneously tackle the fact that CN is both social agent and social system 
(Interview in field no. 18, 2018). Indeed, that tension sets the primary analytical challenge 
for when it comes to understanding the CN. It involves analytically capturing CN’s political 
legitimacy component as a criminal agent output, while understanding and having a look into 
how the social conditions interact with the agent, i.e., mafia as a social order input and output. 
As said earlier, this dilemma is more or less recurrent along the scholars and had produced 
fruitful debates addressing the sociological dimension of criminality.	
 
Jane and Peter Schneider have contributed to that debate when arguing that “[…] a closer 
look at the social and cultural aspects of the mafia reveals it to be an engine of insecurity, its 
order-enhancing structures and solidarity-building rituals frequently distorted by rivalries 
and provocations”	(Schneider and Schneider, 2003, 82). They also studied the “inside”	mafia 
angle, observing	“[…] a secretive fraternal order whose norms and ritual practices situate its 
members ‘outside’	normal society and, in their minds, ‘above’	it”	(Schneider and Schneider, 
2003, 101). Both observations coexist and one does not cancel the other. Paoli´s argument 
that the CN provides normative order makes sense from the point of view of this tension 
(Paoli, 2003, 124-125). As a provider of local historical order, CN becomes a politically 
relevant agent that also sets and promotes their own rules, while dealing with other agents to 
keep their mandate. Somehow, Paoli´s argument reconciles the tension. However, from the 
political legitimacy perspective, it is necessary to go deeper into how that order is preserved, 
reformulated, or lost over time.	
 
5.1.3. Sicily and the Concept of the Mafia 
 
Given the already explored complication of the mafia-State relations, and because CN have 
been historically holding a political interest in terms of defining the local social order, the 
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concept of mafia becomes both relevant as difficult to outline. How to define this criminal 
group from a political legitimacy perspective? While CN has historically played like a 
distinctive agent, at the same time it has not been against the Italian State destruction, nor 
has developed any political statement tending to that. Nando Dalla Chiesa pointed out a 
profound observation around this problem. While criticizing the limits and possibilities of a 
war against the mafia, he detected and remarked that those who are promoting it might found 
that: "[…] the anti-state is not so anti-state as it seems. Alternative and opposed to the rule 
of law but enveloped and communicating and communicating with the state of affairs, what 
works in the concreteness of every day. Outlaws but socially and morally legitimate" (2014, 
p. 3). This research argues that CN did participate in shaping the local social order through 
both contingent and systematic sovereignty practices. 	
 
Moreover, the state is neither homogenous nor unified (Das and Poole, 2004; Migdal, 1988). 
Hence, as it was with Michoacán as the previous research case, this criminal group needs to 
be taken into account as one of several parts of the state, coexisting with one dominant image 
of it, but all of them continually defining the state image as a whole. As a result, CN 
legitimacy analysis relates to the definition of the social order. Hence, rather than a counter-
state, from a political legitimacy discussion, the mafia and specifically CN is realized here in 
two senses. First, given their sovereignty and legitimacy practices, as a relevant local social 
agent participating in the definition of the domestic social order. And secondly, CN needs to 
be considered as a social system through which, in the case of Sicily, power and violence 
have been historically mediated (Blok, 1974). Santino presented a close this idea when he 
questioned himself about mafia´s politically accountability. According to him, mafia is a 
political subject in a double sense: 	
 
1) As criminal association, is a power group and a political one in a Weberian sense having the essential 
characteristics of this group category, namely: a) a set of rules (ordering), b) a territorial dimension, c) 
physical coercion, d) an administrative apparatus able to ensure compliance with the norms and enforce 
physical coercion.	
2) The mafia, as a criminal association and with the social bloc of which it is part, constitutes a broader 
system of power, and is a source of production of politics in the overall sense, as it determines or 
contributes to determine decisions and choices concerning the management of power and the 
distribution of resources (Santino, 2011, 39-40).	
 
Finally, and before proceeding to CN political legitimacy performance, following the 
argumentation here is needed a conceptual stance around the word “mafia”. Indeed, the mafia 
has been used as an umbrella term (Santoro, 2011, 2). Not only as a synonym for organized 
crime, but also to refer to a certain way of structuring groups and social relations – such as 
groups in power, or specific social fields. Moreover, “mafia”	also stands for broadly referring 
to hierarchical and cohesive illegality. Nevertheless, this umbrella concept has been built 
through time as a result of both empirical CN references, as well as for a large set of features 
linked to mafia notion usually produced by mass media. Thus, to clarify the concept, mafia 
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discussion here runs across empirical, theoretical and conceptual references based on the 
Sicilian mafia. The issue of the mafia and its interest in legitimacy stresses what Santino 
called the “produzione mafiosa della politica”	(mafia production of politics) (2011, 40). This 
approach to the notion mafia enables a focus on how legitimacy was and is explicitly searched 
by CN, as well as how this search has been participating in the local social order definition. 
This performance is analyzed in detail and with empirical references in the following section, 
which follows the operative distribution of legitimacy sources and resources for criminal 
groups presented in Table 1.	
 
5.2. The Sicilian Mafia: Sources and Resources of Legitimacy 
 
After briefly reviewing the conceptual and historical dimensions of the Sicilian mafia and its 
political legitimacy interest, now the central question addresses the sources and resources of 
legitimacy with which CN has been historically and is currently participating in the Sicilian 
context. CN´s long history has changed over time in struggling with legitimacy. In this 
regard, the time frame for this research case is considerably longer than the previous, and the 
sources of legitimacy have not been constant, consistent, and static but unsteady, contingent, 
and firmly attached to the specific historical stage. Thus, in order to provide data for this 
issue, this section makes use of both primary and secondary sources. The former was 
collected during fieldwork; however, for building the latter, this research makes usage of 
other studies already published about this case. Currently, during the twenty-first century, 
CN has been experiencing a relatively weak period in terms of authority confirmation. That 
results from the strengthening of a local anti-mafia movement whose legitimacy relevance 
for CN, as well as for the Sicilian context, is analyzed later as part of the “portrayal of the 
enemy”	source. 	
 
Indeed, Sicily has been experiencing a proportionally direct relation between CN´s 
undermining of legitimacy and the anti-mafia movement’s enhancement of political 
legitimacy. However, this phase is not an exception but a confirmation of how important 
political legitimacy is to explain the whole criminal and political configuration in Sicily. 
"Totò" Riina, the capo di tutti i capi commanded the violence of CN during the nineteen 
eighties and nineties, died at 87 in November of 2017 in a hospital at the Northern city of 
Parma. Riina was serving his 26 life sentences. Bernardo Provenzano, Riina´s successor and 
CN´s operational boss of all bosses, also died in July of 2016. After Provenzano´s death, the 
The New York Times stated: "While its extortion and protection rackets survive, however, the 
Sicilian Mafia has never fully recovered from the backlash to its bloody legacy" (Roberts, 
2016). Indeed, that legacy was covered by a historical authority-building struggle, covered 
with many political legitimacy specters. Analyzing that backlash, then, needs to be done 
through a legitimacy lens, in which CN´s tops and downs become visible and rational. Before 
enlisting the empirical references, here it is needed to underline an analytical warning that 
will be observed across the data. On the contrary to Michoacán, where LCT and LFM were 
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interested in having the most exposure possible, when it comes to heir political legitimacy 
claims CN has historically been in the shadows. 	
 
For instance, after the First World War, the mafia did not appear publicly as a result of the 
iron-fisted strategy carried out by the fascist government. However, after the Second World 
War, CN made a sort of comeback precisely expressed through political legitimacy claims. 
Consequently, from the sixties until the early eighties, Sicilian CN did expose their mandate 
without more significant resistance. In terms of political legitimacy, this promoted a more 
prominent campaign for legitimacy. Since the late nineteen-nineties, CN has had to retreat 
into the shadows again as a result of the anti-mafia movement’s success. Of course, this has 
an impact on the mandate intensity and profile, as well as in its political legitimacy 
performance. A relevant and interesting output from this, concerns that this criminal group’s 
political legitimacy performance have historically rested less on material resources (although 
there have been some), whereas is plenty of non-material and internal manifestations 
including founding narratives, catholic symbols, initiation rituals, and internal codes. 
Following Claessen again, this CN´s preference for a non-material legitimacy performance 
is explained because this group spent long periods being an authority (whose legitimacy was 
mostly based in violence and fear) rather than trying to become one (1988). Except for the 
recent decades and the Mori operation period (both explained later), CN´s challenge was 
usually to hold the legitimate authority based in fear and violence, rather than achieving it. 	
 
Finally, before delving into the CN analysis, two interrelated characteristics of the Italian 
social landscape should be mentioned: religiosity and the role of the family. According to 
Doxa, an Italian research center, by 2014, three out of four Italians were Catholic (2014). 
Moreover, according to the same source, the majority of the population support secularized 
values (such as freedom of expression and non-religious education); also 62% believe that 
the dogmas and precepts of the Catholic Church condition the lives of people in general. 
Moreover, even 75% of the non-Catholics shared this opinion (2014). This is indeed 
materialized in the importance of the family in the Italian social structure and practices, 
including patriarchy and hierarchy, and particularly in the most religious areas. Indeed, 
following the same survey, only the Northwestern part of the country held a more significant 
part of atheist and agnostics with 41%. The South, where Sicily is located, counted with only 
20% of the people declared atheist or agnostic (2014). Through several practices, CN 
grounded its legitimacy interest on these features as will be seen below. To structure a 
discussion that later enables the comparison, the coming sections follows the Table 1 on the 
Operative Distribution of Legitimacy Sources and Resources for Criminal Groups.	
 	
5.2.1. Symbolic Sources 
 
Regarding CN´s symbolic sources analysis, the referred CN preference for not becoming 
publicized as a group never meant not to be publicly known as the local and severe authority, 
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whose mandate is as real as their existence despite the shadiness. Moreover, the symbolic 
sources profile from CN exhibits how relevant it has been for this group’s internal cohesion 
rather than for external obedience. To some extent, it seemed that this criminal group had 
understood the latter as a consequence of the former. In other words, the symbolic legitimacy 
displaying first pointed towards gaining loyalty and discipline from mafiosi (current and 
potential), and later the respect from locals, and not the other way around. Since the local 
people’s support comes as a consequence rather than the main objective, many of the CN 
symbolic sources had also the mafiosi as a legitimacy audience. As a result, the idea of 
internal cohesion before outward expression dominates the global Sicilian symbolic 
legitimacy setting. It is not that CN disregarded the interest in discipline and loyalty from the 
general Sicilian population. However, symbolic sources of legitimacy show that inner 
cohesion is primary, and the rest comes as a consequence.56 How do these two elements, not-
publicity and inner-cohesion over popular support, shape CN´s symbolic legitimacy ground? 
Following the Table 1, the symbolic sources are subcategorized into three subtypes: social 
contract offer, agenda´s spread and/or justification, and the spread of symbols.	
 
5.2.1.1. Proposed Social Contract 
 
The “proposed social contract" subtype source of legitimacy becomes expressed through a) 
granting public services (material resource), b) promoting belonging and cohesiveness, and 
a trustworthy mandate (non-material resources). Regarding these non-material resources, CN 
used legitimacy to improve the referred interest in enhancing the inner structure: hierarchy 
and structure.57 On the one hand, the Sicilian mafia is hierarchical and needs a commandment 
to guarantee loyalty. Its structure is designed that way, so the hierarchy spills into the criminal 
group.58 For instance, regarding the hierarchy, through a sort of "division of labor”, CN 
decides who order crimes (the mandanti) and who commits them (the sicari)" (Schneider and 
Schneider, 2003, 98). On the other hand, regarding the structure, Santino explained how 
every famiglia mafiosa has “[…] a variable number of ‘soldati’, the so-called ‘man of honor’, 
organized by dozens, and a capo [chief]; three or more contiguous families integrate a 
mandamento, which has its own capo”	 (2011, 24). Family reference, in this case, works 
parallel as a symbol of trustworthy shelter (very similar as in Michoacán), but also as a 
practical parameter of structuring the criminal group hierarchy. 	
 
 56 Interestingly, these inner ties efforts enhancing does not necessarily mean that every mafioso knows all CN´s 
members, Varese recovered the words of Antonio “Nino”	Calderone, a pentito who said that, despite being a 
secret society, not even those who have grown inside CN since childhood “know the identity of all the affiliated”	
(2017, 14).	57 As it was with LFM and LCT, also in this case the research did not get data on the CN granting public services 
as a material resource in the social contract offer subtype. 	58 In this regard, Schneider and Schneirder argued: “[…] the cosca is structured internally along lines of age 
and privilege, with new recruits, the ‘soldiers,' being expected to take greater risks and receive lesser awards”	
(2005: 503).	
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In the end, however, this double function points towards internally promoting belonging, 
cohesiveness, and a trustworthy mandate. In other words, building an internal social contract 
that later is spread towards the locals in the shape of a ruler and ruled relation. Moreover, 
externally (this is, towards the local Sicilian people), rather than promoting a trustworthy 
mandate as a symbolic legitimacy element, CN attempted to offer a strong mandate especially 
during the second half of the twentieth century, in which any social contract possibility was 
guided through docility from locals and official authorities (Dickie, 2015). Impunity is the 
key word here. Since the nineteen-eighties, Sicily has been experiencing a directly 
proportional relation between impunity and the mafia´s symbolic legitimacy success. As long 
as impunity has been decreasing, so any mafia social contracts offered some possibility – for 
example, in the eighties the Maxi-Trial explains this switch. As a consequence, CN became 
unable to offer any strong mandate during the following decades. In other words, the effective 
mafia production of politics, as Santino defined it (2000), directly depends on the successful 
exercise of corruption and impunity practices between mafiosi and official authorities. It was 
because of this why dalla Chiesa suggested, in his Anti-mafia manifesto, that “legitimacy”	is 
one out of the five mafia-forces that anti-mafia should dismantle in order to succeed (the 
other four being	 “material invisibility”, “conceptual invisibility”, “expansiveness”, and 
“impunity”). 	
 
Although it is not an exclusive CN practice (Schneider and Schneider, 2003), omertà needs 
to be considered as a powerful resource of legitimacy in the social contract offer dimension. 
Omertà practices of honor are those in which individuals keep silent on certain illegalities or 
deviant actions in favor of prioritizing the criminal group´s integrity as a superior interest. 
This spirit recalls the Hobbesian idea of a social contract in terms of conceding to a superior 
entity the individual willingness in order to preserve a social order (Hobbes, 1998; Hurd, 
1999). However, in this case, the pact does not address the individual faculty for killing others 
(homo homini lupus), but the faculty of keeping silent in favor of the superior entity, i.e., the 
criminal group. As an unwritten code, omertà is a non-material resource of legitimacy that 
denies the legal authority by compelling the illegal through silence (Sergi, 2014). In other 
words, omertà has not only the practical function of preserving the secrecy of the perpetrators 
against the potential threat that the law might represent. Moreover, this code has a powerful 
symbolic role in internally configuring a social contract between the CN´s members.	
 
5.2.1.2. Agenda´s Spread and/or Justification 
 
The "agenda´s spread and/or justification" subtype source of legitimacy is expressed through 
a) publications and written codes (material resources), b) founding narratives, songs, 
anthems, and public messages (non-material resources). As in the case of Michoacán, here 
the proposed social contract bases its symbolism on the criminal groups' endeavors to 
establish the basis for a shared destiny. As a particular non-material resource, the myths are 
related to the criminal group agenda´s spread and justification. In this case, the mafia-
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founding narratives, as symbolic sources of legitimacy, play a significant role in both sides. 
Regarding the agenda´s spread, this is done by by promoting a general explanation of the 
criminal group’s existence. On the other hand, as an agenda´s justification, myths also work 
as epic or heroic justifications of the criminal group´s preservation. The mythic and 
apologetic stories of Osso, Mastrosso, and Carcagnosso as well as Beati Paoli´s, play the 
symbolic role in this regard. Both stories played both roles. Moreover, both stories help to 
improve the inner cohesion of the group in the sense of the already reviewed social contract 
offer subtype source of legitimacy. Given that the audience of both aimed more the actual 
and potential members, rather than the general public, they work for promoting belonging 
and cohesiveness, which in the end is also a symbolic source but related to the 
aforementioned social contract offer field. 	
 
Indeed, in Sicily, mafiosi spread their founding myth narratives. Balandier described the 
sociological function of myths in explaining and shaping the historical sense of social order 
(1970), and Migdal observed a connection between the acceptance of the state´s myth and 
the state´s desired social order (1988). In this case, two versions have been running. 
According to the first one, around the fifteenth century, three Spanish brothers and knights 
escaped from the Iberian Peninsula and shipwrecked in Trapani, in the South of Sicily. The 
brothers Osso, Mastrosso, and Carcagnosso later settled in different regions where nowadays 
the three bigger Italian criminal groups are based. Osso, the older brother, stayed in Sicily 
and founded CN; Carcagnosso made it to Naples, where he founded the Camorra; and, 
Mastrosso crossed the strait of Messina, arrived in Calabria in the Southern part of continental 
Italy, and founded the ´Ndrangheta. According to scholars, especially this latter criminal 
group still using this narration as part of their initiation ritual (Dickie, 2015, 29; Paoli, 1994, 
217). Osso, Mastrosso, and Carcagnosso’s exile is an exceptional story in the sense of 
strongly uniting the three criminal groups at least in origin. Somehow, the allegory of their 
separation serves as anticipated destiny.	
 
During the following decades, each criminal group seemed to have a separate or at least 
distinct story, although they kept dealing with the Italian state and under the same historical 
process. Especially in terms of identity, each of them built their own path. The second 
founding myth focuses mainly on CN and Sicily during a random period between the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. According to this story, a secret cult in Sicily named 
Beati Paoli acted as a fraternity of pre-modern vigilantes that challenged local political and 
religious powers and carried out justice across the island. Their secrecy, power, and 
challenging of authority were defining features as the mafias’	predecessors. Beati Paoli's 
myth reinforced another myth, namely, that the mafia grew out of Sicily's feudalist peasant 
past, whereas CN rose hand in hand with the capitalist, liberal and modern Italian nation-sate 
(Schneider and Schneider, 2011, 10). Given that no historical references to the sect have been 
found, this reference becomes more into a powerful mythical narration rather than a historical 
allusion. Journalistic versions say that Toto Riina, capo di tutti i capi, handed copies among 
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mafiosi of the novel I Beati Paoli, initially published in the Sicilian press at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, and later as a book (Domínguez, 2016).	
 
In this case, the fact that CN welcomed and treasured their founding narrative, either factual 
or mythological, shows its interest in legitimacy. In the end, these founding myths especially 
work in improving criminal groups’ inner cohesion. Moreover, by condensing an identity, 
these stories draw a single origin that promotes group identity based on pride, selectiveness, 
bravery, and more. As a narrative tool, the stories are also powerful enough to encourage 
belonging and embrace a shared destiny (such as how other identity discourses do so as well). 
The myths also serve to discursively confirm that mafias are real and formal organizations, 
rather than social behaviors or lifestyles: even when anyone can pretend to be a “man of 
honor”, not everyone can become one. It is only the criminal group itself who accepts and 
denies membership. In the end, despite the truthfulness or falseness of these myths, the 
rationality accompanying the stories uncovers their relevance as a narrative tool and identity 
builder, both elements concerning political legitimacy.	
 
Finally, in the field of written codes, Dickie´s book reproduced a copy of a sort of mafia 
handbook dated in 2007 enlisted inner rules in a single typescript sheet full of misspells 
(2015, 129). This text is considerably smaller and discrete compared to the LCT code. 
Moreover, in this case, the code is also addressing CN´s members, rather than locals in Sicily 
or an ambiguous general audience. LCT, for instance, also addressed their members in the 
code´s prose; however, the distribution plan launched by the Mexican criminal group offers 
a completely different publicity profile in this regard. Across this CN´s code, moral beliefs 
and values (concerning the symbols spread, analyzed in the following chapter) take part 
shaping the expected behavior of the elements. Among them were to respect the wife, as well 
as criteria to not accept new CN members – anyone having relatives in the police, or who 
had emotionally cheated on his family, having bad behaviors, or anyone who does not stick 
to traditional moral values (Dickie, 2015, 128-129). In this regard, these cases also show how 
these groups made justified crime on the one hand, but also their particular agenda on the 
other. Finally, this is another example in which, even when categorizing implies artificially 
locating each empirical reference within one of the sources and resources, in the practice the 
empirical references overlap.	
 
5.2.1.3. Dissemination of Symbols 
 
The “symbol's spread" subtype source of legitimacy is expressed through a) identity symbols 
in ornaments and documents (material resources), and b) rituals, values, moral beliefs, and 
religiosity (non-material resources). In this regard, here it is convenient to analyze carefully 
CN´s initiation rituals. Although this practice has been least performed by CN in the recent 
years, the whole platform works as symbol spreading platform. On the one hand, it enables 
the empirical basis of the criminal group´s fictional membership. On the other, the ritual 
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involves a variety of symbols that shape the group´s identity. As it became publicized, the 
membership also became a restricted feature within CN: “[…] mafia offers its members the 
privilege of exclusivity and belonging. A symbolically laden rite of entry and effort at 
lifelong socialization states them ‘outside’	normal society and, in their view, ‘above it’”	
(Schneider and Schneider, 2005, 503). In order to achieve this goal, the magic that spread the 
initiation rituals become essential. In this regard, following Catino, the initiation rituals (as 
well as the omertà), embody the spread of values and moral beliefs between the CN members. 
All of them, non-material resources of legitimacy inserted in the symbols spread dimension. 
In his words: 	
 
Rules exist both within a family, and between families: a system of formal regulations, sometimes in 
written form, of formal criminal constitutions. These rules discipline organizational life, from the 
recruiting phase on.3 Initiation rites too are strictly regulated, in ways that differ from organization to 
organization and with varying levels of rigidity. The oath taken to be a member of the organization, as 
a man of honor, is binding for life,4 and it requires a subordination of all allegiances to mafia 
membership. Honor and secrecy (omertà) are key inspiring principles of members’	duties (2014, 180-
181).	
 
In the case of CN, initiation rituals are also the space in which material symbols become 
materialized. Indeed, many identity symbols have been used such as blood, religion, and 
secrecy get combined within this ceremony. According to different versions, the mafiosi get 
together with new members around a table with a gun and knife at the center. The 
"Godfather", i.e., the mafioso who is inviting the newbie, explains him the rules and 
afterward pricks his finger to extract blood that is spilled over the image of a Catholic saint 
image, usually the virgin. The image burns into the newbie's hands who repeat the oath: "If I 
betray the Cosa Nostra, let my flesh burn like this sainted woman" (Dickie, 2015, 41).59 The 
prick is what allegedly gives the name to the ritual: the Punciuta, Sicilian for "sting".60 Only 
affiliates can attend the ritual (Varese, 2017, 16). Although the ritual wanders between 
ambiguous reality and media spectacularism (movies have already reproduced it), as a 
narrative habit it helps to realize a relevant piece on the importance that CN gives to symbolic 
legitimacy. According to a Palermitan magistrate, CN had to change the ritual nowadays as 
a protection strategy. Given the judicial investigation improvements, then for Sicily´s official 
authorities become easier to trace mafiosi through recognizing who did attend the ritual, as 
well as who were accompanying (Interview in field no. 4, 2018). The practices might change, 
but the symbolism persists. Perfect metaphor for CN´s history.	
 
 59 Varese made a suggesting point when remembering that, within the Occidental culture, swearing entails 
entering the sphere of religious forces. Thus, he continued, as a solemn liturgy contains three elements: the 
promise of loyalty, the invocation of fearing superior forces, and the punishment for perjury (2017, 18).	60 Across this ritual, the symbolism is constantly operating around specific elements. The blood, for instance, 
works as a bond creation. The oath, on the other hand, enhance honor while reaffirming the idea of belonging 
and cohesiveness. Finally, legitimacy is borrowed from an already legitimate symbol as it is the virgin image.	
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Also, on the grounds of non-material resources, religiosity and moral beliefs come together 
when it comes to CN’s spread of symbols. The Sicilian mafia not only borrows Catholic 
iconography in symbols, practices, and the general belief setting for legitimacy purposes, but 
has translated Catholic morality as the justice parameter to the point in which the Catholic 
faith works as the rule that mafiosi should respect. In other words, religiosity is a political 
legitimacy reference that structure CN while also organizes morality standards. According to 
the Italian magistrate Roberto Scarpinato, “The head of Cosa Nostra, Michele Greco, was a 
practicing Catholic, who died in prison without with the Bible in his hands without 
collaborating with justice. Pietro Aglieri, an important leader of the mafia, during the period 
of his hiding, made a priest come to his retirement to celebrate mass. After being captured, 
he got a degree in theology. He has always refused to cooperate with justice since his Catholic 
formation had taught him that the important thing is to repent before God and not before men	
— the same opinion as Riina's wife, Ninetta Bagarella”	 (2011).61 Following this logic, a 
mafioso does not rule his life through men´s rule, but trough God´s mandate.	
 
5.2.2. Performance-Centered Sources 
 
According to Sciarrone, the mafia is a phenomenon of a secret society, which also needs a 
certain degree of social recognition (2016). His idea hits into a critical CN angle. That is, 
while indeed this criminal group prefers to keep in the shadows regarding publicity 
avoidance, at the same time, as an illegal social agent interested in political legitimacy it also 
needs to be simultaneously recognized as an ultimate authority. How to manage this 
contradiction? The answer somehow addresses to the understanding of the “performance-
centered”	sources of legitimacy. To some extent, the actions undertaken under this source 
umbrella make CN visible, whereas the “portrayal of the enemy”	sources also make them 
visible but as a result of CN´s enemy´s interest – as will be explored later, after this section. 
In other words, this section analyzes the actions that CN launched for becoming visible 
although shadowy, while achieving and preserving social recognition and authority building. 
Afterward, by analyzing CN’s stance against their enemies, a section will examine the actions 
launched by other local social agents making CN visible but to undermine the same social 
recognition and mandate. Following Table 1, the performance-centered sources are 
subcategorized into three subtypes: provision of governing institutions, philanthropy 
(carrots), and coercion (sticks). The latter two are grouped into one unique section in order 
to sharpen the analysis.	
 
5.2.2.1. Provision of Governing Institutions 
 
 61 This is my translation from the transcript of the discourse made by Elisa Norio. More on religiosity as a 
source of legitimacy for CN is analyzed later in this chapter when reviewing the case of the procession of Saint 
Agatha.	
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The "provision of governing institutions" subtype source of legitimacy is expressed through 
a) taxation and economy (material resource), and b) security and justice managing, as well 
as labor regulations (non-material resources). The Sicilian case shows how the mafia was 
able to provide governing institutions for decades by crisscrossing the local cultural code 
with mafiosi power, through violence, corrupting official authorities or simply by becoming 
the de facto authority. An example of this is the already referred idea of intreccio or 
“interweaving”, as well as the hinge function that mafia displayed as factual government 
models – usually as solving-conflict or mediation agents. Usually, by promoting and 
protecting this institution providing, CN extracts concrete benefits that not necessarily are 
exclusively economic profits, but indeed political recognition and reaffirmation. In other 
words, this is criminal mediation launched and consolidated the criminal group's mandate. 
Particularly before the anti-mafia movement enhancement, CN did this to the point that 
quietly and violently spread the idea that no Sicilian public life can happen without the mob 
(Schneider and Schneider, 2003). In the words of Sciarrone:	
 
Mafia groups can find opportunities for growth where it is problematic to guarantee the protection of 
property rights and the execution of contracts. In these cases, they can behave as a sort of private 
government of the economy, specializing in the production and sale of protection, or proposing 
themselves as mediators and guarantors of transitions that take place in contexts characterized by high 
uncertainty. It is important to point out that the mafias are not an anti-State, they rather seek 
cohabitation with the institutions (2016).62	
 
Moreover, rather than seeking local support or sympathy, the Sicilian mafia has historically 
sought local resignation to the mafia´s authority. This is different from Michoacán. There, 
the criminal group displayed a confusing public portrayal oscillating between a friendly 
criminal group in the discourse, and a bloody violent one in the practice. In Sicily, the mafia 
did not register friendly claims in this sense. On the contrary, the historical public display 
pointed towards a strong criminal authority – especially after the Second World War and 
until the nineteen-eighties and nineties. Actually, challenging that premise is at the core of 
the anti-mafia fight and also of some academics. Schneider and Schneider did so with the 
aforementioned Sicilian myth concept (2005), but also Santino, Santoro, Dickie, and others. 
Either from activism or from the field of ideas, both have been counteracting CN´s symbolic 
legitimacy. However, as said earlier, CN needs to be understood in different historical stages. 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, i.e., after the Italian unification, from a 
legitimacy perspective, CN could be described as a feudal but strong mediator and authority. 	
 
To some extent, the Italian mafia and the Italian state have had significant legitimacy clashes 
during the nineteenth century after the Risorgimento, later against Mussolini´s fascist 
government, and finally in the last decades of the twentieth century in the context of the Maxi 
Trial. These confrontations have been happening due to how political authority has been 
 62 This is my translation from Italian.	
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configured in those regions where the mafia has and had a presence, and the legal and official 
authority has had some or none at all. That is, where the effective power displaying of the 
national state had been weak and, as a consequence, “[…] mafiosi were invested by a variety 
of public functions”	(Paoli, 1994, 213). By acting as judges, mediators, as well as protectors, 
argued Arlacchi, mafiosi became a sort of condensation of what was expected from the state. 
Following his idea: "[…] honor transformed itself into authority, and finally into legitimacy. 
The legitimacy, then in its turn, turned into a further source of confirmation and amplification 
of honor" (1983, 114-115). Hence, interestingly legitimacy worked as an instrument that 
enabled the whole authority-building process on the one hand, but not only. In the case of 
CN, it also seemed to feed the sense of honor that in the end reinforce mafiosi´s mandate. 
This cycle started lasted until the First World War ended, when CN became Mussolini´s 
enemy during the Mori´s operation – which is analyzed later as an “expression against formal 
authorities”	subtype source.	
 
The first explanation on mafia studied by Italian official authorities took place during the last 
decades of the nineteenth century. Indeed, it did not talk about "the mafia" but about the 
“questione Meridionale”	 (the Southern question). For Anton Blok, whose work is an 
obligated reference in the study of the mafia in Sicily, given the developing differences 
between the Italian regions, the Southern question was the background in which nineteenth 
century mafiosi operated as violent entrepreneurs that served as mediators between the town 
and country, i.e., the state and the countryside (Blok, 1974; Watts, 2016, 70).63 However, this 
criminal proto-institutionalism lasted with ups and downs during the twentieth century. 
Moreover, this mediation is part of all the set of tangible mafia elements that became visible 
as a result of the formation of a central government apparatus (Blok, 1974, 89-90). 
Nevertheless, more than not having a clue on the phenomenon, Italian official authorities 
exhibited contradictory diagnoses that only detected a phenomenon of infiltration (Puccio-
Den, 2015, 75). Interestingly, while in practice both mafia and public officers were actually 
interacting (i.e., the intreccio), in the legal definition the formal authority was unable to 
 63 In this regard, CN has an interesting similarity with LFM and LCT regarding the economy angle. This is, that 
both developed governing functions addressing to regulate the local agro-industrial and farming production. 
Coincidentally, in both cases the citrus were deeply relevant in this regard. This phenomenon is analyzed in the 
last chapter.	
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recognize the mafia.64 This idea again recalls how interrelated and interconnected are the 
Italian state and the mafia historical processes.65	
 
Somehow, quickly in the nineteenth century, the Southern question became more a 
legitimacy problem of the early Italian political modernity, rather than only a criminal one. 
As effective but atypical power holders, mafiosi held an unusual position during these years 
–that, indeed, persisted with more or less similarity during the twentieth century. On the one 
hand, mafiosi did count with active political and territorial control experience (Arlacchi, 
2007, 152-159). However, as mediators, the mafia was not necessarily against the central 
government. On the contrary, their existence and persistence addressed that middle point: 
between being the real ruler while letting the central government exist and realize their 
governing limitations. In an interesting article, Santino analyzed and described sixteen 
historical moments of the mafia between 1861 and the early years of the twentieth century. 
His intention was to underline how the mafia already surrounded Sicily´s public life, even 
when it was discretely or barely named. Since then, he argued, the mafia has been building 
its “political subjectivity”, the core activity of mafia association, which also involved the 
formal authority (2015, 71). As a result, quickly in the story, state and mafia became nearly 
indistinguishable, and the twentieth century only contributed to the confusion and 
complexity.	
 
 64 This drastically changed in the eighties of the twentieth Century, when the Italian penal code was modified. 
With this new "anti-mafia law" (Santino, 2011, 17) the Italian law stopped punishing "the criminal" as an 
individual mafioso, and start doing so by punishing the associazione di tipo mafioso (mafia-type association), 
i.e., to punish the resulted bonding from belonging the mafia. By unifying La Torre and Rognoni law projects 
presented, this apparently small change was a significant legal improvement that later contributes to two goals. 
In the first place, eliminated the ambiguity and uncertain contour of this social phenomenon. The law eliminated 
the culturist confusion about who is and how a Mafioso looks like and, instead, established a criminological 
criterion in order to define and punish how mafia associations are (Puccio-Den, 2015, 80). Moreover, two types 
of illegal associations were codified, criminal and the mafia association, in which the presence of intimidation, 
the associative bond, the subjection, and the omertá configured this innovative legal type. After more than a 
century dealing with the mafia, the Italian State had finally achieved its own RICO laws –that is, the set of 
regulations used in the United States in order to dismantle local mafias (Dickie, 2015, 595). In the second place, 
once the penal code started to distinguish between the criminal association and the mafiosi association, the 
judicial system legal capacities significantly improved and the biggest trial against the mafia in the Italian 
history was launched: The Maxi Trial. The relevance of this law deserves to be included here literally in order 
to observe how the Italian legality did transform a criminal type from an individual prosecution to a social and 
relational phenomena: “The association is of the mafia type when those who are part of it, make use of the force 
of intimidation of the association bond and of the condition of subjection and of silence that results from 
committing crimes, to acquire directly or indirectly the management or in any case the control of economic 
activities, of concessions, of authorizations, public tenders or services or to realize profits or advantages unfair 
for oneself or for others, or in order to prevent or hinder the free exercise of the vote or to obtain votes for 
oneself or others in election consultations" (quoted in Santino, 2011, 18).	65 Two ideas need to be underlined and reiterated in this regard. In the first place, at least in the case of Sicily, 
the Italian State formation holds an intimate link to criminality. Second, and from a legitimacy perspective, who 
gets on top as the dominant authority results from the foundational interconnection between the legal and illegal 
authority.	
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From a practical perspective, CN has historically attempted (and usually successfully) to 
comply with specific governing duties. Gambetta, for instance, suggested that the main one 
in this regard is the security provision service (1993). He named this security as a private 
one. However, the mafia “service”	is directly related to the government´s lack of security 
provision. The action that embodies this idea is the extortion, named as pizzo and also with 
particularities as it was reviewed in the case of Michoacán. Indeed, as happens in Michoacán, 
in Sicily the practice of extortion connects all performance-centered legitimacy subtype 
sources: provision of governing institutions, philanthropy, and coercion. From the 
perspective of the institutions providing, any likeness with the legal state taxation is no 
coincidence. How many influence and inspiration does pizzo took from state taxes is hard to 
measure. Despite similarities, Varese observed a distinction. According to him, "Mafia 
taxation is personalized, unlike (at least in theory) than that imposed by the State, and often 
men of honor ask for additional payments in kind" (2017, 39). Nevertheless, both pizzo and 
state taxation have a powerful similarity: paying them validates the social norms of who is 
asking for it, either the mafia or the state. On the other hand, pizzo is also a platform through 
which CN has handed out Sicilians several sticks and much fewer carrots.	
 
5.2.2.2. Philanthropy and Coercion: Carrots and Sticks  
 
The "philanthropy" subtype source of legitimacy becomes expressed through a) gifting 
(material resource), and b) promises and hope generation (non-material resources). On the 
other hand, the "coercion" subtype becomes expressed through a) weapons and ammo control 
(material resource), and b) fear and use of threat or violence (non-material resource). Across 
the Italian criminal groups, pizzo is a practice that condenses the mafia seal of authority 
affirmation, although this is mostly through fear and the use or threat of violence, but without 
promises of benefits or generating hope across locals. CN and the pizzo in Sicilian is not the 
exception but a particularly illustrative confirmation of this. According to Dickie, pizzo's term 
originally comes from the medieval prison life in Naples. Those inmates who recently arrived 
at the prison had to pay several sorts of informal taxes charged by the veteran inmates, 
including one for the small space in which they slept. To not pay that pizzo meant to suffer 
punishments that went from insults to being assassinated (2015, 56). Following the idea, 
Santino argued that: 	
 
The activity [of asking for pizzo], controlled by a ‘camorrista di giornata’, consists in extortion, 
practiced una tantum or repetitively on non-affiliated prisoners. The ‘pizzo’	(from vagnarsi u pizzu: 
bathe the beak) or the ‘lampa’	(the candle to ascend in front of a sacred image) is a ticket that you pay 
to ‘fancisi’, i.e., to the affiliates, for buy security and protection”	(2015, 43). Besides, as a powerful 
phenomenon, pizzo phenomenon has historically become "[...] one of the fundamental practices of 
mafia action. Pizzo is a crime that has the function of accumulation and territorial domination, while 
being a form of criminal taxation, in competition with the State (Santino, 2011, 72).	
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As a criminal-political performance, asking for pizzo becomes a validation of the same set of 
social norms imposed by mafia (Di Trapani and Vaccaro, 2014, 15). This has both symbolic 
and practical utilities for CN. As a performance, it helped to reaffirm authority. In practice, 
it transformed basic needs such as authoritative functions into favors and obedience, i.e., 
sticks. In other words, this research understands pizzo as an overwhelming sovereign practice 
through which CN displays performance-centered sources of legitimacy by shaping the 
provision of governing institutions, but most importantly, oscillating between violently 
offering carrots and (mostly) sticks to victims, who eventually become the ruled. More than 
a simple extortion, as a practice it reunites the elements that configure how the ruler and the 
ruled relate in contexts where the state authorities are neither completely distinguishable nor 
completely distinct. Probably, the most relevant empirical reference in order to sharpen this 
is assassination of Libero Grassi by, presumably, CN members.	
 
Addiopizzo is a Palermitan NGO dedicated to fighting pizzo practice since 2004. Its slogan 
appeals not only to conviction but also to a sense of dignity concerning those who ask as well 
as those who pay for pizzo: "Un intero popolo che paga il pizzo è	un popolo sensa dignità" 
(An entire people that pays for pizzo, is a people without dignity). The phrase was inspired 
by Libero Grassi, a Sicilian entrepreneur who produced pajamas in Palermo. CN assassinated 
him in 1991 for his opposition to paying pizzo. Indeed, Grassi´s words went against a relevant 
resource of legitimacy spread by CN when extorting fear. Moreover, his diagnosis was 
accurate: by spreading this fear, CN attempted to undermine locals´	dignity through pizzo, 
while simultaneously enhanced the criminal group’s authority. Grassi opposed this practice 
when no one else did and made his opposition public on national TV: "I do not pay because 
I do not want to renounce to my entrepreneur dignity" (quoted in Di Trapani and Vaccaro, 
2014, 32). Actually, after the first ask for “contributions”, Grassi asked help to the police. As 
a consequence, three extortionists were incarcerated. However, that provoked that pizzo 
petitions became dangerous threats (Dickie, 2015, 691). Grassi decided to publish a letter in 
the local media addressed to his “Caro estortore” (dear extorter): 	
 
I wanted to warn our unknown extorter to save the phone calls from the threatening tone and the 
expenses for the purchase of fuses, bombs, and bullets, as we are not available to make contributions 
and we put ourselves under police protection. I built this factory with my own hands, I have been 
working for a lifetime, and I do not intend to close...If we pay 50 million, they will then return to the 
office asking for more money, a monthly fee, we will be destined to close up shop in a short time. This 
is why we said no to the ‘Geometra Anzalone’	and we will say no to all those like him (Grassi in the 
Giornale di Sicilia, January 10, 1991, quoted in Addiopizzo, 2018).	
 
Since Grassi´s assassination, especially the Palermitan civil society has progressed in 
conforming anti extortion organizations. Addiopizzo and SOS Impresa, an entrepreneur 
association born in Sicily´s capital for the same purpose, are clear examples in this regard. In 
the case of the first one, since the very beginning, Addiopizzo realized that legitimacy was 
the game they need to play in order to challenge pizzo as a spread and respected norm by 
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Sicilians. Somehow, Addiopizzo´s story can be followed through stickers. One day before 
being founded, in 2004, Palermo woke up with a large number of stickers pasted across its 
downtown streets. The stickers included the phrase: “Un intero popolo che paga il pizzo è	un 
popolo senza dignità”	 (An entire people that pays pizzo is a people without dignity) 
(Addiopizzo, 2018). Once working, the NGO carried out a project that is still working today. 
By offering legal advising, Addiopizzo approaches to local shops to convince them of 1) do 
not pay pizzo, 2) denounce with the police the extortion, and 3) promote to expand the anti-
pizzo culture. The cherry on the top of this process is also a sticker with a cross that states: 
“Consumo critico. Addiopizzo. Pago chi non paga”	(Critical Consume. Addiopizzo. I pay to 
those who do not pay [pizzo]).	
 
Indeed, the strategy involves not only producers and sellers but also (and especially) 
consumers (Di Trapani and Vaccaro, 2014, 45). Consumers supposedly also realize that they 
share responsibility in the definition of social order when it comes to mafia presence. The 
sticker can be found in Palermo and is also a sign of affiliation to the NGO. Currently, 
according to their webpage 999 businesses are affiliated to Addiopizzo, more than 13 
thousand consumers support them, and 184 schools are currently involved in anti-pizzo 
training (checked in March 21, 2019 at www.addiopizzo.org). Addiopizzo designed and 
carried out the creation of a list that includes both businesses and consumers committed to 
anti-pizzo. After collecting them, the NGO printed a booklet and uploaded it to their website. 
Publicity and spread were the main idea. A member of explained a poster stick to a wall of 
Addiopizzo´s headquarters, at Palermo: “Those are declaration of gangsters about 
Addiopizzo, they are evaluating to either extort or not shops affiliated, and said, ‘There will 
be more problems than the advantages [profits] to get to them [to extort]’”	(Interview in field 
no. 14, 2018). Indeed, the police and judges are also working together with the NGO. Behind 
this strategy of adding more and more to their cause, there is much more than solidarity. 
There is a web that first points to become consolidated and, second, to enhance the inner ties 
against mafia. Interestingly, this might sound pretty much like the mafia’s symbolic agenda. 	
 
As long as CN was united through inner ties, it became much easier to build and later operate 
the mandate. Indeed, if the mafia and anti-mafia struggle is played out over legitimacy, the 
case of pizzo and Addiopizzo is an emblematic example. While narrating how the NGO 
Addiopizzo was created, Di Trapani and Vaccaro quoted a Sicilian merchant resistant to the 
anti-pizzo mission. According to the authors, the man said with deep conviction that, in 
Sicily, "[...] everything is mafia, thus nothing is mafia. We are all mafiosi, so the mafia is a 
way like another to order society, to do what the central government does not know or does 
not want to do" (2014, 13). Since the last decade, Addiopizzo´s have been making firm steps 
towards changing the situation. Nevertheless, the merchant’s statement as well as 
Addiopizzo's success confirm the aforementioned directly proportional relation, in which the 
mafia´s (in)capacity to perform violence and ruler functions defines how mafia´s legitimacy 
performs. This statement can be traced across history: strong mafia during the late nineteenth 
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century or post Second World War on the one hand; and weak mafia during fascism or since 
the late nineteen-nineties and current century. 	
 
Even when pizzo is still being practiced, as an ongoing phenomenon Addiopizzo has 
successfully undermined CN´s legitimacy. This organization “[…] clearly represents a 
discontinuity element within anti-mafia´s history”	 (Di Trapani and Vaccaro, 2014, 127). 
They have done and continue to do so by “spreading the values of social justice and honesty 
in a difficult social environment plagued by Mafia”	(Vaccaro, 2012, 23). One of the criticisms 
of the organization is that, so far, the strategy is mostly working in the wealthy neighborhoods 
of Palermo while the most marginal zones still work under mafia rule (Dickie, 2015). Indeed, 
this is a symptom that reinforces that this is an ongoing phenomenon in Palermo and to some 
extent in Sicily. In any case, the context in which Addiopizzo has been succeeding is the 
same that was described under a strong promotion of the culture of lawfulness. In this regard, 
it can be argued that denying paying pizzo is also a “rebellion behavior for legality”. Despite 
being an illegal practice, since it was the mafia who promoted and validated the norm, and it 
was also the mafia who was mainly defining the social order, thus, to defy and not follow it 
becomes a rebel attitude.	
 
Currently, there are no trustworthy figures on how many extortion cases have been 
happening, as well as how many of them have mafiosi as the responsible. However, at least 
on the streets of Palermo the pizzo spirit is still prowling around. On the one hand, the locals 
who still have in mind the symbolic “mafia arriving”	for asking pizzo: glue in the businesses 
entrance lock (Interview in field no. 14, 2018) as well as neighbor’s whispering.66 On the 
other hand, there are the migrants coming from Africa and Asia who either do not fear or at 
least react different to both mafia and pizzo practice. As analyzed earlier, when it comes to 
pizzo migrants also get related as perpetrators or as victims. For instance, as perpetrators, 
Varese argued that CN difficulties in asking pizzo to human traffickers coming from Northern 
Africa are due to their lack of contacts. Moreover, the Sicilian mafia has also problems in 
charging landing pizzo as traffickers can easily change the arriving point into the island, 
putting this activity out of mafia control (Varese, 2017, 47). On the other hand, as victims, 
the migrant business owners that become victims of pizzo certainly doubt to ask for help to 
the police due to their legal situation (Interview in field no. 14, 2018). Organizations such as 
Addiopizzo together with official authorities such as the police and judges still have 
significant challenges in this regard. 	
 
 66 In this regard, Addiopizzo had already documented the how CN, at Palermo, charges pizzo differently 
depending on the neighborhood. Moreover, usually this geographical distribution for asking pizzo uses to 
coincide with the local police patrolling distribution (see Picture 13). In this regard, to some extent, pizzo in 
Palermo also works for CN as neighborhoods control mechanism through which the criminal group mark 
affirms their presence in the territory depending on the area of the city.	
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The use or threat of violence is a non-material resource of legitimacy inserted in the 
“Coercion”	subtype source. Pizzo is, in this regard, a practice that makes this resource visible. 
However, during the nineteen-eighties and nineties, CN increasingly displayed violence with 
public assassinations. Some of them were against emblematic victims in Sicilian history.67 
These events took Sicily outside of the shadows, while reinforcing the CN's (bloody) 
authority. In other words, the eighties and nineties mafia violence, served for making public 
stands against their enemies, i.e., those whose interest was against mafia control and social 
order definition. However, the last decades have been contrastingly different regarding 
violence. As said earlier, from a legitimacy perspective, CN has been undermined in the last 
decades as a result of confrontations especially against the anti-mafia movement. A 
consequence the criminal group´s violence has decreased. However, the absence of violence 
does not mean absence or cancelation of the CN´s political legitimacy performance. Santino 
exposed an idea around this. First, as a private type, mafia violence implies in the first place 
rejecting the Weberian monopoly of the state's use of force. Second, it makes competition 
for the internal and external command prevail in order to impose "[...] the mafia control on 
the social context, on the daily life and the economic and political choices”	(2011, 31). In the 
third place, since violence and impunity used to go together in Sicily, then mafia violence 
was usually a part of how both formal and factual authority was established. 	
 
Finally, Santino made an interesting parallel with Arendt´s instrumental understanding of 
violence: mafia violence is an instrument, i.e., a channel through which the essential mafia 
objectives can be achieved. Moreover, he said, this idea is inscribed in a vision in which it is 
legitimate to look for self-justice without involving the formal authority. As a result, violence 
is a non-renounceable attribute of the mafia (2011, 31-33). In this regard, abandoning the use 
of violence would also mean renouncing their authority and, consequently, one of the main 
sources of legitimacy. To some extent, Dickie coincided with the latter point by stating that, 
without violence, there is no mafia. However, he also followed the idea that violence is not 
the end nor the last goal by admitting, for the mafia, violence is only “the beginning”	(2015, 
346). For instance, to corrupt the legal institutions, cut the citizens' life options, avoid justice, 
and transform mafia´s mediation into the tribunal’s alternative are goals that this scholar listed 
between the achievements that mafia can gain through violence. Indeed, these ideas on mafias 
and violence enable to start this section on CN sources and resources of legitimacy. As it was 
 67 The shift could be explained through the tragic appearance of emblematic victims, the so-called "excellent 
cadavers" (Schneider and Schneider, 2001, 431; Paoli, 2003, 12) and the work they did against mafia before 
being assassinated precisely by mafiosi. During the seventies, eighties, and nineties, mafia killed well-
recognized local individuals with diverse professional profile and ideology. These people common denominator 
was precisely their labor against CN. The "excellent cadavers´" symbolism was powerful enough to inspire and 
improve the anti-mafia work and, consequently, to undermine CN political legitimacy by unifying this 
movement that became the most significant criminal group threat to its mandate. Contrary to what used to 
happen with the so-called Lupara Bianca, i.e., mafia victims who have been killed in a way their corps cannot 
be found, the "excellent cadavers" were publicly exposed. With more or less public attention, each assassination 
took a place in the public debate domain and inspired new generations and sympathizers to keep anti-mafia 
actions. Along the “excellent cadavers”	profile there are journalists, bishops, judges, authorities, etcetera. 	
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in the case of LFM and LCT, violence becomes instrumental, and this also affects the political 
legitimacy discussion. 	
 
5.2.3. Portrayals of the Enemy 
 
Before starting this analysis, it is necessary to consider that, given this criminal group 
shadowy presence, most of CN expressions against enemies have actually been reactions. In 
other words, the historical relation between the Sicilian mafia and other social agents 
oscillates between a lasting ambiguity and contingent and spontaneous stances against those 
enemies. Possibly, the first “mafia enemy displaying”	was Mussolini´s regime, when the 
attacks against the mafia were swift and aggressive that CN did not react enough quick nor 
strong to make a stand against fascism. However, especially over the last several decades, 
CN faced what can be considered new powerful but peaceful enemies, i.e., the heterogeneous 
anti-mafia movement. Di Trapani and Vaccaro argued that “[…] a force prevailing outside 
the law, like the mafia, could not do without triggering a reaction against it”	(2014, 15). In 
this regard, CN has a particular stance towards the current law. As a consequence of the 
mafia´s role in the state-building process in Southern Italy, as well as the resulting 
interweaving with the legal authorities, the Sicilian mafia was not necessarily portraying and 
standing against an enemy or the current law as long as their authority did not become 
questioned. This oscillation is analyzed above. Following Table 1, “portrayal of the enemy”	
is subcategorized into: expressions against formal authorities, expressions against other (non-
formal) authorities, and stances towards the current law. The three subtypes are expressed 
through a) documents (material resource), and b) negotiations and confrontations (non-
material resources).	
 
5.2.3.1. Expressions Against Formal Authorities 
 
During the last decade of the nineteenth century and up to before the First World War, the 
Italian state made more or less successful efforts towards democracy, whereas the Southern 
question remained both vague and real. Nevertheless, when the Great War began, the deep 
inner division provoked two postures among Italian politicians regarding whether to 
participate or not in the war. Among those who agreed with military involvement was Benito 
Mussolini, who promoted one of the first nationalist discourses in Italy in the twentieth 
century. In May 1915, Italy signed an agreement with London stating that, in case of winning, 
the regions of Trentino, Alto Adige and Trieste (which belonged then to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire) would become Italian (Irimiás, 2014). In the Italian commanders´	mind, 
nationalism and unification were the keywords during the war. In this regard, the Southern 
question was not an issue during war times and, thus, given for granted inside the unification 
discourse. However, when the war ended, winning territories stopped being the priority, and 
the task was now to promote unification by improving the central government 
commandment. 	
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Mussolini found on CN in particular and mafias in general, his main enemy to that purpose 
(Woodiwiss, 2017, 247). That was the first time that CN faced the formal authority as an 
enemy. The “Mori-operation”	carried out in Sicily by the fascist Italian government after the 
First World War was the first and perfect example in this regard. In charge of Cesare Mori, 
also known as the “Iron Prefect”	due to his iron-fisted actions against CN in Sicily, this 
operation intended to undermine the mafia´s authority publicly: mafiosi were aggressively 
captured, their families held as hostages, and their possessions sold at ridiculously low prices. 
As a consequence, around 450 mafiosi arrests were carried out all around the island, as well 
as countless violent intimidations (Dickie, 2015, 272). The political legitimacy game was 
indeed being played but mostly through the violence and fear arenas. However, as discussed 
before, this game not only concerns the agents disputing legitimacy but also the audiences of 
that legitimacy interest. This case was not the exception. When the Second World War 
started, Mussolini's regime turned his sight again to the North and, by doing so, gave breath 
to the "Southern question". 	
 
For CN, this meant a rest from the repressive fascist dictatorship that lasted for decades given 
the fail of fascism during the war. Scholars of mafia identify this mafia comeback as a sort 
of resurrection that, indeed, also shaped the mafia´s most violent version in Italian history 
(Dickie, 2015; Schneider, 2018). Democracy also returned eventually but, before, the war's 
aftermath brought the Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories (AMGOT) to 
Sicily. The AMGOT was a transitory governing body mainly commanded by the United 
States and the United Kingdom and mostly implemented in the Axis countries. At 1943, after 
the Husky Operation (code name for the military operation Allied Invasion of Sicily) 
launched, the Allies invaded Sicily and installed the AMGOT that lasted until February of 
1944. Despite apparently being a short time, the AMGOT period served as a transitory stage 
from which mafia took advantage to recover political relevance. Almost from its ashes, 
mafiosi quickly resumed, in the devastation of the Allied government and the people in the 
war-devastated streets.68	
 
Under the AMGOT administration, the foreign authorities faced many difficulties in 
establishing order. As a British former police officer and member of Sicily´s AMGOT 
contingent described the situation after landing in Syracuse, in the Southeastern part of the 
island: "Apart from being told that we were to endeavor to re-establish the civil 
administration, particularly the police, in areas captured by the Allies, and to liaise between 
the Allied Forces and the public, we had received neither pre-training nor directives of any 
 68 Among the mafia studies, the notion of intreccio is close to the “hinge”	idea and, somehow, attempts to tackle 
these cases. Translated as "interweaving", it refers to corrupt scenarios in which mafia involves its political or 
economic interests into the public authorities´	agenda (Schneider and Schneider, 2003, 18; Rakopoulos, 2018, 
184). However, this idea restricts the action to pragmatic corruption; on the contrary, understanding mafia as a 
hinge presumes to take these actions beyond towards a political legitimacy interest.	
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kind on the type of work we were expected to carry out" (Rawlings, 1987, 35). Although the 
destruction, mafiosi knew the field and the codes and were indeed prepared to do the job. 
After observing to what extent AMGOT officers and mafiosi became intimate to establish 
local law and order, Sicilians withdrew their confidence from AMGOT (Dickie, 2015, 323). 
Nevertheless, instead of playing against the mafia's interest, this output was utterly 
convenient for the criminal group in order to restore their mandate. On the other hand, the 
new Italian democratic era would sooner or later have to face how to deal with the mafia´s 
return, and its power increasing. Henceforth, especially within the two immediate postwar 
decades, CN´s power became more and more effective all-around Sicily. This process 
implied widespread violence and, as a reaction, a heterogeneous anti-mafia movement 
emerged shaping also the local legitimacy panorama.	
 
Some of the anti-mafia members should be considered as “other non-formal authorities”	(and, 
thus, analyzed in the coming section. However, some others were legal and official 
authorities and, hence, needs to be analyzed since they belong to the CN’s stance against 
formal authorities. This is the case of Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, whose names 
and faces can be currently found all around Palermo in particular and Sicily in general – as a 
matter of fact, Palermo´s airport was named Aeroporto Falcone Borsellino. Very close to 
Palermo´s port, in the corner of the principal avenue Via Cala and the small alley Via Mura 
della Lupa a big mural is featured with a picture of Falcone and Borsellino together. Made 
by the photojournalist Tony Gentile in March of 1992, the shot portrays two smiling 
accomplices. Are these two judges, assassinated by the mafia, the strongest anti-mafia 
symbol? The question is certainly hard to answer.  However, Falcone and Borsellino have 
indeed become a symbol that unites almost all of the anti-mafia sectors, and a representation 
of the general stand against the mafia. 	
 
Their historic weight is especially relevant in terms of legitimacy because, on the one hand, 
their death condensed years of the anti-mafia fight which, eventually, undermined CN´s 
legitimacy; and on the other, their symbolism works as an actual civil society power that 
threatens any political legitimacy chance for the mafia currently. Both Falcone and Borsellino 
were born in Palermo, in 1939 and 1940 respectively. Their careers inside the Sicilian judicial 
field brought them to closely work with Rocco Chinnici, an anti-mafia judge. Rocco was one 
of the first inside the Sicilian legal system in understanding a legitimacy aura around the 
mafia. Therefore, Chinnici looked for public support to the anti-mafia cause by leaving his 
office at Palermo's Justice Palace and attending schools and public events to speak about 
anti-mafia and, of course, about mafia (Dickie, 2014, 606). His assassination in 1983 in a car 
bomb by mafiosi caused public commotion. To some extent, Falcone and Borsellino were 
inspired by Chinnici’s example and promoted justice against the mafia from a broader space 
that was not limited to courts, but which began and finished precisely at courts. According 
to Santoro, three new actors joined the arena of Mafia studies during the eighties and 
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increased knowledge of the the phenomenon: the historians, the judges, and the pentiti (2011, 
13). Falcone and Borsellino were fundamental in the inclusion of the latter two.	
 
During the nineteen-eighties, Falcone and Borsellino lead the first and emblematic Sicilian 
Pool Anti-Mafia. Together with other magistrates and judicial men, the pool boosted the 
greatest anti-mafia legal achievements in the twentieth century: the Maxiprocesso (Maxi 
Trial). The relevance of the Poll and the Maxi Trial was the success that both had in taking 
CN out of the shadows, pointing them out as culprits of Sicily´s security and violence, and 
questioning the criminal group's authority, including their practices as pizzo. Held between 
1985 and 1986, the Maxi Trial collected legal evidence against Mafiosi thanks to Tommaso 
Buscetta´s witness declarations. As the very first official pentito, Buscetta´s declarations 
were the first to be heard by the Sicilian judicial system.69 These helped Falcone to launch 
the Maxi Trial by collecting data from the first hand, but also implied to definitely confirmed 
CN existence, which for some was still considered as a myth. The Maxi Trial made use of a 
relevant legal changed happened years before. Only days after General dalla Chiesa´s 
assassination, a substantial law change related to mafia prosecution was approved into the 
penal code. Pio La Torre and Virginio Rognoni promoted and achieved the urgent 
approbation of those projects of law that each of them proposed in the Italian parliament.70	
 
Leaded by Falcone, the Anti-mafia Pool achieved to detect CN members participating in the 
so-called French Connection (the drug trafficking scheme through which tons of heroin was 
smuggled from Turkey to the United States and passing by Marseille, in France, and Canada), 
as well as in the Pizza Connection (a judicial investigation conducted in the United States by 
the DEA and FBI, through which was found that millions of dollars from heroin selling were 
laundered through pizza parlors owned by CN members) (Chepesiuk, 1999, 105-108). 
However, based on Buscetta´s confessions, the Pool finally arrested 366 mafiosi during 
September of 1984. More than three years later, in December of 1987, the verdict indicated 
life imprisonment for nineteen CN members including Riina, and other shorter sentences as 
well as 114 absolutions (Dickie, 2015, 638). Nevertheless, the Maxi Trial success did not 
only rest on the penalties but also in how the structure was uncovered mainly thanks to many 
conversations between Falcone and Buscetta.	
 
Falcone and Borsellino assassinations by CN are the only expression registered against them. 
On May 23, 1992, as Falcone and his wife were coming back to Palermo, hundreds of 
kilograms of explosives that had been installed by mafia on the highway detonated. The 
explosion caused their death, as well as other police officers that were accompanying 
 69 More than a decade before, in 1973, Leonardo Vitale also confessed and became the very first pentito. 
However, judges did not take his words seriously by adducing madness. Due to that, all the alleged by Vitale 
were declared innocent.	70 The already referred Rognoni-La Torre law resulted from this process. Falcone and Borsellino participated 
in its design whose legal relevance helped changing how the legal prosecution against mafia was made.	
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Falcone. The attack was executed by the "man of honor" Giovanni Brusca. Less than two 
months later, on July 19, Borsellino was also assassinated. A car bomb parked outside his 
mother´s house exploded and caused his death together with bodyguards and police officers 
that were accompanying him. Riina ordered both attacks. And, of course, both had a 
legitimacy intention, which was to publicly display that mafia´s power was still valid, no 
matter if it was by violent means. Currently, former offices of Falcone and Borsellino, inside 
Palermo´s Justice Palace work as a museum in which it is explained how and with which 
resources (technological, political and judicial) they did fight mafia. Inside Falcone´s office, 
a big wooden shelf shelters the several original Maxi Trial folders. Besides, on his desk, there 
is a package of the favorite Falcone´s cigarettes. The symbolism of those rooms draws a 
before and after in Sicily´s modern history.	
 
Finally, in recent times, the Palermo mayor Leoluca Orlando became one of the last 
representative examples of CN´s formal authority enemy.71 Orlando is a Sicilian politician 
who was Palermo´s mayor from 1985 to 1990, later from 1993 to 2000, and also currently 
since the 2012 elections. Moreover, he has also been elected to the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies as well as the European Parliament. Since his first electoral victory, Orlando held 
an openly anti-mafia discourse, which has also been coherent with his mandates. Although 
his many controversies with the parties opposition as well as with civil society members, he 
is still being recognized for the legacy of honesty anti-mafia fight that he had been building 
for decades. "At least he is indeed honest", said a Sicilian NGO member (Interview in field 
no. 13, 2018). At 2001, Orlando published Fighting the Mafia and Renewing Sicilian Culture, 
a sort of memoirs that also reviewed Sicily´s transition towards the twenty-first century. In 
the first line of the Prologue, he stated: "It was June of 1999 when Palermo finally ceased to 
be a Third World city –a city of which a French traveler in the previous century justly said 
that 'even the lemon and orange blossoms smell of corpses'- and became a great European 
city at last" (2001, 1). 	
 
According to Orlando, 1999 was the first year with no mafia-related murders (and only eleven 
in total). Hence, on the summer of that year he felt a “[…] survivor´s special guilt, and also 
a survivor´s unique responsibility: to tell the story as it happened”	(2001, 2 and 8). Palermo 
and Sicily´s success, argued Orlando, is due to a civic conscious change towards improving 
 71 Another example in this regard is Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa, General Division at the Italian Carabinieri. At 
1982, dalla Chiesa became the Palermo prefect and the coordinator of a national anti-mafia campaign. His 
appointment symbolized the “State’s desire to present a strong public anti-mafia posture, so was his 
assassination an assertion [from mafia] of utter disrespect for that effort”	(Schneider and Schneider, 2003, 100). 
General dalla Chiesa fought against the red brigades, a Marxist-Leninist Italian armed organization. As a result 
of his successful work, dalla Chiesa was later appointed as anti-mafia coordinator in Italy. His appointment as 
Palermo prefect, in charge of stop mafia violence in the whole Sicily, lasted only a bit more than four months. 
On the night of September 3, 1982, a “man of honor”	murdered dalla Chiesa and his wife inside his car. 
According to journalistic reports, the assassination was ordered by Salvatore “Totò”	Riina, former CN´s capo 
di tutti i capi (Verdú, 2017).	
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a culture of lawfulness. Mass media, culture, education, and urbanism were the four channels 
through which the strategy did run, he argued. Nowadays, Orlando has switched his agenda 
towards a new topic: support the migrants coming mostly from Africa (van der Zee, 2017). 
Geographically, Sicily has become relevant not only for the migration coming from Africa 
to Italy but also to the whole of Europe. According to a Palermitan magistrate, countless 
boats with refugees and migrants, in general, are currently arriving in Malta. However, given 
this island's small size, the easiest and almost exclusive option is to get afterward into Sicily 
(Interview in field no. 4, 2018). Together with NGO´s, Orlando has led a campaign to cancel 
the residence permit, the paperwork that any Non-European citizen needs in order to legally 
stay within the Schengen space. The battle is open. However, in the meantime, migration has 
been changing Sicilian public space, including the mafia and its legitimacy expectations.72	
 
5.2.3.2. Expressions Against Other (Informal) Authorities  
 
After the Second World War, and as a result of the more and more clear mafia presence, little 
by little a new agent took part in the Sicilian political legitimacy landscape, i.e., the Sicilian 
anti-mafia movement. During the second half of the twentieth century, the anti-mafia 
emerged as a platform to challenge CN´s authority, mainly built out from a left political 
identity (Schneider and Schneider, 2001, 431). During the nineteenth fifties and sixties, 
specific individuals and small groups promoted anti-mafia actions. However, as a movement, 
it started to become much more expanded and organized during the seventies and onwards. 
Hence, increasing its work and structure meant also increasing effectiveness in disputing 
legitimacy against the mafia. Initially atomized, the anti-mafia movement eventually became 
more organized in spite of its heterogeneity. As said earlier, some of the anti-mafia members 
belong to the official authorities, while many non-state actors shape the rest of this anti-mafia 
movement. The specter includes NGO´s such as Addiopizzo and Libera; think tanks 
 72 Based on the data collected, two argumentative lines concerning how CN and migration come together were 
detected during this research. First, no relation has been observed between the two phenomena. Since no 
criminal records had already associated some link between migrants and mafia, then no elements prove neither 
of the associative possibilities (Interview in field no. 4, 2018). The second line points to suggest that CN and 
migrants are indeed related. Within this line, migrants appear both as the new local mob as well as victims of 
several crimes –threats, prostitution, extortion, human trafficking, and etcetera (Varese, 2017, 39-47). Three 
paths are opened up in this regard: Confrontation, collaboration, and complication. As confrontation, Vice News 
reported that Nigerian gangs in Sicily (especially one called Black Axe) might be either challenging or 
competing with CN mostly in drug and human trafficking (Modarressy-Tehrani and Dedman, 2017). Vice News 
made public a video in which two CN bosses’ debate on how to control Black Axe.  On the other hand, as 
collaboration, The Guardian reported that an unusual collaboration between CN and Nigerian mafias was taking 
place in Palermo´s streets (Tondo, 2016). Finally, as complication, this hypothetical scenario suggests that 
migration and CN are not related with migrants and refugees except as for victims, which might be making 
things difficult for CN. Although Sicilian criminal groups, Italian or Nigerian, did find already business 
opportunities in migrants’	disgrace, since most of the migrants come from difficult backgrounds in which 
violence and threats are common, then mob´s threats impact find higher resistance from migrants (Latza 
Nadeau, 2018). Moreover, on the contrary to locals, these people arriving in Sicily do not carry with the cultural 
and historical fear to the mafia, which makes CN to improve intimidation, and, somehow, legitimacy tactics –
this scenario seems to be particularly happening with specific crimes such as pizzo (Varese, 2017, 37-38).	
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dedicated o mafia studies such as the Centro Siciliano di Documentazione "Giuseppe 
Impastato"; and journalists as Pino Maniaci and its broadcasting media Telejato. For 
Sicilians, realize to experiencing public life beyond and without mafia is possible, becomes 
an incentive that in the end delegitimizes mafia.	
 
After the Second World War, the confrontation between mafiosi and local civilians became 
violently explicit. Hence, implicitly, it meant to recognize the hostility, antagonism and, thus, 
enmity. For mafia, violence was the common denominator for answering the anti-mafia 
challenges. This practice became an involuntary manner of portraying mafia´s enemies. 
Hence, following the silence and discretion code, CN never spoked publicly about their 
“enemies”	except for intimidating them and, usually, materially eliminating them. Giuseppe 
Impastato, a Palermitan journalist and activist also known as “Peppino”, was possibly one of 
the first CN non-formal authority's enemies. He was the son of a uomo di onore (Italian for 
“man of honor”, which is the euphemism for mafioso). However, during his adolescence, 
Peppino turned ideologically leftist, broke up with his family, and became an anti-mafia 
activist. At 1977, Peppino created Radio Aut, an independent streaming radio through which 
mafia activities were publicly condemned, which naturally might provoke dislike from CN 
since the criminal group was being pointed as a social harm. CN´s legitimacy, impunity, and 
mandate might be at stake as a result of Peppino´s work. A year later, he did run for the 
municipal elections of Cinisi, in Sicily. However, in May of that year, dynamite on the train 
rails provoked Peppino´s death. Initially, the official authority (allegedly corrupted by the 
mafia) did not blame CN. However, his death moved civilians (including his mother and 
brother) to investigate the crime, who helped to prove the mafia´s responsibility (Varese, 
2017, 207). As Cavadi pointed out, Peppino´s case exhibits two complications of the mafia´s 
conceptualization: 1) borders (how to trace where does mafia ends and formal authority 
begins), 2) agency (mafia a social actor and mafia as social system that structures social 
order): 	
 
[Peppino´s case show that] it became impossible to separate the condemnation of mafia (as a system) 
from the contrast with mafia (as subjects). It is relatively easy to write books or launch proclamations 
or hold rallies against the mafia (in a generic, absent, anonymous sense); but it is another matter to be 
critically related to this or that mafia member with name, surname, and address. For Peppino the mafia 
had a face, indeed dozens of faces: the face of the father, of uncles, of neighbors, of family 
friends...Distinguish, in each of them, the human dimension [...] from the social role of the mafia [...] 
is really challenging (2018, 43).	
 
Another emblematic case of expression against a non-formal authority, was Giusseppe 
Puglisi´s assassination, also by a CN uomo di onore. On September 15, 1993, the Catholic 
priest Puglisi was assassinated outside his home in Palermo. Pino, as he was known, became 
a sort of anti-mafia priest. His work focused on Brancaccio, a Palermitan neighborhood close 
to the central train station allegedly under mafia control. Puglisi was brave enough to spoke 
loud against mafia during the liturgy during a time and place in which that might literally 
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imply a life risk. Moreover, aside of breaking the silence on mafia through sermons and 
homilies, he also opposed to letting mafiosi lead the processions, Catholic festivities and 
rituals with great relevance for the local people – more about this will be analyzed later. 
Probably, his most visible work was done for children. He rescued children from the streets 
by giving them new chances, and worked to change their mind on Mafiosi, often seen as idols 
(Corvaia, 2012, 60). Pino was murdered on his 56th birthday. A “man of honor”, Salvatore 
Grigoli, shot him once and years later would confess the crime as well as reveal Pino´s last 
words: “I was expecting you”, words that inspired Marco Corvaia´s book title: Pino se lo 
aspettava (Pino was expecting it). Twenty years later, in 2013, Pope Francis beatified Pino, 
who became a martyr. Currently, his tomb inside Palermo´s cathedral is an important symbol 
for the anti-mafia catholic congregation. Violence against pentiti needs to be considered as 
part of the mafia´s portrayal of its enemies. Indeed, most of the cases suffered aggressive and 
spectacular violence addressed directly to the pentito´s families (Moss, 2001, 327). As a 
performance, that violence was intended to send a message to current and potential traitors 
that could affect the organization’s interests. Fernando dalla Chiesa is one of the most 
prominent leaders and minds promoting anti-mafia and son of one of the general dalla Chiesa. 
In his text called Manifesto dell´	Antimafia, he stated that the manuscript drafting was:	
 
[…] born close to and due to these considerations. From the conviction that the fight against the mafia: 
a) is not only or above all a question of magistrates and forces of order; b) it is not a phenomenon that 
directly concerns only three or four regions of Italy; c) cannot consist only in a peaceful and painless 
process of future generations legality education; d) nor can it be exhausted in the complaint”	(2014, 
IX). 	
 
Finally, migration and specifically Nigerian gangs in Palermo and operating throughout 
Sicily´s ports might become (or possibly already are) another potential non-formal enemy for 
CN. To what extent these newly arrived gangs may become an enemy is an ongoing process. 
However, in case of being so, the dispute will definitely happen through the clash of 
sovereign practices. As Varese stated: "The most worrying element for the Sicilian mafia is 
the arrival in Palermo of foreigners, who question the territorial sovereignty of CN, do not 
respect the rules and in some cases are willing to confront the local mafia" (Varese, 2017, 
45). Indeed, violence might become a potential output from that possible clash. Given that 
the control of those sovereign practices is in the middle of the dispute, two scenarios might 
pop up in terms of enemy portraying. First, as part of a collaboration scheme, if both criminal 
groups act as homogeneous illegal agents, hence an outcome might be violence addressed 
against CN enemies or people who threaten their authority in general. On the other hand, 
under a confrontation scheme, the result might be more widespread violence in Sicily – at 
least until any local agent, including of course the government, recover the sovereign 
practices exercise.	
 
5.2.3.3. Stances Towards Current Law 
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In Sicily´s capital city, Palermo, the twenty-first century started with the celebration of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The convention started 
in November and, by December the document was already finished and ready to be signed 
by the parties. “With the signing [...] the international community demonstrated the political 
will to answer a global challenge with a global response. If crime crosses borders, so must 
law enforcement", said Kofi A. Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations in 
the document´s foreword (2000, iv). The symbolism of celebrating in Palermo was relevant 
for the locals. Sixteen years later, at 2016, both local and national governments signed the 
Pact for Palermo, through which millions of euros were invested in infrastructure projects 
for the city. Later, at 2018, Palermo was declared the Italian capital of culture. This is 
consequence of how CN have been standing towards the current law since the late nineties 
to nowadays. The CN code during the Mori operation was to hide from the authoritarianism. 
Later, impunity became the stand towards the law since the Second World War and until the 
Maxi Trial. However, afterward, the equation changed the power balance, and CN became 
shady again. Authoritarianism is not anymore the law but the effective rule of law.  	
 
The literature on criminal groups, organized crime, and the mafia has continually dealt with 
understanding how these phenomena and the political system come together (Vanucci, 2015; 
Dino, 2015). Are authoritarianism and totalitarianism regimes that inhibit the creation or 
consolidation of criminal groups? Is democracy fertile ground for the emergence of these 
groups?  Although these questions will not be addressed here, taking a look at the Italian 
experience under Mussolini´s government might be helpful for that discussion. Unlike the 
previous democratic efforts, since fascism took power in Italy the victories against mafia 
were more evident than ever before. As Dickie pointed out, since Mussolini declared himself 
as the dictator, in 1925, the southern question became solved through straightly fighting the 
criminal organizations and, at the time, gave him the perfect enemy to defeat and forge the 
nation (2015, 272). As it is expected from a dictatorship, quickly in the story, severe and 
violent punishments were carried out in order to dismantle any other power that challenged 
the central government, as the mafia did. Organically, Sicily became the first battlefield.	
 
According to the Palermitan NGO member’s words, Palermo is currently a “safe place”, in 
which although the existence of CN, being a victim of violent crime is becoming less and 
less possible: “When we work in the streets at night paying stickers […] we know that for 
sure, if something happens, there will be like [police] helicopters and cars [for taking care of 
us]”	(Interview in field no. 14, 2018). According to the United Nations, the number of mafia-
type homicides in Italy decreased almost 80% between 1992 and 2012 (UNODC, 2014). 
Massari calculated this decrease by the criminal group and her data showed that CN 
homicides went from 152 in 1992 to only 10 in 2010 (Massari, 2013, 83). The percentage 
decrease in this case is of 93.4%. Compared to the other Italian criminal groups, CN 
experienced the more significant reduction in this regard: ´Ndrangeta´s decrease in the same 
period was of 54.7%, Camorra of 85.7%, the Sacra Corona Unita (a smaller criminal group 
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in the Southern region of Apulia) is of 66.6%, and the total decrease including CN´s numbers 
is of 80.3%, such as UNODC calculations including up to 2012 (own calculations based on 
Massari´s data). 	
 
Compared to what the seventies and eighties showed, the change in fatal violence cases is 
evident. However, as Massari herself stated in her chapter, “Murder is the paradigmatic 
expression of mafia power”	 (2013, 83). Thus, other non-pragmatic expressions still 
happening already that are also relevant in order to make an analysis of the current legitimacy 
conditions. Which are those expressions and how to detect them in order to do a political 
legitimacy analysis? What is currently the role of mafia violence for either recover or 
consolidate a mafia mandate? Indeed, Palermo and Sicily in general had gone through a 
significant public life transformation based on improving their justice procuration and 
administration, as well as through shocking moments –as a consequence of emblematic 
victims such as Falcone and Borsellino, but also as a result of the big picture consequences. 
According to Varese, 557 fugitives were captured in Sicily between 1992 and 2006, a figure 
that illustrate the prosecution hard work (2017, 35). However, beyond police and courts, 
another transformation occurs, i.e., that one happening in the streets that shaped the rise of 
the so-called “civil society”.	
 
To some degree, the current century has been the background in which Sicilian civil society 
crystalized. In 2017, The Guardian categorized Palermo as a resilient city, i.e., capable of 
healing and recovery. Palermo, it was argued, moved from being a mafia battlefield to 
cultural capital, referring to the Italian capital of culture award (Tondo, 2017). As a social 
change, it was the result of a consecution of forces switching several conditions, including 
the legitimacy setting	 —	 for instance, how Sicilian civil society promotes anti-mafia 
professionally through a constellation of both professional and sustainable NGOs, including 
Libera and Addiopizzo. The former was born "[...] with the purpose of involving and 
supporting all those who are interested in the fight against mafias and organized crime", 
through these commitments: [...] the law on the social re-use of assets that have been 
confiscated from organized crime; the education of democratic lawfulness promotion; the 
fight against corruption; the camps for anti-mafia education; the support of victims of the 
mafia and their families; the campaigns promoting social justice policies; and the projects on 
jobs, development, and anti-usury activities" (Libera, no-date).	
 
Generally speaking, the strategy of CN towards the enemy as well as towards the current law 
has been not making public stands against them. On the contrary, CN´s enemies (including 
the anti-mafia) have systematically pointed out mafiosi as the enemy (Dalla Chiesa, 2014; 
Vaccaro, 2012). In other words, we can speak about CN´s enemies because their enemies 
have spoken loudly. Speaking loudly and publicly about the mafia became a strategy that the 
anti-mafia followed to challenge the violent reaction that CN experienced during the nineteen 
eighties and nineties. At least in Palermo, people now speak about the mafia; different from 
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the CN, which now has adopted a strategy of silence in order to go unnoticed (Interview in 
field no. 4, 2018). Io ricordo (I remember), is a documentary released in Sicily in 2008. 
Produced by the “Progetto Legalità”	Foundation and directed by Ruggero Gabbai, the movie 
is a trip through Sicilian mafia violence from the victim´s perspective. In the film, a father 
tells his small son about mafia violence consequences in Palermo. The narration is almost 
pedagogic, taking the kid on a journey through the emblematic places and people of 
Palermo´s anti-mafia community, along with interviews with victims´	relatives.	
 
At some point, while the man tells the boy about how the pool anti-mafia created the files for 
launching the Maxi process, he abruptly stops and asks the kid: "Gelato?"; the boy, who 
wears a t-shirt with "It´s not about being a winner. It´s about being a champion", quickly 
answers: "Yes, but keep telling me the story, papa" (Gabbai, 2008). The anti-mafia movement 
has for decades been pushing towards portraying a public image of who and what the mafia 
is while attempting to fight it through education and justice. Io ricordo is a relevant example 
in this regard. As a "portrayal of the enemy" strategy, whereas CN portrays their enemies 
almost exclusively through committing violence against them (either discrete or scandalous), 
anti-mafia chooses an educational strategy based on speaking out against the mafia. By doing 
so, the anti-mafia also forced CN to implicitly take a stand and portray mafia´s enemies as 
well. Currently, Palermo´s primary use the film in order to teach the students about mafia, 
anti-mafia, as well as a speaking-out strategy: by talking about it, both on the streets and in 
the schools, a path through which mafia´s authority might become undermined opens 
(Interview in field no. 13, 2018).	
 
5.3. Across Legitimacy Sources and Resources: La Festa di Sant´Agata 
 
Francisco de Zurbarán, painter during the Spanish Golden Century, created "Santa Águeda" 
between 1630 and 1633. The painting represents the image of this Catholic woman saint, 
Águeda or Agatha, standing with a sober expression while holding her breasts on a tray. This 
iconography alludes to the martyrdom lived by Agatha during the torture that killed her, in 
the third century AD. Allegedly, she rejected Quintianus, the Sicilian proconsul under 
Decio´s Roman Empire. Agatha had already offered her virginity to Jesus Christ and defender 
herself until her death (Kissin, 1992, 20-21). Quintianus ordered her torture that consisted, 
among other things, of cutting off her breasts. After Agatha´s death, the Mt. Etna volcano 
located in the Sicilian town of Catania, exploded. The lava did not enter the city, and the 
miracle was attributed to Agatha, who became the Saint patron of Catania – as well as for 
breast cancer patients, among others due to the breast reference (Kissin, 1992, 19). Since 
centuries ago, around February 5 is celebrated her memorial at Catania, an eastern-maritime 
town in Sicily. Saint Agatha´s procession planning lasts months and, as the second most 
massive Catholic procession in the world (only after the Holy Week in Seville, Spain), it is 
and has been the Catania celebration (Merlino, 2014, 120).	
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5.3.1. The Sicilian Mafia and Catholic Processions 
 
How did the mafia and specifically CN become related to Saint Agatha and her procession? 
Moreover, what is the criminal political legitimacy interest behind the ritual? During the last 
decade, Italian, Sicilian, and foreigner press reported that, according to the local prosecution, 
CN controlled the whole ritual preparations and execution between 1999 and 2005 (Staff 
Proceso, 2010; EFE, 2008). The Sicilian mafia decided who was the organizing coordinator, 
the procession´s route, coordinated public vendors, organized the fireworks spectacle, etc. 
As a consequence, as it is argued here, this relation runs across the three sources of legitimacy 
that are studied here. Specifically, even when all the Italian criminal groups have become 
related to religion through different manners (always Catholic or, at least, Christian), Saint 
Agatha´s rite at Catania is a representative example of how a single phenomenon becomes 
involved into and across all the criminal groups sources and resources political legitimacy 
analyzed in this research. Granting public services; promoting belonging and cohesiveness; 
displaying public messages; spreading images and identities as well as rituals, moral beliefs 
and religiosity; providing taxation by asking pizzo and regulating labor; offering leisure 
events and gifting; creating fear and, finally, standing against formal authorities. All of these 
are material and non-material criminal resources of legitimacy that CN performed through 
Saint Agatha´s procession.	
 
Indeed, historically Italian mafias have been constantly related to Catholicism through 
different paths (Merlino, 2014; Dino, 2008).73 According to the pentito Calderone, the image 
of the Virgin of the Annunciation is used for CN´s punciuta´s rite. In Gli uomini del disonore. 
The Sicilian mafia nella vita of the great pentito Antonino Calderone, by Pino Arlacchi, cited 
by Deborah Puccio-Den, this ritual, which took place in 1962 in Catania, is recounted by 
Calderone himself: “Uncle Peppino asked Calderone: ‘With what hand do you throw?’	and 
then he poked with a pin of hook the index finger of the hand that Calderone had indicated 
him, in order to spill some drops of his blood on a small sacred image. It was the Virgin of 
the Annunciation, the patroness of the Cosa Nostra”	 (Calderone quoted by Arlacchi in 
Puccio-Den, 2011, 311). The Madonna dell'Annunciazione has been also associated as CN´s 
patron saint (Merlino, 2014, 118). Another pentito, Leonardo Messina, confessed how he 
was responsible of organizing the procession of Our Lady of the Annunciation. He also 
narrated how he walked next to the saint during the procession and also confessed 
sarcastically that there was no way in which the priest did not realize that CN was organizing 
it (Dino, 2008; Merlino, 2014, 118).	
 
 73 Across all the possibilities in which both agents have been related, collaboration, submission, victimization, 
and confrontation are representative examples. Regarding the confrontation, only until 1993 (the same year in 
which the priest Giuseppe Puglisi was murdered) Pope John Paul II claimed to mafiosi for their crimes during 
discourses precisely pronounced at Sicily; while on June of 2014, Pope Francis excommunicate all mafiosi.	
	187 
When it comes to religiosity, the Sicilian case needs to address how CN and Catholicism 
interweave (Dino, 2008). From a political legitimacy perspective, it produces both pragmatic 
and ideological syncretism. Pragmatically, CN attempts to embody the moral capital and 
authority that the Catholic institution and faith have within a Catholic society such as Sicily. 
On the other hand, ideologically, CN embraces Catholic beliefs and uses them as a source 
for promoting practices through which validates their internal and external practices. 
Initiation rituals are examples that condense that syncretism. While it has the pragmatic 
function of reinforcing authority, it also makes use of Catholic symbols worshiped by mafiosi 
(Melino, 2011, 67). Saints are already legitimate symbols useful for CN, who attempts to 
borrow or transfer veneration to the criminal organization. Catholic processions are also great 
examples in this regard. As well-rooted centennial rituals, to control them meant to acquire 
or reinforce authority. Nevertheless, the mafia also shows respect to the saint and ritual. By 
doing so, CN looks to borrow or transfer the locals' respect and devotion to the symbols 
(already legitimate) towards them.74	
 
Dino argued that, after the Falcone and Borsellino assassinations in 1992, the Sicilian mafia 
entered into a crisis due to local discredit. When Provenzano led the organization, CN saw in 
religion a platform through which to change its bad reputation. Religiosity, she argued, “[…] 
gives identity and strength to criminal organizations”	(Dino quoted by Staff Proceso, 2010). 
During the procession of 2004 at Catania, the fercolo that contains Saint Agatha´s relics 
stopped in front of the house of Catania´s mafia boss Giuseppe Magnion, who left the jail 
days before, and stayed there for a few minutes. Fireworks were thrown during that stop. 
Moreover, undercover agents photographed members of Santapaola´s family next to the 
fercolo carrying the reliquary casket that later seated in the front lines during the mass at 
Catania´s cathedral (Melino, 2014, 122; Dino, 2008, 29). According to journalistic reports, 
Santapaola´s members are CN´s representation at Catania (Staff La Razón, 2008). Why did 
CN attempt to control Saint Agatha´s festivities? Any analysis needs to consider how, as a 
public power display, it also influenced the criminal group´s identity.	
 
5.3.2. Saint Agatha´s Procession: 2019 Edition 
 
Currently, Saint Agatha´s procession works as a politically disputed field. Furthermore, Saint 
Agatha´s symbolism operates as a holistic legitimacy resource through which political 
disputes between local agents take place. The 2019 edition of the procession lasted more than 
a month, from January 2 to February 12. Nevertheless, the main activities took place from 
February 3 to 5. In the first, the procession for l´offerta della cera (the offer of wax) (see 
Picture 11 in the Appendix). The next day was Aurora´s mass as well as the Giro esterno 
 74 In this regard, Merlino argued: "Evidence suggests that the practice of financing, organizing and performing 
a central role in religious processions in honor of local patron saints has occurred throughout the history of the 
organization [CN]" (2014, 109).	
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(external tour), in which Saint Agatha´s relics went around the outside neighborhoods in the 
city, a rainy day that made it slow. Finally, the great mass took place at 10 am with Saint 
Agatha´s image at Cathedral´s dais (see Picture 12). After the mass ended, the time for the 
Giro interno (internal tour) came. This could be considered one of the most, if not the most 
relevant moment during the whole procession, i.e., the time when Saint Agatha´s relics went 
out of the Cathedral and traveled through via Etnea, the main Catania´s downtown street. 
However, things went particularly different during the 2019 edition.	
 
A few meters after going out of the Cathedral, the fercolo stopped. An enormous number of 
devotees were surrounding it, while also the security cordon was broke, and crowds were 
across the path in which Saint Agatha´s was supposed to walk through. After minutes of 
confusion and chaos, Claudio Consoli, the capo-vara (the chief of the procession 
coordination staff), ordered to come back to Cathedral. The decision turned the situation even 
more troubled. A man yelled at Consoli: “Pagliaccio!”, “Buffone!”	(Clown), whereas during 
the live streaming, a commentator for the local TV qualified the decision as sad but fair 
"mostly due to security [conditions]". "Is a sad and sour epilogue", replied her colleague, 
"Sour but fair", she insisted. "This is a truly complicated moment, a very hard one!" replied 
another commentator. Only one thing became clear: there were no conditions to keep walking 
and, thus, comply with the ascending towards Saint Julian church. The giro interno would 
not be complete this year. After coming back to Cathedral, and in the middle of confusion, 
Monsignor Barbaro Scionti who remained standing on the fercolo during the chaos, took the 
microphone and said:	
 
In il nome del Padre, del Figlio, e dello Spirito Santo. Dobbiamo fare una preghiera di riparazione, 
perché	quello che è	avvenuto è	molto grave. I devoti di Sant’Agata, con Sant’Agata, non sono ostaggio 
di nessuno. I devoti di Sant’Agata sono per Sant’Agata [...] Cari delinquenti, perché	di questo si tratta, 
cari delinquenti, siete soli e isolati. Adesso fate silenzio perché	 dobbiamo pregare. Questa e la 
risposta.	
---	
In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. We must make a prayer of reparation, because 
what has happened is very serious. The devotees of Saint Agatha, with Saint Agatha, are not hostage 
to anyone. Saint Agatha devotees are for Saint Agatha [...] Dear delinquents, because this is what it is 
about, dear delinquents, you are alone and isolated. Do silence because we have to pray. This is the 
answer.	
 
After his speech, the fercolo entered into the church. Indeed, Scionti was somehow not only 
diagnosing what was happening in the middle of the chaos, but also defining accused, 
accusations, and even solutions. Nevertheless, the question remained: who are these 
delinquenti? Was the Monsignor referring to irresponsible devotees that did not behave 
properly and let the procession continue? Was he suggesting a sort of organized plot? Maybe 
both? Mattia Gangi, a local journalist, wrote a column for Catania Today which stated: "With 
that reprimand launched against the "delinquents" […] the church seems to have proposed 
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the ancient question that has always permeated the celebration of Saint Agatha: who takes, 
for real, the decisions within the path? Is it the people and, with it, also the criminal 
organizations or, instead, the authorities of the State, the Committee for the Celebrations and 
the Archdiocese? This is a question which might seem to have been answered by the capo-
vara with his behavior" (2019). Indeed, the references “siete soli”	and “ostaggio” are the 
proof of the existence of a dispute for who has the devotion: between the “delinquents”	and 
the faithful. For this research, Scionti´s words need to be analyzed 1) together with the very 
particular moment in which they were pronounced, 2) as well as considering the procession´s 
history and 3) as part of narrative strategies. 	
 
In this regard, it does not matter if Scionti or Consoli knew who interfered, and why, with 
the procession. It is also irrelevant if those “delinquents”	were a reference to mafiosi. What 
really matters is to realize how the procession receives real and potential challenges, which 
involve how different local agents have been and still interested in having, preserving, or 
challenging the control of the procession. The church, the state, and the mafia have been 
involved in this dilemma in recent Catania history. Emphasizing the aforementioned idea, 
Saint Agatha´s procession is a field in which local political legitimacy becomes challenged. 
The procession has two characteristics that produced this scenario. In the first place, the 
various and potentially confronted agents that have been politically using and currently use 
the rite. And second, the many sources and resources of political legitimacy involved in one 
sole celebration. In the end, by controlling the procession, the agents might obtain a tool 
through which they can display themselves as well as their political presence towards a 
significant audience and together with an already valid and very well appreciated ritual. 
Additionally, as a political tool, the procession is a way to access to how the city is social 
and politically structured and restructured.	
 
5.4. Closing Remarks: Chapter V Summary 
 
After elaborating on the particular CN context and political legitimacy efforts, the following 
are closing remarks derived from this fifth chapter. In the first place, Sicilian CN needs to be 
understood in the historic Italian state-building context. In this regard, certain CN political 
legitimacy practices have been as modern as the Italian state. This centennial accompaniment 
experienced between the official authority and the mafia gives the pattern to explain, if not 
Sicily´s history, at least how CN performed their political legitimacy attempts. Indeed, CN 
did and still participates in the Sicilian social order shaping through contingent and 
systematic sovereignty practices. Besides, rather than a counter-state, this chapter adopted a 
twofold CN definition. First, defined as a criminal group interested in the local social order 
definition. And secondly, defined as a local social system through which power, authority, 
and violence become mediated, i.e., CN as the mafia production of politics source. Moreover, 
this chapter describes how Sicily also became a profoundly and high-density contested 
political legitimacy field. 	
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Especially over the last five decades, Sicily has experienced a dense concentration of political 
agents taking place in the local social order definition. In Sicily, however, although the 
heterogeneous composition of these political agents, many of them joint under the anti-mafia 
claim. As a consequence, CN faced a massive resistance that, in the last decades, undermined 
their political legitimacy specter and capacity. This chapter argued how CN has been going 
and coming from the shades when it comes to their political legitimacy claims. After the First 
World War, the mafia did not appear publicly as a result of the iron-fisted strategy carried 
out by the fascist government. However, after the Second World War, CN made a comeback 
expressed through political legitimacy claims. Consequently, from the sixties until the early 
eighties, Sicilian CN exposed their mandate without more significant resistance. In terms of 
political legitimacy, this promoted a more prominent display of mafia legitimacy. 	
 
However, since the pentiti phenomena, the Maxi Trial and the judicial achievements against 
the mafia, the rest of the nineteen eighties and most of the nineties became decades of 
contestation for political legitimacy. Finally, during the current century years, CN had to 
become shadowy again due to a lack of success precisely in the legitimacy arena against the 
aforementioned anti-mafia movement in Sicily. However, generally speaking, CN´s 
preference for a non-material legitimacy performance is explained because this group spent 
long periods being a local authority rather than trying to become one (1988). Regarding CN 
sources and resources of legitimacy, this criminal group is and has been much more orthodox 
when attempting legitimacy. Orthodoxism is particularly evident in two CN´s legitimacy 
attempts. First, by CN's preference to not appear publicly over becoming publicized in the 
sense of having a public presence, as well as advertised, i.e., spreading identity symbols. 
Finally, the second orthodox feature concerns how CN permanently prioritizes inner 
cohesion over popular support, which in the end is another manner of gaining and using 
legitimacy.	
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Chapter 6.  
Reshaping Crime and (Dis)order: Towards a Comparison 
 
Almond and Verba published The Civic Culture in 1963, one of the first quantitative studies 
to comparatively examine political culture across five countries – the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. While elaborating on the analytical 
advantages of comparison, they argued: “In order to compare political behavior cross-
nationally, one must be able to specify dimensions of political behavior that apply to all the 
systems”, hence, it becomes needed to develop “[…] a means of conceptualizing politics in 
ways that have wide applicability”	 (1963, 55). How to epistemologically develop those 
means? Moreover, to what extent do these become fixed parameters to guide the 
investigation? Comparative research brings not only opportunities but also challenges. By 
comparing, new understandings might open opportunities for improving the analysis, but also 
run the risk of close other. Methodological rigor is the rule in this regard, whereas the 
conceptual consistency from the beginning to end carries the investigating patterns. By doing 
it correctly, comparing adds new analytical perspectives to the specific cases but, most 
importantly, pushes forward the conceptual discussion on the analyzed phenomenon.	
 
Case-comparison investigations on armed conflicts require meeting certain criteria in order 
to become analytically productive. In the first place, they must be “[…] representative of the 
phenomenon at hand [and the two cases need also to be] significant examples". The second 
requirement is that "[...] the cases must be comparable. They must show similarities in order 
to present enough evidence to test the hypotheses". The third requirement is that "[...] the two 
cases must also differ in critical variables so as to highlight the factors that are more general 
and those that are specific to each particular case". In other words, similarities are as relevant 
as differences. Considering the two sides means to structure the cases selection properly, but 
also relevant outputs might come out from considering both. Finally, the fourth requirement 
takes to underline how relevant the comparison method might produce new insights on each 
one of the selected cases: "[...] the cases must also be able to bring to the fore the 
particularities of the actors, their interests and instruments. These requirements promote the 
use of a substantial narrative" (Duyvesteyn, 2005, 18-19).	
 
Those ideas and requirements have guided this comparative research, but most specifically 
this comparative and analytical last chapter. Criminal group comparisons need to consider 
not only how the cases differ, but how specific contexts influence each difference or 
similarity. Hence, by addressing a review of what varies and what is similar between both 
cases, a first broad comparative panorama becomes drawn. This descriptive exercise also 
works as the starting point from which the comparison transforms later into an analysis 
guided by specific examples and, finally, into a conceptual discussion. Neither similarities 
nor differences are always sharply distinguishable. On the contrary, under particular 
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circumstances, a customary practice of LFM/LCT or CN may simultaneously fit into an 
understanding that comprehends both categories. For instance, thinking about the Italian 
criminal groups, Dickie pointed out that, "Organizational rituals and structures are a liturgical 
device designed to transform young men into professional criminals and convert a simple life 
as a delinquent into a vocation for barbarism”	(2015, 47). As an analytical statement, the 
quote could also apply to Michoacán´s criminal groups between 2005 and 2014.	
 
Given this existence of similarities and differences between both cases, what kind of criminal 
legitimacy-construction process does each experience offer? This question guides this last 
chapter by considering political legitimacy as a gear that enables building bridges of 
understanding towards other dimensions regarding the criminal phenomenon. First, once 
reviewed the empirical cases data in the previous chapters, the first section in this chapter 
elaborates how that data and those cases push forward the conceptual discussion on 
legitimacy and crime. Afterward, following again the Table 1, this chapter starts by 
conducting the comparative review. By following this structure, the comparative analysis is 
guided through extracting how each case performed every source and resource of legitimacy 
explained across this research. In other words, by grouping every source, subtype source, and 
resource of legitimacy, similarities and differences are sharpened but also analyzed. That is 
an extensive, explicit, and descriptive exercise starting from the observation of the data 
recovered for the two cases. By enlisting, grouping, and ordering both what is alike and what 
contrasts, hence the instances become closer together with the data presented across the 
previous chapters. 	
 
This investigation started by reviewing and reflecting on the literature review about the main 
concepts. That implied recognizing both conceptual discussion tracks such as the current 
debate status, as well as taking a stance towards it. Inspired on following that path, here the 
analysis starts by coming back to concepts for contributing to the debate. Once the cases were 
explained and developed, the main idea is to summarize and elaborate how, together, 
Michoacán and Sicily move forward the discussion when it comes to how criminal groups 
and political legitimacy come together. Ironically, it is through other concepts by which the 
discussion is fed. The state, sovereignty, and the social order are core ideas that have been 
directly and indirectly guiding the theoretical framework, the methodology and, as a 
consequence, the data collecting process. Indeed, by working as analytical platforms, these 
other concepts also led this final step. As it is needed, constant references to the cases will be 
made to the research cases to support and illustrate the argumentation. In the end, neither 
legitimacy nor criminality are fixed ideas. Hence this exercise is another valuable opportunity 
to continue thinking about them.	
 
6.1. Criminal Groups and Legitimacy: Pushing Conceptualization 
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The first chapter of this dissertation affirmed that authority is not synonymous with 
legitimacy. So how are they related? Is legitimacy a noun, a verb, or maybe an adjective? In 
other words, is legitimacy a thing, a condition, or an attribute? And what about authority? 
Underneath these ideas rests a meaningful political and sociological discussion which this 
final section addresses, namely, how Sicily and Michoacán advance the discussion to 
understand how authority and legitimacy relate to each other. Without being operationalized, 
this question of how they relate extends beyond this research. Thus, in order to organize the 
discussion, henceforward authority idea is divided into three other concepts already 
discussed: the state, the social order, and sovereignty. From each of these ideas deeply 
attached to the idea of authority, emerge conceptual thoughts to rethink the legitimacy debate 
resulting from the analysis of the cases. As seen earlier, high-criminality contexts that also 
have the presence of criminal groups with legitimacy pretensions, are fertile grounds for 
pushing forward this discussion. Hence, after going deep into empirical references, now the 
discussion closes by coming back to the conceptual level while recovering the empirical 
outputs coming from both Michoacán and Sicily.	
 
The authority building process, as explained in the first chapter, is both dynamic and 
contingent. These features justify focusing the analysis on the descriptive perspective of 
political legitimacy, which empirically explores how legitimacy actually occurs, rather than 
how it might or should do so according to pre-established conditions. Also, in the theoretical 
discussion, as part of the work of designing an operative concept of legitimacy, five 
considerations were presented. These were 1) to consider the ruler, the ruled, as well as those 
also pretending to become the ruler (agents); 2) to recognize the contingency in which 
legitimacy struggles happen (context), 3) to note the hypothetical of legitimate parallel 
authorities (coexistence); 4) to review the historical process in which legitimacy has been 
evolving in a specific place (history); and finally, 5) to recognize the current legitimacy 
setting moment into an ongoing social process (continuity). These five issues have been 
present across the research, and here are recovered to structure the conceptual thoughts that 
the cases of LFM and LCT in Michoacán, and CN in Sicily, offer in terms of political 
legitimacy.	
 
Before getting there, here is what this research answers to the question of how legitimacy 
and authority relate to each other. Despite the differences between the sets of political 
legitimacy resources displayed and developed, LFM and LCT share with CN the continual 
effort for building authority. The paths might be different or similar, but the end goal did not 
change: to establish an authority-building process. While traveling this path, these criminal 
groups face reactions from both formal authorities, other pretending legitimacy agencies, and 
especially relevant, from the audiences of this legitimacy interest. However, traveling the 
legitimacy path does not eliminate or cancel but reaffirms the authority-building process – 
including those with legitimacy, those wanting it, and those sharing it. As a result, political 
legitimacy clashes are instrumental to the constant and contingent authority-building process. 
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In other words, legitimacy and authority get related through the former being a useful 
instrument during shaping and deciding on the latter.	
 
However, as an instrument, no legitimacy related clashes happen outside that authority-
building process, while no authority disputes exclude the usage of legitimacy. Furthermore, 
since political legitimacy is instrumental to the definition of the ruler and the ruled, it tends 
to be used, and not merely accumulated. Its value depends on what is exchanged or what it 
is used for. In this regard comes the relevance of the criminal groups. As particular social 
agents whose separation from society is merely fictional, their interest in participating in the 
legitimacy clashes does not make them political agents – in the end, every individual is 
already more or less a political agent while existing in society. However, these atypical 
criminal groups’ existence speaks more about the context’s exceptionality in terms of the 
authority-building process, rather than the criminal groups´	hypothetical rarity. As such a 
useful and irrevocable instrument for taking part in the authority-building process, those 
scenarios in which political legitimacy is accessible for criminal groups does not lack 
authority. On the contrary, they have an excess of it. Legitimacy becomes as divisible as 
multiple agents looking for power appear. To address how these ideas impact the concepts, 
some thoughts follow.	
 
6.1.1. Political Legitimacy, Criminal Groups, and the State 
 
1. Agents. As a social phenomenon, several agents compose the state. The studied legitimacy 
disputes in Michoacán and Sicily allow seeing how blurred the boundaries are allegedly 
separating a) state and non-state actors and b) legal and illegal political agents –producing 
political legitimacy coexistence, as analyzed below. In this regard, the state does not weaken 
or disappear but becomes reaffirmed through recognizing the many parts making up its 
political composition. For instance, with its centenary existence, CN has been participating 
in Italian state building – especially but not exclusively in Sicily. LFM and LCT also 
influenced Mexican state building despite their relatively short small existence compared to 
CN. Criminal non-state agents, combined with an increased legitimacy dispute in a given 
context, do not eliminate but reaffirm the state as a dominant political order. In this regard, 
the state needs to be understood as a complex, non-rational, and non-homogenous agent 
composed of many parts but providing societies governance expectations and predictability 
patterns.	
 
2. Context. The state, as a social phenomenon, changes. Hence, legitimacy struggles might 
be an engine to either boost or speed up these changes. Moreover, criminal groups like CN, 
LFM, and LCT are both outputs and inputs of this contingent process. Taking criminal 
groups’ public displays as a variable, Michoacán between 2005 and Nazario´s ‘second death’, 
might be similar to Sicily during the post-war period until anti-mafia became a real resistance. 
This can also be seen from the perspective of the formal authority. Currently, Sicilian judges 
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portray a deeply different image of legal authority, which has practical consequences in terms 
of crime and violence. Authority claims coming from these groups were consistently related 
to the state idea, independently of the context, but it is the context that defines how this idea 
takes form. 	
 
3. Coexistence. Criminal groups with political legitimacy pretentions tend to cannibalize the 
state as a powerful symbol and reference of authority. However, this scenario is mostly 
possible in contexts where authority coexistence is either a reality or an attempt. In the case 
of extortion practices, both piso and pizzo based their violence, profit expectation and, most 
important, political intentions on the idea of emulating, simulating, and embodying the state. 
This is basically fictional since the state is not this rational and unidirectional entity, nor can 
it be substituted as easily as this performance pretends. Nevertheless, the idea of the state 
works as an inevitable reference point for these criminal groups when designing and 
displaying specific attempts of authority-building towards local people, but not only them.	
 
4. History. The state has margins. Beyond them, the social and political dynamics need 
special analytical attention and considerations. Moreover, these margins result from each 
historical state-building process. The history of the Italian state as well as of the Mexican 
state has a particular perspective when seen from Sicily or Michoacán. However, even as an 
analytical category, margins are not always equal nor work the same way when it comes to 
political legitimacy. Since state experiences differ, especially in the marginal regions, 
authority expectations and mandate acceptance might differ from case to case. History serves 
for identifying specificities. By considering and recognizing the margins, it is possible to find 
different models of legitimacy-building resulting from both: a particular authority 
expectation, and also singular mandate acceptance conditions. Practically, the material and 
non-material resources of legitimacy from LFM, LCT, and CN resulted from there.	
 
5. Continuity. Legitimacy renews the state and its multiple parts. As an ongoing process, both 
legitimacy and the state are under contingency. However, if the legitimacy struggle itself 
pushes this contingency, it becomes deeper when criminal groups also take part. Illegality 
has an expectation of social disapproval in advance. Thus, to counter this, criminal groups 
appeal to discourses and actions of profound change as what means to switch legal to illegal 
and building authority from there. This pushes the contingency together with the resistances 
that these attempts find and face. In Sicily, the anti-mafia movement provoked (and still 
provokes) profound changes in the state idea, practices and institutions. However, its 
existence is due to CN’s challenge. In Michoacán, autodefensas is also a good example in 
this regard but with less success in terms of stopping the violence.	
 
6.1.2. Political Legitimacy, Criminal Groups, and Sovereignty 
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1. Agents. As a practice, sovereignty can potentially reside in as many hands as agents dispute 
political legitimacy. In these circumstances, the several agents performing sovereign 
practices do not lead to a lack of authority but an excess of powers potentially confronted. 
As a consequence, the more agents simultaneously involved, also means the more authorities 
having or exercising the right over other’s life and death as the ultimate expression of 
sovereignty. Following Arendt (1970), violent actions in which either LFM, LCT, and CN 
participated, despite the particularities, could always be rationalized through the 
understanding of the final goals, which might be a combination of political, economic, and 
cultural motivations. Legitimacy serves as a catalyst through which the analysis becomes 
organized.	
 
2. Context. Sovereignty practices become visible thanks to legitimacy. Moreover, in the same 
way in which understanding sovereignty as a practice helps to realize that the state is not 
monolithic, also legitimacy disputes make visible that the sovereign is not an object. Thus, 
depending on the context, the formal authority could concentrate these practices, but another 
possible scenario is that dispersed sovereignty practices also clash against each other. 
Practically every source and resource of criminal legitimacy collected and analyzed in this 
research has an angle of political aspiration to build a political mandate to decide on the rest. 
That means that (independently of its success or failure) both criminal legitimacy 
performances attempted to build authority towards making the criminal group the local 
sovereign. Located behind what shapes this "act of deciding on the rest" are the sovereign 
practices. Finally, when displaying publicly become covered by the blanket of legitimacy to 
make them socially acceptable.	
 
3. Coexistence. Apart from making them visible, legitimacy also helps to enable the 
simultaneous exercise of several practices of sovereignty – which does not imply the 
existence of several simultaneous sovereigns. These practices take place independently of 
whether or not they are covered by legitimacy. Nevertheless, as such a powerful political 
instrument, legitimacy allowed LFM and LCT in the first place to justify their sovereignty 
practices as a stance that challenged and resisted the status quo. Later, the resistance that 
these groups faced were also sovereign practices filled with legitimacy discourses as well. 
As a result, the coexistence of sovereignties became enabled thanks to the political legitimacy 
setting. Every social agent in Michoacán during the analyzed context pretended to influence 
or define the local social order through looking for public acceptance or condescension, and 
displaying public presence. Within a context of contested coexistence of sovereignty 
practices, the shortest route to keeping in the dispute is through staying inside legitimacy 
arenas.	
 
4. History. In spite of the specificities that every context has for the legitimacy definition, 
practicing sovereignty is a historical continuum. Ancient as well as recently created criminal 
groups would have the same chance to act as sovereigns as long as they become interested in 
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political legitimacy. CN, for instance, as part of its historical oscillation between retraction 
and relatively public exposure, continually recurred to performing diverse sets of sovereign 
practices –some of them involving legitimacy and some others not. LFM and LCT, on the 
other hand, despite being such recent when compared to the Sicilian mafia, also quickly 
started their political performance by exercising a wide range of sovereign practices 
including, indeed, the right to decide who lives, who dies, and why.	
 
5. Continuity. As an analytical category, the monopoly of violence is not legitimate if the 
sovereignty is not monopolized as well. In other words, as long as sovereign practices from 
various social agents are taking place into one sole context, no concentration of sovereignty 
is possible and, thus, violence will spread due to the multiple agents claiming or threatening 
with using it. Following the argument, the monopoly of violence is neither a condition of the 
state nor an indicator of social order presence, but an ongoing result of sovereignty 
monopolization. Indeed, this condition also could change through time and, again, legitimacy 
is instrumental to that modification. Consequently, violent non-state actors are not a 
consequence of a lack of the state´s monopoly of violence but of the fact that sovereignty, as 
a practice, can be potentially exercised by almost any other social agent. Instead, as long as 
the official authority legitimately monopolizes sovereignty, violence will also be 
monopolized.	
 
6.1.3. Political Legitimacy, Criminal groups, and Social (Dis)Order 
 
1. Agents. Legitimacy conflicts serve for observing different versions of social order within 
the same place. Even though these versions may become explicit through public messages or 
representations, due to its illegal condition, particularly criminal groups with legitimacy 
interests face the necessity of spreading their social order vision. For instance, the anti-mafia 
movement pushed CN to implicitly contrast their social order version (based on violence 
emerging from their symbolic existence and factual presence) against the culture of 
lawfulness promoted by the anti-mafia. On the other hand, the explicit public communication 
carried out by LFM and LCT forced them to criticize the status quo and, consequently, 
uncover their “alternative”	version of social order for Michoacán. The more agents involved, 
the more probabilities of different social orders as long as these agents experience legitimacy 
struggles.	
 
2. Context. Although promoting or having a specific version of social order, criminal groups 
involved in legitimacy struggles are somehow products, shapers, and transformers of the 
current local social order. In other words, each social order context contains while receive 
affectations coming from these groups. As social agents, these criminal groups are not 
separated from the society from which have emerged. Moreover, any effort to contradict this 
statement could be understood as part of how criminal groups discursively build their 
alternative social order version. Although this statement may be obvious, no other context 
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besides Michoacán might produce the exact case of LFM and LCT, such as no other context 
besides Sicily is the space in which CN could emerge. Both are products of particular social 
orders that later alter the same social order no matter their success or failure in becoming 
legitimate.	
 
3. Coexistence. Empirically, there is no such thing as social disorder due to parallel 
authorities’ coexistence. As a normative perception of social order, social disorder chases to 
filling both social and political expectations based on ideal conceptions. In other words, 
having or lacking social order is not a possibility since every society becomes somehow 
ordered. In the best scenario, the social order needs to be improved notably in the reviewed 
cases, which might be guided by human rights respect criteria. However, even in these violent 
and high-criminality contexts, there is a social order that could be rationalized. An instrument 
to do that is by studying how and why the legitimacy disputes are taking place. Comparing 
similarities and differences between Michoacán in Sicily was inspired by translating the 
disorder into order. To some extent, political legitimacy helps to rationalize the social order 
analysis in the context of a presumable disorder.	
 
4. History. Historically, the social order definition process has winners and losers. Following 
the idea, especially for criminal groups, taking part in the legitimacy struggles means the 
possibility of losing the game of defining the social order. Whereas standard criminals (i.e., 
criminals without aspirations to political legitimacy) do not need to justify their actions nor 
develop a political stand, the studied cases did so explicit or implicitly and, thus, played the 
game of modifying the current social order. In that case, it is not that these groups did not 
influence the resulting version of social order, but that they will become discredited. 
Although that does not kill their future legitimation possibilities, in the short term the chances 
of taking place in the social order definition will be shortened. Indeed, during this research 
developing, LCT and CN need to be considered as losers in each of their contexts.	
 
5. Continuity. As another contingent element, the social contract as a core part of the social 
order will be permanently renewed. In order to trace these renewals, legitimacy contestations 
work as a useful research tool. To some extent, the existence of social groups attempting to 
become political legitimate from the criminality may be due to either accompanying the 
social contract formation in the long run or as a result of significant social contract 
breakdowns historically produced. CN is a close example of the first case. Its existence within 
the Sicilian context is as modern as the local and national legal authority. On the other hand, 
both LFM and LCT are close examples of the second scenario, in which their emergence 
could not be disconnected from several and relevant failures in the local modern social 
contract.	
 
6.2. Michoacán-Sicily Connection: Comparing Sources of Legitimacy 
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The distance between Palermo, the capital city of Sicily, and Morelia, the capital city of 
Michoacán, is 10.6 thousand kilometers. What kind of bond allows the comparing of such 
remote places? By the beginning of the twentieth century, Dante and Theresa Cusi, born in 
Italy, arrived in Mexico with their two small sons and bought cheap land in Michoacán. The 
Cusi family was the desired type of immigrant during the porfirismo period, when president 
Porfirio Diaz aspired to develop the country through Western European standards. These 
lands later became the municipalities of Lombardía and Nueva Italia. During the 30s, as a 
result of the post-revolutionary ideology, the peasants of Nueva Italia and Lombardía 
working for Cusi´s family rice plantations launched an original strike. Instead of demanding 
land rights, as was common, instead the claim was for labor rights (Pureco, 2008). 
Nevertheless, by the late 30s, president Lázaro Cárdenas (also the former governor of 
Michoacán) expropriated the lands to the Cusi, which became collective property, i.e., ejido. 
However, after this period, Cusi´s Italian-ness interweaved with the Mexican-ness identity 
as well as the other way around.	
 
According to Gurwitz, "The Cusi´s connections with Italy and with fellow Italian immigrants 
shaped their business practices even as they became increasingly invested in the Mexican 
nation" (2015, 94). Almost eighty years later, the former lands of the Cusi family retook the 
national spotlight. A group of armed civilians fighting LCT called autodefensas emerged in 
Nueva Italia, a strategically located point in Michoacán. Positioned in the Southern part of 
the city, Cuatro Caminos (four paths) is the cruiser point from which highways run to every 
cardinal point in Michoacán: to the North (Uruapan), South (Lázaro Cárdenas port), West 
(Morelia), and East (to Apatzingán). Cusi family exposes how a small case might entwine 
such distant places through complex and diverse social dynamics. This case connected 
Michoacán with Italy such as also the atypical criminal groups analyzed in this research do 
so. The following section guides the comparative analysis by following the Table 1 that also 
structured the cases analysis. However, before addressing each source of legitimacy, this 
comparison needs to first comparatively analyze both political contexts where the legitimacy 
performance took place. 	
 
In this regard, Michoacán and Sicily were characterized by being highly contested political 
legitimacy scenarios. Sullivan suggested the existence of "Criminal enclaves" as "[...] areas 
where lawbreakers [...] exert political and social control. Essentially these areas are ‘other 
governed spaces’. The state may or may not be absent — although its hold is certainly 
challenged — but other informal governance structures, such as gangs, wield substantial 
political influence or control”. Moreover, he continued, "These enclaves could also fully 
supplant the state when it is absent or lacks solvency, which I define as the sum of legitimacy 
and capacity" (2019). In these cases, despite the intermittently effective criminal control, 
rather than criminal enclaves, from a political legitimacy perspective Michoacán and Sicily 
need to be defined as contested enclaves as a result of the dense presence of social agents 
involved in the local social order definition. Indeed, the local criminal groups were one 
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particularly relevant social agent –but one among others in the end. Moreover, the criminal 
group´s political legitimacy interest emerged, in both cases, from the importance given to 
define or preserve such social order. 	
 
Moreover, social, political, and historical contexts also produced different legitimacy 
performances in both cases. CN is as modern as the Italian state, whereas LFM and LCT 
emerged in a very particular Mexican context but with deep roots in local Michoacán social 
and political history. As a result, while in Michoacán the over-exposition of LFM and LCT 
produced intense and visible amounts of material and non-material legitimacy resources, the 
shadowy presence of CN Sicily produced a concentration of non-material sources. Bringing 
back Claessen (1988), whereas LFM and LCT kept in the legitimation track (which to some 
extent explains the preference for being publicly visible and, thus, develop and spread 
primarily material legitimacy resources), CN indeed had long periods being an authority 
(whose legitimacy was mostly based in violence and fear) rather than trying to become one 
(which to some extent explains the preference for not becoming publicly visible and, thus, 
develop and spread primarily non-material legitimacy resources). Indeed, the recent decades 
with anti-mafia resistance, and the Mori operation are exceptional periods in this regard. Also 
related to the historical conditions, during long periods, CN sought to preserve the status quo. 
On the other hand, LFM and LCT had a disruptive vision of social order based on having 
enemies who were already ruling before them as well as those pretending to do so later, such 
as the federal government or autodefensas. Nevertheless, this difference produced a 
similarity: both became zero-sum political legitimacy contexts. In other words, Michoacán 
and Sicily became arenas in which the legitimacy gained by the criminal group eventually 
was struggled by another local social agent and vice versa – either legal or not, local or not.	
 
6.2.1. Comparing Symbolic Sources 
 
How appropriate is it to compare these criminal groups in Michoacán and Sicily? For this 
research, the answer points to an immeasurable epistemological opportunity. Both are 
criminal groups that have portrayed, performed, and launched actions to gain or preserve 
political legitimacy for their illegal activities. The differences between the two are as 
analytically significant as the similarities. This comparison starts with the symbolic sources 
of legitimacy. This research encountered two criminal groups taking different paths but 
heading towards the same objective: developing symbolic sources of legitimacy towards 
defining the local social order. In Michoacán, there was an interest in expanding the criminal 
group's legitimacy inside as well as outside, whereas CN has favored belonging, cohesion, 
and internal strength over publicity. But both used symbols as legitimacy sources to attain a 
conducive social order to continue with crime activities, contesting the official authorities, 
and becoming legitimate albeit illegal.	
 
Table 5. Symbolic Legitimacy Sources and Resources for Criminal Groups	
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Main Source	 Subtype Source	 Material Resources	 Non-Material Resources	
 
 
Symbolic	 Social Contract Offer	 Granting Public services	 Promote belonging and cohesiveness / Trustworthy mandate	
Agenda´s Spread 
and/or Justification	 Publications / Written Codes	 Founding narratives / Songs / Anthems / Public messages 	
Spread of Symbols	 Identity Symbols in 
Ornaments and 
Documents	 Rituals / Values, Moral Beliefs / Religiosity		
 
Following the Table 5, the symbolic sources are subcategorized into three subtypes: social 
contract offer, spread and/or justification of agenda, and spread of symbols.	
 
6.2.1.1. Proposed Social Contract 
 
The "proposed social contract" subtype source of legitimacy is expressed through a) granting 
public services (material resource), b) promoting belonging and cohesiveness, and a 
trustworthy mandate (non-material resources). While both sought to create a social contract, 
each criminal group commanded a different audience. While in Sicily the social contract was 
more an inner rule creation, in Michoacán the criminal group expected obedience from both 
crime group members as well as locals – including legal authorities and civilians. In other 
words, CN inner legitimation resulted in external obedience, whereas LFM and LCT were 
simultaneously attempting to create obedience across every flank. Following Buscetta´s 
argumentation during the Maxi Trial, CN interest has been always prioritizing to improve 
inner group cohesiveness. On the other hand, in Michoacán, the purpose seemed to mainly 
expand their rule of law by spreading their (quickly failed) idea of a criminal trustworthy 
mandate. On the other hand, regarding belonging, each criminal group attempted to promote 
it by modeling the political and institutional destiny as well as the general social order of 
their native lands. 	
 
Indeed, territorial identity characterizes each of these political legitimacy performances. 
Despite the particularities, it was generally reflected in the valuation of geography and a cult 
to the territory, which helped to shape the political legitimacy discourses of LFM and LCT. 
References appeared either inside the criminal editorial production, or in narcomantas. To 
some extent, the criminal groups of Michoacán expressed a sort of nationalism by spreading 
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the idea of a common destiny based on locality.75 On the other hand, in the case of Sicily, an 
expression of the land-attaching can be found in analyzing how CN related to other Italian 
criminal groups: by respecting other territories (i.e., "sovereignties") CN expected the same 
from the Camorra, the ´Ndrangheta, and the Sacra Corona Unita. The territorial identity also 
implies a political interest. La presenza è	potenza (presence is power) is a typical phrase 
among mafiosi that also describes LFM and LCT’s political attitudes (Dickie, 2015, 694). On 
the other hand, regarding cohesiveness, both criminal groups´	made use of similar social 
features addressing social organization. These were: structuring, hierarchy, familism, honor, 
and machismo. 	
 
As explained earlier, the Sicilian mafia is and has been historically hierarchical. However, 
LFM and LCT also exhibited hierarchical practices concerning not only the relevance of the 
charismatic leader, but also through the rituals of affiliation and commandment designation. 
This hierarchy works in both cases for, in the first place, practically ordering practice 
implementations (who commands and who obeys). Nevertheless, it also reaffirms the groups´	
agency by transferring authority from the group to the leaders. Deeply related to hierarchy, 
familism is a standard feature on the grounds of “group structuring”. In both locations, as a 
referential institution, the “family”	works as a binary. First, as a central symbol, it promotes 
internal and sometimes external authority. Second, as an umbrella idea, it also gives patterns 
to organize the criminal group internally. In the case of CN, le famiglie is the base of the 
organization and does not necessarily mean blood ties between the members –even when this 
could be the case (Santino, 2011, 24). As the organizational base from which the affiliation 
and authority become structured, the institution of family in Sicily helps to support an idea 
of loyalty and belonging.	
 
An individual cannot abandon the family except by betraying their ‘relatives’. Belonging to 
CN is also non-renounceable, a life commitment. Failing at this might consequently become 
a major betrayal. This image is well transferred from the family idea in this case. Whereas, 
in the case of Michoacán, following Lomnitz the idea of family worked as a discursive 
element and a symbolic vehicle in which criminal group´s morality rested –explicitly talking 
about LFM. The Mexican family, he argued, results from a complex interdependence 
between the state and family, in which “[…] the rise of the national State is based on, but it 
is also done at the expense of the authority of the family”	(2016a). Moreover, he continued 
in the case of Michoacán, as a result of the migration dynamics to which these families are 
exposed (separation, uprooting, remittances), as an institution, the family becomes 
simultaneously individuals´	source of support and abandon (Lomnitz, 2016a; Maldonado, 
2014, 164). LFM emerged from this complex social context. Also related to family is the 
 75 An example in this regard comes from the Código de los Caballeros Templarios de Michoacán, in which is 
stated that: “The Order fosters patriotism through expressing pride in one's own land and its achievements, and 
by recognizing the role corresponding to the nations and the duties towards humanity”	(No name, No date, 7).	
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honor working as an element of cohesiveness, i.e., a non-material resource of legitimacy in 
the category of social contracts. 	
 
Even when, initially, honor is a discursive element, later it becomes empirically reflected. In 
the case of Sicily, to become a mafioso is synonymous with being an uomo di onore; on the 
other hand, LCT published their code of honor. In other words, honor empirically takes shape 
in respecting the internal rules (for instance, the omertá or the LCT code commitments); thus, 
hierarchy starts to make sense and acquire authority. Finally in this regard, machismo is also 
a shared element related to the groups´	structuring. Indeed, masculinity plays a relevant role 
in organizing the legitimacy intentions of such type of criminal organizations. Nevertheless, 
it needs to be mentioned that, in both Michoacán and Sicily, machismo is part of the analyzed 
practices, symbols, and general power setting.76 As men-centered and asymmetrical groups, 
these cases of criminal groups tend to exclude, if not eliminate, women inside the 
organization (Santino, 2011, 25). Both criminal groups developed patriarchal modes of rule, 
not only towards internally structuring the group operation, but also when these groups 
disseminated their mandate among locals. Moreover, machismo also worked for improving 
the aftermath´s efforts of criminal governance. 	
 
In the case of Michoacán, LCT re-victimized and humiliated women by taking advantage of 
the violence that they were already suffering at home, together with the impunity from the 
official authorities when women ask for justice. LCT members offered them the justice the 
women did not find in the official courts, and later were asked to “pay for the favors”	already 
received by keeping weapons in their backyards (Interview in field, 2017). On the other hand, 
in the case of CN, women were essentially excluded:	
 
[…] the exclusion of women and their symbolic status can be explained mostly by the use of violence 
by the Mafia and the establishment of the reputation necessary for the industry of protection to prosper. 
Gender norms have mostly supported these two essential tools of Mafia trade. Nevertheless, an 
exclusively functional explanation of gender norms does not suffice to account for Mafia members’	
behavior as it appears in court and in statements made by state witnesses (Pizzini-Gambeta, 1999, 176).	
 
Indeed, besides to this functional explanation, Pizzini-Gambeta also argued that mafiosi 
shyness might help to understand women´s exclusion of CN: “Contrary to macho mystique 
Mafia members generally seemed ill at ease in the presence of women [...] this surprising 
shyness with women stemmed from the fact that specific gender norms were crucial to 
distinguish the Sicilian Mafia from other criminal societies, and to assess the reputation 
(1999, 176-177). Other researchers have argued in favor of a more active role of women 
inside criminal organizations, by either being aware or even to be willing to support men by 
endorsing their criminal activities (see more in Fiandaca, 2007 and Ingrascì, 2007). On the 
 76 Across machismo symbolism, both cases exhibited the use of guns, masculine leadership, marginalization of 
women (both inside and outside the criminal group), as well as brutality regarding the use of violence.	
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other hand, Dino explored the role of women in the anti-mafia movements and argued that 
women also have been struggling to find stable and lasting forms and structures of 
participation (2016). In the end, from a political legitimacy perspective, women's 
subordination within these criminal groups was reflected both internally and sometimes 
externally. The consequences were not minor. The aftermath of masculine organization 
models such as patriarchy and machismo hierarchy, are expressed as violence, domination, 
and the attempts of building criminal governing models.	
 
6.2.1.2. Agenda´s Spread and/or Justification 
 
The "spread and/or justification of agenda" subtype source of legitimacy is expressed through 
a) publications and written codes (material resources), b) founding narratives, songs, 
anthems, and public messages (non-material resources). Indeed, regarding the agenda´s 
spread and justification, the relevant difference between both cases concerns publicity. On 
the one hand, LFM and LCT expressed several and different willingness to being advertised. 
Within a relatively short period of nine years (especially compared to CN), these criminal 
groups performed such diverse as constant attempts in order to either introduce themselves 
towards local people, as well as make their presence and identity evident. Behind these 
attempts, LFM and LCT addressed a political discourse towards the audiences of their 
legitimacy attempt caused by the different contexts, as it is explained later as part of the 
“portray of the enemy”	sources. Nevertheless, this difference does not indicate the lack of an 
agenda, nor the absence of trials to spread or justify their message. On the contrary, LFM, 
LCT, and CN were criminal groups with an agenda whose usage was simply different. What 
were the differences in this regard?	
 
In Michoacán, the criminal groups constantly attempted to be seen and noticed. Dropping 
human heads in a night club, publishing paid insertions in local media, spreading 
narcomantas, distributing and disseminating the criminal editorial production, video-
recording the leaders for YouTube videos, developing a religious identity, and spreading an 
anthem, are all examples of this. Nevertheless, CN´s case is significantly different in this 
regard. The Sicilian mafia did not merely want to become public. Indeed, the secrecy even 
worked for CN as a legitimacy resource to keep the organization cohesive, structured and 
organized. Beati Paoli myth; as well as the founding narrative of Osso, Mastrosso, and 
Carcagosso; both rest on the mystery of heroic but excluding, and secret societies, which 
somehow inspired CN´s essence and agenda´s spread profile. Inner mafia institutions such 
as the omertá or the initiation rituals reinforced the Sicilian mafia as a secret organization 
whose existence wandered between dealing with a phantom and a reality. The role of pentiti 
becomes extremely relevant in this regard. Indeed, before Buscetta´s confessions, the “mafia-
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as-myth”	hypothesis remained in the Sicilian conversation (Dickie, 2015, 607). As a result, 
to not become publicized was a success for CN´s interests.77	
 
Undoubtedly, in the two cases, the criminal groups had a criminal agenda. Additionally, also 
in both cases, it was spread. The difference in this regard relates to the audience of that 
message. In the case of Michoacán, the audience was multiple. The manifesto, published in 
2006 by LFM, used the local press to spread their agenda in a quite clear way –stating the 
criminal group´s mission, vision, objectives, and etcetera. The code addressed LCT members, 
while also to locals due to how it was printed and distributed. Moreover, the courses in which 
public officers and general locals were forcefully taken to study Pensamientos, the book 
allegedly written by Nazario, was also an explicit agenda´s spread action across the local 
audience. On the other hand, CN´s agenda´s audience was mainly (if not exclusively) their 
members. In this regard, the initiation rituals combined with the closed and hierarchical 
structure worked as space and opportunity to conduct this action. Finally, to some extent in 
both cases, the goal of spreading it was for promoting belonging and cohesiveness –also 
symbolic sources but under the non-material resources expressions of the social contract 
offer.	
 
6.2.1.3. Dissemination of Symbols 
 
The “symbol's spread" subtype source of legitimacy becomes expressed through a) identity 
symbols in ornaments and documents (material resources), and b) rituals, values, moral 
beliefs, and religiosity (non-material resources). In this regard, the religious factor holds a 
great relevance in both cases while also presents differences and similarities. As a similarity, 
one that might be obvious but still needs to be underlined is that both groups made religion 
a source of legitimacy. However, while LCT opted for creating a new religion from the very 
beginning from which create legitimacy, CN preferred to take control of an already legitimate 
centennial religious ritual. From an orthodox Catholic perspective, comparing Saint Agatha 
and Saint Nazario might be profane. As a centennial Saint, Agatha is part of the Roman 
Catholic Church's history including the social acceptance towards its faith. On the other hand, 
Nazario is a self-proclaimed divinity whose existence is inevitably attached to his bloody 
leadership of a violent criminal group. 	
 
However, from a criminal legitimacy perspective, the same parallel becomes a profoundly 
fruitful analytical vehicle. As a powerful symbolic source of legitimacy, religion was used in 
both locations. In the case of Michoacán, it was under LCT's appearance when religion 
became a central instrument of legitimacy; despite the fact that Nazario had already offered 
messianic discourses and practices since the times of LFM – especially in his autobiography. 
 77 In this regard, anti-mafia understood how valuable this element is for Mafiosi. That is why one of the 
succeeded political flags from this movement was and still is to talk about mafia in order to combat the secrecy.	
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On the other hand, although criminal groups all around Italy have historically established 
close political and moral relationships with the Catholic Church and specifically when it 
comes to local patron saint processions (Merlino, 2014, 109), currently Saint Agatha´s case 
has a special relevance for political legitimacy. Both scenarios reveal a political interest in 
material and immaterial religious culture. Although the image of a saint (apocryphal or not) 
acted as the receptacle in which political desires and intentions were deposited and 
withdrawn, these phenomena are not restricted to saints. 	
 
On the contrary, from the saints' image, criminal groups propelled a whole set of moral 
beliefs, authority-building, and social acceptance. On the material grounds, images and the 
imaginaries were used for promoting the cult around Catania´s Saint Agatha, a complex 
baroque aesthetic environment. In the case of Nazario, it was an aura of medieval warfare 
aspiring to vindicate LCT. Lomnitz suggested that, in Michoacán, LCT endeavored to 
institutionalize a rite and a proper Templar mythology, which, he argued, is still somewhat 
opaque (2016). CN, on the other hand, also had interest in commanding an already 
institutionalized rite based on an already spread Catholic religiosity. In other words, whereas 
in Michoacán a religion conceived from pieces of a complex set of beliefs was displayed with 
a legitimacy interest, in Sicily, the same attempt was made but by capturing an already 
legitimate religious ritual related to an already legitimated sacred image.78 The resulting 
symbolic sources of legitimacy from the cases of Saint Agatha and Nazario have a significant 
difference: ideological consistency. Whereas Michoacán displayed syncretism across what 
might be called as the "Templar religion", CN presented orthodox practices by respecting 
Catholic images, beliefs and codes. 	
 
The Templar code shows how such different, distant and ambiguous ideas and ideologies 
shape their ethical and moral guidelines: the "fight against materialism", nationalism, 
patriotism, "natural justice and the fundamental rights of men", self-determination of nations, 
freedom of expression, serving "the only God", protecting women, abstaining from alcohol, 
lying or "being immoral" (No author, No date, 1-8). Although CN displayed moral values 
and codes of conduct, these commandments were not as syncretic as it was the case of LCT 
and, to some extent, LFM. Instead, CN promoted (also through a consistently ambiguous 
manner) a sort of co-validation to the Catholic commandments and moral beliefs without 
forcing it to fit distant visions into each other. Nevertheless, both criminal religious interests 
produced concrete similarities in terms of symbolic legitimacy and in which saints became 
involved. The initiation rituals are illustrative examples. Allegedly, CN used saints´	images 
to burn them during the initiation ritual. Afterward, the oath is pronounced. In this regard, 
 78 As an example of how Saint Agatha is an already legitimate, during the procession period, local shops at 
Catania decorate their shop windows by converting them into shrines dedicated to Saint Agatha. See Picture 10 
in the Appendix. 	
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somehow the ritual withdraws the Saint symbolic honor and, by doing so, to the criminal 
organization as well. 	
 
In the Templar code, the fifth commandment stated: "Every member of the order [...] should 
be under oath, which will be made under a ritual established by the Council" (No name, No 
date, 2). As a result of the initiation ritual and the oath, also the code of silence is another 
example of how religion and particular saints became useful for transferring legitimacy from 
morality towards the criminal organization. In Sicily, the omertà is an inner mafia institution 
whose lack of respect (by pentiti) would produce the beginning of the first great inner 
breakdown of the mafia, by weakening the ties inside the criminal group. On the other hand, 
the seventh commandment of the Templar code demands the "knights" to "respect the 
SILENCE VOTE [since] is absolutely forbidden to spread our activities or secrets" (No 
name, No date, 2. Capital letters in the original text). The cases of Saint Agatha and a self-
sanctified Nazario are somehow the tip of the iceberg of two different criminal groups and 
religious institutions relationship models.79 The deep roots of this phenomenon reveal that 
the relationship between the church and the mob in Michoacán is not as symbiotic as it is in 
the Sicilian case. 	
 
Actually, Michoacán is atypical in this regard. Generally speaking, Mexican and Italian 
criminal groups usually share a close relationship with the Catholic Church. In both cases, it 
is not strange that criminals may be interested in following Catholic rituals and staying more 
or less close to the local church hierarchy. Moreover, they could even build temples or 
become powerful sponsors. Nevertheless, Mexico is indeed atypical in the sense of the lack 
of syncretism and LCT took it further beyond. As a result, apocryphal but secular saints such 
as Santa Muerte, Malverde and the aforementioned Nazario appeared in the Mexican 
landscape (Aguiar, 2018, 128). Although these saints are not disconnected from the spiritual 
atmosphere of the Catholic religion (Roush, 2014), the Catholic Church has attempted to 
continuously distance from these apocryphal saints.80 As forbidden but legitimate cults, their 
rituals and material culture become clandestine and, thus, associated with illegality. That 
trend has more or less spread throughout Latin American:	
 
The popular saints in Latin America are nourished both by the original cultures of the region and by 
the colonial experience, in particular, the Hispanic Catholicism of the sixteenth century. Likewise, the 
popular saints understood as icons and religious practices result of the syncretism of the cultures 
 79 In the case of Saint Nazario, despite the adoption of a Catholic baroque style iconography, this apocryphal 
condition is precisely the line where the Catholicism spirit ends. Onwards, the saint became more a source of a 
criminal political message rather than a cult (Interview in the field no. 17, 2017). 	80 Sponsoring might take different shapes. In Mexico, former Cardinal Norberto Rivera, maximum Catholic 
authority in the country, recognized within an editorial published in 2010 that bishops received narcolimosnas 
(alms coming from drug traffickers), which were presumably used to build and improve chapels (Rivera quoted 
in Martínez, 2010). On the other hand, the pentito Leonardo Messina, Our Lady of the Annunciation procession 
organizer, said there was no way in which the local priest did not notice it (Merlino, 2014, 118).	
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brought by slaves to the colonies, such as voodoo, and the different influences of the diversification of 
religiosity in the region since the second half of the twentieth century. Among these emerging 
influences can be identified millenarianism or New Age, but also forms and lifestyles linked to criminal 
activities (Aguiar, 2018, 129).	
 
From a journalistic perspective, Gil Olmos argued that the Mexican popular saints emerged 
as a consequence of the sum of crises (of violence, impunity, and corruption) happening in 
the country since the late nineties. These men and women, he pointed out, were not sanctified 
by an ecclesiastic hierarchy but by the popular faith (2017). In other words, despite the 
contempt from the Catholic Church, the believers who do not stop being loyal to traditional 
Catholic saints also do the job of reconciling both mystical worlds and transforming them 
into a single world. Is hard to say with empirical evidence that this was the case of Nazario. 
Compared to other cults, it seemed much more contingent and localized but mostly attached 
to the Nazario´s leadership itself. However, his case could not be detached from the general 
context described by Gil Olmos. On the other hand, the procession of Saint Agatha, including 
its social acceptance and devotion, lives utterly independent from the criminal presence. Its 
strength is not attached to specific junctures, thus is not contingent. Neither the saint nor the 
ritual needs to build or consolidate its acceptance since it is already active. On the contrary, 
the rite has a historical legitimacy that several local actors seek to capitalize on their favor –
not only CN.81	
 
Religion is in Mexico and Italy a fount from which robust and reliable symbolic legitimacy 
sources and resources might emerge. By adopting and using especially Catholic symbols as 
part of their legitimacy aspirations, the local criminal groups made us of already recognized 
symbols that count already with public acceptance. Thus, borrowing legitimacy from them 
is a convenient idea. However, and even when Italy and Mexico have shown scenarios of 
either collaboration or understanding between criminal groups and the Catholic hierarchy, 
disputes motivated by the use of these symbols had also been taking place. In Sicily, the case 
of the priest Pino Puglisi referred earlier represents an inspiration of how Catholicism and 
pacific pastoral work full of dignity might defy mafia´s rule. Michoacán has the example of 
the priest "Goyo", Gregorio López Jerónimo, whom as parish priest of Apatzingán cathedral, 
in Michoacán, supported the autodefensas while also mediated between LCT members and 
local population in order to prevent violent crimes. Goyo was sent to Mexico City in 2016, 
from where he recorded a video. Speaking about Michoacán, he proclaimed phrases such as: 
"we cannot remain silent" "prayers are not enough", and "the worst thing that can happen to 
us is to get used to the smell of death, to bury the faithful" (quoted in Arrieta, 2018). Pino 
and Goyo cases belong to the very local level, i.e., the below part of Catholic hierarchy. 	
 81 Examples in this regard are how local shops share (and, somehow, compete with) global trademarks for 
advertising themselves in a big screen installed besides the cathedral during the days of procession. Moreover, 
each year Catania´s shops transform one of their shop windows into a sort of shrine dedicated to Saint Agatha. 
The procession´s organizing committee was awarded the best of the year.	
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From the higher side, in recent times the Vatican has reacted notably differently to both cases. 
Whereas Pope Francis excommunicated all mafiosi in 2014, at the beginning of 2015, he 
wrote an email to an Argentinian legislator in which he confessed his worry on the 
Argentinian security conditions and wrote: “Hopefully we are in time to avoid 
Mexicanization. I was talking to some Mexican bishops, and the thing is there of terror”	
(quoted in Rebossio, 2015). During the mass celebrated on February 5, 2019, in the middle 
of the procession celebrations, the priest claimed: “La forza di Agueda è	la forza di Catania”	
(the force of Agatha is the force of Catania). These words have deep meaning in terms of the 
political legitimacy analysis carried out here. While Agatha holds that relevance, Nazario is 
not, neither was, the force of Michoacán nor Tierra Caliente. However, that was the intention, 
i.e., to turning Saint Nazario into a forceful symbolic point of reference around which identity 
and sympathy would be joined. Beyond the success or failure of each of these two cases, both 
represent different paths towards reaching the same point: religion as a source of symbolic 
legitimacy.	
 
6.2.2. Comparing Performance-centered Sources 
 
As it has been argued during this research, criminal groups´ authority building involves more 
than exclusively understanding the economic profit from illegal activities. In this regard, 
transcending economic explanations of criminal groups opens the door to an analysis of 
political legitimacy. Moreover, as social agents, the context becomes crucial when 
determining specificities. Michoacán and Sicily are two legitimacy-contested scenarios, with 
dense practices of authority. In this context, local criminal groups performed actions in their 
campaigns for legitimacy. In this regard, criminal group practices work as analytical vehicles 
in order to study criminal groups’ legitimacy. These practices have been understood and 
analyzed here as part of the performance-centered sources of legitimacy. The practices have 
also been analyzed as legitimacy and sovereignty practices due to how they involve the 
creation of mandate and influence the local authority-building process. In this regard, the 
comparison of these sources presented below, displays how both criminal groups attempted 
to create or reinforce the provision of governing institutions. Moreover, the provision of 
carrots and sticks in both instances was deeply attached (if not a consequence) to the referred 
institutions provision. 
 
Table 6. Performance-centered Legitimacy Sources and Resources for Criminal Groups	
Main Source	 Subtype Source	 Material Resources	 Non-Material Resources	
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Performance
-centered	
Provision of 
Governing 
Institutions	 Taxation and Economy	 Security and Justice Managing (courts, sanctions, and judges) / Labor 
Regulations	
Philanthropy	
(Carrots)	 Gifting	 Promises and Hope Generation	
Coercion	
(Sticks)	 Weapons and Ammo Control	 Fear / Use or Threat of Violence 		
 
Following the Table 6, the performance-centered sources are subcategorized into three 
subtypes: provision of governing institutions, philanthropy (carrots), and coercion (sticks). 
As it was in the previous chapters, the latter two are grouped into one unique section in order 
to sharpen the analysis.	
 
6.2.2.1. Provision of Governing Institutions 
 
The "provision of governing institutions" subtype source of legitimacy is expressed through 
a) taxation and economy (material resource), and b) security and justice managing, as well 
as labor regulations (non-material resources). In this regard, in the two cases, these groups 
managed to act as providers of institutions directing to regulate issues on the local public and 
daily life. For instance, both criminal groups promoted regulations on alcohol and drug 
consumption. According to Tomasso Buscetta´s declaration, the first pentito, the habit of 
drinking alcohol is forbidden for members of CN. If a member fails to comply he can be 
expelled from the organization.82 On the other hand, LCT also launched drug consumption 
regulations to ban specifically meth consumption and punish both consumers and sellers –
LCT members had explicitly forbidden drug and alcohol consumption according to the Code 
commandments (No author, No date). Moreover, as security and justice managers, in 
Michoacán and in Sicily the criminal groups also punished those who did not follow their 
rules – such as thieves, other criminal groups´	members, and of course a countless number 
of innocent victims. In the end, CN as well as LFM and LCT acted intermittently as mediators 
between a weak rule of law and their criminal mandate. In this regard, the analyzed cases fit 
in the “criminal group”	concept developed here as an active criminal organization. 	
 
Another example in this regard concerns how criminal groups attempted to create labor 
regulations, economic control, and taxation mechanisms in the local agro-industrial area. As 
 82 During a declaration, Buscetta himself argued, “[…] a drunken person has no secret while a mafioso must 
keep self-control and decency in every circumstance. I never met an alcoholic man of honor, neither in Sicily 
nor anywhere else”	(quoted by Varese, 2001, 234-235 in Arlacchi, 1994, 159).	
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a result of the remarkable territorial roots, both cases evolved an interesting economic 
administration in criminal-agricultural production: Michoacán and Sicily are important agro-
industrial production and distribution centers. At some point, this territoriality was  expressed 
through the attempts of controlling the agricultural production – coincidently, both places 
have been relevant producers of citrus fruits in different periods of history.83 To some extent 
and at some point, both locations experienced the presence of criminals pretending to become 
legitimate authorities by controlling the local farming production (see Blok, 1974 and 
Maldonado, 2013b). Indeed, this example also speaks about a particular capitalism interest 
from CN, LFM, and LCT – which, of course, evolve over time. The transversal mechanism 
to promote and preserve these regulations was the extortion. This practice connects, in both 
cases, the two performance-centered subtypes sources of legitimacy. 	
 
On the one hand, this practice worked as a provision of governing institutions by establishing 
the criminal group as an effective ruler able and capable enough to charge the extortion and 
have control over people. However, extortion sharply displays how these criminal groups 
used carrots and sticks in how these groups approached locals and spread fear and use of 
violence under a discourse of more effective governance –usually compared to the legal 
governance. As crimes, neither pizzo nor piso are committed individually but collectively, 
and on behalf an organization. In general, extortions might have or not personal or group 
authority. Nevertheless, in these cases, the charge claim is made on behalf LFM, LCT or CN, 
and with the "institutional" backrest. By doing so, these criminal groups use or attempt to use 
the group structure as an added value which supports and strengthens the claim. To do so, 
the set of symbols, practices84 and general representations alluding to the group´s identity 
and parallels developed, serve as platforms through which extortion also play as authority 
claims for victims. By charging and collecting pizzo and piso, criminal organizations 
obtained ruling advantages. 	
 
Charging piso and pizzo helped these groups to keep in touch with the community and spread 
their presence, identity, and interests. Moreover, extortion demanding allowed controlling 
territories, business, markets, and local dynamics in general. As profiting mechanisms, piso 
and pizzo in these cases not only became materialized as taxation and economy material 
resources, but also and most importantly, as power-reaffirmation devices (non-material 
resources). However, the context conditions including the reactions from other local agents 
(from victims to legal authorities, etcetera) as well as the violence magnitudes marked a 
significant difference. Indeed, in both contexts, extortion needs to be understood as a 
 83 According to Watts, “[…] by 1880 Sicily had become the largest supplier of lemons and lemon byproducts 
in the world”	(2016, 74; also, see in this regard Dimico, et al., 2012). On the other hand, Michoacán is currently 
the leading Mexican state citrus producer with 1 million 300 thousand tons produced in 2018 (Redacción 
Cambio, 2018).	84 The case of CN adding glue to the commerce’s entrance locks is a good example. Currently, the symbolism 
behind this old practice makes businesspeople to fear the mafia extortion (Interview in field no. 14, 2018).	
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sovereign practice and authoritative claim. Unlike drug trafficking, which might be 
considered a victimless crime given that both parties are usually willing to participate in the 
transfer (human and animal trafficking are evident exceptions in this regard; see more in 
Costa, 2009, 6-7), extortion has a perpetrator and a victim. 	
 
6.2.2.2. Philanthropy and Coercion: Carrots and Sticks  
 
The "philanthropy" subtype source of legitimacy becomes expressed through a) gifting 
(material resource), and b) promises and hope generation (non-material resources). On the 
other hand, the "coercion" subtype becomes expressed through a) weapons and ammunition 
control (material resource), and b) fear and use of threat or violence (non-material 
resource).85 The practice of extortion is more or less worldwide spread throughout urban and 
rural contexts. In Japan, the Yakuza there is the practice known as sōkaiya, a term referred 
to organized extortionists who either blackmail or prevent companies blackmailing (see more 
in Szymkowiak, 2002). In the former Soviet countries, the term kompromat refers to a local 
political practice based on obtaining material to publicly defame people who later receive 
extortion threats in order to keep their reputation (see more in Markowitz, 2017). Also is the 
case of the Mexican cobro de piso and the Italian pizzo. Almost all criminal groups in both 
countries have somehow practiced it (and are currently doing so). In these cases, the extortion 
is not contingent but a systematic practice, in which both victim and offender establish a 
hierarchical relationship (Pérez, et al., 2015, 119). Moreover, this relation is not limited to 
the “extorting moment”; on the contrary, it lasts before and after the extortion as a re-
affirmation of who rules, who does not, and who obeys whom. That means a relation full of 
sticks with significantly less carrots. According to the Encyclopedia of White-Collar and 
Corporate Crime, extortion is:	
 
[…] the use of threats, violence, or force to extract unlawful gains and rewards to which one is not 
morally or legally entitled. […] The threat of harm could be to property, personal safety, privacy, or 
economic interests, which makes this a major concern for governments and business firms alike. A 
central ingredient of extortion is a severe imbalance in the power relationship between the offender 
and the victim—the former has the power to cause a kind of harm that the victim feels cannot be 
avoided unless payment is made (Barker, 2013, 381). 	
 
Indeed, extortion is not always nor everywhere a sovereign practice and, thus, not always a 
sticks and carrots provider. In order to become so, the “severe imbalance in the power 
relationship”	becomes crucial. Without it, the crime would be closer to bribery (Azaola, 2009, 
119). Furthermore, in order to become that sovereign practice, the presence of a criminal 
group interested in political legitimacy also becomes imperative. Allegedly, criminal groups 
 85 When it comes to weapons and ammo control, this research only found data for Michoacán. It addressed how 
LFM and LCT asked local women to keep them in their backyards as paybacks for practical favors such as 
justice managing. No similar data was found in the case of CN, which does not mean that the Sicilian mafia did 
not create some firearms control scheme during its existence.	
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tend to generally operate around the so-called illegal markets. Within these spaces, the 
criminalization business opportunities that become much more profitable for those who 
controlled its circulation – indeed, profits become much more rentable than if both markets 
and commodities were legal. Here it becomes relevant to underline that illegal markets are 
neither automatically nor instantaneous violent. On the contrary, as it has been insisted, as an 
instrument, violence appears as long as it enables specific conditions, and depends on other 
conditions such as the business´	nature, as well as the victims or legal authority reactions. 
However, both cobro de piso and pizzo exhibit an interesting mutation in this regard.	
 
In both cases, this “severe imbalance in the power relationship”	gets mixed with the presence 
of criminal groups looking for political legitimacy. As a result, the practice of extortion 
becomes also political. Given that, at least three conditions need to be met to consider it a 
sovereign practice: 1) the existence of an authority discourse, 2) a state-emulation standing, 
and 3) the invocation of the extortion in the name of the criminal organization. Michoacán 
and Sicily are cases that join these conditions. LFM and LCT on the one hand, and CN on 
the other, developed an authority discourse by performing extortion. Paying either pizzo or 
piso becomes, aside from the explicit act of charging, into an informal but powerful 
recognition of a sort of parallel taxing.86 By doing so, even when the extorting was or not 
regular through time, the "authority" charging it was indeed consistent. Another similarity is 
how relevant it was for both criminal groups to spread fear among victims. Notwithstanding, 
speaking about the differences, there is a remarkable one between both scenarios. While in 
Michoacán the authority discourse was spread loudly, in the case of Sicily the strategy was 
closer to a silent but strong presence.	
 
As a modern social order model, the state is a non-elusive paradigm that inspires criminal 
groups formation and operation. 87  Nevertheless, when these illegal groups distance 
themselves from the legal authority and develop agency as a result of a political legitimacy 
interest, the potential aftermath is clashes between legal and illegal groups. To some extent, 
the European modern state experience followed the same route, i.e., occupying the public 
responsibilities previously offered by landlords, armed retainers of the monarch, and 
churchmen (Tilly, 1985, 181). The tithe is an example. As an inherited institution, it 
eventually mutated into the modern state's taxation – since feudal periods but later 
consolidated during capitalism (Scott, 1998, 65). Nowadays, since neither pizzo nor piso 
substitutes for the state´s taxation, charging it produces a state emulation due to the power 
displaying accompanying it. Simultaneously, charging pizzo and piso means to compete with 
the state taxing authority. As a result, extortion and legal taxing coexist and compete as 
parallel sovereign practices taking place in these particular regions of Mexico and Italy. 
 86 Indeed, parallel taxation is a wide practice among rebel groups (Schlichte and Schneckener, 2015, 418. The 
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Hezbollah in Lebanon, or the FARC in Colombia are examples in this regard.	87 In the case of Michoacán, how LCT controlled piso by issuing papeletas de cobro as if they were official 
stationery gives a example on the state emulation.	
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Although also clashes take place as a consequence, both practices play a role within the large 
components and interactions shaping what is called "the state".	
 
Following the idea, these extortions could also tend to follow the state´s mandate (at least 
briefly or ephemeral) of bringing back benefits to "contributors". Because of the social 
contract offer behind the proposal of paying and receiving benefits in exchange, this element 
holds particular relevance in terms of political legitimacy. As Gambetta underlined for CN, 
in some cases the benefits from paying illegal protection are real, immediate, and tangible 
(1993, 15-33). Since the criminal groups become contingent rulers, then they could be seen 
as social problem-solvers (for instance, controlling street delinquency or providing public 
services), or even mediators with the legal authorities. This "illegal protection" might come 
as a result of the vulnerabilities found in the local context that results from the lack of 
protection of the legal authority to guarantee rights or properties. In those cases, victims of 
extortion might also become satisfied clients, as well as loyal ruled (Guerrero, 2011). 
However, in this case it is argued that CN as well as LFM and LCT are much more than only 
protection entrepreneurs or administrators. On the contrary, the political interest set a 
platform through which factual and symbolic mandates become unveiled.	
 
Another significant difference addresses how distant both state-building processes are 
concerning the criminal groups. As explained earlier, CN is as ancient and modern as the 
Italian state, while LFM and LCT have extensive histories in Michoacán – for instance, the 
case of the cartel Milenio, Los Valencia (see Maldonado, 2014, 161-164), or even what LFM 
itself has said about Los Zetas. In other words, these criminal groups in Michoacán need to 
be explained as social outcomes from the local, national, and transnational history, combined 
with specific conjunctures marked by, among other features, poverty, marginalization, and 
criminalization. Consequently, this atypical criminality results from tradition and social 
conditions. On the other hand, given its longevity and influence in the Sicilian history, the 
also atypical CN is not a result but a producer of local tradition and social conditions. The 
Sicilian mafia has decades leaving structural sediment in the society that takes different 
shapes. It is not a conjuncture but a structural phenomenon (Santino, 2011, 9). Therefore, 
behind the historical difference related to how these criminal groups have been associated 
with each state-building process, there is a particular distinction. That is, to what extent the 
criminal group is a product (such as LFM and LCT) or a producer (as CN) of society in every 
context.	
 
6.2.3. Comparing Portrayals of Enemy Sources 
 
In both cases, having enemies is a significant political expression. However, the difference 
in this regard is between the criminal group naming their enemy themselves (as it was the 
case of LFM and LCT) or the criminal group was named as an enemy by their enemies (as 
in the case of CN). Indeed, the existence of a legitimacy-contested scenario in both cases, in 
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which every criminal group disputed and performed their political legitimacy aspirations, 
results from the creation and existence of the idea of “enemies”. Both cases have unusual 
social contexts in which legitimacy becomes, if not scarce, at least remarkably valuable due 
to this contesting. Moreover, by comparing the “portrayal of the enemy”	 sources, this 
disseration argues that these were zero-sum legitimacy scenarios. Legitimacy lost by one 
actor was gained by other. In the end, regardless of the mediation function that criminal 
groups complied at some point, as well as the promoted arrangements (for instance through 
corruption, intreccio, subordination, etc.), Michoacán and Sicily became arenas in which, at 
some point, the legitimacy gained by a criminal group eventually was struggled by another 
local social agent – either legal or not, local or not, such as the state (in the form of security 
forces, local or central authorities), NGO, militias, etc. Means of disputing might also change, 
but the fight was (and is still) consistent.	
 
Table 7. Portrayal of the Enemy Legitimacy Sources and Resources for Criminal Groups	
Main Source	 Subtype Source	 Material Resources	 Non-Material Resources	
 
 
Portray of 
the Enemy	
Expressions against 
Formal Authorities	   
 
Documents	
 
 
 
Negotiations / 
Confrontations	Expressions against Other (non-formal) 
authorities	
Stances towards 
current Law		
 
Following the Table 7, portrayal of the enemy sources are subcategorized into three subtypes: 
expressions against formal authorities, expressions against other (non-formal) authorities, 
and stands towards the current law. In this case, the three subtype sources of legitimacy 
become expressed through a) documents (material resource), and b) negotiations and 
confrontations (non-material resources).	
 
6.2.3.1. Expressions Against Formal Authorities 
 
Around eighty years separate the Italian Mori-operation from the Mexican war on drugs. 
However, their similarities are numerous. Both were legal agents, i.e., formal authorities, 
pointing the criminal groups studied here as the public “enemy”. As iron-fisted policies, both 
were presented as strategies, carried out by armed forces, and were inspired by the objective 
of materially eliminating criminal groups mainly formed by national citizens –which in both 
cases were identified as "counter-state agents" or "state-enemies". Nevertheless, the two 
scenarios contrast in one way that indeed makes all the difference: while the European case 
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happened as part of an authoritarian regime, in the Latin American scenario, democracy was 
the context. During the Mori-operation, those CN members who survived the aggressive 
government contestation had no other choice than hiding. Whereas the war on drugs still as 
an ongoing process whose mark on the recent Mexican history still shaping the social, legal, 
political, and institutional destiny of the country. 	
 
In the case of Michoacán, the enemy-portrayal angle during the war on drugs was more or 
less exceptional compared to the rest of the country. If the Mexican government during 
Calderón´s administration attempted to "play the war game", LFM and LCT were exceptional 
cases in which, through discourses and symbols, the criminal groups accepted the challenge. 
Moreover, from a classic war strategy analysis, by the time of Nazario´s second death, LCT 
had already accumulated too many war enemies, i.e., armed (or willing to be armed) social 
agents interested in materially eliminating LCT (Schmitt, 2004). Among others formal agents 
in the list, there were: the federal police, the army, and the marines. In the context of the 
“Mori-operation”, carried out in Sicily by the fascist Italian government after the First World 
War, on May 26, 1927, Mussolini pronounced the Ascension Day speech. The discourse was 
and still is fascinating from the political legitimacy perspective. As a progress bulletin of the 
fascist dictatorship, it was intended to inform about the progression of the “renewed”	Italian 
state. 	
 
Someone of you may ask me: when the fight against Mafia will end? It will, not only when there are 
no more mobsters, but when the memory of the mafia will definitely disappear from the memory of 
Sicilians. 	
[…]	
What have we done, Fascists, in these five years? We did something huge, secular, monumental. What 
is that? We have created the Italian unitary State. Consider that from the Empire onwards, Italy was 
no longer a unitary State. Here we solemnly reaffirm our doctrine concerning the State; here I reaffirm 
my formula of discourse at La Scala in Milan, "all inside the State, nothing against the State, nothing 
outside the State”	(Mussolini, 1927).	
 
For the fascist Italian regime and during the interwar period the fight against the mafia was 
one of the notable achievements. Indeed, for Mussolini the fight against the mafia attempted 
to consolidate his regime as well as the idea of a unitary Italian state. Both were at stake 
during the twenties and until the Second World War started. Interestingly, Mussolini used a 
pretty similar medical metaphor to what former Mexican president Calderón also used more 
than eighty years later to justify the war on drugs. Somehow, both assumed himself as a 
medic saving the patient (Italy and Mexico) from a serious disease (mafia and organized 
crime) (see Table 8). In this case, Michoacán and Sicily experienced stands from the formal 
authority against the local criminal groups. From this particular angle, both criminal groups 
were firstly pointed as enemies precisely from the legal authority. However, it needs to be 
emphasized that despite the similar metaphors used in constructing images of the enemy in 
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both discourses, the difference is that one was under an authoritarian and totalitarian regime, 
whereas the other took place in the context of democracy and human rights.	
 
Table 8. Mussolini vs. Calderón speeches against criminal groups	
Benito Mussolini, 1927	 Felipe Calderón, 2008	
“Let's see. Since many of you do not know yet how extent 
is the phenomenon, I bring it to you as if on a clinical 
table: and my scalpel already engraved the body […] But 
do not think that this has not cost anything […] All the 
fascists must know that the Arma dei Reali Carabinieri is 
one of the columns of the fascist regime”. (Mussolini, 
1927).	
“When I became President, the scope [of 
organized crime] was no longer tenable. I arrived 
at the operating room knowing that the patient had 
a serious medical condition; but when he was 
opened, we realized that he was completely 
invaded and had to be healed at any cost”	
(Calderón quoted by Moreno, 2008).		
 
At some point, in both cases the criminal groups later made expressions, and concretely 
confrontations, against the formal authority in terms of enemy portraying. In the case of 
Sicily, it lasted decades. Before and after launching the already reviewed Maxi Trial process 
during the eighties (which also was a relevant stand from the official authority against CN as 
an enemy), the Sicilian mafia managed to take aggressive stands against official authorities. 
General dalla Chiesa assassination is an example in this regard. However, Falcone and 
Borsellino’s assassinations were even more emblematic and clear messages in this regard. In 
any case, the method was the same: killing prominent government individuals who openly 
defied CN´s mandate and interests. The murders combined CN´s features: publicity 
combined with shadiness.88 The criminal organization did not recognize the actions although 
the judicial investigations later proved the criminal group indeed made the killings. On the 
other hand, LCT used the allegedly journalistic book Palabra de Caballero (Morales, no 
year) to portray Calderón´s administration as the enemy that was attacking and treating them 
like criminals, and not as a “popular and insurgent movement”, which is how especially LCT 
is self-described in this book (Morales, no year, 31).	
 
6.2.3.2. Expressions Against Other (Informal) Authorities  
 
Regarding the non-formal authorities, the story was not profoundly different from the 
expressions against formal authorities. Given the dense presence of social agents disputing 
legitimacy, CN on the one hand and LFM and LCT have historically faced non-formal 
authorities either pointing them as enemies, or these criminal groups pointing towards 
enemies. This could be divided into two subgroups: general civil actors, and other criminal 
groups. In Sicily the anti-mafia movement holds the main position and served for CN 
indirectly delineate their enemies portray in the last decades. That included some official 
 88 In this regard, an interesting exception is Leoluca Orlando, the mayor who had make expressions against CN 
and, as it was analyzed before, has been portrayed himself as an anti-mafia politician.	
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authorities but non-official such as journalists (for instance, in the referred case of Peppino), 
religious people (as in the case of Pino), and more recently in the history the complex and 
well-organized Sicilian constellation of NGOs. On the other hand, in Michoacán, the non-
formal authorities holding tagged as LFM and LCT are, among others, the autodefensas and 
the concrete case of Cherán and its indigenous movement (Interviews in field no. 15 and 20, 
2016; Gasparello, 2018). Moreover, given the exposure that the autodefensas had, national 
and local press also played a relevant role in this regard. Of course, in this case to have a 
common “enemy”	did not mean to join forces. On the contrary, the disputes between these 
social agents produce numerous political and also armed clashes (Fuentes Díaz, 2018).	
 
Regarding the subgroup of the other criminal groups, both cases exhibit differences. In 
Michoacán, even before the federal government launched the war on drugs, LFM had already 
pointed, attacked, and expelled "the enemy" during the bloody event in Uruapan´s nightclub, 
i.e., the Zetas. However, this was not an isolated case. In the manifesto published months 
later in the local press, LFM introduced them as native workers organized in order to get rid 
of the "oppression" and "humiliation" from the Millennium and Valencia cartels, both 
criminal groups based in Michoacán before LFM. Using a discourse of locality, LFM 
threatened "foreign criminals" to do not come to Michoacán: "[…] we will not allow people 
from here or from other states to commit crimes" (LFM, 2006). The discourse later evolved 
to the point where Calderón's administration and the right wing were identified as enemies 
in Palabra de Caballero. This does not mean that these criminal groups were, in practice, as 
homogenous as the discourse suggested. On the contrary, the dynamics of corruption, 
extortion, and violence existed along an uneasy and ill-defined border between illegal and 
legal. In this regard, neither LFM nor LCT was different from the other Mexican criminal 
groups.	
 
Contrastingly, CN’s relations with other Italian mafias seemed more organic and without 
open hostility. The more or less mutual respect toward territories, members, and codes, might 
be called a pax mafiosa. Nevertheless, what seems more clear is that neither Camorra, nor 
´Ndrangheta, nor the recently formed Sacra Corona Unita, together with CN´s control of the 
local Sicilian criminals, produced that mafiosi portrayal of the enemy of another criminal 
group. 89  However, the anti-mafia movement did force CN to define their enemy 
involuntarily. Indeed, the anti-mafia members themselves fulfilled this lack of willingness 
from CN. Quickly, the anti-mafia understood the importance of speaking, pointing out, and 
having distance from their enemy, i.e., the Sicilian mafia. CN’s response was mainly (if not 
exclusively) to violently eliminate this peaceful but powerful enemy. Moreover, a significant 
difference with Michoacán is how the heterogeneous anti-mafia movement managed to 
portray itself as a single entity despite their actual and ongoing disputes between the different 
 89 Nowadays, Nigerian mob arriving in Sicily would possibly motivate something different in this regard, but 
this research has no more elements to suggest any direction or possibility.	
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actors that were part of it. In the end, stopping the mafia as a shared belief works to promote 
their cause. The numerous LFM and LCT armed and unarmed enemies never formed a single 
front.	
 
In Sicily, a large part of the anti-mafia movement has been focusing on extortion as a way to 
confront CN and dispute the mafia´s control. This is an outstanding idea from a political 
legitimacy perspective that launched the non-formal authorities in Sicily. Addiopizzo´s 
squad, for instance, is still perfectly aware that economic profits from pizzo are not significant 
for the mafia compared to how it is politically profitable (Interview in field no. 14, 2018). 
Consequently, they decided to fight that angle and dispute with the mafia the authority built 
with the extortion victims. To do so, anti-mafia had spent time, imagination, funds, and 
human resources in planning the execution of the strategy, which is continually renewing 
whereas, in Michoacán, the story is different. The reaction that piso (together with other 
crimes committed by LFM and LCT) faced was mostly headed by autodefensas. Although 
the legitimacy dispute was also in the core of the movement, a number of conditions made 
of the context an enormously violent one. As a consequence, reactions did not have time, 
imagination, funds, or human resources to maintain the reaction aside from the bullets and 
blood. Moreover, as an armed group, the autodefensas were constantly oscillating between 
either collaborating or challenging the official authorities. That point contrasts between piso 
and pizzo.	
 
6.2.3.3. Stances Towards Current Law 
 
Apart from being interested in becoming legitimate, as a valuable political tool, it does not 
seem that this legitimacy was always used in the same way or for opening the same doors. In 
that sense, these criminal groups´	stances towards the law differed due to how each got to the 
status quo. In Michoacán, the alleged intention was to change it, whereas in Sicily was to 
preserve it. For LFM and LCT, legitimacy worked as a way to gain spaces, sympathy, fear, 
confidence, and quorum mainly across the local population. Legitimacy helped to attain 
authority and was a cheaper way of ruling than coercion – which does not mean that any of 
these analyzed criminal groups resigned the use or threat of violence. The several attempts 
for displaying the criminal group´s presence in the public space can be understood through 
this logic – for instance, through spreading material and non-material identity resources. 
Moreover, at least in the discourse (as well as in practice from time to time), LFM and LCT 
argumentation appeared either subversive or at least disruptive: change the current social 
order. That is, tending to remove institutions, authorities, and challenging the status quo. 
Even when none of these claims were incoherent, the discourse of vindicating lost causes is 
a constant reference. On the other hand, in Sicily, the status quo defense was consistent within 
CN at least after the Second World War and before the anti-mafia movement strengthened. 	
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CN legitimacy sought to maintain (their?) order in the first place, which meant to preserve 
the status quo including the authority image as well as specific institutions whose structure 
was influenced or commanded by the criminal organization given its historicity. Besides, by 
promoting a membership exclusion scheme, the Sicilian mafia controlled the hierarchy by 
guarantying the creation of an economization of power, which also served as legitimacy 
capital. Also related to the stance towards the current law, here it’s necessary to emphasize a 
significant distinction, namely, the enormous difference between the amounts of violence 
and the levels of (in)justice. In Michoacán, high and increasing levels of criminal violence 
have been taking place since the war on drugs was launched. Mixed with the impunity crisis, 
it produces a central component to explain the social circumstances in which LFM and LCT 
appeared and developed. 90  Whereas, especially since the eighties, Sicily has been 
experiencing decades of pacification led by a broad and heterogeneous social movement 
focused on fighting the mafia. Moreover, as it has been previously argued, the effectiveness 
in the justice procuration and administration became and still being crucial in this regard.	
 
Coming back to Michoacán, impunity and violence became the seal. The lack of trust in 
official authority represents a significant difference from Sicily. This difference became 
entrenched in the law. Motivated by the Palermitan case, the Italian penal code was reformed 
to make a substantial change regarding extortion: not only are those asking for pizzo guilty, 
so are those who pay it (Interview in field no. 4, 2018). The legal change is that now the 
"mafia association" rather than the “mafioso" is punished. Also, in 1997, the Italian Supreme 
Court clearly established that paying for protection would be considered illegal (Dickie, 
2015, 692). On the other hand, the article 390 of the Mexican Penal Code states that extortion 
is punished with two to eight years in jail, and doing so through “criminal association”	or 
being current or former public officers are aggravating factors (H. Congreso de la Unión, 
2018). However, since the government measures the dark figure, 2012 presented the lowest 
figure with 92.1% of non-reported crimes. During the following years, and until 2018, the 
range kept between 92.8 (2014) and 93.8 percent (2013) (ENVIPE). Impunity is the de facto 
rule in Mexico.	
 
Regarding justice access and administration, especially in the current situation, where the 
war on drugs and the anti-mafia movement coexist, the comparison exposes two completely 
different worlds. In Sicily, the aftermath of the Maxiprocesso produced judicial 
professionalization, a culture of lawfulness, NGOs supporting the legal work, increase in 
people´s confidence towards authorities, and a general legitimization of the denounciation as 
a tool for repairing damages. It is a critical juncture and an inflection point in recent Sicilian 
 90 For instance, whereas in Michoacán 14,625 murders were registered between 1992 and 2010 (INEGI), CN 
has the attribution of 792 during the same period (Massari, 2013). Indeed, while Michoacán´s figure includes 
the total assassinations happened in the territory, and the CN´s figure only consists of the cases happened 
anywhere as long as they were attributed to the criminal group, in the end, it helps to illustrate how drastically 
different are the two locations in terms of brutal violence.	
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history, as are the Falcone and Borsellino assassinations, whose social acceptance and 
relevance was marked by the results of the Maxiprocesso. On the other hand, Mexican justice 
lacks any of these features. Incompetent judges, the absence of the rule of law, violence 
against NGOs, and lack of confidence in authorities results in a huge absence of 
denunciations of crime in more than 90% of the cases since 2011 and currently. Those 366 
mafiosi arrested in September of 1984 represent the beginning of a different way of 
understanding justice in Sicily. Indeed, each criminal group based its stand towards the law 
based on this. That is, whereas LFM and LCT based their stance on the necessity of changing 
the status quo (while both denouncing and committing injustice), CN grounded its evolution 
in the basis of the status quo; thus, this criminal group tried to resist change.	
 
The Mexican war on drugs produced not only impunity but also inconsistency regarding 
justice. During the six years of Felipe Calderón’s administration, from the 9,233 people 
arrested and accused of offenses related to organized crime. This is a high number explained 
by the many federal armed forces deployed around the country, Michoacán included. 
However, only 1,059 of them were convicted, and only 682 served their sentence. That means 
that only 4% met a legal fate, which meant being declared guilty or innocent (Saúl, 2013). 
Moreover, with these numbers it is almost impossible to judicially know how much justice 
was lost during these cases. That is because of the bad management from the authorities. 
During the war on drugs, it became a common practice to show arrested people in a sort of 
press conferences in which the authorities "shared" the big or small victories of the war. 
Nevertheless, by doing so, official authorities were violating the presumption of innocence 
by exhibiting individuals as guilty without being judged before. As a human right, the 
presumption of innocence was neglected for the arrested people. That also reproduced cycles 
of illegality, impunity, and increased the lack of confidence in authorities. Added to the high 
levels of violence, particularly Michoacán became contrastingly different from Sicily in this 
regard.		
Deeply related to the violence and injustice dimension differences, it is interesting to observe 
how the legal authority reacted to extortion in both cases. While Addiopizzo enhanced an 
alliance with the Sicilian judicial system that involved promoting and accompanying victim´s 
denunciation, autodefensas and the general civil society of Michoacán never had support 
from authorities. As a result, each criminal group faced different complications: CN currently 
avoids asking for pizzo with people affiliated to Addiopizzo, whereas LFM and LCT 
promoted a sort of infiltration of autodefensas groups through the perdonados. Walking 
through the cities of Palermo and Catania gives a constant sensation of being watched. 
Multiple signs with the phrase "area videosorvegliata" (area under video surveillance) can 
be seen all around the streets. Despite converting the street areas into urban panopticon, anti-
mafia magistrates and NGOs found in the video surveillance an anti-mafia tool that, 
combined with fighting impunity, push to either inhibit or make of pizzo a "shadowy 
activity", made only under discretion (Interview in field no. 4, 2018). 	
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6.3. Closing Remarks: Chapter VI Summary 
 
After elaborating on the comparisons between LFM and LCT on the one hand, and CN on 
the other, the following are closing remarks derived from this sixth and last chapter. In the 
first place, and as a result of the cases´	analysis, specific thoughts addressing the state, the 
social order, and sovereignty were presented in this chapter re-considering certain concepts. 
Regarding the state, several agents compose it; while as a social phenomenon, it changes. On 
the grounds of social order, different versions of legitimacy can exist within the same place. 
Similarly, parallel authority does not mean social disorder. On the contrary, both or more 
agents involved will be building an order despite hypothetical clashes. Finally, as a practice, 
sovereignty can potentially reside in as many hands as agents dispute political legitimacy. 
Moreover, when it comes to criminal groups, sovereignty practices become visible thanks to 
legitimacy as a catalyst that makes distinguishable actions towards building authority from 
criminal activities. In this regard, the practices of sovereignty work as a historical continuum. 
This helps to explain how the same sovereign code was used in such different contexts as 
Michoacán and Sicily, but performed by more or less similar criminal agents as LFM and 
LCT on the one hand, and CN on the other.	
 
Regarding the comparative analysis, this chapter argued that both scenarios, Michoacán and 
Sicily, were characterized by being highly contested political legitimacy scenarios. This 
resulted from the dense presence of social agents involved in the local social order definition. 
Among all of these, the local criminal groups were one particularly relevant social agent – 
but one among others in the end. Indeed, although every context deal with a degree of 
criminality, the exceptionality in these cases is the struggle resulting from the perpetrators' 
legitimacy interest. Moreover, the criminal group´s political legitimacy interest emerged, in 
both cases, from the importance given to define or preserve such social order. However, there 
were differences between both cases. Pursuing publicly was one of them. While in 
Michoacán, the over-exposition of LFM and LCT produced intense and visible amounts of 
material and non-material legitimacy resources, the shady presence of CN Sicily produced a 
concentration of non-material sources. This was because LFM and LCT remained in the 
legitimation process, whereas CN had long periods of legitimate condition when the groups 
became authorities	– the recent decades and the Mori operation are exceptional periods in 
this regard. This chapter also underlined another difference concerning the longevity of each 
criminal group. 	
 
While CN is as modern as the Italian state, LFM and LCT emerged in a very particular 
Mexican context but with deep roots in Michoacán´s social and political history. This 
difference influenced each political legitimacy performance by pointing to diverse social 
order definition objectives. Whereas CN sought to preserve the status quo (due to how it was 
set historically since the post-war era), LFM and LCT had a disruptive vision of social order 
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– based on having enemies who were already ruling before them as well as those pretending 
to do so later such as the federal government or autodefensas. Nevertheless, this difference 
produced a similarity: both became zero-sum political legitimacy contexts. In other words, 
Michoacán and Sicily became arenas in which the legitimacy gained by the criminal group 
eventually was struggled and gained by another local social agent and vice versa – either 
legal or not, local or not. On the symbolic sources of legitimacy comparison, this chapter 
exhibited how LCT and LFM were interested in expanding their legitimacy both inside and 
outside the group –this is, towards the general local population. On the other hand, CN has 
been more interested in pushing belonging and cohesiveness, primarily towards internally 
strengthening the group, rather than becoming publicized.	
 
Regarding the performance-centered sources of political legitimacy, the comparison showed 
how both cases attempted to create or reinforce the provision of governing institutions. 
Moreover, the provision of carrots and sticks in both instances was deeply attached to the 
referred institutions’ provision. Finally, addressing the enemy portraying, both cases 
presented a similarity and a difference. The similarity addresses the fact of the enemy-
portraying existence as a result of the contested political legitimacy scenario. The different 
concerns of the criminal groups indicated or was indicated by those enemies. On the one 
hand, LCT and LFM made constant efforts identifying and delineating their enemies. On the 
other, in Sicily, it happened the other way around as a result of CN being identified by 
numerous enemies – many of whom eventually joined the heterogeneous but successful 
Sicilian anti-mafia movement. Also, as a result of the comparison, this chapter stated that, in 
contexts of high criminality, the analysis of different aspirations for political legitimacy 
serves to rationalize the social order behind the apparent disorder. However, political 
legitimacy has another empirical instrumental function when it comes to authority. As an 
instrument, no legitimacy related clashes take place outside of the authority-building process, 
and no disputes of authority exclude the usage of legitimacy.	
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Conclusions 
 
According to Thomson Reuters’	Web of Science, a database in which the recurrence of 
academic terms can be easily traced and analyzed over time, from 1945 to 2019, the concept 
of "political legitimacy" was used in 39.1% of searches related to "Government Law". In 
second place comes "Public Administration" at 20%, followed by "Business Economics" at 
15.6%. In other words, according to this database analysis, what here has been called the 
normative perspective of legitimacy involves 74.7% of academic production related to 
political legitimacy since 1945 (Clarivate Analytics, 2019). Other research perspectives that 
might be close to the descriptive perspective appear only as relatively minor categories, such 
as "Social Science other topics" (12.476%), and "Sociology" (11.522%), followed by 
"International Relations" (6th, 9.533%) and "History" (7th, 9.452%), while "Anthropology" 
placed at 18th (2.331%). These data reveal the dominant perspectives on the topic. However, 
how has this concept appeared over time in the academic literature?	
 
Again, according to Thomson Reuters’	 Web of Science, academic interest in political 
legitimacy has been continually increasing in the last decades. In 1995, only 69 academic 
works were published. However, by 2017 there were 1,106, an increase of 1,503% (Clarivate 
Analytics, 2019). In other words, while the academic interest in political legitimacy 
phenomena has exponentially increased, the descriptive perspective has dominated the 
debate. By promoting the descriptive angle, this research attempts to challenge given notions 
emerging from the political legitimacy discussion, but also involving criminal groups debate. 
In the end, the cases of Michoacán and Sicily indicate to the necessity of re-defining what 
has allegedly already been learned, and show the value of thinking outside the box, beginning 
with a hypothetical legitimate but criminal political agent. These conclusions are organized 
by first answering the main research question, then connecting that to the conclusions drawn 
in every chapter's closing remarks. Finally, afterward are presented ideas intended to push 
the conceptual discussion of political legitimacy by combining theory, concepts, 
methodology, and practical cases’	references, i.e., from data across sections.	
 
Answering the Research Question	
 
The main research question addressed here was why and how criminal groups look for 
political legitimacy. That is, in other words, the understanding of the criminal groups' 
legitimation process. This research answers that question as follows. The existence of a 
conflictive authority-building process is not a synonym for social disorder. On the contrary, 
the social order exists as a consequence of the interactions of several legal and illegal actors. 
In that sense, as embedded agents in society, this research answers that criminal groups will 
look for political legitimacy to take place in the local social order definition when this is 
under dispute. Consequently, in these contesting contexts, there is no political legitimacy 
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vacuum. Given that the definition of the social order is being challenged, one or more 
political agents will attempt to define it. Therefore, for criminal groups, an interest in 
legitimacy becomes an instrument: that is, no more and no less than a tool to participate in 
both the conflict and the definition of the social order. Sicily and Michoacán are both 
particularly dense contexts due to the saturation of statehood practices. Behind every 
legitimacy attempt performed by the criminal group, there will be the intention of these 
groups to define the local social order over other versions coming from other actors. 	
 
Pushing the Debate Over Legitimacy and Criminality	
 
Detecting the division between the normative and the descriptive political legitimacy 
perspective helped this research to make this definition operational. Instead of offering a new 
conception, the operational proposal based the argument over five considerations designed 
to follow how the political legitimacy contesting process takes place, i.e., how political 
legitimacy could be empirically traced under the descriptive perspective. The first 
consideration addresses both sides of the coin when defining legitimacy; that is, the ruler as 
well as the ruled. The second recognizes the contingency of how legitimacy is built. That 
involves three analytical elements: locality, temporality, and rationality. Third, given that 
legitimacy is a relational concept, to consider the hypothesis of legitimate parallel authorities’ 
coexistence. Fourth, to acknowledge the presumption of contingency since the understanding 
of political legitimacy requires studying not only the current moment of the legitimate 
authority but, also, how it became legitimate and how it was lost from another. Finally, as an 
ongoing process, the fifth consideration addresses the perpetual necessity of the legitimate 
political actor to reconfirm itself and its legitimacy. First comes the legitimacy campaign 
itself and, afterwards, comes the probability of becoming the authority among authorities.	
 
As quoted earlier, Tilly understood legitimacy as the probability that other authorities 
confirm the decisions of a given authority (1985). His idea matches broadly with each of the 
considerations stated here. However, rather than a possibility, here it is argued that legitimacy 
is the instrument with which a given authority got access to that possibility to confirm its 
mandate. Moreover, when it comes to criminal groups, Claessen's distinction between being 
legitimate and legitimation (1988, 24) blurs, given that both are instrumental. That is because 
criminal groups involved in legitimacy dilemmas need to simultaneously deal with and have 
access to both stages, i.e., become legitimate while taking place in the legitimation process. 
To some extent, this is the case of other actors, including the state; however, criminal groups 
searching for legitimacy find a powerful source denying them legitimacy. As explained in 
this research, even when legality is a powerful legitimacy source, it does not definitively 
guarantee or deny political legitimacy. However, it will play a significant role for the actors 
pursuing legitimacy as this instrument in order to define the local social order.	
 
	226 
Indeed, the contingency of being an ongoing process leads to a condition of a “never 
definitive victory”	of political actors in their legitimation process. This fact also influences 
the understanding of concepts deeply related to political legitimacy such as the social order, 
sovereignty, and the state, which in this research were mostly developed by following the 
literature on the anthropology of the state. On the other hand, since societies produce the 
state, specific communities can also reproduce the experience of the state. Therefore, 
especially the non-state actors who according to the definition of the state followed here are 
already somehow part of it can be capable enough and interested in reproducing the state 
experience. Moreover, as a more organized part or extract of these societies, rebels will be 
even more capable and interested in doing so. This is what sets the path for non-state actors 
to achieve political legitimacy. Inside this constellation, rather than organized crime or 
similar notions, this research developed the category of criminal groups. As peculiar violent 
non-state actors, a "criminal group" might become involved in legitimacy struggles by 
performing an artificial separation from the rest of society. 	
 
Consequently, rather than studying organized crime and the state as alleged separated social 
groups, this research addressed the organization of crime as a social phenomenon, which may 
or may not relate to the phenomena of political legitimacy. When a criminal group dealt with 
legitimacy (as seen in the cases of LFM/LCT and CN), this criminal organization involved 
1) illegal activities, but also the effort to 2) create the image of a cohesive, unitary 
organization with its own identity, and 3) acting or performing like it, all while aiming to 4) 
achieve or preserve legitimacy. Under this conception, as part of their participation in the 
definition of local political legitimacy, criminal groups´	resignation to legality does not mean 
to get rid of legitimacy´s interest. That is why criminal groups, despite the efforts of 
portraying themselves like that, are not counter-society or counter-state actors. Empirically, 
both criminals and non-criminals are embedded and interacting in social circuits in which 
certain legal actors also enable illegality and vice-versa. However, how common it is for 
criminal groups to pursue legitimacy is a question that needs to be addressed in other similar 
studies. Only then will it be possible to know if Michoacán and Sicily are typical or are 
exceptions.	
 
Moreover, how criminal groups become interested in political legitimacy demands a 
threefold condition. Because of a historical and political context that enables and allows it, 
because achieving it is essential to guarantee domination or social control by granting access 
to resources, and finally, because in order to become justified, it might be necessary to 
explain criminal activity. This research made two methodological contributions for collecting 
data in contexts like those analyzed here. The first addresses the audiences of legitimacy. 
Given that someone has to provide or withdraw it, someone else may win or lose it. 
Therefore, there will always be audiences, which become potent sources of approaching and 
collecting data in the field. This research proposed the operative distribution of sources and 
resources of political legitimacy for studying criminal groups.  As a point of supply from 
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which emerged the actual legitimacy resources, each source makes sense in the local context 
as a social, political, cultural, economic, and semantic field from which specific legitimacy 
resources can emerge. Both methodological propositions rest on understanding legitimacy as 
a relational concept from a descriptive perspective.	
 
The Contested Legitimacy Arena of Michoacán	
 
Regarding the case of Michoacán, there is no possibility of disconnecting LFM/LCT from 
the war on drugs launched in Mexico in 2006. As an iron-fisted punitive strategy, it 
influenced the increasing violence around the country but concentrated in specific states and 
regions, including Michoacán. The war, metaphorical but real in its consequences, holds a 
general legitimacy relevance that became maximized in Michoacán as the first battlefield and 
Calderón´s home state, the president who launched the war. Moreover, in terms of this war´s 
logic, in which the federal government attempted to draw a discursive line artificially 
separating "us", i.e. "the legal people" and "them", i.e. "the criminals", in Michoacán this 
effort was reciprocated first by LFM and, later, by LCT. These criminal groups displayed, 
since their beginning, identity efforts intending to distinguish themselves from the rest of the 
society and to justify their own authority and foster enmity towards the federal government. 
For them, also metaphors and discourses with practical consequences became the vehicle 
shaping the message. This research presented, specifically in the case of Michoacán, how 
Hobsbawm´s concept of the bandit needs to be framed in a broader social scenario. In this 
regard, Nazario´s cult of personality and legitimacy intentions based on charismatic 
domination in the Weberian sense need to be understood in the context in which it was 
embedded. It emerged from there, and only there begins to make sense. 	
 
Following Blok´s critique of Hobsbawm: "Before looking [to the bandits] it is necessary to 
look at the larger society within which peasant communities are contained" (2001, 18), and 
also the context from which the phenomenon emerges. However, with relative independence 
from this, the high criminality incidence trends taking place in the state, together with the 
already existence of LFM, made the context even more particular in terms of a political 
legitimacy contestation. Since the legal authority was not complying nor being efficient with 
public security tasks, thus the criminal group launched a discourse of taking care of locals’	
security, which quickly evolved into a governance discourse. This political legitimacy 
contesting only increased through the next years when other social agents such as Cherán 
movement, autodefensas, the different official authorities levels as well as when LFM turned 
into LCT. Within this context, from a general political legitimacy evaluation, Michoacán is 
appreciated by the simple equation of many actors, many state. In other words, far from the 
absence of authority, the contestation of political legitimacy led to an excess of authorities. 
Each of the political actors in the social order constellation of Michoacán (as well as Sicily) 
performed sovereign practices. This research was conducted explicitly for analyzing the case 
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of the local criminal groups. Both LFM and LCT legitimacy aspirations were the 
contestations codified in this legitimacy language.	
 
Indeed, regarding Michoacán´s criminal groups, this research found a political legitimacy 
continuum between LFM and LCT. Indeed, that continuation is marked by the increase in the 
legitimacy efforts intensity and frequency. This research found how, thinking about that 
increasing, the general legitimation discourse had elements of political modernity in the 
beginning, and eventually mixed pre-modern and modern attributes as long as LFM turned 
into LCT. By the last years analyzed for this case, LCT became a post-modern political agent 
who created a discourse combining religion thoughts and messianism with human and 
political rights; initiation rituals and prohibitions with promises of progress for locals; as well 
as a feudal regime based on nationalism and localism but with a vision of a capitalist and 
global criminal business. Of course, this post-modern combination are marked by bloody 
criminal behavior with no respect for human dignity. In the end, despite the particularities, 
both violence and legitimacy endeavors were embedded in a context of disputed authority, 
as well as contested versions of the definition of social order.	
 
The Contested Arena of Legitimacy in Sicily	
 
On the other hand, as an auxiliary but much more ancient research case, Sicily and the CN 
needed to be framed into a historic Italian state-building context. In Sicily, the centennial 
accompaniment experienced between the official authority and the mafia gives the pattern to 
explain, if not Sicily´s history, at least how CN performed political legitimacy attempts. 
Indeed, CN participates in shaping Sicilian social order through contingent and systematic 
sovereignty practices. Rather than a counter-state, this research defined CN from a political 
legitimacy perspective and followed the idea of the mafia’s production of politics in a twofold 
phenomenon. First, given their sovereign practices, as a relevant local social agent 
participating in the definition of the domestic social order, and second, as a local social 
system through which power, authority, and violence become mediated. As in the case of 
Michoacán, especially over the last five decades Sicily has become a field of deeply and 
high-density contestation of political legitimacy. The main difference, however, is the 
effectiveness (at the expense violence suffered) that the agents against CN showed when 
uniting their political legitimacy claim against the mafia's.	
 
The heterogeneous composition of the anti-mafia movement of the post-war reveals it. Since 
the dawn of the current century, the maturity reached by this mafia-contesting agent has 
translated into professionalism, expertise, and constant local support. CN is currently acting 
in the shadows, and rates of mafia violence have decreased significantly. This victory has a 
legitimacy explanation and angle based on the success of changing the setting of who rules 
and why they rule. Anti-mafia campaigns changed the social order by playing the political 
legitimacy game, as has been the case with CN. On the other hand, CN has been much more 
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orthodox when attempting legitimacy, especially compared to LFM and even more with 
LCT. Orthodoxism is particularly evident in two CN´s legitimacy attempts features. First, by 
preferring to not appear publicly over becoming publicized in the sense of having a public 
presence, as well as advertised, i.e., spreading identity symbols. Secondly, CN permanently 
prioritizes inner cohesion over popular support, which in the end is another manner of gaining 
and using legitimacy.	
 
Comparison as a Catalyzer of Legitimacy	
 
When comparing, this research contrasted empirical data while pushing the conceptual 
debate. As Mitchell argued when elaborating on the idea of the state-effect (2006), depending 
on the context, criminal groups´	political legitimacy might be pursued by material and non-
material, representational and real, subjective and objective means. While in Michoacán, the 
over-exposition of LFM and LCT produced intense and visible amounts of material and non-
material legitimacy resources, the shadowy presence of CN in Sicily produced a 
concentration of non-material sources. This was because LFM and LCT remained in the 
legitimation process, and thus needed that visibility, whereas CN had long periods of being 
an authority and only in recent times had to become public – which was done mostly through 
violent assassinations. However, in the end both contexts exhibited puzzling combinations 
of efforts in the direction of achieving legitimacy. Even when the disputing means and 
motivations changed, reflecting differences and similarities, political legitimacy was the 
same tool used in local disputes. Moreover, Michoacán and Sicily became arenas in which 
the legitimacy gained by the criminal group eventually was struggled by another local social 
agent and vice versa – either legal or not, local or not. On the other hand, the central 
discrepancy between what Michoacán and Sicily showed happened in terms of social order. 
While CN pretended to preserve the status quo due to how it was set historically since the 
post-war era, LFM and LCT had a disruptive vision of social order based on having enemies 
who were already ruling before them as well as those pretending to do so later such as the 
federal government or autodefensas. In both cases, however, legitimacy was instrumental to 
that goal.	
 
This research also found that, in contexts of high criminality, the analysis of political 
legitimacy aspirations serves to epistemologically rationalize the social order behind the 
apparent disorder. As a concept, political legitimacy works as an auxiliary analytical tool to 
make sense of statehood practices proposed by the anthropology of the state (Migdal, 1988; 
Mitchell, 2006; Hansen and Stepputat, 2005) either coming from criminal groups or other 
social agents, including to recognize the clashing of encountered social order visions coming 
from these. However, political legitimacy has another empirical instrumental function when 
it comes to authority. These relate through the former being a useful tool in shaping and 
deciding on the latter. As an instrument, no legitimacy related clashes take place outside that 
authority-building process, while no authority disputes exclude the usage of legitimacy. By 
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doing so, social agents are primarily political, and for the criminal groups, the condition of 
illegality becomes an extra relevant element shaping the phenomenon. Therefore, criminal 
groups struggling for legitimacy do not eliminate the authority-building process; instead, it 
becomes reaffirmed. Also, as a consequence, violence related to criminal groups´	legitimacy 
is as instrumental as any other violence.	
 
Towards a Broader Conceptual Debate: The State, the Social Order, and Sovereignty	
 
Derived from these ideas, some thoughts regarding the state, the social order, and sovereignty 
invite a re-consideration of given concepts and discussions referenced in this research. 
Regarding the state, as a social phenomenon, several agents compose it and contingently 
changes. Hence, legitimacy struggles work as an engine to either boost and speed up or slow 
down changes in the authority claiming history of the state-building process. Therefore, 
political legitimacy disputes renew the state and its multiple parts. Criminal groups with 
political legitimacy aspirations influence the state building process, usually by borrowing its 
image as a powerful symbol and reference of authority. Finally, the state has margins, where 
these changes might be more frequent or at least will need special analytical considerations. 
On the grounds of social order idea, legitimacy conflicts serve for observing different 
versions of these within the same place. In the case of criminal groups involved in legitimacy 
struggles, these are somehow products, shapers, and transformers of the current local social 
order although promoting or having their version. Related to the social contract, as a core 
part of the social order it will be permanently renewed. 	
 
Indeed, winners and losers will be an output coming out from this process, while this does 
not cancel the current existence of social order, whatever it is. Moreover, parallel authority 
coexistence does not mean social disorder. On the contrary, both or more agents involved 
will be building an order despite hypothetical, potential, and actual clashes. Lastly in this 
regard, as a practice, sovereignty can potentially reside in as many hands as agents dispute 
political legitimacy. Moreover, when it comes to criminal groups, sovereignty practices 
become visible thanks to legitimacy as a catalyst that makes distinguishable actions towards 
building authority from simple crimes. In spite of the specificities that every context has for 
the legitimacy definition, practicing sovereign is a historical continuum. That is what 
explains that the same sovereign code was used in such different contexts as Michoacán and 
Sicily but performed by more or less similar criminal agents as LFM and LCT on the one 
hand, and CN on the other. Finally, the legitimate monopoly of violence idea needs to include 
sovereignty within these cases. That conducts to observe that this monopolization is not 
legitimate as long as the sovereignty (as a practice) is not monopolized as well.	
 
Final Thoughts: Routes for Continuing Researching	
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Finally, some observations and recommendations arose from the findings for future research. 
One suggestion is to carry out more investigations on the descriptive grounds of political 
legitimacy to keep learning how authority empirically takes place and changes over time. 
This is not to say that normative research is not useful. However, it is the intention to 
underline that certain social phenomena can be better analyzed through the lens of being less 
normative and more descriptive. Following the idea, such as how this research added the idea 
of legitimation practices, keep researching through this lens would lead to producing other 
concepts on the descriptive grounds of political legitimacy. On the other hand, although this 
research recovered specific references on the external factor, it would be indeed interesting 
to have new investigations where this external variable becomes highlighted. That implies 
considering new research from the locality angle, but also to focus on cases in which the 
criminal groups' legitimacy interest could be strongly analyzed from their regional, 
transnational, and even global dimensions.	
 
Moreover, regarding a public interest angle, locality still is relevant for public policymakers 
related to security and justice. For them, the understanding of how and why criminal groups 
become involved in political legitimacy struggles is useful to design strategies to challenge 
actual or potential social orders based on criminal groups governance. Ignoring this 
conceptual re-think could lead to blindness towards how the authority building process takes 
place, potentially resulting in violence and widespread human rights violations. Moving to 
the cases, another suggestion concerns to expand the research on Michoacán to the present 
times under these methodological and conceptual parameters. Currently, the Mexican press 
is still reporting on and making references to LCT. Since 2015, the year in which this research 
stopped collecting data, Mexican violence has been increasing and acquiring extra 
complexity dimensions. One of them concerns hypothetical residual criminal groups 
operating after leaders like Nazario had been killed or captured. This hypothetical scenario 
is close to the Colombian context since the twenty-first century and onwards, where the so-
called Bacrim (Spanish acronym for criminal bands) resulted from the war against Cali and 
Medellín criminal groups. In any case, the legitimacy angle used here serves to study other 
cases as long as they still embedded into political contestation frames.	
 
To what extent this is the case in Michoacán is a question that still needs a political legitimacy 
answer that leads to public policy decisions that help current and potential victims. Related 
to Sicily, this research found in the migration phenomenon happening in the island interesting 
and divergent information. How CN and the Sicilian political legitimacy landscape changed, 
reacted to, and were affected by migration needs to be researched. The challenge is immense 
in terms of describing modifications in criminal tendencies under migration dynamics 
without criminalizing migrants. Finally, from this research, it is suggested to continue and 
increase comparative studies addressing criminal groups interested in political legitimacy. 
Moreover, while doing so, it is suggested to twist concepts with empirical references and 
coming back to ideal-types to improve them. Understanding that the criminal groups will 
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look for political legitimacy to take place in a disputed definition of local social order helps 
to explain how societies become ordered, especially when they are apparently becoming less 
ordered.	
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Appendix 
 
Picture 1. Saint Nazario´s Shrine seized from LCT by the Mexican Army and the Código de 
los Caballeros Templarios de Michoacán. Museum of Narcotics, Mexico City, Mexico. 
Picture 2. Set of gold made medallions and guns seized from criminal organizations by the 
Mexican Army. Museum of Narcotics, Mexico City, Mexico.		
Rodrigo Peña González, PhD thesis. Work in Progress	
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Picture 3. Demonstration supporting Nazario. Apatzingán, Michoacán, Mexico.		
	
Three days after Nazario Moreno´s killing, a demonstration took place in Apatzingán, Michoacán. A man holds 
up a sign that reads in Spanish "Nazario will always live in our hearts”. December 12, 2010. Source: (AP 
Photo/Primera Plana), Photographer: Anonymous.	
 
Picture 4. Demonstration supporting Nazario. Apatzingán, Michoacán, Mexico.	
	
The weekend after the first demonstration, another one happened in Apatzingán. Local people hold up signs 
that read in Spanish “Rest in Peace, Nazareo [sic]”, referring again to Nazario Moreno. December 18, 2010. 
Source: Notimex.
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Picture 5. Cover of the book Nazario. ¿Idealista? ¿Renovador? ¿Justiciero? Uzted juzgue	
	
 
Picture 6. Parts of the book Me dicen “El más loco”	
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Picture 7. Cover of the book Palabra de Caballero. Los Caballeros Templarios Un 
Movimiento Insurgente and pray to Saint Nazario in the back cover.	
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Picture 8. Manifesto of LFM in El Sol de Morelia.	
	
Source: La Familia Michoacana (2006), “La Familia Michoacana”, in El Sol de Morelia, November 22.	
 
Picture 9. Michoacán Regions. 	
	
Source: Maldonado, 2010.	
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Picture 10. Shop windows in Catania, Sicily, during Saint Agatha´s 2019 Procession. The 
left shows the 2013 award for the most beautiful in that year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 11. Wax street vendors at 2019 Saint Agatha´s Procession, Catania. 
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Picture 12. Saint Agatha´s fercolo during the 2019 procession mass, Catania.	
	
 
Picture 13. Palermo´s map indicating neighborhoods by pizzo charging distribution, 
Addiopizzo´s headquarters.	
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This investigation researches on contexts of disorder or crisis, in which criminal actors gain 
legitimacy. By affirming that criminal groups are already social agents, this research argues 
that they gain political legitimacy to the extent that criminal groups engage in an authority-
building process. Thus, it focuses on two instances in which criminal groups launched 
campaigns—or at least engaged in planned activities— in order to gain political and social 
legitimacy. La Familia Michoacana (LFM) and Los Caballeros Templarios (LCT) de 
Michoacán, on the one hand, and Cosa Nostra (CN), on the other, offer rich and instructive 
cases to examine. Precisely, the research asks for how these groups seek to forge legitimacy, 
as well as for what are their strategies for that purpose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
